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@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ title: "Qubes Overview"
icon: simple/qubesos
description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within *qubes* (formerly "VMs") for heightened security.
---
[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated *qubes*, (which are Virtual Machines). You can assign each *qube* a level of trust based on its purpose. Qubes OS provides security by using isolation. It only permits actions on a per-case basis and therefore is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb).
[**Qubes OS**](../../../tools/os/desktop/_index.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated *qubes*, (which are Virtual Machines). You can assign each *qube* a level of trust based on its purpose. Qubes OS provides security by using isolation. It only permits actions on a per-case basis and therefore is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb).
## How does Qubes OS work?
Qubes uses [compartmentalization](https://qubes-os.org/intro) to keep the system secure. Qubes are created from templates, the defaults being for Fedora, Debian and [Whonix](../desktop.md#whonix). Qubes OS also allows you to create once-use [disposable](https://qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-use-disposables) *qubes*.
Qubes uses [compartmentalization](https://qubes-os.org/intro) to keep the system secure. Qubes are created from templates, the defaults being for Fedora, Debian and [Whonix](../../../tools/os/desktop/_index.md#whonix). Qubes OS also allows you to create once-use [disposable](https://qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-use-disposables) *qubes*.
<details class="note" markdown>
<summary>The term <em>qubes</em> is gradually being updated to avoid referring to them as "virtual machines".</summary>
@@ -16,17 +16,17 @@ Some of the information here and on the Qubes OS documentation may contain confl
</details>
![Qubes architecture](../assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png)
![Qubes architecture](/assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png)
<figcaption>Qubes Architecture, Credit: What is Qubes OS Intro</figcaption>
Each qube has a [colored border](https://qubes-os.org/screenshots) that can help you keep track of the domain in which it runs. You could, for example, use a specific color for your banking browser, while using a different color for a general untrusted browser.
![Colored border](../assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png)
![Colored border](/assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png)
<figcaption>Qubes window borders, Credit: Qubes Screenshots</figcaption>
## Why Should I use Qubes?
Qubes OS is useful if your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md) requires strong security and isolation, such as if you think you'll be opening untrusted files from untrusted sources. A typical reason for using Qubes OS is to open documents from unknown sources, but the idea is that if a single qube is compromised it won't affect the rest of the system.
Qubes OS is useful if your [threat model](../../basics/threat-modeling.md) requires strong security and isolation, such as if you think you'll be opening untrusted files from untrusted sources. A typical reason for using Qubes OS is to open documents from unknown sources, but the idea is that if a single qube is compromised it won't affect the rest of the system.
Qubes OS utilizes [dom0](https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Dom0) Xen VM for controlling other *qubes* on the host OS, all of which display individual application windows within dom0's desktop environment. There are many uses for this type of architecture. Here are some tasks you can perform. You can see just how much more secure these processes are made by incorporating multiple steps.
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
## Connecting to Tor via a VPN
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
We [recommend](../../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../../../tools/services/vpn/_index.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@ Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| <mark>sys-proxyvm</mark> | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | <mark>sys-proxyvm</mark> |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## Additional Resources
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