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@@ -87,17 +87,17 @@ schema:
[:octicons-info-16:](https://source.android.com/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-code-16:](https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
These are the Android operating systems, devices, and apps we recommend to maximize your mobile device's security and privacy. 了解更多 Android 資訊:
這些是我們推薦 Android 作業系統、設備和應用程式,最大程度地提高行動設備的安全和隱私。 了解更多 Android 資訊:
[安卓概况 :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/android-overview.md ""){.md-button}
## AOSP 衍生品
We recommend installing one of these custom Android operating systems on your device, listed in order of preference, depending on your device's compatibility with these operating systems.
根據設備與這些作業系統的兼容性,列出偏好順序以安裝我們推薦的某款定制 Android 作業系統。
!!! 備註
End-of-life devices (such as GrapheneOS or CalyxOS's "extended support" devices) do not have full security patches (firmware updates) due to the OEM discontinuing support. These devices cannot be considered completely secure regardless of installed software.
由於 OEM 停止支持,壽命終止的設備(如GrapheneOSCalyxOS的 "延長支授 "設備)沒有完整的安全補丁(軔體更新)。 這些設備無論安裝何種軟體,都不能視為完全安全。
### GrapheneOS
@@ -106,9 +106,9 @@ We recommend installing one of these custom Android operating systems on your de
![GrapheneOS logo](assets/img/android/grapheneos.svg#only-light){ align=right }
![GrapheneOS logo](assets/img/android/grapheneos-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
**GrapheneOS** is the best choice when it comes to privacy and security.
**GrapheneOS** 是隱私與安全的最佳選擇。
GrapheneOS provides additional [security hardening](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardening_(computing)) and privacy improvements. It has a [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), network and sensor permissions, and various other [security features](https://grapheneos.org/features). GrapheneOS also comes with full firmware updates and signed builds, so verified boot is fully supported.
GrapheneOS 提供額外的 [安全加固](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardening_(computing)) 與隱私改善。 它有 [加固的記憶體分配器](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc)、網路、感應許可與各類[安全功能](https://grapheneos.org/features). GrapheneOS 還帶有完整的軔體更新與已簽名的建置版本,因此完全支援 verified boot。
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://grapheneos.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@@ -116,11 +116,11 @@ We recommend installing one of these custom Android operating systems on your de
[:octicons-code-16:](https://grapheneos.org/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
GrapheneOS supports [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), which runs [Google Play Services](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Play_Services) fully sandboxed like any other regular app. This means you can take advantage of most Google Play Services, such as [push notifications](https://firebase.google.com/docs/cloud-messaging/), while giving you full control over their permissions and access, and while containing them to a specific [work profile](os/android-overview.md#work-profile) or [user profile](os/android-overview.md#user-profiles) of your choice.
GrapheneOS 支援 [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), 它可以像其它普通應用一樣在沙盒中執行[Google Play 服務](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Play_Services) 。 這意味著您將可以利用大多數 Google Play 服務,如 [推送通知](https://firebase.google.com/docs/cloud-messaging/),完全控制其權限和訪問,同時將其包含所選的特定 [工作設定檔](os/android-overview.md#work-profile) [用戶設定檔](os/android-overview.md#user-profiles)
Google Pixel phones are the only devices that currently meet GrapheneOS's [hardware security requirements](https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-support).
Google Pixel 手機是目前唯一符合 GrapheneOS [硬體安全要求](https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-support)的設備。
[Why we recommend GrapheneOS over CalyxOS :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/ ""){.md-button}
[為何我們推薦 GrapheneOS 而非 CalyxOS :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/ ""){.md-button}
### DivestOS
@@ -128,8 +128,8 @@ Google Pixel phones are the only devices that currently meet GrapheneOS's [hardw
![DivestOS logo](assets/img/android/divestos.svg){ align=right }
**DivestOS** is a soft-fork of [LineageOS](https://lineageos.org/).
DivestOS inherits many [supported devices](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=devices&base=LineageOS) from LineageOS. It has signed builds, making it possible to have [verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) on some non-Pixel devices.
**DivestOS** [LineageOS](https://lineageos.org/)的分支。
DivestOS 從 LineageOS 繼承了許多[支援的設備](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=devices&base=LineageOS)。 它具有簽名的建置,因此可在某些非 Pixel 設備上執行 [verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot)
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://divestos.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:simple-torbrowser:](http://divestoseb5nncsydt7zzf5hrfg44md4bxqjs5ifcv4t7gt7u6ohjyyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
@@ -138,62 +138,62 @@ Google Pixel phones are the only devices that currently meet GrapheneOS's [hardw
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/divested-mobile){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
DivestOS has automated kernel vulnerability ([CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures)) [patching](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/cve_checker), fewer proprietary blobs, and a custom [hosts](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=dnsbl) file. Its hardened WebView, [Mulch](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/mulch), enables [CFI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity) for all architectures and [network state partitioning](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning), and receives out-of-band updates. DivestOS also includes kernel patches from GrapheneOS and enables all available kernel security features via [defconfig hardening](https://github.com/Divested-Mobile/DivestOS-Build/blob/master/Scripts/Common/Functions.sh#L758). All kernels newer than version 3.4 include full page [sanitization](https://lwn.net/Articles/334747/) and all ~22 Clang-compiled kernels have [`-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero`](https://reviews.llvm.org/D54604?id=174471) enabled.
DivestOS 有自動內核弱點 ([CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures)) [補丁](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/cve_checker)、更少的商業專用 blobs 與自定的 [hosts](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=dnsbl) 檔案。 其加固的 WebView, [Mulch](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/mulch),能使 [CFI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity) 用在所有架構和 [網路狀態分區](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning),且接收額外更新。 DivestOS 還包括來自GrapheneOS 內核補丁,並通過 [defconfig hardening](https://github.com/Divested-Mobile/DivestOS-Build/blob/master/Scripts/Common/Functions.sh#L758),開啟所有可用的內核安全功能。 3.4 版之後更新的內核都包括全頁[淨化](https://lwn.net/Articles/334747/) ,所有 ~22 Clang 編譯的內核都啟用了 [`-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero`](https://reviews.llvm.org/D54604?id=174471)
DivestOS implements some system hardening patches originally developed for GrapheneOS. DivestOS 16.0 and higher implements GrapheneOS's [`INTERNET`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) and SENSORS permission toggle, [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), [exec-spawning](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/#additional-hardening), [JNI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_Native_Interface) [constification](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Const_(computer_programming)), and partial [bionic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bionic_(software)) hardening patchsets. 17.1 and higher features GrapheneOS's per-network full [MAC randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address#Randomization) option, [`ptrace_scope`](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.html) control, and automatic reboot/Wi-Fi/Bluetooth [timeout options](https://grapheneos.org/features).
DivestOS 實現了一些最初為 GrapheneOS 開發的系統加固補丁。 DivestOS 16.0以上版本實現了 GrapheneOS [`網際網路`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) 和感應權限切換, [固化記憶體分配器](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc) [exec-spawning](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/#additional-hardening) [JNI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_Native_Interface) [constification](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Const_(computer_programming)),以及部分 [bionic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bionic_(software)) 固化補丁集。 17.1 之後的 GrapheneOS 支援完整 [MAC 隨機化](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address#Randomization) 選項, [`ptrace_scope`](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.html) 控制,以及自動重啟/Wi-Fi/藍牙 [超時選項](https://grapheneos.org/features)
DivestOS uses F-Droid as its default app store. Normally, we would recommend avoiding F-Droid due to its numerous [security issues](#f-droid). However, doing so on DivestOS isn't viable; the developers update their apps via their own F-Droid repositories ([DivestOS Official](https://divestos.org/fdroid/official/?fingerprint=E4BE8D6ABFA4D9D4FEEF03CDDA7FF62A73FD64B75566F6DD4E5E577550BE8467) and [DivestOS WebView](https://divestos.org/fdroid/webview/?fingerprint=FB426DA1750A53D7724C8A582B4D34174E64A84B38940E5D5A802E1DFF9A40D2)). We recommend disabling the official F-Droid app and using [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) with the DivestOS repositories enabled to keep those components up to date. For other apps, our recommended methods of obtaining them still apply.
DivestOS F-Droid 為預設的應用下載服務。 通常我們建議避免使用 F-Droid它有不少[安全問題](#f-droid)。 然而 DivestOS 這樣卻不可行,開發者透過 ([DivestOS 官方](https://divestos.org/fdroid/official/?fingerprint=E4BE8D6ABFA4D9D4FEEF03CDDA7FF62A73FD64B75566F6DD4E5E577550BE8467) [DivestOS WebView](https://divestos.org/fdroid/webview/?fingerprint=FB426DA1750A53D7724C8A582B4D34174E64A84B38940E5D5A802E1DFF9A40D2))的 F-Droid 存取庫來更新他們的應用程式。 我們建議禁用官方 F-Droid 應用,並使用 [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) 啟用DivestOS 存取庫,以保持這些組件為最新。 至於其它應用,我們建議的獲取方式仍適用。
!!! 警告
DivestOS firmware update [status](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/firmware-empty/-/blob/master/STATUS) and quality control varies across the devices it supports. We still recommend GrapheneOS depending on your device's compatibility. For other devices, DivestOS is a good alternative.
DivestOS 軔體更新 [status](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/firmware-empty/-/blob/master/STATUS)和品管依所支援的設備不同而異。 雖取決於設備的兼容性,我们仍推薦 GrapheneOS。 對其它設備DivestOS 是不錯的選項。
Not all of the supported devices have verified boot, and some perform it better than others.
並非所有支援設備都可 verified boot某些設備的表現較好。
## Android 設備
When purchasing a device, we recommend getting one as new as possible. The software and firmware of mobile devices are only supported for a limited time, so buying new extends that lifespan as much as possible.
選購設備時,建議儘可能挑選較新的設備。 行動設備的軟體和軔體只支持時間有期限,因此購買新上市的設備可以盡可能地延長其支援壽命。
Avoid buying phones from mobile network operators. These often have a **locked bootloader** and do not support [OEM unlocking](https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/locking_unlocking). These phone variants will prevent you from installing any kind of alternative Android distribution.
避免從電信行動營運商購置手機。 它們往往 **鎖定 bootloader** 也不支援 [OEM 解鎖](https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/locking_unlocking)。 這類手機變體阻止安裝任何替代的 Android 發行版。
Be very **careful** about buying second hand phones from online marketplaces. Always check the reputation of the seller. If the device is stolen, there's a possibility of [IMEI blacklisting](https://www.gsma.com/security/resources/imei-blacklisting/). There is also a risk involved with you being associated with the activity of the previous owner.
從網路市集購買二手手機必須要非常**小心**。 請檢查賣家的信譽 如果是失竊的設備,有可能被列為 [IMEI 黑名單](https://www.gsma.com/security/resources/imei-blacklisting/)。 前一位持有者的活動發生關係也將有風險。
A few more tips regarding Android devices and operating system compatibility:
對於 Android 設備與作業系統相容有一些提示:
- Do not buy devices that have reached or are near their end-of-life, additional firmware updates must be provided by the manufacturer.
- Do not buy preloaded LineageOS or /e/ OS phones or any Android phones without proper [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) support and firmware updates. These devices also have no way for you to check whether they've been tampered with.
- In short, if a device or Android distribution is not listed here, there is probably a good reason. Check out our [forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/) to find details!
- 不要購買已經達到或接近其支援壽命的設備,額外的軔體更新必須由製造商提供。
- 不要購買預裝 LineageOS /e/OS 或是無適當 [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) 支持和軔體更新的 Android 手機。 這些設備沒辦檢查是否曾遭篡改。
- 簡而言之,如果這裏沒列出某設備或 Android 發行版,都是有原因的。 請查看 [本站論壇 ](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/) 了解詳情!
### Google Pixel
Google Pixel phones are the **only** devices we recommend for purchase. Pixel phones have stronger hardware security than any other Android devices currently on the market, due to proper AVB support for third-party operating systems and Google's custom [Titan](https://security.googleblog.com/2021/10/pixel-6-setting-new-standard-for-mobile.html) security chips acting as the Secure Element.
Google Pixel 是**唯一** 推薦的手機。 由於對第三方作業系統的適當AVB 支持和 Google 定制的 [Titan](https://security.googleblog.com/2021/10/pixel-6-setting-new-standard-for-mobile.html) 安全晶片為安全元件Pixel 硬體安全性比目前市場上其他 Android 設備強。
!!! recommendation
![Google Pixel 6](assets/img/android/google-pixel.png){ align=right }
![ Google Pixel 6](assets/img/android/google-pixel.png){ align=right }
**Google Pixel** devices are known to have good security and properly support [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), even when installing custom operating systems.
眾所周知,** Google Pixel**設備具有良好安全性,支持[Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot),即使安裝自定義作業系統時也是如此。
Beginning with the **Pixel 6** and **6 Pro**, Pixel devices receive a minimum of 5 years of guaranteed security updates, ensuring a much longer lifespan compared to the 2-4 years competing OEMs typically offer.
**Pixel 6****6 Pro**開始,Pixel 設備至少有 5年的安全更新保證確保其使用壽命比其他競爭OEM 廠商 2-4年長得多。
[:material-shopping: Store](https://store.google.com/category/phones){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
Secure Elements like the Titan M2 are more limited than the processor's Trusted Execution Environment used by most other phones as they are only used for secrets storage, hardware attestation, and rate limiting, not for running "trusted" programs. Phones without a Secure Element have to use the TEE for *all* of those functions, resulting in a larger attack surface.
Titan M2 這類安全元件比大多數其他手機處理器的可信執行環境更為有限因為Titan M2 只用於秘密存儲、硬體證明和速率限制,而不是用於運行 "可信 "程式。 沒有安全元件的手機必須使用 TEE *執行所有這些功能* ,從而導致更大的攻擊面。
Google Pixel phones use a TEE OS called Trusty which is [open-source](https://source.android.com/security/trusty#whyTrusty), unlike many other phones.
Google Pixel 手機使用名為Trusty 的 TEE 作業系統,它是 [開源](https://source.android.com/security/trusty#whyTrusty),與其他許多手機不同。
The installation of GrapheneOS on a Pixel phone is easy with their [web installer](https://grapheneos.org/install/web). If you don't feel comfortable doing it yourself and are willing to spend a bit of extra money, check out the [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) as they come preloaded with GrapheneOS from the reputable [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/about) company.
Pixel 手機很容易安裝 GrapheneOS 只需依其 [網頁安裝程式](https://grapheneos.org/install/web)即可。 如果不敢自行安裝願意多花一點錢,可以看看 [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) ,它們預裝 GrapheneOS來自著名的 [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/about) 公司。
A few more tips for purchasing a Google Pixel:
購買 Google Pixel 的一些提醒:
- If you're after a bargain on a Pixel device, we suggest buying an "**a**" model, just after the next flagship is released. Discounts are usually available because Google will be trying to clear their stock.
- Consider price beating options and specials offered at physical stores.
- Look at online community bargain sites in your country. These can alert you to good sales.
- Google provides a list showing the [support cycle](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) for each one of their devices. The price per day for a device can be calculated as: $\text{Cost} \over \text {EOL Date}-\text{Current Date}$, meaning that the longer use of the device the lower cost per day.
- 如果想買便宜的 Pixel 設備,建議購買"**a**"型號,其為旗艦機發布後的預算款。 通常會有折扣,因為 Google 會出清庫存。
- 考慮在實體商店提供折扣與特價的商品。
- 找找國內線上折扣社區的網站。 這些可提醒有好的商品。
- Google 提供一份其設備 [支援週期](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705)的列表清單。 設備每日價格可以計算為: $\text{Cost} \over \text {EOL Date}-\text{Current Date}$,意味著設備使用時間越長,每天的費用越低。
## 一般應用
We recommend a wide variety of Android apps throughout this site. The apps listed here are Android-exclusive and specifically enhance or replace key system functionality.
我們在網站上推薦了各種各樣的 Android 應用。 這裡列出的應用程式是 Android 專用、特別加強或取代重要系統功能。
### Shelter
@@ -201,9 +201,9 @@ We recommend a wide variety of Android apps throughout this site. The apps liste
![Shelter logo](assets/img/android/shelter.svg){ align=right }
**Shelter** is an app that helps you leverage Android's Work Profile functionality to isolate or duplicate apps on your device.
**Shelter** 有助於利用 Android 工作設定檔功能隔離或複制設備上的應用程式。.
Shelter supports blocking contact search cross profiles and sharing files across profiles via the default file manager ([DocumentsUI](https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/modular-system/documentsui)).
Shelter 阻止聯繫人利用默認檔案管理器([DocumentsUI](https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/modular-system/documentsui))作跨設定檔搜尋與共享檔案 。
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://gitea.angry.im/PeterCxy/Shelter#shelter){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitea.angry.im/PeterCxy/Shelter){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
@@ -211,9 +211,9 @@ We recommend a wide variety of Android apps throughout this site. The apps liste
!!! 警告
Shelter is recommended over [Insular](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/) and [Island](https://github.com/oasisfeng/island) as it supports [contact search blocking](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/faq.html).
推薦使用 Shelter 取代[Insular](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/) [Island](https://github.com/oasisfeng/island),因為 Shelter 支持[聯繫人搜索屏蔽](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/faq.html)
When using Shelter, you are placing complete trust in its developer, as Shelter acts as a [Device Admin](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/admin/device-admin) to create the Work Profile, and it has extensive access to the data stored within the Work Profile.
當使用 Shelter 時將信任置於其開發者Shelter 作為[設備管理員](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/admin/device-admin)來創建工作設定檔,它有大量權限訪問存儲在工作設定檔的資料。
### Auditor
@@ -236,17 +236,17 @@ We recommend a wide variety of Android apps throughout this site. The apps liste
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases)
- [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
Auditor performs attestation and intrusion detection by:
Auditor 通過下列方式鑑證和入侵檢測。
- Using a [Trust On First Use (TOFU)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_on_first_use) model between an *auditor* and *auditee*, the pair establish a private key in the [hardware-backed keystore](https://source.android.com/security/keystore/) of the *Auditor*.
- The *auditor* can either be another instance of the Auditor app or the [Remote Attestation Service](https://attestation.app).
- The *auditor* records the current state and configuration of the *auditee*.
- Should tampering with the operating system of the *auditee* happen after the pairing is complete, the auditor will be aware of the change in the device state and configurations.
- You will be alerted to the change.
- 如果在配對完成後發生篡改 *審計對象的作業系統* ,審計人員將意識到設備狀態和配置的變化。
- 您會被提醒注意此一變化。
No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
沒有個人識別資料被提交給證明服務。 建議使用匿名帳戶註冊,並啟用遠程認證,以進行持續監控。
If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service. To make sure that your hardware and operating system is genuine, [perform local attestation](https://grapheneos.org/install/web#verifying-installation) immediately after the device has been installed and prior to any internet connection.
如果您的 [威脅模型](basics/threat-modeling.md) 需要隱私,可以考慮使用 [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) 或VPN從證明服務中隱藏 IP地址。 為了確保硬體和作業系統真實, [,在設備安裝後連上網際網路之前,立即進行本地認證](https://grapheneos.org/install/web#verifying-installation)。
### 安全相機
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ Main privacy features include:
**Secure PDF Viewer** is a PDF viewer based on [pdf.js](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PDF.js) that doesn't require any permissions. The PDF is fed into a [sandboxed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandbox_(software_development)) [webview](https://developer.android.com/guide/webapps/webview). This means that it doesn't require permission directly to access content or files.
[Content-Security-Policy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy) is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content.
[內容安全政策](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy)用來強制要求 WebView 內的JavaScript 和造型屬性需全為靜態內容。
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
@@ -305,11 +305,11 @@ Main privacy features include:
### GrapheneOS App Store
GrapheneOS's app store is available on [GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases). It supports Android 12 and above and is capable of updating itself. The app store has standalone applications built by the GrapheneOS project such as the [Auditor](https://attestation.app/), [Camera](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera), and [PDF Viewer](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer). If you are looking for these applications, we highly recommend that you get them from GrapheneOS's app store instead of the Play Store, as the apps on their store are signed by the GrapheneOS's project own signature that Google does not have access to.
GrapheneOS 應用商店可在 [GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)找到。 It supports Android 12 and above and is capable of updating itself. The app store has standalone applications built by the GrapheneOS project such as the [Auditor](https://attestation.app/), [Camera](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera), and [PDF Viewer](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer). If you are looking for these applications, we highly recommend that you get them from GrapheneOS's app store instead of the Play Store, as the apps on their store are signed by the GrapheneOS's project own signature that Google does not have access to.
### Aurora Store
The Google Play Store requires a Google account to login which is not great for privacy. You can get around this by using an alternative client, such as Aurora Store.
Google Play商店需要登錄 Google 帳戶,這對隱私來說不是很好。 可以使用替代客戶端,如 Aurora Store 來解決這個問題。
!!! recommendation
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ The Google Play Store requires a Google account to login which is not great for
- [:simple-gitlab: GitLab](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore/-/releases)
Aurora Store does not allow you to download paid apps with their anonymous account feature. You can optionally log in with your Google account with Aurora Store to download apps you have purchased, which does give access to the list of apps you've installed to Google, however you still benefit from not requiring the full Google Play client and Google Play Services or microG on your device.
Aurora Store不允許其匿名帳戶下載付費應用程式。 You can optionally log in with your Google account with Aurora Store to download apps you have purchased, which does give access to the list of apps you've installed to Google, however you still benefit from not requiring the full Google Play client and Google Play Services or microG on your device.
### Manually with RSS Notifications
@@ -379,17 +379,17 @@ If you download APK files to install manually, you can verify their signature wi
![F-Droid 圖標](assets/img/android/f-droid.svg){ align=right width=120px }
==We do **not** currently recommend F-Droid as a way to obtain apps.== F-Droid is often recommended as an alternative to Google Play, particularly in the privacy community. The option to add third-party repositories and not be confined to Google's walled garden has led to its popularity. F-Droid additionally has [reproducible builds](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Reproducible_Builds/) for some applications and is dedicated to free and open-source software. However, there are [notable problems](https://privsec.dev/posts/android/f-droid-security-issues/) with the official F-Droid client, their quality control, and how they build, sign, and deliver packages.
==We do **not** currently recommend F-Droid as a way to obtain apps.== F-Droid is often recommended as an alternative to Google Play, particularly in the privacy community. The option to add third-party repositories and not be confined to Google's walled garden has led to its popularity. F-Droid 另外還有 [可複制建構](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Reproducible_Builds/) ,用於一些應用程式,並致力於自由和開源軟體。 然而官方F-Droid 有 [不少問題](https://privsec.dev/posts/android/f-droid-security-issues/)包括客戶端應用、 品質控制、建置方式、簽署和交付套件等等。
Due to their process of building apps, apps in the official F-Droid repository often fall behind on updates. F-Droid maintainers also reuse package IDs while signing apps with their own keys, which is not ideal as it gives the F-Droid team ultimate trust.
由於其構制應用程式的程序F-Droid 官方資源庫中的應用程式經常在更新上落後。 F-Droid 維護者在用自己的密鑰簽署應用程式時也會重複使用套件 ID此作法並不理想因為這給予 F-Droid 團隊終極信任。
Other popular third-party repositories such as [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) alleviate some of these concerns. The IzzyOnDroid repository pulls builds directly from GitHub and is the next best thing to the developers' own repositories. However, it is not something that we can recommend, as apps are typically [removed](https://github.com/vfsfitvnm/ViMusic/issues/240#issuecomment-1225564446) from that respository when they make it to the main F-Droid repository. While that makes sense (since the goal of that particular repository is to host apps before they're accepted into the main F-Droid repository), it can leave you with installed apps which no longer receive updates.
其他流行的第三方資源庫,如 [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) ,緩解一些擔憂。 IzzyOnDroid 存儲庫直接從 GitHub 拉取構建,是開發者自己存儲庫的下一個最好的東西。 然而,這不是我們所推薦的,當應用程式進入 F-droid 主倉庫時,通常 [就會從該倉庫刪除](https://github.com/vfsfitvnm/ViMusic/issues/240#issuecomment-1225564446)。 雖然可以理解(因為該特定倉庫的作用是應用程式在為 F-Droid 主倉庫接受之前託管工作),它可能會讓所安裝的應用程式不再收到更新。
That said, the [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/) and [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) repositories are home to countless apps, so they can be a useful tool to search for and discover open-source apps that you can then download through Play Store, Aurora Store, or by getting the APK directly from the developer. It is important to keep in mind that some apps in these repositories have not been updated in years and may rely on unsupported libraries, among other things, posing a potential security risk. You should use your best judgement when looking for new apps via this method.
That said, the [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/) and [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) repositories are home to countless apps, so they can be a useful tool to search for and discover open-source apps that you can then download through Play Store, Aurora Store, or by getting the APK directly from the developer. 重要的是要記住,這些資源庫裏一些應用程式已多年未更新,可能依賴於不支援的程式庫等,構成潛在的安全風險。 使用這種方法尋找新的應用程式時,應該善用最佳判斷。
!!! 備註
In some rare cases, the developer of an app will only distribute it through F-Droid ([Gadgetbridge](https://gadgetbridge.org/) is one example of this). If you really need an app like that, we recommend using [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) instead of the official F-Droid app to obtain it.
在某些罕見情況下,應用程式開發者將只通過 F-droid 發布([Gadgetbridge](https://gadgetbridge.org/)就是一例。) 如果真需要這樣的應用程式,建議使用 [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/),而不是從官方的 F-droid 應用程式來獲得。
## 標準
@@ -402,8 +402,8 @@ That said, the [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/) and [IzzyOnDroid](htt
### 作業系統
- 必須是開源軟體。
- Must support bootloader locking with custom AVB key support.
- Must receive major Android updates within 0-1 months of release.
- 必須支援 bootloader 鎖定與自定 AVB 密鑰支援。
- Android 主要系統發布後的 1個月內接受更新。
- Must receive Android feature updates (minor version) within 0-14 days of release.
- Must receive regular security patches within 0-5 days of release.
- Must **not** be "rooted" out of the box.

View File

@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ cover: email-clients.png
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/mail){ .card-link title=Documentation}
Apple Mail has the ability to load remote content in the background or block it entirely and hide your IP address from senders on [macOS](https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/mlhl03be2866/mac) and [iOS](https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/iphf084865c7/ios).
[macOS](https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/mlhl03be2866/mac) [iOS](https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/iphf084865c7/ios) 的Apple Mail 可在後台載入遠端內容或完全封鎖並能隱藏您的 IP 位址。
### Canary Mail (iOS)