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	Various corrections to Linux Pages (#1331)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gray <dng@disroot.org>
This commit is contained in:
		| @@ -32,15 +32,17 @@ Do **not** disable unprivileged user namespaces if you use software that relies | ||||
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| ## Linux-Hardened | ||||
|  | ||||
| Some distributions like Arch Linux have the [linux-hardened](https://github.com/anthraxx/linux-hardened), kernel package. It includes [hardening patches](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/security#Kernel_hardening) and more security-conscious defaults. Linux-Hardened has `kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=0` disabled by default. See the [warning above](#kernel-hardening) about how this might impact you. | ||||
| Some distributions like Arch Linux have the [linux-hardened](https://github.com/anthraxx/linux-hardened), kernel package. It includes [hardening patches](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/security#Kernel_hardening) and more security-conscious defaults. Linux-Hardened has `kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=0` disabled by default. See the [note above](#kernel-hardening) about how this might impact you. | ||||
|  | ||||
| ## Linux Kernel Runtime Guard (LKRG) | ||||
|  | ||||
| LKRG is a kernel module that performs runtime integrity check on the kernel to help detect detect exploits against the kernel. LKRG works in a *post*-detect fashion, meaning that it attempts to respond to unauthorized modifications to the running Linux kernel. The intention is that it will defeat many pre-existing exploits as well as undiscovered vulnerabilities. Some hardened distributions, such as [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Linux_Kernel_Runtime_Guard_LKRG), have documentation. | ||||
| LKRG is a kernel module that performs runtime integrity check on the kernel to help detect detect exploits against the kernel. LKRG works in a *post*-detect fashion, attempting to respond to unauthorized modifications to the running Linux kernel. While it is [bypassable by design](https://lkrg.org/), it does stop off-the-shelf malware that does not specifically target LKRG itself. This may make exploits harder to develop and execute on vulnerable systems. | ||||
|  | ||||
| If you can get LKRG and maintain module updates it provides a worthwhile improvement to security. Debian based distributions can get the LKRG DKMS from KickSecure's secure repository and the [KickSecure documentation](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Linux_Kernel_Runtime_Guard_LKRG) has instructions on how this can be achieved. There is no LKRG package for Fedora yet, however the Qubes OS project has a COPR repository which [may become]((https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/5461) part of the main distribution in the future. Archlinux based systems provide LKRG DKMS modules via an [AUR package](https://aur.archlinux.org/packages/lkrg-dkms). | ||||
|  | ||||
| ## GRSecurity | ||||
|  | ||||
| GRSecurity is a set of kernel patches that attempt to improve security of the Linux kernel. Open source  access, however, requires [subscription to a paid model](https://grsecurity.net/passing_the_baton). | ||||
| GRSecurity is a set of kernel patches that attempt to improve security of the Linux kernel.  It requires [payment to access]((https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/5461) the code. | ||||
|  | ||||
| ## Simultaneous multithreading (SMT) | ||||
|  | ||||
| @@ -58,7 +60,9 @@ If you are not using openSUSE, consider changing the default [umask](https://en. | ||||
|  | ||||
| ## Mountpoint hardening | ||||
|  | ||||
| Consider adding the [following options](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/mount.8.html) `nodev`, `noexec`, and `nosuid` to [mountpoints](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mount_(computing)) which do not need them. Typically, these could be applied to `/boot`, `/boot/efi`, `/home`, `/root`, and `/var`. | ||||
| Consider adding the [following options](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/mount.8.html) `nodev`, `noexec`, and `nosuid` to [mountpoints](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mount_(computing)) which do not need them. Typically, these could be applied to `/boot`, `/boot/efi`, and `/var`. | ||||
|  | ||||
| These flags could also be applied to `/home` and `/root` as well, however, `noexec` will prevent applications from working that require binary execution in those locations. This includes products such as Flatpak and Snap. | ||||
|  | ||||
| If you use [Toolbox](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora-silverblue/toolbox/), `/var/log/journal` must not have any of those options. If you are on Arch Linux, do not apply `noexec` to `/var/tmp`. | ||||
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