From 5d700f214b179008c779b09bd61292b10efcdb64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Crowdin Bot Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2025 12:43:59 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] New Crowdin translations by GitHub Action --- i18n/ar/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/ar/real-time-communication.md | 8 ++--- i18n/bn-IN/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/bn-IN/real-time-communication.md | 8 ++--- i18n/bn/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/bn/real-time-communication.md | 8 ++--- i18n/cs/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/cs/real-time-communication.md | 8 ++--- i18n/de/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/de/real-time-communication.md | 44 ++++++++++++------------- i18n/el/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/el/real-time-communication.md | 8 ++--- i18n/eo/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/eo/real-time-communication.md | 8 ++--- i18n/es/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/es/real-time-communication.md | 44 ++++++++++++------------- i18n/fa/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/fa/real-time-communication.md | 8 ++--- i18n/fr/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/fr/real-time-communication.md | 28 ++++++++-------- i18n/he/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/he/real-time-communication.md | 18 +++++----- i18n/hi/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/hi/real-time-communication.md | 8 ++--- i18n/hu/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/hu/real-time-communication.md | 8 ++--- i18n/id/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/id/real-time-communication.md | 8 ++--- i18n/it/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/it/real-time-communication.md | 28 ++++++++-------- i18n/ja/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/ja/real-time-communication.md | 8 ++--- i18n/ko/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/ko/real-time-communication.md | 18 +++++----- i18n/ku-IQ/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/ku-IQ/real-time-communication.md | 8 ++--- i18n/nl/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/nl/real-time-communication.md | 18 +++++----- i18n/pl/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/pl/real-time-communication.md | 8 ++--- i18n/pt-BR/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/pt-BR/real-time-communication.md | 8 ++--- i18n/pt/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/pt/real-time-communication.md | 20 +++++------ i18n/ru/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/ru/real-time-communication.md | 18 +++++----- i18n/sv/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/sv/real-time-communication.md | 8 ++--- i18n/tr/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/tr/real-time-communication.md | 8 ++--- i18n/uk/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/uk/real-time-communication.md | 8 ++--- i18n/vi/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/vi/real-time-communication.md | 8 ++--- i18n/zh-Hant/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/zh-Hant/real-time-communication.md | 34 +++++++++---------- i18n/zh/os/ios-overview.md | 11 ++++++- i18n/zh/real-time-communication.md | 8 ++--- 58 files changed, 472 insertions(+), 269 deletions(-) diff --git a/i18n/ar/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/ar/os/ios-overview.md index 1517bd86..b52f5025 100644 --- a/i18n/ar/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/ar/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Blacking Out Faces/Information +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/ar/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/ar/real-time-communication.md index ddbf7da9..50465504 100644 --- a/i18n/ar/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/ar/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. diff --git a/i18n/bn-IN/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/bn-IN/os/ios-overview.md index 1517bd86..b52f5025 100644 --- a/i18n/bn-IN/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/bn-IN/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Blacking Out Faces/Information +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/bn-IN/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/bn-IN/real-time-communication.md index ddbf7da9..50465504 100644 --- a/i18n/bn-IN/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/bn-IN/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. diff --git a/i18n/bn/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/bn/os/ios-overview.md index 1517bd86..b52f5025 100644 --- a/i18n/bn/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/bn/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Blacking Out Faces/Information +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/bn/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/bn/real-time-communication.md index ddbf7da9..50465504 100644 --- a/i18n/bn/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/bn/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. diff --git a/i18n/cs/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/cs/os/ios-overview.md index 1517bd86..b52f5025 100644 --- a/i18n/cs/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/cs/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Blacking Out Faces/Information +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/cs/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/cs/real-time-communication.md index ddbf7da9..50465504 100644 --- a/i18n/cs/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/cs/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. diff --git a/i18n/de/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/de/os/ios-overview.md index 82a46991..26776ac8 100644 --- a/i18n/de/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/de/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Blacking Out Faces/Information +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/de/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/de/real-time-communication.md index 7139aa50..6f5cab73 100644 --- a/i18n/de/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/de/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly-Logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** ist ein alternativer Signal-Client für Android, der es dir ermöglicht, die lokale Datenbank im Ruhezustand mit einer Passphrase zu verschlüsseln, ungenutzte RAM-Daten sicher zu schreddern, deine Verbindung über Tor zu leiten und [mehr](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). Außerdem gibt es Verbesserungen bei der Benutzerfreundlichkeit, wie z. B. geplante Backups, automatisches Sperren und die Möglichkeit, dein Android-Telefon als verknüpftes Gerät anstelle des Hauptgeräts für ein Signal-Konto zu verwenden. +**Molly** ist ein alternativer Signal-Client für Android, der es dir ermöglicht, die lokale Datenbank im Ruhezustand mit einer Passphrase zu verschlüsseln, ungenutzte RAM-Daten sicher zu schreddern, deine Verbindung über Tor zu leiten und [mehr](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Datenschutzerklärung" } @@ -100,13 +100,11 @@ Molly wird alle zwei Wochen aktualisiert, um die neuesten Funktionen und Fehlerb Beachte, dass du durch die Verwendung von Molly mehreren Parteien vertraust, da du nun dem Signal-Team *und dem* Molly-Team vertrauen musst, dass sie sichere und rechtzeitige Aktualisierungen liefern. -Es gibt eine Version von Molly namens **Molly-FOSS**, die proprietären Code wie die Google-Dienste, die sowohl von Signal als auch von Molly verwendet werden, entfernt, was allerdings auf Kosten einiger Funktionen wie akkusparende Push-Benachrichtigungen via Google Play Services geht. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. -Alle drei Versionen von Molly bieten die gleichen Sicherheitsverbesserungen. - -Molly und Molly-FOSS unterstützen [reproduzierbare Builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), d.h. es ist möglich zu bestätigen, dass die kompilierten APKs mit dem Quellcode übereinstimmen. +Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ### SimpleX Chat @@ -135,13 +133,13 @@ Molly und Molly-FOSS unterstützen [reproduzierbare Builds](https://github.com/m -SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Zusätzlich bietet SimpleX Chat Schutz für Metadaten durch Verwendung von unidirektionalen [„simplex queues“](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue), um Nachrichten zu senden. +SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. -Um an Unterhaltungen in SimpleX Chat teilzunehmen, musst du einen QR-Code scannen oder auf einen Einladungslink klicken. So kannst du einen Kontakt Out-Of-Band verifizieren, was vor Man-in-the-Middle-Angriffen durch Netzbetreiber schützt. Deine Daten können exportiert und auf ein anderes Gerät importiert werden, da es keine zentralen Server gibt, auf denen die Daten gesichert werden. +To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -Eine vollständige Liste der in SimpleX Chat implementierten [Datenschutz- und Sicherheitsfunktionen](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) findest du im Repository der App. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. -SimpleX Chat wurde im [Juli 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) und im [Oktober 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website) unabhängig geprüft. +SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). ### Briar @@ -169,13 +167,13 @@ SimpleX Chat wurde im [Juli 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-net -Um einen Kontakt auf Briar hinzuzufügen, musst sich beide Seiten zuerst gegenseitig hinzufügen. Du kannst entweder `briar://` Links austauschen oder den QR-Code eines Kontakts scannen, wenn dieser in der Nähe ist. +To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. -Die Client-Software wurde von unabhängiger Seite [geprüft](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), und das anonyme Routing-Protokoll verwendet das Tor-Netzwerk, das ebenfalls geprüft ist. +The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar hat eine vollständig [veröffentlichte Spezifikation](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). -Briar unterstützt Forward Secrecy[^1] durch Verwendung des Bramble [Handshake-](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) und [Transportprotokolls](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md). +Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. ## Weitere Optionen @@ -216,13 +214,13 @@ Nachrichten und Dateien, die in privaten Räumen (für die eine Einladung erford -Profilbilder, Reaktionen und Spitznamen sind nicht verschlüsselt. +Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted. -Mit der Integration von [Element Call](https://element.io/blog/we-have-lift-off-element-x-call-and-server-suite-are-ready) in die Web-App, die Desktop-Apps und die [neu geschriebenen Mobile-Apps](https://element.io/blog/element-x-experience-the-future-of-element) von Element sind Gruppen-VoIP- und Videoanrufe standardmäßig E2EE. +With the integration of [Element Call](https://element.io/blog/we-have-lift-off-element-x-call-and-server-suite-are-ready) into Element's web app, desktop apps, and its [rewritten mobile apps](https://element.io/blog/element-x-experience-the-future-of-element), group VoIP and video calls are E2EE by default. -Das Matrix-Protokoll selbst [unterstützt theoretisch Forward Secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1]. Dies wird jedoch [derzeit in Element nicht unterstützt](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101), da es einige Aspekte der Benutzerfreundlichkeit, wie z. B. das Schlüssel-Backup und den gemeinsamen Nachrichtenverlauf, beeinträchtigt. +The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history. -Das Protokoll wurde 2016 einem unabhängigen [Audit](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) unterzogen. Die Spezifikation des Matrix-Protokolls findest du in der entsprechenden [Dokumentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest). Die von Matrix verwendete [kryptografische Olm Ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption) ist eine Implementierung des [Double-Ratchet-Algorithmus](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet) von Signal. +The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet). ### Session @@ -253,19 +251,19 @@ Session verwendet das dezentralisierte [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen. -Session ermöglicht E2EE in Einzelchats oder geschlossenen Gruppen, die bis zu 100 Mitglieder umfassen können. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants. +Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants. -Session basierte früher auf dem Signal-Protokoll, bevor es im Dezember 2020 durch sein eigenes ersetzt wurde. Das Session-Protokoll unterstützt [keine](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) Forward-Secrecy.[^1] +Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1] -Im März 2020 forderte Oxen ein unabhängiges Audit für Session an. Das Audit wurde im April 2021 [abgeschlossen](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit): +Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021: > Das allgemeine Sicherheitsniveau dieser Anwendung ist gut und macht sie für Menschen, die sich um ihre Privatsphäre sorgen, nutzbar. -Session hat ein [Whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf), in dem die technischen Details der App und des Protokolls beschrieben werden. +Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol. ## Kriterien -**Bitte beachte, dass wir mit keinem der Projekte, die wir empfehlen, in Verbindung stehen.** Zusätzlich zu unseren [Standardkriterien](about/criteria.md) haben wir eine Reihe klarer Anforderungen entwickelt, die es uns ermöglichen, objektive Empfehlungen zu geben. Wir empfehlen dir, dich mit der Liste vertraut zu machen, bevor du dich für ein Projekt entscheidest, und deine eigenen Recherchen anzustellen, um sicherzustellen, dass es die richtige Wahl für dich ist. +**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. ### Mindestanforderungen diff --git a/i18n/el/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/el/os/ios-overview.md index 7f8abb2b..0bf3c4c7 100644 --- a/i18n/el/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/el/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Blacking Out Faces/Information +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/el/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/el/real-time-communication.md index ddbf7da9..50465504 100644 --- a/i18n/el/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/el/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. diff --git a/i18n/eo/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/eo/os/ios-overview.md index 1517bd86..b52f5025 100644 --- a/i18n/eo/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/eo/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Blacking Out Faces/Information +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/eo/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/eo/real-time-communication.md index 0050a8f2..2f718110 100644 --- a/i18n/eo/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/eo/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. diff --git a/i18n/es/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/es/os/ios-overview.md index 53efa4b1..9f07dc14 100644 --- a/i18n/es/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/es/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ Además de bloquear las aplicaciones tras los datos biométricos, también puede Puedes ocultar una aplicación pulsando prolongadamente sobre ella y seleccionando **Requerir Face ID/Touch**→**Ocultar y Requerir Face ID/Touch ID**. Ten en cuenta que las aplicaciones de Apple preinstaladas, así como el navegador web y la aplicación de correo electrónico predeterminados, no se pueden ocultar. Las aplicaciones ocultas residen en una carpeta **Oculta** en la parte inferior de la biblioteca de aplicaciones, que puede desbloquearse utilizando datos biométricos. Esta carpeta aparece en la Biblioteca de Aplicaciones tanto si has ocultado aplicaciones como si no, lo que te proporciona un grado de negación plausible. -### Ocultar Caras/Información +### Redacting Elements in Images Si necesitas ocultar información en una foto, puedes utilizar las herramientas de edición integradas de Apple para hacerlo. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Abre la aplicación **Fotos** y toca la foto que hayas seleccionado para editarla +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Pulsa :material-tune: (en la parte inferior de la pantalla) → el símbolo de marca (arriba a la derecha) → el icono más en la parte inferior derecha - Selecciona **Añadir Forma** y elige el cuadrado o el círculo - En la barra de herramientas, pulsa sobre el círculo (opción situada más a la izquierda) y elige el negro como color para rellenar la forma. También puedes mover la forma y aumentar su tamaño según te convenga. diff --git a/i18n/es/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/es/real-time-communication.md index 5d504e7c..14741c20 100644 --- a/i18n/es/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/es/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ Si utiliza Android y su modelo de amenazas requiere protección contra [:materia ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** es un cliente alternativo de Signal para Android que le permite cifrar la base de datos local con una frase de contraseña en reposo, hacer que los datos de RAM no utilizados se destruyan de forma segura, enrutar su conexión a través de Tor, y [más](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). También presenta mejoras de usabilidad, como copias de seguridad programadas, bloqueo automático y la posibilidad de utilizar su teléfono Android como dispositivo vinculado en lugar de dispositivo principal para una cuenta Signal. +**Molly** es un cliente alternativo de Signal para Android que le permite cifrar la base de datos local con una frase de contraseña en reposo, hacer que los datos de RAM no utilizados se destruyan de forma segura, enrutar su conexión a través de Tor, y [más](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Página Principal](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Política de Privacidad" } @@ -100,13 +100,11 @@ Molly se actualiza cada dos semanas para incluir las últimas funciones y correc Tenga en cuenta que está confiando en múltiples partes al utilizar Molly, ya que ahora necesita confiar en el equipo de Signal *y* en el equipo de Molly para entregar actualizaciones seguras y oportunas. -Existe una versión de Molly llamada **Molly-FOSS** que elimina el código propietario como los servicios de Google utilizados tanto por Signal como por Molly, a costa de algunas características como las notificaciones push que ahorran batería a través de Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -También existe una versión llamada [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) que se basa en Molly-FOSS y añade soporte para notificaciones push con [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), una alternativa de código abierto a las notificaciones push proporcionadas por Google Play Services, pero requiere ejecutar un programa independiente llamado [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) para funcionar. Mollysocket puede ser autoalojado en un ordenador o servidor independiente (VPS), o alternativamente se puede utilizar una instancia pública de Mollysocket[(tutorial paso a paso, en alemán](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. -Las tres versiones de Molly ofrecen las mismas mejoras de seguridad. - -Molly y Molly-FOSS admiten [compilaciones reproducibles](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), lo que significa que es posible confirmar que los APK compilados coinciden con el código fuente. +Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ### SimpleX Chat @@ -135,13 +133,13 @@ Molly y Molly-FOSS admiten [compilaciones reproducibles](https://github.com/moll -SimpleX proporciona mensajería directa, chats de grupo y llamadas E2EE protegidas con el [protocolo de mensajería SimpleX](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), que utiliza cifrado de doble trinquete con resistencia cuántica. Además, SimpleX Chat proporciona protección de metadatos mediante el uso de ["colas simplex](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) " unidireccionales para entregar mensajes. +SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. -Para participar en conversaciones en SimpleX Chat, debe escanear un código QR o hacer clic en un enlace de invitación. Esto le permite verificar un contacto fuera de banda, lo que le protege contra los ataques man-in-the-middle por parte de los proveedores de red. Sus datos pueden ser exportados e importados a otro dispositivo, ya que no hay servidores centrales donde se hace una copia de seguridad. +To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -Puede encontrar una lista completa de las [funciones](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) de privacidad y seguridad implementadas en SimpleX Chat en el repositorio de la aplicación. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. -SimpleX Chat fue auditada de forma independiente en [julio de 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) y en [octubre de 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). +SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). ### Briar @@ -169,13 +167,13 @@ SimpleX Chat fue auditada de forma independiente en [julio de 2024](https://simp -Para añadir un contacto en Briar, ambos deben añadirse entre sí primero. Puede intercambiar enlaces `briar://` o escanear el código QR de un contacto si están cerca. +To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. -El software cliente fue [auditado](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit) de forma independiente, y el protocolo de enrutamiento anónimo utiliza la red Tor, que también ha sido auditada. +The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar tiene una [especificación publicada](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec) completamente. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). -Briar soporta el secreto hacia delante[^1] utilizando el protocolo Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) y [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md). +Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. ## Opciones Adicionales @@ -216,13 +214,13 @@ Los mensajes y archivos compartidos en salas privadas (aquellas que requieren in -Las fotos de perfil, las reacciones y los apodos no están cifrados. +Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted. -Con la integración de [Element Call](https://element.io/blog/we-have-lift-off-element-x-call-and-server-suite-are-ready) en la aplicación web de Element, las aplicaciones de escritorio y sus [aplicaciones móviles reescritas](https://element.io/blog/element-x-experience-the-future-of-element), las llamadas VoIP y las videollamadas en grupo son E2EE por defecto. +With the integration of [Element Call](https://element.io/blog/we-have-lift-off-element-x-call-and-server-suite-are-ready) into Element's web app, desktop apps, and its [rewritten mobile apps](https://element.io/blog/element-x-experience-the-future-of-element), group VoIP and video calls are E2EE by default. -El propio protocolo Matrix [soporta teóricamente el secreto hacia adelante](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], sin embargo [no está soportado actualmente en Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) debido a que rompe algunos aspectos de la experiencia del usuario como las copias de seguridad de claves y el historial de mensajes compartidos. +The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history. -El protocolo fue [auditado](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) de forma independiente en 2016. La especificación del protocolo Matrix puede encontrarse en su [documentación](https://spec.matrix.org/latest). El [trinquete criptográfico Olm](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption) utilizado por Matrix es una implementación del [algoritmo Double Ratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet) de Signal. +The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet). ### Session @@ -253,19 +251,19 @@ Session utiliza la red descentralizada [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen. -Session permite E2EE en chats individuales o grupos cerrados que admiten hasta 100 miembros. También es posible [crear](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) o unirse a grupos abiertos que pueden albergar a miles de miembros, pero los mensajes en estos grupos abiertos **no** están cifrados de extremo a extremo entre los participantes. +Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants. -Session se basaba anteriormente en el Protocolo Signal antes de sustituirlo por el suyo propio en diciembre de 2020. El Protocolo Sesion [no](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) soporta el secreto hacia adelante.[^1] +Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1] -Oxen solicitó una auditoría independiente para Session en marzo de 2020. La auditoría [concluyó](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) en abril de 2021: +Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021: > El nivel general de seguridad de esta aplicación es bueno y la hace utilizable para personas preocupadas por su privacidad. -Session tiene un [informe oficial](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) que describe los aspectos técnicos de la aplicación y el protocolo. +Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol. ## Criterios -**Por favor, tenga en cuenta que no estamos afiliados con ninguno de los proyectos que recomendamos.** Además de [nuestros criterios estándar](about/criteria.md), hemos desarrollado un conjunto claro de requisitos que nos permiten ofrecer recomendaciones objetivas. Sugerimos que usted se familiarice con esta lista, antes de decidir utilizar un proyecto y realizar su propia investigación para asegurarse de que es la elección ideal para usted. +**Por favor, ten en cuenta que no estamos afiliados con ninguno de los proyectos que recomendamos.** Además de [nuestros criterios estándar](about/criteria.md), hemos desarrollado un conjunto claro de requisitos que nos permiten ofrecer recomendaciones objetivas. Sugerimos que te familiarices con esta lista, antes de decidir utilizar un proyecto y realizar tu propia investigación para asegurarte de que es la elección ideal para ti. ### Requisitos Mínimos diff --git a/i18n/fa/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/fa/os/ios-overview.md index cfc365b8..06c60ae7 100644 --- a/i18n/fa/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/fa/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Blacking Out Faces/Information +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/fa/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/fa/real-time-communication.md index ddbf7da9..50465504 100644 --- a/i18n/fa/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/fa/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. diff --git a/i18n/fr/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/fr/os/ios-overview.md index 9e4d46e5..6f20b881 100644 --- a/i18n/fr/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/fr/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Caviardage des visages/informations +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/fr/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/fr/real-time-communication.md index 223afaff..aa850c83 100644 --- a/i18n/fr/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/fr/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. @@ -169,13 +167,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ -Pour ajouter un contact sur Briar, vous devez d'abord vous ajouter tous les deux. Vous pouvez soit échanger des liens `briar://` soit scanner le QR code d'un contact s'il se trouve à proximité. +To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar a un [cahier des charges](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec) entièrement publié. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). -Briar prend en charge la confidentialité persistante[^1] en utilisant le protocole [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) et [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) de Bramble. +Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. ## Autres options @@ -216,13 +214,13 @@ Messages and files shared in private rooms (those which require an invite) are b -Les photos de profil, les réactions et les surnoms ne sont pas chiffrés. +Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted. With the integration of [Element Call](https://element.io/blog/we-have-lift-off-element-x-call-and-server-suite-are-ready) into Element's web app, desktop apps, and its [rewritten mobile apps](https://element.io/blog/element-x-experience-the-future-of-element), group VoIP and video calls are E2EE by default. -Le protocole Matrix lui-même [prend théoriquement en charge la confidentialité persistante](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], mais elle [n'est pas prise en charge par Element pour le moment](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) car elle rompt certains aspects de l'expérience utilisateur tels que la sauvegarde des clés et l'historique des messages partagés. +The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history. -Le protocole a fait l'objet d'un [audit](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) indépendant en 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet). +The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet). ### Session @@ -253,15 +251,15 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io) to s -Session permet le E2EE dans les chats individuels ou des groupes fermés pouvant compter jusqu'à 100 membres. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants. +Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants. -Session était auparavant basée sur le protocole Signal avant d'être remplacée par son propre protocole en décembre 2020. Le protocole de Session ne prend [pas](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) en charge la confidentialité persistante.[^1] +Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1] -Oxen a demandé un audit indépendant pour Session en mars 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021: +Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021: > The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people. -Session a un [livre blanc](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) décrivant les spécifications techniques de l'application et du protocole. +Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol. ## Critères diff --git a/i18n/he/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/he/os/ios-overview.md index e0583c05..c2eba694 100644 --- a/i18n/he/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/he/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### השחרת פנים/מידע +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/he/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/he/real-time-communication.md index d2994085..6d11313d 100644 --- a/i18n/he/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/he/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. @@ -169,11 +167,11 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ -כדי להוסיף איש קשר ב Briar, שניכם חייבים להוסיף אחד את השני קודם. באפשרותך להחליף `קישורים ` או לסרוק את קוד ה - QR של איש הקשר אם הוא נמצא בקרבת מקום. +To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -ל Briar יש מפרט ש[פורסם במלואו](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. @@ -216,13 +214,13 @@ Messages and files shared in private rooms (those which require an invite) are b -תמונות פרופיל, תגובות וכינויים אינם מוצפנים. +Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted. With the integration of [Element Call](https://element.io/blog/we-have-lift-off-element-x-call-and-server-suite-are-ready) into Element's web app, desktop apps, and its [rewritten mobile apps](https://element.io/blog/element-x-experience-the-future-of-element), group VoIP and video calls are E2EE by default. The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history. -הפרוטוקול היה מבוקר [באופן עצמאי](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) בשנת 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet). +The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet). ### Session @@ -253,7 +251,7 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io) to s -Session מאפשרת E2EE בצ'אטים אחד על אחד או קבוצות סגורות המאפשרות עד 100 חברים. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants. +Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants. Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1] diff --git a/i18n/hi/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/hi/os/ios-overview.md index 1517bd86..b52f5025 100644 --- a/i18n/hi/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/hi/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Blacking Out Faces/Information +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/hi/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/hi/real-time-communication.md index ddbf7da9..50465504 100644 --- a/i18n/hi/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/hi/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. diff --git a/i18n/hu/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/hu/os/ios-overview.md index e967bfd8..000600c4 100644 --- a/i18n/hu/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/hu/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Arcok/információk elsötétítése +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/hu/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/hu/real-time-communication.md index a74be818..05b6609c 100644 --- a/i18n/hu/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/hu/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. diff --git a/i18n/id/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/id/os/ios-overview.md index ac409259..2795eadd 100644 --- a/i18n/id/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/id/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Blacking Out Faces/Information +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/id/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/id/real-time-communication.md index 476a409b..c6f88812 100644 --- a/i18n/id/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/id/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. diff --git a/i18n/it/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/it/os/ios-overview.md index 66ce0d37..e62d8aaf 100644 --- a/i18n/it/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/it/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Oscuramento di Volti/Informazioni +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/it/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/it/real-time-communication.md index 3e8864e4..bea71ca4 100644 --- a/i18n/it/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/it/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. @@ -169,13 +167,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ -Per aggiungere un contatto su Briar, è necessario prima aggiungersi a vicenda. Puoi scambiare i link `briar://` o scansionare il codice QR di un contatto, se è nelle vicinanze. +To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar ha [pubblicato le specifiche](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec) complete. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). -Briar supporta la segretezza in avanti[^1] utilizzando il Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) e il protocollo [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md). +Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. ## Opzioni Aggiuntive @@ -216,13 +214,13 @@ Messages and files shared in private rooms (those which require an invite) are b -Le immagini del profilo, le reazioni e i nomi utente non sono crittografati. +Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted. With the integration of [Element Call](https://element.io/blog/we-have-lift-off-element-x-call-and-server-suite-are-ready) into Element's web app, desktop apps, and its [rewritten mobile apps](https://element.io/blog/element-x-experience-the-future-of-element), group VoIP and video calls are E2EE by default. -Il protocollo Matrix stesso [teoricamente supporta la segretezza in avanti](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], tuttavia questo è [attualmente non supportato in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) a causa dell'interruzione di alcuni aspetti dell'esperienza utente, come i backup delle chiavi e la cronologia dei messaggi condivisi. +The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history. -Il protocollo è stato [controllato](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) indipendentemente nel 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet). +The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet). ### Session @@ -253,15 +251,15 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io) to s -Session consente l'E2EE per le chat individuali o i gruppi chiusi, che consentono fino a 100 membri. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants. +Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants. -Session si basava in precedenza sul Signal Protocol, prima di sostituirlo con il proprio nel dicembre 2020. Session Protocol [non](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) supporta la segretezza in avanti.[^1] +Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1] -Oxen ha richiesto un controllo indipendente per Session a marzo 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021: +Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021: > The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people. -Session ha un [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) che descrive i dettagli tecnici dell'applicazione e del protocollo. +Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol. ## Criteri diff --git a/i18n/ja/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/ja/os/ios-overview.md index 42c3ba54..88f94c2a 100644 --- a/i18n/ja/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/ja/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Blacking Out Faces/Information +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/ja/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/ja/real-time-communication.md index e5307ad4..f469bc9d 100644 --- a/i18n/ja/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/ja/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. diff --git a/i18n/ko/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/ko/os/ios-overview.md index dbd3e606..608c9049 100644 --- a/i18n/ko/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/ko/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Blacking Out Faces/Information +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/ko/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/ko/real-time-communication.md index 07897bd6..b3000b79 100644 --- a/i18n/ko/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/ko/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. @@ -169,11 +167,11 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ -Briar 연락처에 누군가를 등록하려면 서로가 모두 서로를 연락처에 추가해야 합니다. `briar://` 링크를 서로 교환하거나, (가까운 거리에 있는 경우) 연락처에서 QR 코드를 스캔하여 추가할 수 있습니다. +To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar [사양 문서](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec)는 전체 공개되어 있습니다. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. @@ -216,13 +214,13 @@ Messages and files shared in private rooms (those which require an invite) are b -프로필 사진, 메시지 반응, 닉네임은 암호화가 적용되지 않습니다. +Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted. With the integration of [Element Call](https://element.io/blog/we-have-lift-off-element-x-call-and-server-suite-are-ready) into Element's web app, desktop apps, and its [rewritten mobile apps](https://element.io/blog/element-x-experience-the-future-of-element), group VoIP and video calls are E2EE by default. The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history. -Matrix 프로토콜은 2016년에 독립적으로 [감사를 받았습니다](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last). The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet). +The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet). ### Session @@ -253,7 +251,7 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io) to s -Session은 일대일 채팅 및 최대 100명까지 참여 가능한 비공개 그룹에서 E2EE를 지원합니다. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants. +Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants. Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1] diff --git a/i18n/ku-IQ/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/ku-IQ/os/ios-overview.md index 1517bd86..b52f5025 100644 --- a/i18n/ku-IQ/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/ku-IQ/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Blacking Out Faces/Information +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/ku-IQ/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/ku-IQ/real-time-communication.md index ddbf7da9..50465504 100644 --- a/i18n/ku-IQ/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/ku-IQ/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. diff --git a/i18n/nl/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/nl/os/ios-overview.md index 35170a2a..351d32cc 100644 --- a/i18n/nl/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/nl/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Blacking Out Faces/Information +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/nl/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/nl/real-time-communication.md index 43b4828a..d4fdfee7 100644 --- a/i18n/nl/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/nl/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. @@ -169,11 +167,11 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ -Om een contact toe te voegen aan Briar, moet je eerst beide elkaar toevoegen. Je kunt `briar://` links ruilen of de QR-code van een contactpersoon scannen als deze dichtbij zijn. +To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar heeft een volledig [gepubliceerde specificatie](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. @@ -216,13 +214,13 @@ Messages and files shared in private rooms (those which require an invite) are b -Profielfoto's, reacties en bijnamen zijn niet versleuteld. +Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted. With the integration of [Element Call](https://element.io/blog/we-have-lift-off-element-x-call-and-server-suite-are-ready) into Element's web app, desktop apps, and its [rewritten mobile apps](https://element.io/blog/element-x-experience-the-future-of-element), group VoIP and video calls are E2EE by default. The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history. -Het protocol is in 2016 onafhankelijk [gecontroleerd](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last). The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet). +The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet). ### Session @@ -253,7 +251,7 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io) to s -Session maakt E2EE mogelijk in één-op-één chats of gesloten groepen met maximaal 100 leden. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants. +Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants. Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1] diff --git a/i18n/pl/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/pl/os/ios-overview.md index 96e19f33..f5f9625b 100644 --- a/i18n/pl/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/pl/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Blacking Out Faces/Information +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/pl/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/pl/real-time-communication.md index ddbf7da9..50465504 100644 --- a/i18n/pl/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/pl/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. diff --git a/i18n/pt-BR/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/pt-BR/os/ios-overview.md index b80eab01..15ff01d6 100644 --- a/i18n/pt-BR/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/pt-BR/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Blacking Out Faces/Information +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/pt-BR/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/pt-BR/real-time-communication.md index f5f8784a..4dff3d25 100644 --- a/i18n/pt-BR/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/pt-BR/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. diff --git a/i18n/pt/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/pt/os/ios-overview.md index 256c2e55..eb377149 100644 --- a/i18n/pt/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/pt/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Blacking Out Faces/Information +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/pt/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/pt/real-time-communication.md index 097a726a..6ee7a527 100644 --- a/i18n/pt/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/pt/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. @@ -169,11 +167,11 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ -Para adicionar um contacto no Briar, é necessário que você e o contacto se adicionem mutuamente. Pode trocar links `briar://` ou digitalizar o código QR de um contacto, se este estiver próximo. +To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -O Briar publicou na íntegra a sua [especificação](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. @@ -216,13 +214,13 @@ Messages and files shared in private rooms (those which require an invite) are b -As imagens de perfil, as reações e os nicknames não são encriptados. +Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted. With the integration of [Element Call](https://element.io/blog/we-have-lift-off-element-x-call-and-server-suite-are-ready) into Element's web app, desktop apps, and its [rewritten mobile apps](https://element.io/blog/element-x-experience-the-future-of-element), group VoIP and video calls are E2EE by default. The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history. -O protocolo foi objeto de uma [auditoria independente](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) em 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet). +The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet). ### Session @@ -253,7 +251,7 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io) to s -O Session permite E2EE em conversas individuais ou em grupos fechados com um máximo de 100 membros. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants. +Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants. Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1] @@ -265,7 +263,7 @@ Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the ## Critérios -**Note que não estamos associados a nenhum dos projetos que recomendamos.** Para além dos [nossos critérios padrão](about/criteria.md), temos um conjunto claro de requisitos que nos permitem fornecer recomendações objetivas. Sugerimos que se familiarize com esta lista antes de optar por um projeto e que desenvolva a sua própria investigação para garantir que se trata da escolha certa para si. +**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. ### Requisitos mínimos diff --git a/i18n/ru/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/ru/os/ios-overview.md index 9549a778..d0458669 100644 --- a/i18n/ru/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/ru/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Blacking Out Faces/Information +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/ru/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/ru/real-time-communication.md index 8840b023..aff45a7c 100644 --- a/i18n/ru/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/ru/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. @@ -169,11 +167,11 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ -Чтобы добавить контакт в Briar, вы оба должны сначала добавить друг друга. Вы можете либо обмениваться ссылками `briar://`, либо сканировать QR-код контакта, если он находится поблизости. +To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar имеет полностью [опубликованную документацию](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. @@ -216,13 +214,13 @@ Messages and files shared in private rooms (those which require an invite) are b -Фотографии профиля, реакции и никнеймы не зашифрованы. +Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted. With the integration of [Element Call](https://element.io/blog/we-have-lift-off-element-x-call-and-server-suite-are-ready) into Element's web app, desktop apps, and its [rewritten mobile apps](https://element.io/blog/element-x-experience-the-future-of-element), group VoIP and video calls are E2EE by default. The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history. -Протокол прошел независимый [аудит](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) в 2016 году. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet). +The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet). ### Session @@ -253,7 +251,7 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io) to s -Сессия использует E2EE в чатах один на один или в закрытых группах, в которых могут участвовать до 100 человек. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants. +Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants. Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1] diff --git a/i18n/sv/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/sv/os/ios-overview.md index 542a0694..0d84fc30 100644 --- a/i18n/sv/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/sv/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Blacking Out Faces/Information +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/sv/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/sv/real-time-communication.md index 93b78d83..7d0aa4b8 100644 --- a/i18n/sv/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/sv/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Hemsida](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Integritetspolicy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. diff --git a/i18n/tr/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/tr/os/ios-overview.md index 73bbe7a9..e5db8d4b 100644 --- a/i18n/tr/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/tr/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Blacking Out Faces/Information +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/tr/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/tr/real-time-communication.md index 597283f1..037fde0b 100644 --- a/i18n/tr/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/tr/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. diff --git a/i18n/uk/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/uk/os/ios-overview.md index 1517bd86..b52f5025 100644 --- a/i18n/uk/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/uk/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Blacking Out Faces/Information +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/uk/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/uk/real-time-communication.md index 6a4efde2..d87ba810 100644 --- a/i18n/uk/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/uk/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. diff --git a/i18n/vi/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/vi/os/ios-overview.md index 1517bd86..b52f5025 100644 --- a/i18n/vi/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/vi/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Blacking Out Faces/Information +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/vi/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/vi/real-time-communication.md index e3392995..1957746c 100644 --- a/i18n/vi/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/vi/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. diff --git a/i18n/zh-Hant/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/zh-Hant/os/ios-overview.md index d30e4c80..bc68e8a1 100644 --- a/i18n/zh-Hant/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/zh-Hant/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### 塗黑臉孔/資訊 +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/zh-Hant/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/zh-Hant/real-time-communication.md index 0793439c..d41347b1 100644 --- a/i18n/zh-Hant/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/zh-Hant/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ Signal 需要手機號碼才能註冊，但是您應該建立用戶名，以隱 ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** 是 Android 的替代 Signal 用戶端，可讓您使用密碼加密本機資料庫、安全地刪除未使用的 RAM 資料、透過 Tor 路由連線；除此之外，還有 [許多](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features)。 它還改善了可用性，包括排程備份、自動鎖定，以及使用 Android 手機作為連結裝置，而非 Signal 帳戶的主要裝置。 +**Molly** 是 Android 的替代 Signal 用戶端，可讓您使用密碼加密本機資料庫、安全地刪除未使用的 RAM 資料、透過 Tor 路由連線；除此之外，還有 [許多](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features)。 It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: 首頁](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="隱私權政策" } @@ -100,13 +100,11 @@ Molly 每兩週更新一次，以包含 Signal 的最新功能和錯誤修正。 請注意，您使用 Molly 是對多方的信任，因為您現在需要信任 Signal 團隊 *和* Molly 團隊 ，以提供安全且及時的更新。 -Molly 有一個稱為 **Molly-FOSS** 的版本，它移除了 Signal 和 Molly 所使用的 Google 服務等專有程式碼，但卻犧牲了一些功能，例如透過 Google Play 服務來推送通知（可節省電池用量）。 +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. -三個版本的 Molly 都提供相同的安全性改進。 - -Molly 和 Molly-FOSS 支援 [可重現構建](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds) ，這表示可以確認編譯後的 APK 與原始碼相符。 +Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ### SimpleX Chat @@ -137,7 +135,7 @@ Molly 和 Molly-FOSS 支援 [可重現構建](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. -To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. 您的資料可以匯出或匯入另一部裝置，因為沒有中央伺服器備份這些資料。 +To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. @@ -169,13 +167,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ -Briar 要新增聯絡人，必須先彼此互加。 您可以交換 `briar://` 鏈結或是掃瞄對方的QR碼。 +To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. -客戶端軟體被獨立 [稽核](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit)，而匿名路由協議使用Tor 網路也接受了審計。 +The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar有一個完整 [發布的規範](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec)。 +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). -Briar 利用[^1] Bramble[Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) 和[Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md)協定來支援前向保密。 +Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. ## 額外選項 @@ -216,13 +214,13 @@ Briar 利用[^1] Bramble[Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-sp -個人資料圖片、反應和暱稱不會加密。 +Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted. With the integration of [Element Call](https://element.io/blog/we-have-lift-off-element-x-call-and-server-suite-are-ready) into Element's web app, desktop apps, and its [rewritten mobile apps](https://element.io/blog/element-x-experience-the-future-of-element), group VoIP and video calls are E2EE by default. -Matrix協議本身 [理論上支援前向保密](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1] ，但 [目前在 Element 中並不支援](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) ，因為這會破壞某些方面的使用者體驗，例如金鑰備份和共用訊息歷史記錄。 +The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history. -其協議在 2016年獨立進行了 [審計](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) 。 Matrix 協議的規範可以在他們的 [文檔](https://spec.matrix.org/latest)中找到。 Matrix 使用的 [Olm 加密棘輪](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption) 是 Signal 的 [雙棘輪演算法](https 的實作: //signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet)。 +The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet). ### Session @@ -253,15 +251,15 @@ Session使用去中心化的 [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) 來 -Session 允許E2EE在一對一聊天或封閉羣組中，最多可容納100名成員。 It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants. +Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants. -Session 先前基於 Signal 協議，並於 2020 年 12 月替換為自己的協議。 Session 協議[不](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information)支援前向保密。[^1] +Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1] -2020年3月Oxen 對 Session 進行獨立審計。 審計於 2021 年 4 月 [結束](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) ： +Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021: > 此應用程式的整體安全層級良好，讓注重隱私的人也能使用。 -Session [白皮書](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) ，描述了應用程式和協議的技術。 +Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol. ## 標準 diff --git a/i18n/zh/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/zh/os/ios-overview.md index 29994617..2d8c4aa3 100644 --- a/i18n/zh/os/ios-overview.md +++ b/i18n/zh/os/ios-overview.md @@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability. -### Blacking Out Faces/Information +### Redacting Elements in Images If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so. +If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images. + - Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction +- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) +- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up** +- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else. + +Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app. + +- Tap the image you have selected for redaction - Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right - Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle - On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit. diff --git a/i18n/zh/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/zh/real-time-communication.md index e1fab6f1..855eb75b 100644 --- a/i18n/zh/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/zh/real-time-communication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -100,11 +100,9 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. +There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). -There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). - -All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. +All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code.