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refactor: Move wiki articles to individual folders
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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/android
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description: Android is an open-source operating system with strong security protections, which makes it our top choice for phones.
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---
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{ align=right }
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{ align=right }
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The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system.
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@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ If you have a Google account we suggest enrolling in the [Advanced Protection Pr
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The Advanced Protection Program provides enhanced threat monitoring and enables:
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- Stricter two-factor authentication; e.g. that [FIDO](../../basics/multi-factor-authentication/_index.md#fido-fast-identity-online) **must** be used and disallows the use of [SMS OTPs](../../basics/multi-factor-authentication/_index.md#sms-or-email-mfa), [TOTP](../../basics/multi-factor-authentication/_index.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp) and [OAuth](../../basics/account-creation.md#sign-in-with-oauth)
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- Stricter two-factor authentication; e.g. that [FIDO](../../basics/multi-factor-authentication/_index.md#fido-fast-identity-online) **must** be used and disallows the use of [SMS OTPs](../../basics/multi-factor-authentication/_index.md#sms-or-email-mfa), [TOTP](../../basics/multi-factor-authentication/_index.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp) and [OAuth](../../basics/account-creation/_index.md#sign-in-with-oauth)
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- Only Google and verified third-party apps can access account data
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- Scanning of incoming emails on Gmail accounts for [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing#Email_phishing) attempts
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- Stricter [safe browser scanning](https://google.com/chrome/privacy/whitepaper.html#malware) with Google Chrome
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@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is l
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Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make trade-offs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security.
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Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** → **Passcode Options** → **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](../../basics/passwords-overview.md).
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Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** → **Passcode Options** → **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](../../basics/passwords-overview/_index.md).
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If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode.
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@@ -226,11 +226,11 @@ When an app prompts you for access to your device's photo library, iOS provides
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Rather than allow an app to access all the photos on your device, you can allow it to only access whichever photos you choose by tapping the "Select Photos..." option in the permission dialog. You can change photo access permissions at any time by navigating to **Settings** → **Privacy & Security** → **Photos**.
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**Add Photos Only** is a permission that only gives an app the ability to download photos to the photo library. Not all apps which request photo library access provide this option.
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Some apps also support **Private Access**, which functions similarly to the **Limited Access** permission. However, photos shared to apps using Private Access include their location by default. We recommend unchecking this setting if you do not [remove photo metadata](../../../tools/software/data-redaction/_index.md) beforehand.
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@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ Some apps also support **Private Access**, which functions similarly to the **Li
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Similarly, rather than allow an app to access all the contacts saved on your device, you can allow it to only access whichever contacts you choose. You can change contact access permissions at any time by navigating to **Settings** → **Privacy & Security** → **Contacts**.
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### Require Biometrics and Hide Apps
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@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to h
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### Before First Unlock
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If your threat model includes [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](../../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } that involve forensic tools, and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation.
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If your threat model includes [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](../../basics/common-threats/_index.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } that involve forensic tools, and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation.
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iPhones [automatically reboot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/protecting-user-data-in-the-face-of-attack-secf5549a4f5/1/web/1#:~:text=On%20an%20iPhone%20or%20iPad%20with%20iOS%2018%20and%20iPadOS%2018%20or%20later%2C%20a%20new%20security%20protection%20will%20restart%20devices%20if%20they%20remain%20locked%20for%20a%20prolonged%20period%20of%20time.) if they're not unlocked after a period of time.
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@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ There are some notable security concerns with Linux which you should be aware of
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### Open-Source Security
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It is a [common misconception](../../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software are inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security).
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It is a [common misconception](../../basics/common-misconceptions/_index.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software are inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security).
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In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years.
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@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re
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For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit).
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Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations){ .pg-viridian }, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository).
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Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../../basics/common-threats/_index.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations){ .pg-viridian }, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository).
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The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora.
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@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Eth
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### Other Identifiers
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There are other system identifiers which you may wish to be careful about. You should give this some thought to see if it applies to your [threat model](../../basics/threat-modeling.md):
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There are other system identifiers which you may wish to be careful about. You should give this some thought to see if it applies to your [threat model](../../basics/threat-modeling/_index.md):
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- **Hostnames:** Your system's hostname is shared with the networks you connect to. You should avoid including identifying terms like your name or operating system in your hostname, instead sticking to generic terms or random strings.
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- **Usernames:** Similarly, your username is used in a variety of ways across your system. Consider using generic terms like "user" rather than your actual name.
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@@ -180,10 +180,10 @@ System Integrity Protection makes critical file locations read-only to protect a
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##### App Sandbox
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On macOS, whether an app is sandboxed is determined by the developer when they sign it. The [App Sandbox](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/xcode/configuring-the-macos-app-sandbox) protects against vulnerabilities in the apps you run by limiting what a malicious actor can access in the event that the app is exploited. The App Sandbox *alone* can't protect against [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations){ .pg-viridian } by malicious developers. For that, sandboxing needs to be enforced by someone other than the developer themselves, as it is on the [App Store](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/gatekeeper-and-runtime-protection-sec5599b66df/1/web/1#:~:text=All%20apps%20from%20the%20App%20Store%20are%20sandboxed%20to%20restrict%20access%20to%20data%20stored%20by%20other%20apps.).
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On macOS, whether an app is sandboxed is determined by the developer when they sign it. The [App Sandbox](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/xcode/configuring-the-macos-app-sandbox) protects against vulnerabilities in the apps you run by limiting what a malicious actor can access in the event that the app is exploited. The App Sandbox *alone* can't protect against [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../../basics/common-threats/_index.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations){ .pg-viridian } by malicious developers. For that, sandboxing needs to be enforced by someone other than the developer themselves, as it is on the [App Store](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/gatekeeper-and-runtime-protection-sec5599b66df/1/web/1#:~:text=All%20apps%20from%20the%20App%20Store%20are%20sandboxed%20to%20restrict%20access%20to%20data%20stored%20by%20other%20apps.).
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> [!WARNING]
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> Software downloaded from outside the official App Store is not required to be sandboxed. If your threat model prioritizes defending against [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](../../basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }, then you may want to check if the software you download outside the App Store is sandboxed, which is up to the developer to *opt in*.
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> Software downloaded from outside the official App Store is not required to be sandboxed. If your threat model prioritizes defending against [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](../../basics/common-threats/_index.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }, then you may want to check if the software you download outside the App Store is sandboxed, which is up to the developer to *opt in*.
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You can check if an app uses the App Sandbox in a few ways:
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@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ If an app is sandboxed, you should see the following output:
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[Bool] true
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```
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If you find that the app you want to run is not sandboxed, then you may employ methods of [compartmentalization](../../basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy) such as virtual machines or separate devices, use a similar app that is sandboxed, or choose to not use the non-sandboxed app altogether.
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If you find that the app you want to run is not sandboxed, then you may employ methods of [compartmentalization](../../basics/common-threats/_index.md#security-and-privacy) such as virtual machines or separate devices, use a similar app that is sandboxed, or choose to not use the non-sandboxed app altogether.
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##### Hardened Runtime
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@@ -16,17 +16,17 @@ Some of the information here and on the Qubes OS documentation may contain confl
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</details>
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<figcaption>Qubes Architecture, Credit: What is Qubes OS Intro</figcaption>
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Each qube has a [colored border](https://qubes-os.org/screenshots) that can help you keep track of the domain in which it runs. You could, for example, use a specific color for your banking browser, while using a different color for a general untrusted browser.
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<figcaption>Qubes window borders, Credit: Qubes Screenshots</figcaption>
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## Why Should I use Qubes?
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Qubes OS is useful if your [threat model](../../basics/threat-modeling.md) requires strong security and isolation, such as if you think you'll be opening untrusted files from untrusted sources. A typical reason for using Qubes OS is to open documents from unknown sources, but the idea is that if a single qube is compromised it won't affect the rest of the system.
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Qubes OS is useful if your [threat model](../../basics/threat-modeling/_index.md) requires strong security and isolation, such as if you think you'll be opening untrusted files from untrusted sources. A typical reason for using Qubes OS is to open documents from unknown sources, but the idea is that if a single qube is compromised it won't affect the rest of the system.
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Qubes OS utilizes [dom0](https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Dom0) Xen VM for controlling other *qubes* on the host OS, all of which display individual application windows within dom0's desktop environment. There are many uses for this type of architecture. Here are some tasks you can perform. You can see just how much more secure these processes are made by incorporating multiple steps.
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title: Group Policy Settings
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description: A quick guide to configuring Group Policy to make Windows a bit more privacy respecting.
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---
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Outside modifying the registry itself, the **Local Group Policy Editor** is the most powerful way to change many aspects of your system without installing third-party tools. Changing these settings requires [Pro Edition](_index.md#windows-editions) or better.
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Outside modifying the registry itself, the **Local Group Policy Editor** is the most powerful way to change many aspects of your system without installing third-party tools. Changing these settings requires [Pro Edition](../_index.md#windows-editions) or better.
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These settings should be set on a brand-new installation of Windows. Setting them on your existing installation should work, but may introduce unpredictable behavior and is done at your own risk.
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