Consider OnlyKey hardware password manager #489

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opened 2018-06-19 15:54:26 +00:00 by onlykey · 6 comments

onlykey commented 2018-06-19 15:54:26 +00:00 (Migrated from github.com)

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OnlyKey is an open source hardware password manager that stores passwords offline. It would be a great addition to the https://www.privacytools.io/#pw list. It was recently on the complete privacy and security podcast -
https://soundcloud.com/user-98066669/078-onlykey-by-cryptotrust
It has other privacy features like plausible deniability and self destruct

https://onlykey.io

OnlyKey is an open source hardware password manager that stores passwords offline. It would be a great addition to the https://www.privacytools.io/#pw list. It was recently on the complete privacy and security podcast - https://soundcloud.com/user-98066669/078-onlykey-by-cryptotrust It has other privacy features like plausible deniability and self destruct https://onlykey.io

blacklight447 commented 2019-09-05 14:13:24 +00:00 (Migrated from github.com)

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I was recently notified about thisd section in your documentation:https://docs.crp.to/usersguide.html#secure-encrypted-backup-anywhere

Do I understand correctly understand that keys are also exported into the backup from the keystore?

I was recently notified about thisd section in your documentation:https://docs.crp.to/usersguide.html#secure-encrypted-backup-anywhere Do I understand correctly understand that keys are also exported into the backup from the keystore?

SISheogorath commented 2019-09-05 15:33:01 +00:00 (Migrated from github.com)

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So I looked into your documentation for a little more insight in how you do things and there are various things that jumped at me in your documentation.

Starting from questionable statements like:

"OnlyKey addresses b) by allowing users to set strong 32 character passwords that cannot be cracked by an attacker."
‐ https://docs.crp.to/faq.html#%0Ahow-does-onlykey-keep-my-information-from-getting-hacked%0A

I just hope you can correct that to a working that says "that is hard to crack by an attacker" instead of "cannot be cracked by an attack". I assume there was just some marketing person writing :)

To statements that make me worried:

Using the backup file created in the Secure Encrypted Backup Anywhere section, we can restore an OnlyKey from backup.
‐ https://docs.crp.to/usersguide.html#secure-encrypted-backup-anywhere

From a hardware store for secrets I would expect that it never allows to read secrets again. No matter if it was physically obtained by a third-party or not. That's basically the main purpose to have those. This sounds like a design flaw to me.

Which brings us to the heart of my concerns:

You may find it easier to remember a pattern rather than a 7 - 10 digit PIN.
‐ https://docs.crp.to/usersguide.html#onlykey-setup

When I get that correct the maximum PIN length is 10 numbers, feel free to correct me if I'm wrong since I couldn't find any better resource that stated the maximum PIN length in the docs.

Enter a PIN code on the OnlyKey Keypad
‐ https://docs.crp.to/usersguide.html#onlykey-setup

Together with this statement it means we get 6¹⁰ (60'466'176) possible PINs. That are actually 60 times more than possible on a regular OpenPGP smartcard. At least when it comes to the PIN people use to authenticate. Since those are 6 digits. On the other hand the AdminPIN for OpenPGP smartcards allows 8 digits and therefore allows 10⁸ (100'000'000).

But all this is just weird talking since actually smartcards and the OnlyKey are not really comparable.

Starting with this statement in the docs:

The reason that primary PIN can’t just be changed is a security reason. The key that encrypts all of sensitive data on the OnlyKey is derived from your PIN and a random number.
‐ https://docs.crp.to/usersguide.html#pin-change

This along with the statement how you keep things save:

The data stored on OnlyKey is encrypted with military grade encryption (AES-256-GCM) and most importantly is PIN protected.
‐ https://docs.crp.to/faq.html#%0Awhat-if-i-lose-my-onlykey%0A

And finally revealing itself by looking at the international traveling "feature":

This is accomplished through locking the flash memory and requiring a PIN code to access accounts.
‐ https://docs.crp.to/ite.html#how-are-accounts-secure-without-encryption

All in all it seems like you store all data encrypted on a more or less regular flash memory. That is protected by having it's data encrypted with a 7-10 digit PIN that is (hopefully) fed into a KDF along with a random number (which I assume is stored on the OnlyKey) to generate the decryption key.

While this all sounds safe and due to the separate hardware fine for a threat profile where an attacker never gets physical access to the key itself, it sounds to me like one could just take the key apart, desolder the flash memory out or use a similar way to read it separated from the key. And therefore create an image of it that can be decrypted separately without the 10 times restriction the key imposes.

This is prevented by smartcards by using hardware-temper proven chips like TPMs (yes, they don't work 100% but have a way better protection than regular flash memory). But I couldn't find any information about that in the OnlyKey docs.

Feel free to proof me wrong on all of this, I would really welcome it, since more good security keys on the market are a good sign, but for now, I'm very far from being impressed by this key :/

So I looked into your documentation for a little more insight in how you do things and there are various things that jumped at me in your documentation. Starting from questionable statements like: > "OnlyKey addresses b) by allowing users to set strong 32 character passwords that cannot be cracked by an attacker." > ‐ https://docs.crp.to/faq.html#%0Ahow-does-onlykey-keep-my-information-from-getting-hacked%0A I just hope you can correct that to a working that says "that is hard to crack by an attacker" instead of "cannot be cracked by an attack". I assume there was just some marketing person writing :) To statements that make me worried: > Using the backup file created in the Secure Encrypted Backup Anywhere section, we can restore an OnlyKey from backup. > ‐ https://docs.crp.to/usersguide.html#secure-encrypted-backup-anywhere From a hardware store for secrets I would expect that it never allows to read secrets again. No matter if it was physically obtained by a third-party or not. That's basically the main purpose to have those. This sounds like a design flaw to me. Which brings us to the heart of my concerns: > You may find it easier to remember a pattern rather than a 7 - 10 digit PIN. > ‐ https://docs.crp.to/usersguide.html#onlykey-setup When I get that correct the maximum PIN length is 10 numbers, feel free to correct me if I'm wrong since I couldn't find any better resource that stated the maximum PIN length in the docs. > Enter a PIN code on the OnlyKey Keypad > ‐ https://docs.crp.to/usersguide.html#onlykey-setup Together with this statement it means we get 6¹⁰ (60'466'176) possible PINs. That are actually 60 times more than possible on a regular OpenPGP smartcard. At least when it comes to the PIN people use to authenticate. Since those are 6 digits. On the other hand the AdminPIN for OpenPGP smartcards allows 8 digits and therefore allows 10⁸ (100'000'000). But all this is just weird talking since actually smartcards and the OnlyKey are not really comparable. Starting with this statement in the docs: > The reason that primary PIN can’t just be changed is a security reason. The key that encrypts all of sensitive data on the OnlyKey is derived from your PIN and a random number. > ‐ https://docs.crp.to/usersguide.html#pin-change This along with the statement how you keep things save: > The data stored on OnlyKey is encrypted with military grade encryption (AES-256-GCM) and most importantly is PIN protected. > ‐ https://docs.crp.to/faq.html#%0Awhat-if-i-lose-my-onlykey%0A And finally revealing itself by looking at the international traveling "feature": > This is accomplished through locking the flash memory and requiring a PIN code to access accounts. > ‐ https://docs.crp.to/ite.html#how-are-accounts-secure-without-encryption All in all it seems like you store all data encrypted on a more or less regular flash memory. That is protected by having it's data encrypted with a 7-10 digit PIN that is (hopefully) fed into a KDF along with a random number (which I assume is stored on the OnlyKey) to generate the decryption key. While this all sounds safe and due to the separate hardware fine for a threat profile where an attacker never gets physical access to the key itself, it sounds to me like one could just take the key apart, desolder the flash memory out or use a similar way to read it separated from the key. And therefore create an image of it that can be decrypted separately without the 10 times restriction the key imposes. This is prevented by smartcards by using hardware-temper proven chips like TPMs (yes, they don't work 100% but have a way better protection than regular flash memory). But I couldn't find **any** information about that in the OnlyKey docs. Feel free to proof me wrong on all of this, I would really welcome it, since more good security keys on the market are a good sign, but for now, I'm very far from being impressed by this key :/

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onlykey commented 2019-09-06 12:13:48 +00:00 (Migrated from github.com)

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@SISheogorath We posted this to privacy tools because people are looking for real solutions for privacy and security, I see a lot of criticism in your post but there were no alternatives mentioned. Its kind of like you are saying here, 2-factor authentication isn't perfect so I just won't use it. There are trade offs to every solution out there but clearly keeping your private keys offline has much less risk that storing your private keys online, on your computer and on the cloud. For example, one of the privacy tools recommended here is Keybase, which is great but if you are using this your private key is stored with Keybase and if someone hacks your account through something like a weak password, they can get your private key. With OnlyKey your private key is offline, and it's easy to use with Keybase. You can send an encrypted message using a new app we are working on here:
https://apps.crp.to/dev-new/encrypt-dev.html?type=e&recipients=tws

The message can then be decrypted with a private key that never touches the computer. Now you have to admit that this is much more secure than just using Keybase with your key stored in the cloud and on the computer.

So I looked into your documentation for a little more insight in how you do things and there are various things that jumped at me in your documentation.

Starting from questionable statements like:

"OnlyKey addresses b) by allowing users to set strong 32 character passwords that cannot be cracked by an attacker."
‐ https://docs.crp.to/faq.html#%0Ahow-does-onlykey-keep-my-information-from-getting-hacked%0A

I just hope you can correct that to a working that says "that is hard to crack by an attacker" instead of "cannot be cracked by an attack". I assume there was just some marketing person writing :)

This should be changed to "random 58 character passwords that cannot be cracked by an attacker"

You have to admit it is impossible currently to crack a random 32 or 58 character password.

To statements that make me worried:

Using the backup file created in the Secure Encrypted Backup Anywhere section, we can restore an OnlyKey from backup.
‐ https://docs.crp.to/usersguide.html#secure-encrypted-backup-anywhere

From a hardware store for secrets I would expect that it never allows to read secrets again. No matter if it was physically obtained by a third-party or not. That's basically the main purpose to have those. This sounds like a design flaw to me.

We do allow encrypted backups, you can disable this feature if you like but it is something that is necessary for a real solution. Backups require a person's PIN, the device, and physical presence to initiate. Restores require the private key. This was an intentional feature, for lots of people the risk of losing all of your accounts stored on your key is a much bigger risk than the risks you mention.

Which brings us to the heart of my concerns:

You may find it easier to remember a pattern rather than a 7 - 10 digit PIN.
‐ https://docs.crp.to/usersguide.html#onlykey-setup

When I get that correct the maximum PIN length is 10 numbers, feel free to correct me if I'm wrong since I couldn't find any better resource that stated the maximum PIN length in the docs.

Enter a PIN code on the OnlyKey Keypad
‐ https://docs.crp.to/usersguide.html#onlykey-setup

Together with this statement it means we get 6¹⁰ (60'466'176) possible PINs. That are actually 60 times more than possible on a regular OpenPGP smartcard. At least when it comes to the PIN people use to authenticate. Since those are 6 digits. On the other hand the AdminPIN for OpenPGP smartcards allows 8 digits and therefore allows 10⁸ (100'000'000).

But all this is just weird talking since actually smartcards and the OnlyKey are not really comparable.

I am not sure what you are saying here, you can set a 7-10 digit PIN, you have 10 failed PIN attempts before device is wiped.

Starting with this statement in the docs:

The reason that primary PIN can’t just be changed is a security reason. The key that encrypts all of sensitive data on the OnlyKey is derived from your PIN and a random number.
‐ https://docs.crp.to/usersguide.html#pin-change

This along with the statement how you keep things save:

The data stored on OnlyKey is encrypted with military grade encryption (AES-256-GCM) and most importantly is PIN protected.
‐ https://docs.crp.to/faq.html#%0Awhat-if-i-lose-my-onlykey%0A

And finally revealing itself by looking at the international traveling "feature":

This is accomplished through locking the flash memory and requiring a PIN code to access accounts.
‐ https://docs.crp.to/ite.html#how-are-accounts-secure-without-encryption

All in all it seems like you store all data encrypted on a more or less regular flash memory. That is protected by having it's data encrypted with a 7-10 digit PIN that is (hopefully) fed into a KDF along with a random number (which I assume is stored on the OnlyKey) to generate the decryption key.

While this all sounds safe and due to the separate hardware fine for a threat profile where an attacker never gets physical access to the key itself, it sounds to me like one could just take the key apart, desolder the flash memory out or use a similar way to read it separated from the key. And therefore create an image of it that can be decrypted separately without the 10 times restriction the key imposes.

This is prevented by smartcards by using hardware-temper proven chips like TPMs (yes, they don't work 100% but have a way better protection than regular flash memory). But I couldn't find any information about that in the OnlyKey docs.

Terms like secure element is a marketing term. What it means is that the chip is being marketed to manufacturers of security devices. It doesn't actually mean its secure, but it does mean its proprietary and closed source so you probably won't know it has a flaw unless something like this happens - https://crocs.fi.muni.cz/public/papers/rsa_ccs17

The OnlyKey does not use a chip that is marketed as a secure element but it does have hardware security features. Clearly you cannot desolder and extract the flash memory from OnlyKey - https://docs.crp.to/security.html

Feel free to proof me wrong on all of this, I would really welcome it, since more good security keys on the market are a good sign, but for now, I'm very far from being impressed by this key :/

So what would you recommend people use for things like password management?

@SISheogorath We posted this to privacy tools because people are looking for real solutions for privacy and security, I see a lot of criticism in your post but there were no alternatives mentioned. Its kind of like you are saying here, 2-factor authentication isn't perfect so I just won't use it. There are trade offs to every solution out there but clearly keeping your private keys offline has much less risk that storing your private keys online, on your computer and on the cloud. For example, one of the privacy tools recommended here is Keybase, which is great but if you are using this your private key is stored with Keybase and if someone hacks your account through something like a weak password, they can get your private key. With OnlyKey your private key is offline, and it's easy to use with Keybase. You can send an encrypted message using a new app we are working on here: https://apps.crp.to/dev-new/encrypt-dev.html?type=e&recipients=tws The message can then be decrypted with a private key that never touches the computer. Now you have to admit that this is much more secure than just using Keybase with your key stored in the cloud and on the computer. > So I looked into your documentation for a little more insight in how you do things and there are various things that jumped at me in your documentation. > > Starting from questionable statements like: > > > "OnlyKey addresses b) by allowing users to set strong 32 character passwords that cannot be cracked by an attacker." > > ‐ https://docs.crp.to/faq.html#%0Ahow-does-onlykey-keep-my-information-from-getting-hacked%0A > > I just hope you can correct that to a working that says "that is hard to crack by an attacker" instead of "cannot be cracked by an attack". I assume there was just some marketing person writing :) This should be changed to "random 58 character passwords that cannot be cracked by an attacker" You have to admit it is impossible currently to crack a random 32 or 58 character password. > > To statements that make me worried: > > > Using the backup file created in the Secure Encrypted Backup Anywhere section, we can restore an OnlyKey from backup. > > ‐ https://docs.crp.to/usersguide.html#secure-encrypted-backup-anywhere > > From a hardware store for secrets I would expect that it never allows to read secrets again. No matter if it was physically obtained by a third-party or not. That's basically the main purpose to have those. This sounds like a design flaw to me. > We do allow encrypted backups, you can disable this feature if you like but it is something that is necessary for a real solution. Backups require a person's PIN, the device, and physical presence to initiate. Restores require the private key. This was an intentional feature, for lots of people the risk of losing all of your accounts stored on your key is a much bigger risk than the risks you mention. > Which brings us to the heart of my concerns: > > > You may find it easier to remember a pattern rather than a 7 - 10 digit PIN. > > ‐ https://docs.crp.to/usersguide.html#onlykey-setup > > When I get that correct the maximum PIN length is 10 numbers, feel free to correct me if I'm wrong since I couldn't find any better resource that stated the maximum PIN length in the docs. > > > Enter a PIN code on the OnlyKey Keypad > > ‐ https://docs.crp.to/usersguide.html#onlykey-setup > > Together with this statement it means we get 6¹⁰ (60'466'176) possible PINs. That are actually 60 times more than possible on a regular OpenPGP smartcard. At least when it comes to the PIN people use to authenticate. Since those are 6 digits. On the other hand the AdminPIN for OpenPGP smartcards allows 8 digits and therefore allows 10⁸ (100'000'000). > > But all this is just weird talking since actually smartcards and the OnlyKey are not really comparable. > I am not sure what you are saying here, you can set a 7-10 digit PIN, you have 10 failed PIN attempts before device is wiped. > Starting with this statement in the docs: > > > The reason that primary PIN can’t just be changed is a security reason. The key that encrypts all of sensitive data on the OnlyKey is derived from your PIN and a random number. > > ‐ https://docs.crp.to/usersguide.html#pin-change > > This along with the statement how you keep things save: > > > The data stored on OnlyKey is encrypted with military grade encryption (AES-256-GCM) and most importantly is PIN protected. > > ‐ https://docs.crp.to/faq.html#%0Awhat-if-i-lose-my-onlykey%0A > > And finally revealing itself by looking at the international traveling "feature": > > > This is accomplished through locking the flash memory and requiring a PIN code to access accounts. > > ‐ https://docs.crp.to/ite.html#how-are-accounts-secure-without-encryption > > All in all it seems like you store all data encrypted on a more or less regular flash memory. That is protected by having it's data encrypted with a 7-10 digit PIN that is (hopefully) fed into a KDF along with a random number (which I assume is stored on the OnlyKey) to generate the decryption key. > > While this all sounds safe and due to the separate hardware fine for a threat profile where an attacker never gets physical access to the key itself, it sounds to me like one could just take the key apart, desolder the flash memory out or use a similar way to read it separated from the key. And therefore create an image of it that can be decrypted separately without the 10 times restriction the key imposes. > > This is prevented by smartcards by using hardware-temper proven chips like TPMs (yes, they don't work 100% but have a way better protection than regular flash memory). But I couldn't find **any** information about that in the OnlyKey docs. > Terms like secure element is a marketing term. What it means is that the chip is being marketed to manufacturers of security devices. It doesn't actually mean its secure, but it does mean its proprietary and closed source so you probably won't know it has a flaw unless something like this happens - https://crocs.fi.muni.cz/public/papers/rsa_ccs17 The OnlyKey does not use a chip that is marketed as a secure element but it does have hardware security features. Clearly you cannot desolder and extract the flash memory from OnlyKey - https://docs.crp.to/security.html > Feel free to proof me wrong on all of this, I would really welcome it, since more good security keys on the market are a good sign, but for now, I'm very far from being impressed by this key :/ So what would you recommend people use for things like password management?

ccoenen commented 2019-09-06 22:32:58 +00:00 (Migrated from github.com)

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I would like to quickly step in to combat one key point: of course it is OK to criticize even if you have no other/better solution. That post asks a lot of hard questions about the security of your device. This is the only sane thing to do when it comes to security. Especially when an endorsement is on the table.

To illustrate: I can't solve clothing manufacturing, not by a long shot. But I most certainly can point out that child labour is the wrong way to go about it.

Back to the topic at hand:
At the very least this may be crucial info that might be important for users to make an informed decision. Would you rather have a blanket endorsement that basically means "we didn't fully understand it, but you're probably safe. Trust them."?

I would like to quickly step in to combat one key point: _of course_ it is OK to criticize even if you have no other/better solution. That post asks a lot of hard questions about the security of your device. This is the _only_ sane thing to do when it comes to security. Especially when an endorsement is on the table. To illustrate: I can't solve clothing manufacturing, not by a long shot. But I most certainly _can_ point out that child labour is the wrong way to go about it. Back to the topic at hand: At the very least this may be crucial info that might be important for users to make an informed decision. Would you rather have a blanket endorsement that basically means "we didn't fully understand it, but you're probably safe. Trust them."?

beerisgood commented 2019-09-07 07:27:31 +00:00 (Migrated from github.com)

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A alternative to OnlyKey would be Nitrokey - Github site

A alternative to OnlyKey would be [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com) - [Github site](https://github.com/Nitrokey/)

onlykey commented 2019-09-09 13:49:34 +00:00 (Migrated from github.com)

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@beerisgood Sure, that's an option they both do quite different things though - https://support.nitrokey.com/t/nitrokey-vs-onlykey/638

@beerisgood Sure, that's an option they both do quite different things though - https://support.nitrokey.com/t/nitrokey-vs-onlykey/638

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