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refactor: Move wiki articles to individual folders
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@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Welcome to our **Privacy Wiki**!
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Here, the Privacy Guides community is building *the* comprehensive resource for understanding digital privacy, the threats we face, and the tools we can use to protect ourselves. This wiki is a living document, and we encourage you to contribute if you have something to add.
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This is a selection of featured pages, but you can browse the sidebar for more topics, or use the search bar to find something specific. If you're looking for somewhere to start, start [here](basics/why-privacy-matters.md) to learn about why privacy is important, and then check out our [threat modeling guide](basics/threat-modeling.md) to learn how to make informed decisions about the software and services you use.
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This is a selection of featured pages, but you can browse the sidebar for more topics, or use the search bar to find something specific. If you're looking for somewhere to start, start [here](basics/why-privacy-matters/_index.md) to learn about why privacy is important, and then check out our [threat modeling guide](basics/threat-modeling/_index.md) to learn how to make informed decisions about the software and services you use.
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## Getting Started
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@@ -4,14 +4,14 @@ weight: 40
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description: An overview of several network architectures commonly used by instant messaging applications.
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---
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There are several network architectures commonly used to relay messages between people. These networks can provide different privacy guarantees, which is why it's worth considering your [threat model](../../basics/threat-modeling.md) when deciding which app to use.
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There are several network architectures commonly used to relay messages between people. These networks can provide different privacy guarantees, which is why it's worth considering your [threat model](../../basics/threat-modeling/_index.md) when deciding which app to use.
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- [Recommended Instant Messengers](../../../tools/services/messengers/_index.md)
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- [Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why)
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## Centralized Networks
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Centralized messengers are those where all participants are on the same server or network of servers controlled by the same organization.
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@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Some self-hosted messengers allow you to set up your own server. Self-hosting ca
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## Federated Networks
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Federated messengers use multiple, independent, decentralized servers that are able to talk to each other (email is one example of a federated service). Federation allows system administrators to control their own server and still be a part of the larger communications network.
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@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ When self-hosted, members of a federated server can discover and communicate wit
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## Peer-to-Peer Networks
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P2P messengers connect to a [distributed network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_networking) of nodes to relay a message to the recipient without a third-party server.
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@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ P2P networks do not use servers, as peers communicate directly between each othe
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## Anonymous Routing
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A messenger using [anonymous routing](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_628) hides either the identity of the sender, the receiver, or evidence that they have been communicating. Ideally, a messenger should hide all three.
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+1
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@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ We can see the [connection establishment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmis
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## Why **shouldn't** I use encrypted DNS?
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In locations where there is internet filtering (or censorship), visiting forbidden resources may have its own consequences which you should consider in your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md). We do **not** suggest the use of encrypted DNS for this purpose. Use [Tor](tor-overview/_index.md) or a [VPN](../../tools/services/vpn/_index.md) instead. If you're using a VPN, you should use your VPN's DNS servers. When using a VPN, you are already trusting them with all your network activity.
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In locations where there is internet filtering (or censorship), visiting forbidden resources may have its own consequences which you should consider in your [threat model](../../basics/threat-modeling/_index.md). We do **not** suggest the use of encrypted DNS for this purpose. Use [Tor](../tor-overview/_index.md) or a [VPN](../../tools/services/vpn/_index.md) instead. If you're using a VPN, you should use your VPN's DNS servers. When using a VPN, you are already trusting them with all your network activity.
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When we do a DNS lookup, it's generally because we want to access a resource. Below, we will discuss some of the methods that may disclose your browsing activities even when using encrypted DNS:
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@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ If you go this route, make sure to purchase Monero at different times and in dif
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When you're making a payment in person with cash, make sure to keep your in-person privacy in mind. Security cameras are ubiquitous. Consider wearing non-distinct clothing and a face mask (such as a surgical mask or N95). Don’t sign up for rewards programs or provide any other information about yourself.
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When purchasing online, ideally you should do so over [Tor](tor-overview/_index.md). However, many merchants don’t allow purchases with Tor. You can consider using a [recommended VPN](../../tools/services/vpn/_index.md) (paid for with cash, gift card, or Monero), or making the purchase from a coffee shop or library with free Wi-Fi. If you are ordering a physical item that needs to be delivered, you will need to provide a delivery address. You should consider using a PO box, private mailbox, or work address.
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When purchasing online, ideally you should do so over [Tor](../tor-overview/_index.md). However, many merchants don’t allow purchases with Tor. You can consider using a [recommended VPN](../../tools/services/vpn/_index.md) (paid for with cash, gift card, or Monero), or making the purchase from a coffee shop or library with free Wi-Fi. If you are ordering a physical item that needs to be delivered, you will need to provide a delivery address. You should consider using a PO box, private mailbox, or work address.
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<!-- TODO: Admonition -->
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<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ weight: 20
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description: Tor is a free to use, decentralized network designed for using the internet with as much privacy as possible.
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---
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[**Tor**](../../tools/advanced/alternative-networks/_index.md#tor) is a free to use, decentralized network designed for using the internet with as much privacy as possible. If used properly, the network enables private and anonymous browsing and communications. Because Tor traffic is difficult to block and trace, Tor is an effective censorship circumvention tool.
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@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ If you have the ability to access a trusted VPN provider and **any** of the foll
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- Your threat model includes your ISP itself as an adversary
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- Your threat model includes local network administrators before your ISP as an adversary
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Because we already [generally recommend](../../basics/vpn-overview.md) that the vast majority of people use a trusted VPN provider for a variety of reasons, the following recommendation about connecting to Tor via a VPN likely applies to you. <mark>There is no need to disable your VPN before connecting to Tor</mark>, as some online resources would lead you to believe.
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Because we already [generally recommend](../../basics/vpn-overview/_index.md) that the vast majority of people use a trusted VPN provider for a variety of reasons, the following recommendation about connecting to Tor via a VPN likely applies to you. <mark>There is no need to disable your VPN before connecting to Tor</mark>, as some online resources would lead you to believe.
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Connecting directly to Tor will make your connection stand out to any local network administrators or your ISP. Detecting and correlating this traffic [has been done](https://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/17/justice/massachusetts-harvard-hoax) in the past by network administrators to identify and deanonymize specific Tor users on their network. On the other hand, connecting to a VPN is almost always less suspicious, because commercial VPN providers are used by everyday consumers for a variety of mundane tasks like bypassing geo-restrictions, even in countries with heavy internet restrictions.
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@@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ Those at risk of browser vulnerabilities should consider additional protections
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Every time you [connect to Tor](../../tools/software/tor/_index.md), it will choose three nodes to build a path to the internet—this path is called a "circuit."
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<figure markdown>
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<figcaption>Tor circuit pathway</figcaption>
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</figure>
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@@ -145,8 +145,8 @@ The exit node will be chosen at random from all available Tor nodes ran with an
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Connecting to an Onion Service in Tor works very similarly to connecting to a clearnet service, but your traffic is routed through a total of **six** nodes before reaching the destination server. Just like before, however, only three of these nodes are contributing to *your* anonymity, the other three nodes protect *the Onion Service's* anonymity, hiding the website's true IP and location in the same manner that Tor Browser is hiding yours.
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<figure style="width:100%" markdown>
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<figcaption>Tor circuit pathway with Onion Services. Nodes in the <span class="pg-blue">blue</span> fence belong to your browser, while nodes in the <span class="pg-red">red</span> fence belong to the server, so their identity is hidden from you.</figcaption>
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</figure>
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@@ -165,8 +165,8 @@ Once Tor has built a circuit, data transmission is done as follows:
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Below is an alternative diagram showing the process. Each node removes its own layer of encryption, and when the destination server returns data, the same process happens entirely in reverse. For example, the exit node does not know who you are, but it does know which node it came from, and so it adds its own layer of encryption and sends it back.
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<figure markdown>
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<figcaption>Sending and receiving data through the Tor Network</figcaption>
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</figure>
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+4
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@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Often people sign up for services without thinking. Maybe it's a streaming servi
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There are risks associated with every new service that you use. Data breaches; disclosure of customer information to third parties; rogue employees accessing data; all are possibilities that must be considered when giving your information out. You need to be confident that you can trust the service, which is why we don't recommend storing valuable data on anything but the most mature and battle-tested products. That usually means services which provide E2EE and have undergone a cryptographic audit. An audit increases assurance that the product was designed without glaring security issues caused by an inexperienced developer.
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It can also be difficult to delete the accounts on some services. Sometimes [overwriting data](account-deletion/_index.md#overwriting-account-information) associated with an account can be possible, but in other cases the service will keep an entire history of changes to the account.
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It can also be difficult to delete the accounts on some services. Sometimes [overwriting data](../account-deletion/_index.md#overwriting-account-information) associated with an account can be possible, but in other cases the service will keep an entire history of changes to the account.
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## Terms of Service & Privacy Policy
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### Email and password
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The most common way to create a new account is by an email address and password. When using this method, you should use a password manager and follow [best practices](passwords-overview.md) regarding passwords.
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The most common way to create a new account is by an email address and password. When using this method, you should use a password manager and follow [best practices](../passwords-overview/_index.md) regarding passwords.
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> [!TIP]
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> You can use your password manager to organize other authentication methods too! Just add the new entry and fill the appropriate fields, you can add notes for things like security questions or a backup key.
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You will be responsible for managing your login credentials. For added security, you can set up [MFA](multi-factor-authentication/_index.md) on your accounts.
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You will be responsible for managing your login credentials. For added security, you can set up [MFA](../multi-factor-authentication/_index.md) on your accounts.
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[Recommended password managers](../../tools/software/passwords/_index.md){ .md-button }
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@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ But there are disadvantages:
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- **Privacy**: The OAuth provider you log in with will know the services you use.
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- **Centralization**: If the account you use for OAuth is compromised, or you aren't able to log in to it, all other accounts connected to it are affected.
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OAuth can be especially useful in those situations where you could benefit from deeper integration between services. Our recommendation is to limit using OAuth to only where you need it, and always protect the main account with [MFA](multi-factor-authentication/_index.md).
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OAuth can be especially useful in those situations where you could benefit from deeper integration between services. Our recommendation is to limit using OAuth to only where you need it, and always protect the main account with [MFA](../multi-factor-authentication/_index.md).
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All the services that use OAuth will be as secure as your underlying OAuth provider's account. For example, if you want to secure an account with a hardware key, but that service doesn't support hardware keys, you can secure the account you use with OAuth with a hardware key instead, and now you essentially have hardware MFA on all your accounts. It is worth noting though that weak authentication on your OAuth provider account means that any account tied to that login will also be weak.
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If you have a password manager that you've used for your entire digital life, this part will be very easy. Oftentimes, they include built-in functionality for detecting if your credentials were exposed in a data breach—such as Bitwarden's [Data Breach Report](https://bitwarden.com/blog/have-you-been-pwned).
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<figure markdown>
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</figure>
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Even if you haven't explicitly used a password manager before, there's a chance you've used the one in your browser ([Firefox](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/password-manager-remember-delete-edit-logins), [Chrome](https://passwords.google.com/intro), [Edge](https://support.microsoft.com/microsoft-edge/save-or-forget-passwords-in-microsoft-edge-b4beecb0-f2a8-1ca0-f26f-9ec247a3f336)) or your phone ([Google](https://passwords.google.com/intro) on stock Android, [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/HT211146) on iOS) without even realizing it.
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These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. <mark>Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.</mark> When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis.
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Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations){ .pg-viridian }, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1]
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Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../common-threats/_index.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations){ .pg-viridian }, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](../common-threats/_index.md) page.[^1]
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On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering.
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description: Your threat model is personal to you, but these are some of the things many visitors to this site care about.
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---
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Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. <mark>You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities</mark>, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat.
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Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](../threat-modeling/_index.md) or goals that apply to most people. <mark>You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities</mark>, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat.
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<span class="pg-purple">:material-incognito: **Anonymity**</span>
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@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible
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</div>
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Even with E2EE, service providers can still profile you based on **metadata**, which typically isn't protected. While the service provider can't read your messages, they can still observe important things, such as whom you're talking to, how often you message them, and when you're typically active. Protection of metadata is fairly uncommon, and—if it's within your [threat model](threat-modeling.md)—you should pay close attention to the technical documentation of the software you're using to see if there's any metadata minimization or protection at all.
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Even with E2EE, service providers can still profile you based on **metadata**, which typically isn't protected. While the service provider can't read your messages, they can still observe important things, such as whom you're talking to, how often you message them, and when you're typically active. Protection of metadata is fairly uncommon, and—if it's within your [threat model](../threat-modeling/_index.md)—you should pay close attention to the technical documentation of the software you're using to see if there's any metadata minimization or protection at all.
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## Mass Surveillance Programs
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@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ Additionally, even companies outside the *AdTech* or tracking industry can share
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The best way to keep your data private is simply not making it public in the first place. Deleting unwanted information you find about yourself online is one of the best first steps you can take to regain your privacy.
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- [View our guide on account deletion :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](account-deletion/_index.md)
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- [View our guide on account deletion :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../account-deletion/_index.md)
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On sites where you do share information, checking the privacy settings of your account to limit how widely that data is spread is very important. For example, enable "private mode" on your accounts if given the option: This ensures that your account isn't being indexed by search engines, and that it can't be viewed without your permission.
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@@ -200,12 +200,12 @@ Censorship online can be carried out (to varying degrees) by actors including to
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Censorship on corporate platforms is increasingly common, as platforms like Twitter and Facebook give in to public demand, market pressures, and pressures from government agencies. Government pressures can be covert requests to businesses, such as the White House [requesting the takedown](https://nytimes.com/2012/09/17/technology/on-the-web-a-fine-line-on-free-speech-across-globe.html) of a provocative YouTube video, or overt, such as the Chinese government requiring companies to adhere to a strict regime of censorship.
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People concerned with the threat of censorship can use technologies like [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview/_index.md) to circumvent it, and support censorship-resistant communication platforms like [Matrix](../../tools/software/social-networks/_index.md#element), which doesn't have a centralized account authority that can close accounts arbitrarily.
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People concerned with the threat of censorship can use technologies like [Tor](../../advanced/tor-overview/_index.md) to circumvent it, and support censorship-resistant communication platforms like [Matrix](../../tools/software/social-networks/_index.md#element), which doesn't have a centralized account authority that can close accounts arbitrarily.
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> [!TIP]
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> While evading censorship itself can be easy, hiding the fact that you are doing it can be very problematic.
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>
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> You should consider which aspects of the network your adversary can observe, and whether you have plausible deniability for your actions. For example, using [encrypted DNS](../advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns) can help you bypass rudimentary, DNS-based censorship systems, but it can't truly hide what you are visiting from your ISP. A VPN or Tor can help hide what you are visiting from network administrators, but can't hide that you're using those networks in the first place. Pluggable transports (such as Obfs4proxy, Meek, or Shadowsocks) can help you evade firewalls that block common VPN protocols or Tor, but your circumvention attempts can still be detected by methods like probing or [deep packet inspection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection).
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> You should consider which aspects of the network your adversary can observe, and whether you have plausible deniability for your actions. For example, using [encrypted DNS](../../advanced/dns-overview/_index.md#what-is-encrypted-dns) can help you bypass rudimentary, DNS-based censorship systems, but it can't truly hide what you are visiting from your ISP. A VPN or Tor can help hide what you are visiting from network administrators, but can't hide that you're using those networks in the first place. Pluggable transports (such as Obfs4proxy, Meek, or Shadowsocks) can help you evade firewalls that block common VPN protocols or Tor, but your circumvention attempts can still be detected by methods like probing or [deep packet inspection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection).
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You must always consider the risks of trying to bypass censorship, the potential consequences, and how sophisticated your adversary may be. You should be cautious with your software selection, and have a backup plan in case you are caught.
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### What Email Clients Support E2EE?
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Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../../tools/software/email-clients/_index.md). Depending on the authentication method, this may lead to decreased security if either the provider or the email client does not support [OAuth](account-creation.md#sign-in-with-oauth) or a bridge application as [multifactor authentication](multi-factor-authentication/_index.md) is not possible with plain password authentication.
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Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../../tools/software/email-clients/_index.md). Depending on the authentication method, this may lead to decreased security if either the provider or the email client does not support [OAuth](../account-creation/_index.md#sign-in-with-oauth) or a bridge application as [multifactor authentication](../multi-factor-authentication/_index.md) is not possible with plain password authentication.
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### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
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@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Some devices will have a "hardware security program", which is a collaboration b
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- [Windows Secured-core PCs](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-highly-secure-11) meet a higher security criteria specified by Microsoft. These protections aren't only applicable to Windows users; Users of other operating systems can still take advantage of features like [DMA protection](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt) and the ability to completely distrust Microsoft certificates.
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- [Android Ready SE](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) is a collaboration between vendors to ensure their devices follow [best practices](https://source.android.com/docs/security/best-practices/hardware) and include tamper resistant hardware backed storage for things like encryption keys.
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- macOS running on an Apple SoC takes advantage of [hardware security](../os/macos/_index.md#hardware-security) which may not be available with third party operating systems.
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- macOS running on an Apple SoC takes advantage of [hardware security](../../os/macos/_index.md#hardware-security) which may not be available with third party operating systems.
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- [ChromeOS security](https://chromium.org/chromium-os/developer-library/reference/security/security-whitepaper) is at its best when running on a Chromebook as it is able to make use of available hardware features such as the [hardware root-of-trust](https://chromium.org/chromium-os/developer-library/reference/security/security-whitepaper/#hardware-root-of-trust-and-verified-boot).
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Even if you don't use these operating systems, participation in these programs may indicate that the manufacturer is following best practices when it comes to hardware security and updates.
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@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ Some threats can't be protected against by your internal components alone. Many
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|
||||
Hardware keys are devices that use strong cryptography to authenticate you to a device or account. The idea is that because they can not be copied, you can use them to secure accounts in such a way that they can only be accessed with physical possession of the key, eliminating many remote attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
[Recommended Hardware Keys :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../../tools/hardware/security-keys/_index.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Learn More about Hardware Keys :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](multi-factor-authentication/_index.md#hardware-security-keys){ .md-button }
|
||||
[Recommended Hardware Keys :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../../tools/hardware/security-keys/_index.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Learn More about Hardware Keys :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../multi-factor-authentication/_index.md#hardware-security-keys){ .md-button }
|
||||
|
||||
### Camera/Microphone
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ When logging into a website, all you need to do is to physically touch the secur
|
||||
The service will then forward the one-time password to the Yubico OTP server for validation. A counter is incremented both on the key and Yubico's validation server. The OTP can only be used once, and when a successful authentication occurs, the counter is increased which prevents reuse of the OTP. Yubico provides a [detailed document](https://developers.yubico.com/OTP/OTPs_Explained.html) about the process.
|
||||
|
||||
<figure markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
</figure>
|
||||
|
||||
There are some benefits and disadvantages to using Yubico OTP when compared to TOTP.
|
||||
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ U2F and FIDO2 refer to the [Client to Authenticator Protocol](https://en.wikiped
|
||||
WebAuthn is the most secure and private form of second factor authentication. While the authentication experience is similar to Yubico OTP, the key does not print out a one-time password and validate with a third-party server. Instead, it uses [public key cryptography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography) for authentication.
|
||||
|
||||
<figure markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
</figure>
|
||||
|
||||
When you create an account, the public key is sent to the service, then when you log in, the service will require you to "sign" some data with your private key. The benefit of this is that no password data is ever stored by the service, so there is nothing for an adversary to steal.
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ All of our [recommended password managers](../../tools/software/passwords/_index
|
||||
|
||||
You should avoid changing passwords that you have to remember (such as your password manager's master password) too often unless you have reason to believe it has been compromised, as changing it too often exposes you to the risk of forgetting it.
|
||||
|
||||
When it comes to passwords that you don't have to remember (such as passwords stored inside your password manager), if your [threat model](threat-modeling.md) calls for it, we recommend going through important accounts (especially accounts that don't use multifactor authentication) and changing their password every couple of months, in case they have been compromised in a data breach that hasn't become public yet. Most password managers allow you to set an expiry date for your password to make this easier to manage.
|
||||
When it comes to passwords that you don't have to remember (such as passwords stored inside your password manager), if your [threat model](../threat-modeling/_index.md) calls for it, we recommend going through important accounts (especially accounts that don't use multifactor authentication) and changing their password every couple of months, in case they have been compromised in a data breach that hasn't become public yet. Most password managers allow you to set an expiry date for your password to make this easier to manage.
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- TODO: Admonition -->
|
||||
<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
|
||||
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ There are many good options to choose from, both cloud-based and local. Choose o
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Don't place your passwords and TOTP tokens inside the same password manager</p>
|
||||
|
||||
When using [TOTP codes as multifactor authentication](multi-factor-authentication/_index.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp), the best security practice is to keep your TOTP codes in a [separate app](../../tools/software/multi-factor-authentication/_index.md).
|
||||
When using [TOTP codes as multifactor authentication](../multi-factor-authentication/_index.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp), the best security practice is to keep your TOTP codes in a [separate app](../../tools/software/multi-factor-authentication/_index.md).
|
||||
|
||||
Storing your TOTP tokens in the same place as your passwords, while convenient, reduces the accounts to a single factor in the event that an adversary gains access to your password manager.
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ Making a security plan will help you to understand the threats that are unique t
|
||||
|
||||
For people looking to increase their privacy and security online, we've compiled a list of common threats our visitors face or goals our visitors have, to give you some inspiration and demonstrate the basis of our recommendations.
|
||||
|
||||
- [Common Goals and Threats :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](common-threats.md)
|
||||
- [Common Goals and Threats :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../common-threats/_index.md)
|
||||
|
||||
## Sources
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit
|
||||
|
||||
[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: Do you need a VPN?](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2024/12/12/do-you-need-a-vpn){ .md-button }
|
||||
|
||||
Normally, an ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (i.e. modem). Encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, so they may not be able to see exactly what you're posting or reading, but they can get an idea of the [domains you request](../advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).
|
||||
Normally, an ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (i.e. modem). Encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, so they may not be able to see exactly what you're posting or reading, but they can get an idea of the [domains you request](../../advanced/dns-overview/_index.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).
|
||||
|
||||
Using a VPN hides even this information from your ISP, by shifting the trust you place in your network to a server somewhere else in the world. As a result, the ISP then only sees that you are connected to a VPN and nothing about the activity that you're passing through it.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -46,9 +46,9 @@ VPNs cannot encrypt data outside the connection between your device and the VPN
|
||||
|
||||
## When isn't a VPN suitable?
|
||||
|
||||
Using a VPN in cases where you're using your [real-life or well-known identity](common-misconceptions.md#complicated-is-better) online is unlikely to be useful. Doing so may trigger spam and fraud detection systems, such as if you were to log into your bank's website.
|
||||
Using a VPN in cases where you're using your [real-life or well-known identity](../common-misconceptions/_index.md#complicated-is-better) online is unlikely to be useful. Doing so may trigger spam and fraud detection systems, such as if you were to log into your bank's website.
|
||||
|
||||
It's important to remember that a VPN will not provide you with absolute anonymity because the VPN provider itself will still have access to your real IP address, destination website information, and often a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. "No logging" policies are merely a promise; if you need complete safety from the network itself, consider using [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview/_index.md) in addition to or instead of a VPN.
|
||||
It's important to remember that a VPN will not provide you with absolute anonymity because the VPN provider itself will still have access to your real IP address, destination website information, and often a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. "No logging" policies are merely a promise; if you need complete safety from the network itself, consider using [Tor](../../advanced/tor-overview/_index.md) in addition to or instead of a VPN.
|
||||
|
||||
You also should not trust a VPN to secure your connection to an unencrypted, HTTP destination. In order to keep what you actually do on the websites you visit private and secure, you must use HTTPS. This will keep your passwords, session tokens, and queries safe from the VPN provider and other potential adversaries in between the VPN server and your destination. You should enable HTTPS-only mode in your browser (if it's supported) to mitigate attacks which try to downgrade your connection from HTTPS to HTTP.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -60,9 +60,9 @@ Another common reason encrypted DNS is recommended is that it prevents DNS spoof
|
||||
|
||||
## Should I use Tor *and* a VPN?
|
||||
|
||||
Maybe, Tor is not necessarily suitable for everybody in the first place. Consider your [threat model](threat-modeling.md), because if your adversary is not capable of extracting information from your VPN provider, using a VPN alone may provide enough protection.
|
||||
Maybe, Tor is not necessarily suitable for everybody in the first place. Consider your [threat model](../threat-modeling/_index.md), because if your adversary is not capable of extracting information from your VPN provider, using a VPN alone may provide enough protection.
|
||||
|
||||
If you do use Tor then you are *probably* best off connecting to the Tor network via a commercial VPN provider. However, this is a complex subject which we've written more about on our [Tor overview](../advanced/tor-overview/_index.md) page.
|
||||
If you do use Tor then you are *probably* best off connecting to the Tor network via a commercial VPN provider. However, this is a complex subject which we've written more about on our [Tor overview](../../advanced/tor-overview/_index.md) page.
|
||||
|
||||
## Should I access Tor through VPN providers that provide "Tor nodes"?
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Many people get the concepts of **privacy**, **security**, and **anonymity** con
|
||||
|
||||
All of these concepts overlap, but it is possible to have any combination of these. The sweet spot for most people is when all three of these concepts overlap. However, it's trickier to achieve than many initially believe. Sometimes, you have to compromise on some of these, and that's okay too. This is where **threat modeling** comes into play, allowing you to make informed decisions about the [software and services](../../tools/_index.md) you use.
|
||||
|
||||
[:material-book-outline: Learn More About Threat Modeling](threat-modeling.md){ .md-button }
|
||||
[:material-book-outline: Learn More About Threat Modeling](../threat-modeling/_index.md){ .md-button }
|
||||
|
||||
## Privacy vs. Secrecy
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/android
|
||||
description: Android is an open-source operating system with strong security protections, which makes it our top choice for phones.
|
||||
robots: nofollow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large
|
||||
---
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ If you have a Google account we suggest enrolling in the [Advanced Protection Pr
|
||||
|
||||
The Advanced Protection Program provides enhanced threat monitoring and enables:
|
||||
|
||||
- Stricter two-factor authentication; e.g. that [FIDO](../../basics/multi-factor-authentication/_index.md#fido-fast-identity-online) **must** be used and disallows the use of [SMS OTPs](../../basics/multi-factor-authentication/_index.md#sms-or-email-mfa), [TOTP](../../basics/multi-factor-authentication/_index.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp) and [OAuth](../../basics/account-creation.md#sign-in-with-oauth)
|
||||
- Stricter two-factor authentication; e.g. that [FIDO](../../basics/multi-factor-authentication/_index.md#fido-fast-identity-online) **must** be used and disallows the use of [SMS OTPs](../../basics/multi-factor-authentication/_index.md#sms-or-email-mfa), [TOTP](../../basics/multi-factor-authentication/_index.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp) and [OAuth](../../basics/account-creation/_index.md#sign-in-with-oauth)
|
||||
- Only Google and verified third-party apps can access account data
|
||||
- Scanning of incoming emails on Gmail accounts for [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing#Email_phishing) attempts
|
||||
- Stricter [safe browser scanning](https://google.com/chrome/privacy/whitepaper.html#malware) with Google Chrome
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is l
|
||||
|
||||
Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make trade-offs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security.
|
||||
|
||||
Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** → **Passcode Options** → **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](../../basics/passwords-overview.md).
|
||||
Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** → **Passcode Options** → **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](../../basics/passwords-overview/_index.md).
|
||||
|
||||
If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -226,11 +226,11 @@ When an app prompts you for access to your device's photo library, iOS provides
|
||||
|
||||
Rather than allow an app to access all the photos on your device, you can allow it to only access whichever photos you choose by tapping the "Select Photos..." option in the permission dialog. You can change photo access permissions at any time by navigating to **Settings** → **Privacy & Security** → **Photos**.
|
||||
|
||||
 
|
||||
 
|
||||
|
||||
**Add Photos Only** is a permission that only gives an app the ability to download photos to the photo library. Not all apps which request photo library access provide this option.
|
||||
|
||||
 
|
||||
 
|
||||
|
||||
Some apps also support **Private Access**, which functions similarly to the **Limited Access** permission. However, photos shared to apps using Private Access include their location by default. We recommend unchecking this setting if you do not [remove photo metadata](../../../tools/software/data-redaction/_index.md) beforehand.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ Some apps also support **Private Access**, which functions similarly to the **Li
|
||||
|
||||
Similarly, rather than allow an app to access all the contacts saved on your device, you can allow it to only access whichever contacts you choose. You can change contact access permissions at any time by navigating to **Settings** → **Privacy & Security** → **Contacts**.
|
||||
|
||||
 
|
||||
 
|
||||
|
||||
### Require Biometrics and Hide Apps
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to h
|
||||
|
||||
### Before First Unlock
|
||||
|
||||
If your threat model includes [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](../../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } that involve forensic tools, and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation.
|
||||
If your threat model includes [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](../../basics/common-threats/_index.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } that involve forensic tools, and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation.
|
||||
|
||||
iPhones [automatically reboot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/protecting-user-data-in-the-face-of-attack-secf5549a4f5/1/web/1#:~:text=On%20an%20iPhone%20or%20iPad%20with%20iOS%2018%20and%20iPadOS%2018%20or%20later%2C%20a%20new%20security%20protection%20will%20restart%20devices%20if%20they%20remain%20locked%20for%20a%20prolonged%20period%20of%20time.) if they're not unlocked after a period of time.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ There are some notable security concerns with Linux which you should be aware of
|
||||
|
||||
### Open-Source Security
|
||||
|
||||
It is a [common misconception](../../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software are inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security).
|
||||
It is a [common misconception](../../basics/common-misconceptions/_index.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software are inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security).
|
||||
|
||||
In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re
|
||||
|
||||
For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit).
|
||||
|
||||
Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations){ .pg-viridian }, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository).
|
||||
Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../../basics/common-threats/_index.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations){ .pg-viridian }, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository).
|
||||
|
||||
The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Eth
|
||||
|
||||
### Other Identifiers
|
||||
|
||||
There are other system identifiers which you may wish to be careful about. You should give this some thought to see if it applies to your [threat model](../../basics/threat-modeling.md):
|
||||
There are other system identifiers which you may wish to be careful about. You should give this some thought to see if it applies to your [threat model](../../basics/threat-modeling/_index.md):
|
||||
|
||||
- **Hostnames:** Your system's hostname is shared with the networks you connect to. You should avoid including identifying terms like your name or operating system in your hostname, instead sticking to generic terms or random strings.
|
||||
- **Usernames:** Similarly, your username is used in a variety of ways across your system. Consider using generic terms like "user" rather than your actual name.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -180,10 +180,10 @@ System Integrity Protection makes critical file locations read-only to protect a
|
||||
|
||||
##### App Sandbox
|
||||
|
||||
On macOS, whether an app is sandboxed is determined by the developer when they sign it. The [App Sandbox](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/xcode/configuring-the-macos-app-sandbox) protects against vulnerabilities in the apps you run by limiting what a malicious actor can access in the event that the app is exploited. The App Sandbox *alone* can't protect against [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations){ .pg-viridian } by malicious developers. For that, sandboxing needs to be enforced by someone other than the developer themselves, as it is on the [App Store](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/gatekeeper-and-runtime-protection-sec5599b66df/1/web/1#:~:text=All%20apps%20from%20the%20App%20Store%20are%20sandboxed%20to%20restrict%20access%20to%20data%20stored%20by%20other%20apps.).
|
||||
On macOS, whether an app is sandboxed is determined by the developer when they sign it. The [App Sandbox](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/xcode/configuring-the-macos-app-sandbox) protects against vulnerabilities in the apps you run by limiting what a malicious actor can access in the event that the app is exploited. The App Sandbox *alone* can't protect against [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../../basics/common-threats/_index.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations){ .pg-viridian } by malicious developers. For that, sandboxing needs to be enforced by someone other than the developer themselves, as it is on the [App Store](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/gatekeeper-and-runtime-protection-sec5599b66df/1/web/1#:~:text=All%20apps%20from%20the%20App%20Store%20are%20sandboxed%20to%20restrict%20access%20to%20data%20stored%20by%20other%20apps.).
|
||||
|
||||
> [!WARNING]
|
||||
> Software downloaded from outside the official App Store is not required to be sandboxed. If your threat model prioritizes defending against [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](../../basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }, then you may want to check if the software you download outside the App Store is sandboxed, which is up to the developer to *opt in*.
|
||||
> Software downloaded from outside the official App Store is not required to be sandboxed. If your threat model prioritizes defending against [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](../../basics/common-threats/_index.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }, then you may want to check if the software you download outside the App Store is sandboxed, which is up to the developer to *opt in*.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
You can check if an app uses the App Sandbox in a few ways:
|
||||
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ If an app is sandboxed, you should see the following output:
|
||||
[Bool] true
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
If you find that the app you want to run is not sandboxed, then you may employ methods of [compartmentalization](../../basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy) such as virtual machines or separate devices, use a similar app that is sandboxed, or choose to not use the non-sandboxed app altogether.
|
||||
If you find that the app you want to run is not sandboxed, then you may employ methods of [compartmentalization](../../basics/common-threats/_index.md#security-and-privacy) such as virtual machines or separate devices, use a similar app that is sandboxed, or choose to not use the non-sandboxed app altogether.
|
||||
|
||||
##### Hardened Runtime
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,17 +16,17 @@ Some of the information here and on the Qubes OS documentation may contain confl
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
<figcaption>Qubes Architecture, Credit: What is Qubes OS Intro</figcaption>
|
||||
|
||||
Each qube has a [colored border](https://qubes-os.org/screenshots) that can help you keep track of the domain in which it runs. You could, for example, use a specific color for your banking browser, while using a different color for a general untrusted browser.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
<figcaption>Qubes window borders, Credit: Qubes Screenshots</figcaption>
|
||||
|
||||
## Why Should I use Qubes?
|
||||
|
||||
Qubes OS is useful if your [threat model](../../basics/threat-modeling.md) requires strong security and isolation, such as if you think you'll be opening untrusted files from untrusted sources. A typical reason for using Qubes OS is to open documents from unknown sources, but the idea is that if a single qube is compromised it won't affect the rest of the system.
|
||||
Qubes OS is useful if your [threat model](../../basics/threat-modeling/_index.md) requires strong security and isolation, such as if you think you'll be opening untrusted files from untrusted sources. A typical reason for using Qubes OS is to open documents from unknown sources, but the idea is that if a single qube is compromised it won't affect the rest of the system.
|
||||
|
||||
Qubes OS utilizes [dom0](https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Dom0) Xen VM for controlling other *qubes* on the host OS, all of which display individual application windows within dom0's desktop environment. There are many uses for this type of architecture. Here are some tasks you can perform. You can see just how much more secure these processes are made by incorporating multiple steps.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
title: Group Policy Settings
|
||||
description: A quick guide to configuring Group Policy to make Windows a bit more privacy respecting.
|
||||
---
|
||||
Outside modifying the registry itself, the **Local Group Policy Editor** is the most powerful way to change many aspects of your system without installing third-party tools. Changing these settings requires [Pro Edition](_index.md#windows-editions) or better.
|
||||
Outside modifying the registry itself, the **Local Group Policy Editor** is the most powerful way to change many aspects of your system without installing third-party tools. Changing these settings requires [Pro Edition](../_index.md#windows-editions) or better.
|
||||
|
||||
These settings should be set on a brand-new installation of Windows. Setting them on your existing installation should work, but may introduce unpredictable behavior and is done at your own risk.
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user