1
1
mirror of https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org.git synced 2026-05-31 15:39:12 +00:00

style!: Convert wiki articles to Hugo formatting

This commit is contained in:
2026-05-13 00:29:52 -05:00
parent 5a6d219c29
commit abf140ce8e
47 changed files with 211 additions and 281 deletions
+4 -7
View File
@@ -29,16 +29,13 @@ There are usually multiple ways to sign up for an account, each with their own b
The most common way to create a new account is by an email address and password. When using this method, you should use a password manager and follow [best practices](passwords-overview.md) regarding passwords.
<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Tip</p>
> [!TIP]
> You can use your password manager to organize other authentication methods too! Just add the new entry and fill the appropriate fields, you can add notes for things like security questions or a backup key.
You can use your password manager to organize other authentication methods too! Just add the new entry and fill the appropriate fields, you can add notes for things like security questions or a backup key.
</div>
You will be responsible for managing your login credentials. For added security, you can set up [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md) on your accounts.
[Recommended password managers](../passwords.md){ .md-button }
[Recommended password managers](../../tools/software/passwords/_index.md){ .md-button }
#### Email aliases
@@ -46,7 +43,7 @@ If you don't want to give your real email address to a service, you have the opt
Should a service get hacked, you might start receiving phishing or spam emails to the address you used to sign up. Using unique aliases for each service can assist in identifying exactly what service was hacked.
[Recommended email aliasing services](../email-aliasing.md){ .md-button }
[Recommended email aliasing services](../../tools/services/email-aliasing/_index.md){ .md-button }
### "Sign in with..." (OAuth)
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Over time, it can be easy to accumulate a number of online accounts, many of whi
If you have a password manager that you've used for your entire digital life, this part will be very easy. Oftentimes, they include built-in functionality for detecting if your credentials were exposed in a data breach—such as Bitwarden's [Data Breach Report](https://bitwarden.com/blog/have-you-been-pwned).
<figure markdown>
![Bitwarden's Data Breach Report feature](../assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png)
![Bitwarden's Data Breach Report feature](/assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png)
</figure>
Even if you haven't explicitly used a password manager before, there's a chance you've used the one in your browser ([Firefox](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/password-manager-remember-delete-edit-logins), [Chrome](https://passwords.google.com/intro), [Edge](https://support.microsoft.com/microsoft-edge/save-or-forget-passwords-in-microsoft-edge-b4beecb0-f2a8-1ca0-f26f-9ec247a3f336)) or your phone ([Google](https://passwords.google.com/intro) on stock Android, [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/HT211146) on iOS) without even realizing it.
@@ -43,13 +43,13 @@ Residents of the EEA have additional rights regarding data erasure specified in
In some situations where you plan to abandon an account, it may make sense to overwrite the account information with fake data. Once you've made sure you can log in, change all the information in your account to falsified information. The reason for this is that many sites will retain information you previously had even after account deletion. The hope is that they will overwrite the previous information with the newest data you entered. However, there is no guarantee that there won't be backups with the prior information.
For the account email, either create a new alternate email account via your provider of choice or create an alias using an [email aliasing service](../email-aliasing.md). You can then delete your alternate email address once you are done. We recommend against using temporary email providers, as oftentimes it is possible to reactivate temporary emails.
For the account email, either create a new alternate email account via your provider of choice or create an alias using an [email aliasing service](../../tools/services/email-aliasing/_index.md). You can then delete your alternate email address once you are done. We recommend against using temporary email providers, as oftentimes it is possible to reactivate temporary emails.
### Delete
You can check [JustDeleteMe](https://justdeleteme.xyz) for instructions on deleting the account for a specific service. Some sites will graciously have a "Delete Account" option, while others will go as far as to force you to speak with a support agent. The deletion process can vary from site to site, with account deletion being impossible on some.
For services that don't allow account deletion, the best thing to do is falsify all your information as previously mentioned and strengthen account security. To do so, enable [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md) and any extra security features offered. As well, change the password to a randomly-generated one that is the maximum allowed size (a [password manager](../passwords.md) can be useful for this).
For services that don't allow account deletion, the best thing to do is falsify all your information as previously mentioned and strengthen account security. To do so, enable [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md) and any extra security features offered. As well, change the password to a randomly-generated one that is the maximum allowed size (a [password manager](../../tools/software/passwords/_index.md) can be useful for this).
If you're satisfied that all information you care about is removed, you can safely forget about this account. If not, it might be a good idea to keep the credentials stored with your other passwords and occasionally re-login to reset the password.
Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 27 KiB

+8 -12
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: Privacy isn't a straightforward topic, and it's easy to get caught
## "Open-source software is always secure" or "Proprietary software is more secure"
These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis.
These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. <mark>Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.</mark> When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis.
Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations){ .pg-viridian }, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1]
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ We talk about "shifting trust" a lot when discussing solutions like VPNs (which
## "Privacy-focused solutions are inherently trustworthy"
Focusing solely on the privacy policies and marketing of a tool or provider can blind you to its weaknesses. When you're looking for a more private solution, you should determine what the underlying problem is and find technical solutions to that problem. For example, you may want to avoid Google Drive, which gives Google access to all of your data. The underlying problem in this case is lack of E2EE, so you should make sure that the provider you switch to actually implements E2EE, or use a tool (like [Cryptomator](../encryption.md#cryptomator-cloud)) which provides E2EE on any cloud provider. Switching to a "privacy-focused" provider (that doesn't implement E2EE) doesn't solve your problem: it just shifts trust from Google to that provider.
Focusing solely on the privacy policies and marketing of a tool or provider can blind you to its weaknesses. When you're looking for a more private solution, you should determine what the underlying problem is and find technical solutions to that problem. For example, you may want to avoid Google Drive, which gives Google access to all of your data. The underlying problem in this case is lack of E2EE, so you should make sure that the provider you switch to actually implements E2EE, or use a tool (like [Cryptomator](../../tools/software/encryption/_index.md#cryptomator-cloud)) which provides E2EE on any cloud provider. Switching to a "privacy-focused" provider (that doesn't implement E2EE) doesn't solve your problem: it just shifts trust from Google to that provider.
The privacy policies and business practices of providers you choose are very important, but should be considered secondary to technical guarantees of your privacy: You shouldn't shift trust to another provider when trusting a provider isn't a requirement at all.
@@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ We often see people describing privacy threat models that are overly complex. Of
Finding the "best" solution for yourself doesn't necessarily mean you are after an infallible solution with dozens of conditions—these solutions are often difficult to work with realistically. As we discussed previously, security often comes at the cost of convenience. Below, we provide some tips:
1. ==Actions need to serve a particular purpose:== think about how to do what you want with the fewest actions.
2. ==Remove human failure points:== We fail, get tired, and forget things. To maintain security, avoid relying on manual conditions and processes that you have to remember.
3. ==Use the right level of protection for what you intend.== We often see recommendations of so-called law-enforcement or subpoena-proof solutions. These often require specialist knowledge and generally aren't what people want. There's no point in building an intricate threat model for anonymity if you can be easily deanonymized by a simple oversight.
1. <mark>Actions need to serve a particular purpose:</mark> think about how to do what you want with the fewest actions.
2. <mark>Remove human failure points:</mark> We fail, get tired, and forget things. To maintain security, avoid relying on manual conditions and processes that you have to remember.
3. <mark>Use the right level of protection for what you intend.</mark> We often see recommendations of so-called law-enforcement or subpoena-proof solutions. These often require specialist knowledge and generally aren't what people want. There's no point in building an intricate threat model for anonymity if you can be easily deanonymized by a simple oversight.
So, how might this look?
@@ -45,16 +45,12 @@ One of the clearest threat models is one where people *know who you are* and one
We don't suggest using a VPN or Tor for any of these things, as your identity is already known through other means.
<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Tip</p>
When shopping online, the use of a [parcel locker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parcel_locker) can help keep your physical address private.
</div>
> [!TIP]
> When shopping online, the use of a [parcel locker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parcel_locker) can help keep your physical address private.
2. **Unknown identity** - An unknown identity could be a stable pseudonym that you regularly use. It is not anonymous because it doesn't change. If you're part of an online community, you may wish to retain a persona that others know. This pseudonym isn't anonymous because—if monitored for long enough—details about the owner can reveal further information, such as the way they write, their general knowledge about topics of interest, etc.
You may wish to use a VPN for this, to mask your IP address. Financial transactions are more difficult to mask: You could consider using anonymous cryptocurrencies, such as [Monero](../cryptocurrency.md#monero). Employing altcoin shifting may also help to disguise where your currency originated. Typically, exchanges require KYC (know your customer) to be completed before they'll allow you to exchange fiat currency into any kind of cryptocurrency. Local meet-up options may also be a solution; however, those are often more expensive and sometimes also require KYC.
You may wish to use a VPN for this, to mask your IP address. Financial transactions are more difficult to mask: You could consider using anonymous cryptocurrencies, such as [Monero](../../tools/software/cryptocurrency/_index.md#monero). Employing altcoin shifting may also help to disguise where your currency originated. Typically, exchanges require KYC (know your customer) to be completed before they'll allow you to exchange fiat currency into any kind of cryptocurrency. Local meet-up options may also be a solution; however, those are often more expensive and sometimes also require KYC.
3. **Anonymous identity** - Even with experience, anonymous identities are difficult to maintain over long periods of time. They should be short-term and short-lived identities which are rotated regularly.
+17 -22
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ weight: 30
description: Your threat model is personal to you, but these are some of the things many visitors to this site care about.
---
Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat.
Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. <mark>You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities</mark>, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat.
<span class="pg-purple">:material-incognito: **Anonymity**</span>
@@ -62,14 +62,11 @@ When it comes to application security, we generally don't (and sometimes can't)
To minimize the damage that a malicious piece of software *could* do, you should employ security by compartmentalization. For example, this could come in the form of using different computers for different jobs, using virtual machines to separate different groups of related applications, or using a secure operating system with a strong focus on application sandboxing and mandatory access control.
<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Tip</p>
> [!TIP]
> Mobile operating systems generally have better application sandboxing than desktop operating systems: Apps can't obtain root access, and require permission for access to system resources.
>
> Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS has similar sandboxing capabilities to Android, and macOS has full system permission control (and developers can opt in to sandboxing for applications). However, these operating systems do transmit identifying information to their respective OEMs. Linux tends to not submit information to system vendors, but it has poor protection against exploits and malicious apps. This can be mitigated somewhat with specialized distributions which make significant use of virtual machines or containers, such as [Qubes OS](../../tools/os/desktop/_index.md#qubes-os).
Mobile operating systems generally have better application sandboxing than desktop operating systems: Apps can't obtain root access, and require permission for access to system resources.
Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS has similar sandboxing capabilities to Android, and macOS has full system permission control (and developers can opt in to sandboxing for applications). However, these operating systems do transmit identifying information to their respective OEMs. Linux tends to not submit information to system vendors, but it has poor protection against exploits and malicious apps. This can be mitigated somewhat with specialized distributions which make significant use of virtual machines or containers, such as [Qubes OS](../desktop.md#qubes-os).
</div>
## Attacks against Specific Individuals
@@ -77,12 +74,9 @@ Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS ha
Targeted attacks against a specific person are more problematic to deal with. Common attacks include sending malicious documents via email, exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g. in browsers and operating systems), and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you should employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies.
<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Tip</p>
> [!TIP]
> By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typically run untrusted code, sent to you from third parties. Running multiple virtual machines—to separate applications like these from your host system, as well as each other—is one technique you can use to mitigate the chance of an exploit in these applications compromising the rest of your system. For example, technologies like Qubes OS or Microsoft Defender Application Guard on Windows provide convenient methods to do this.
By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typically run untrusted code, sent to you from third parties. Running multiple virtual machines—to separate applications like these from your host system, as well as each other—is one technique you can use to mitigate the chance of an exploit in these applications compromising the rest of your system. For example, technologies like Qubes OS or Microsoft Defender Application Guard on Windows provide convenient methods to do this.
</div>
If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user.
@@ -92,6 +86,7 @@ If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating syst
Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of <span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: Targeted Attack</span> towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well.
<!-- TODO: Admonition -->
<div class="admonition example" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Example</p>
@@ -123,10 +118,11 @@ The obvious problem with this is that the service provider (or a hacker who has
Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between you and your desired recipients before they are even sent to the server. The confidentiality of your messages is guaranteed, assuming the service provider doesn't have access to the private keys of either party.
<!-- TODO: Admonition -->
<div class="admonition note" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Note on Web-based Encryption</p>
In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering).
In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../../tools/services/messengers/_index.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering).
On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt.
@@ -142,6 +138,7 @@ Even with E2EE, service providers can still profile you based on **metadata**, w
Mass surveillance is the intricate effort to monitor the "behavior, many activities, or information" of an entire (or substantial fraction of a) population.[^1] It often refers to government programs, such as the ones [disclosed by Edward Snowden in 2013](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_surveillance_disclosures_(2013%E2%80%93present)). However, it can also be carried out by corporations, either on behalf of government agencies or by their own initiative.
<!-- TODO: Admonition -->
<div class="admonition abstract" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Atlas of Surveillance</p>
@@ -153,6 +150,7 @@ In France, you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolic
Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.
<!-- TODO: Admonition -->
<div class="admonition quote" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">ACLU: <em><a href="https://aclu.org/news/national-security/the-privacy-lesson-of-9-11-mass-surveillance-is-not-the-way-forward">The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward</a></em></p>
@@ -202,16 +200,13 @@ Censorship online can be carried out (to varying degrees) by actors including to
Censorship on corporate platforms is increasingly common, as platforms like Twitter and Facebook give in to public demand, market pressures, and pressures from government agencies. Government pressures can be covert requests to businesses, such as the White House [requesting the takedown](https://nytimes.com/2012/09/17/technology/on-the-web-a-fine-line-on-free-speech-across-globe.html) of a provocative YouTube video, or overt, such as the Chinese government requiring companies to adhere to a strict regime of censorship.
People concerned with the threat of censorship can use technologies like [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) to circumvent it, and support censorship-resistant communication platforms like [Matrix](../social-networks.md#element), which doesn't have a centralized account authority that can close accounts arbitrarily.
People concerned with the threat of censorship can use technologies like [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) to circumvent it, and support censorship-resistant communication platforms like [Matrix](../../tools/software/social-networks/_index.md#element), which doesn't have a centralized account authority that can close accounts arbitrarily.
<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Tip</p>
> [!TIP]
> While evading censorship itself can be easy, hiding the fact that you are doing it can be very problematic.
>
> You should consider which aspects of the network your adversary can observe, and whether you have plausible deniability for your actions. For example, using [encrypted DNS](../advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns) can help you bypass rudimentary, DNS-based censorship systems, but it can't truly hide what you are visiting from your ISP. A VPN or Tor can help hide what you are visiting from network administrators, but can't hide that you're using those networks in the first place. Pluggable transports (such as Obfs4proxy, Meek, or Shadowsocks) can help you evade firewalls that block common VPN protocols or Tor, but your circumvention attempts can still be detected by methods like probing or [deep packet inspection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection).
While evading censorship itself can be easy, hiding the fact that you are doing it can be very problematic.
You should consider which aspects of the network your adversary can observe, and whether you have plausible deniability for your actions. For example, using [encrypted DNS](../advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns) can help you bypass rudimentary, DNS-based censorship systems, but it can't truly hide what you are visiting from your ISP. A VPN or Tor can help hide what you are visiting from network administrators, but can't hide that you're using those networks in the first place. Pluggable transports (such as Obfs4proxy, Meek, or Shadowsocks) can help you evade firewalls that block common VPN protocols or Tor, but your circumvention attempts can still be detected by methods like probing or [deep packet inspection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection).
</div>
You must always consider the risks of trying to bypass censorship, the potential consequences, and how sophisticated your adversary may be. You should be cautious with your software selection, and have a backup plan in case you are caught.
+5 -5
View File
@@ -11,9 +11,9 @@ As a result, email is best used for receiving transactional emails (like notific
## Email Encryption Overview
The standard way to add E2EE to emails between different email providers is by using OpenPGP. There are different implementations of the OpenPGP standard, the most common being [GnuPG](../encryption.md#gnu-privacy-guard) and [OpenPGP.js](https://openpgpjs.org).
The standard way to add E2EE to emails between different email providers is by using OpenPGP. There are different implementations of the OpenPGP standard, the most common being [GnuPG](../../tools/software/encryption/_index.md#gnu-privacy-guard) and [OpenPGP.js](https://openpgpjs.org).
Even if you use OpenPGP, it does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if the private key of either you or the message recipient is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. This is why we recommend [instant messengers](../real-time-communication.md) which implement forward secrecy over email for person-to-person communications whenever possible.
Even if you use OpenPGP, it does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if the private key of either you or the message recipient is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. This is why we recommend [instant messengers](../../tools/services/messengers/_index.md) which implement forward secrecy over email for person-to-person communications whenever possible.
There is another standard which is popular with business called [S/MIME](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME), however it requires a certificate issued from a [Certificate Authority](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) (not all of them issue S/MIME certificates, and often a yearly payment is required). In some cases it is more usable than PGP because it has support in popular/mainstream email applications like Apple Mail, [Google Workplace](https://support.google.com/a/topic/9061730), and [Outlook](https://support.office.com/article/encrypt-messages-by-using-s-mime-in-outlook-on-the-web-878c79fc-7088-4b39-966f-14512658f480). However, S/MIME does not solve the issue of lack of forward secrecy, and isn't particularly more secure than PGP.
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ There is another standard which is popular with business called [S/MIME](https:/
The [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD) standard allows email clients to discover the OpenPGP key for other mailboxes, even those hosted on a different provider. Email clients which support WKD will ask the recipient's server for a key based on the email address' domain name. For example, if you emailed `jonah@privacyguides.org`, your email client would ask `privacyguides.org` for Jonah's OpenPGP key, and if `privacyguides.org` has a key for that account, your message would be automatically encrypted.
In addition to the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md) which support WKD, some webmail providers also support WKD. Whether *your own* key is published to WKD for others to use depends on your domain configuration. If you use an [email provider](../email.md#openpgp-compatible-services) which supports WKD, such as Proton Mail or Mailbox Mail, they can publish your OpenPGP key on their domain for you.
In addition to the [email clients we recommend](../../tools/software/email-clients/_index.md) which support WKD, some webmail providers also support WKD. Whether *your own* key is published to WKD for others to use depends on your domain configuration. If you use an [email provider](../../tools/services/email/_index.md#openpgp-compatible-services) which supports WKD, such as Proton Mail or Mailbox Mail, they can publish your OpenPGP key on their domain for you.
If you use your own custom domain, you will need to configure WKD separately. If you control your domain name, you can set up WKD regardless of your email provider. One easy way to do this is to use the "[WKD as a Service](https://keys.openpgp.org/about/usage#wkd-as-a-service)" feature from the `keys.openpgp.org` server: Set a CNAME record on the `openpgpkey` subdomain of your domain pointed to `wkd.keys.openpgp.org`, then upload your key to [keys.openpgp.org](https://keys.openpgp.org). Alternatively, you can [self-host WKD on your own web server](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKDHosting).
@@ -29,11 +29,11 @@ If you use a shared domain from a provider which doesn't support WKD, like `@gma
### What Email Clients Support E2EE?
Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md). Depending on the authentication method, this may lead to decreased security if either the provider or the email client does not support [OAuth](account-creation.md#sign-in-with-oauth) or a bridge application as [multifactor authentication](multi-factor-authentication.md) is not possible with plain password authentication.
Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../../tools/software/email-clients/_index.md). Depending on the authentication method, this may lead to decreased security if either the provider or the email client does not support [OAuth](account-creation.md#sign-in-with-oauth) or a bridge application as [multifactor authentication](multi-factor-authentication.md) is not possible with plain password authentication.
### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
A smart card (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smart card and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
A smart card (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../../tools/hardware/security-keys/_index.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smart card and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smart card to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.
+12 -24
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Some devices will have a "hardware security program", which is a collaboration b
- [Windows Secured-core PCs](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-highly-secure-11) meet a higher security criteria specified by Microsoft. These protections aren't only applicable to Windows users; Users of other operating systems can still take advantage of features like [DMA protection](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt) and the ability to completely distrust Microsoft certificates.
- [Android Ready SE](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) is a collaboration between vendors to ensure their devices follow [best practices](https://source.android.com/docs/security/best-practices/hardware) and include tamper resistant hardware backed storage for things like encryption keys.
- macOS running on an Apple SoC takes advantage of [hardware security](../os/macos-overview.md#hardware-security) which may not be available with third party operating systems.
- macOS running on an Apple SoC takes advantage of [hardware security](../os/macos/_index.md#hardware-security) which may not be available with third party operating systems.
- [ChromeOS security](https://chromium.org/chromium-os/developer-library/reference/security/security-whitepaper) is at its best when running on a Chromebook as it is able to make use of available hardware features such as the [hardware root-of-trust](https://chromium.org/chromium-os/developer-library/reference/security/security-whitepaper/#hardware-root-of-trust-and-verified-boot).
Even if you don't use these operating systems, participation in these programs may indicate that the manufacturer is following best practices when it comes to hardware security and updates.
@@ -37,12 +37,9 @@ If you build your own PC, you may need to manually update your motherboard's fir
Most computers and phones come equipped with a TPM (or a similar secure cryptoprocessor) which safely stores your encryption keys and handles other security-related functions. If you're currently using a machine that doesn't have one of these, you might benefit from purchasing a newer computer that has this feature. Some desktop and server motherboards have a "TPM header" which can accept a small accessory board containing the TPM.
<div class="admonition Note" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Note</p>
> [!NOTE]
> Virtual TPMs are susceptible to side-channel attacks and external TPMs, as a result of being separate from the CPU on the motherboard, are vulnerable to [sniffing](https://pulsesecurity.co.nz/articles/TPM-sniffing) when an attacker has access to the hardware. The solution to this problem is to include the secure processor inside the CPU itself, which is the case for Apple's chips and Microsoft's [Pluton](https://microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2020/11/17/meet-the-microsoft-pluton-processor-the-security-chip-designed-for-the-future-of-windows-pcs).
Virtual TPMs are susceptible to side-channel attacks and external TPMs, as a result of being separate from the CPU on the motherboard, are vulnerable to [sniffing](https://pulsesecurity.co.nz/articles/TPM-sniffing) when an attacker has access to the hardware. The solution to this problem is to include the secure processor inside the CPU itself, which is the case for Apple's chips and Microsoft's [Pluton](https://microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2020/11/17/meet-the-microsoft-pluton-processor-the-security-chip-designed-for-the-future-of-windows-pcs).
</div>
### Biometrics
@@ -52,18 +49,15 @@ Biometrics can prevent someone from watching you type in your password, so if sh
Most implementations of face authentication require you to be looking at your phone and also only work from a relatively close distance, so you don't need to worry too much about someone pointing your phone at your face to unlock it without your consent. You can still disable biometrics when your phone is locked if you want. On iOS, you can hold the side button and a volume button for 3 seconds to disable Face ID on models that support it. On Android, hold the power button and press Lockdown on the menu.
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
> [!WARNING]
> Some devices do not have the proper hardware for secure face authentication. There are two main types of face authentication: 2D and 3D. 3D face authentication makes use of a dot projector that lets the device create a 3D depth map of your face. Make sure that your device has this capability.
Some devices do not have the proper hardware for secure face authentication. There are two main types of face authentication: 2D and 3D. 3D face authentication makes use of a dot projector that lets the device create a 3D depth map of your face. Make sure that your device has this capability.
</div>
Android defines three [security classes](https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/biometric/measure#biometric-classes) for biometrics; you should check that your device is Class 3 before enabling biometrics.
### Device Encryption
If your device is [encrypted](../encryption.md), your data is most secure when your device is completely powered off (as opposed to merely asleep), i.e. before you've entered your encryption key or lock screen password for the first time. On phones, this state of higher security is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and "After First Unlock" (AFU) once you enter the correct password after a reboot/power-on. AFU is considerably less secure against digital forensics toolkits and other exploits, compared to BFU. Therefore, if you are concerned about an attacker with physical access to your device, you should turn it off fully whenever you aren't using it.
If your device is [encrypted](../../tools/software/encryption/_index.md), your data is most secure when your device is completely powered off (as opposed to merely asleep), i.e. before you've entered your encryption key or lock screen password for the first time. On phones, this state of higher security is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and "After First Unlock" (AFU) once you enter the correct password after a reboot/power-on. AFU is considerably less secure against digital forensics toolkits and other exploits, compared to BFU. Therefore, if you are concerned about an attacker with physical access to your device, you should turn it off fully whenever you aren't using it.
This may be impractical, so consider whether it's worth it, but in either case even AFU mode is effective against most threats, given you are using a strong encryption key.
@@ -75,18 +69,15 @@ Some threats can't be protected against by your internal components alone. Many
Hardware keys are devices that use strong cryptography to authenticate you to a device or account. The idea is that because they can not be copied, you can use them to secure accounts in such a way that they can only be accessed with physical possession of the key, eliminating many remote attacks.
[Recommended Hardware Keys :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../security-keys.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Learn More about Hardware Keys :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](multi-factor-authentication.md#hardware-security-keys){ .md-button }
[Recommended Hardware Keys :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../../tools/hardware/security-keys/_index.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Learn More about Hardware Keys :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](multi-factor-authentication.md#hardware-security-keys){ .md-button }
### Camera/Microphone
If you don't want to trust your OS's permission controls to prevent the camera from activating in the first place, you can buy camera blockers that physically prevent light from reaching the camera. You could also buy a device that doesn't have a built-in camera and use an external camera that you can unplug whenever you're done using it. Some devices come with built-in camera blockers or hardware switches that physically disconnect the camera from power.
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
> [!WARNING]
> You should only buy covers that fit your laptop and won't cause damage when you close the lid. Covering the camera will interfere with automatic brightness and face authentication features.
You should only buy covers that fit your laptop and won't cause damage when you close the lid. Covering the camera will interfere with automatic brightness and face authentication features.
</div>
For microphone access, in most cases you will need to trust your OS's built-in permission controls. Alternatively, buy a device that doesn't have a built-in microphone and use an external microphone that you can unplug when you're done using it. Some devices, like a [MacBook or an iPad](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/hardware-microphone-disconnect-secbbd20b00b/web), feature a hardware disconnect for the microphone when you close the lid.
@@ -136,17 +127,14 @@ You may find it useful to go around your home and make a list of every connected
Your router handles all your network traffic and acts as your first line of defense between you and the open internet.
<div class="admonition Note" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Note</p>
> [!NOTE]
> A lot of routers come with storage to put your files on so you can access them from any computer on your network. We recommend you don't use networking devices for things other than networking. In the event your router was compromised, your files would also be compromised.
A lot of routers come with storage to put your files on so you can access them from any computer on your network. We recommend you don't use networking devices for things other than networking. In the event your router was compromised, your files would also be compromised.
</div>
The most important thing to think about with routers is keeping them up-to-date. Many modern routers will automatically install updates, but many others won't. You should check on your router's settings page for this option. That page can usually be accessed by typing `192.168.1.1` or `192.168.0.1` into the URL bar of any browser assuming you're on the same network. You can also check in the network settings of your OS for "router" or "gateway".
If your router does not support automatic updates, you will need to go to the manufacturer's site to download the updates and apply them manually.
Many consumer-grade routers aren't supported for very long. If your router isn't supported by the manufacturer anymore, you can check if it's supported by [FOSS firmware](../router.md). You can also buy routers that come with FOSS firmware installed by default; these tend to be supported longer than most routers.
Many consumer-grade routers aren't supported for very long. If your router isn't supported by the manufacturer anymore, you can check if it's supported by [FOSS firmware](../../tools/os/router-firmware/_index.md). You can also buy routers that come with FOSS firmware installed by default; these tend to be supported longer than most routers.
Some ISPs provide a combined router/modem. It can be beneficial for security to purchase a separate router and set your ISP router/modem into modem-only mode. This way, even when your ISP-provided router is no longer getting updates, you can still get security updates and patches. It also means any problems that affect your modem won't affect your router and vice versa.
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Unlike [WebAuthn](#fido-fast-identity-online), TOTP offers no protection against
An adversary could set up a website to imitate an official service in an attempt to trick you into giving out your username, password and current TOTP code. If the adversary then uses those recorded credentials they may be able to log into the real service and hijack the account.
Although not perfect, TOTP is secure enough for most people, and when [hardware security keys](../security-keys.md) are not supported [authenticator apps](../multi-factor-authentication.md) are still a good option.
Although not perfect, TOTP is secure enough for most people, and when [hardware security keys](../../tools/hardware/security-keys/_index.md) are not supported [authenticator apps](../../tools/software/multi-factor-authentication/_index.md) are still a good option.
### Hardware security keys
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ When logging into a website, all you need to do is to physically touch the secur
The service will then forward the one-time password to the Yubico OTP server for validation. A counter is incremented both on the key and Yubico's validation server. The OTP can only be used once, and when a successful authentication occurs, the counter is increased which prevents reuse of the OTP. Yubico provides a [detailed document](https://developers.yubico.com/OTP/OTPs_Explained.html) about the process.
<figure markdown>
![Yubico OTP](../assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png)
![Yubico OTP](/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png)
</figure>
There are some benefits and disadvantages to using Yubico OTP when compared to TOTP.
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ U2F and FIDO2 refer to the [Client to Authenticator Protocol](https://en.wikiped
WebAuthn is the most secure and private form of second factor authentication. While the authentication experience is similar to Yubico OTP, the key does not print out a one-time password and validate with a third-party server. Instead, it uses [public key cryptography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography) for authentication.
<figure markdown>
![FIDO](../assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png)
![FIDO](/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png)
</figure>
When you create an account, the public key is sent to the service, then when you log in, the service will require you to "sign" some data with your private key. The benefit of this is that no password data is ever stored by the service, so there is nothing for an adversary to steal.
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ When configuring your MFA method, keep in mind that it is only as secure as your
You should always have backups for your MFA method. Hardware security keys can get lost, stolen or simply stop working over time. It is recommended that you have a pair of hardware security keys with the same access to your accounts instead of just one.
When using TOTP with an authenticator app, be sure to back up your recovery keys or the app itself, or copy the "shared secrets" to another instance of the app on a different phone or to an encrypted container (e.g. [VeraCrypt](../encryption.md#veracrypt-disk)).
When using TOTP with an authenticator app, be sure to back up your recovery keys or the app itself, or copy the "shared secrets" to another instance of the app on a different phone or to an encrypted container (e.g. [VeraCrypt](../../tools/software/encryption/_index.md#veracrypt-disk)).
### Initial Set Up
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ If you have to use email for MFA, make sure that the email account itself is sec
If you use SMS MFA, use a carrier who will not switch your phone number to a new SIM card without account access, or use a dedicated VoIP number from a provider with similar security to avoid a [SIM swap attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam).
[MFA tools we recommend](../multi-factor-authentication.md){ .md-button }
[MFA tools we recommend](../../tools/software/multi-factor-authentication/_index.md){ .md-button }
## More Places to Set Up MFA
@@ -133,12 +133,9 @@ The command will prevent an adversary from bypassing MFA when the computer boots
### Linux
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
> [!WARNING]
> If the hostname of your system changes (such as due to DHCP), you would be unable to login. It is vital that you set up a proper hostname for your computer before following this guide.
If the hostname of your system changes (such as due to DHCP), you would be unable to login. It is vital that you set up a proper hostname for your computer before following this guide.
</div>
The `pam_u2f` module on Linux can provide two-factor authentication for logging in on most popular Linux distributions. If you have a hardware security key that supports U2F, you can set up MFA authentication for your login. Yubico has a guide [Ubuntu Linux Login Guide - U2F](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360016649099-Ubuntu-Linux-Login-Guide-U2F) which should work on any distribution. The package manager commands—such as `apt-get`—and package names may however differ. This guide does **not** apply to Qubes OS.
Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 130 KiB

Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 115 KiB

+11 -11
View File
@@ -16,9 +16,9 @@ This is called [credential stuffing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credential_st
### Use randomly generated passwords
==You should **never** rely on yourself to come up with a good password.== We recommend using [randomly generated passwords](#passwords) or [diceware passphrases](#diceware-passphrases) with sufficient entropy to protect your accounts and devices.
<mark>You should **never** rely on yourself to come up with a good password.</mark> We recommend using [randomly generated passwords](#passwords) or [diceware passphrases](#diceware-passphrases) with sufficient entropy to protect your accounts and devices.
All of our [recommended password managers](../passwords.md) include a built-in password generator that you can use.
All of our [recommended password managers](../../tools/software/passwords/_index.md) include a built-in password generator that you can use.
### Rotating Passwords
@@ -26,10 +26,11 @@ You should avoid changing passwords that you have to remember (such as your pass
When it comes to passwords that you don't have to remember (such as passwords stored inside your password manager), if your [threat model](threat-modeling.md) calls for it, we recommend going through important accounts (especially accounts that don't use multifactor authentication) and changing their password every couple of months, in case they have been compromised in a data breach that hasn't become public yet. Most password managers allow you to set an expiry date for your password to make this easier to manage.
<!-- TODO: Admonition -->
<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Checking for data breaches</p>
If your password manager lets you check for compromised passwords, make sure to do so and promptly change any password that may have been exposed in a data breach. Alternatively, you could follow [Have I Been Pwned's Latest Breaches feed](https://feeds.feedburner.com/HaveIBeenPwnedLatestBreaches) with the help of a [news aggregator](../news-aggregators.md).
If your password manager lets you check for compromised passwords, make sure to do so and promptly change any password that may have been exposed in a data breach. Alternatively, you could follow [Have I Been Pwned's Latest Breaches feed](https://feeds.feedburner.com/HaveIBeenPwnedLatestBreaches) with the help of a [news aggregator](../../tools/software/news-aggregators/_index.md).
</div>
@@ -51,12 +52,9 @@ An example of a diceware passphrase is `viewable fastness reluctant squishy seve
To generate a diceware passphrase using real dice, follow these steps:
<div class="admonition Note" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Note</p>
> [!NOTE]
> These instructions assume that you are using [EFF's large word list](https://eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate the passphrase, which requires five dice rolls per word. Other word lists may require more or less rolls per word, and may require a different amount of words to achieve the same entropy.
These instructions assume that you are using [EFF's large word list](https://eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate the passphrase, which requires five dice rolls per word. Other word lists may require more or less rolls per word, and may require a different amount of words to achieve the same entropy.
</div>
1. Roll a six-sided die five times, noting down the number after each roll.
@@ -66,6 +64,7 @@ These instructions assume that you are using [EFF's large word list](https://eff
4. Repeat this process until your passphrase has as many words as you need, which you should separate with a space.
<!-- TODO: Admonition -->
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Important</p>
@@ -159,12 +158,13 @@ The best way to store your passwords is by using a password manager. They allow
There are many good options to choose from, both cloud-based and local. Choose one of our recommended password managers and use it to establish strong passwords across all of your accounts. We recommend securing your password manager with a [diceware passphrase](#diceware-passphrases) comprised of at least seven words.
[List of recommended password managers](../passwords.md){ .md-button }
[List of recommended password managers](../../tools/software/passwords/_index.md){ .md-button }
<!-- TODO: Admonition -->
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Don't place your passwords and TOTP tokens inside the same password manager</p>
When using [TOTP codes as multifactor authentication](multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp), the best security practice is to keep your TOTP codes in a [separate app](../multi-factor-authentication.md).
When using [TOTP codes as multifactor authentication](multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp), the best security practice is to keep your TOTP codes in a [separate app](../../tools/software/multi-factor-authentication/_index.md).
Storing your TOTP tokens in the same place as your passwords, while convenient, reduces the accounts to a single factor in the event that an adversary gains access to your password manager.
@@ -174,4 +174,4 @@ Furthermore, we do not recommend storing single-use recovery codes in your passw
### Backups
You should store an [encrypted](../encryption.md) backup of your passwords on multiple storage devices or a cloud storage provider. This can help you access your passwords if something happens to your primary device or the service you are using.
You should store an [encrypted](../../tools/software/encryption/_index.md) backup of your passwords on multiple storage devices or a cloud storage provider. This can help you access your passwords if something happens to your primary device or the service you are using.
+7 -7
View File
@@ -7,11 +7,11 @@ description: Balancing security, privacy, and usability is one of the first and
Balancing security, privacy, and usability is one of the first and most difficult tasks you'll face on your privacy journey. Everything is a trade-off: The more secure something is, the more restricting or inconvenient it generally is, etc. Often, people find that the problem with the tools they see recommended is that they're just too hard to start using!
If you wanted to use the **most** secure tools available, you'd have to sacrifice *a lot* of usability. And, even then, ==nothing is ever fully secure.== There's **high** security, but never **full** security. That's why threat models are important.
If you wanted to use the **most** secure tools available, you'd have to sacrifice *a lot* of usability. And, even then, <mark>nothing is ever fully secure.</mark> There's **high** security, but never **full** security. That's why threat models are important.
**So, what are these threat models, anyway?**
==A threat model is a list of the most probable threats to your security and privacy endeavors.== Since it's impossible to protect yourself against **every** attack(er), you should focus on the **most probable** threats. In computer security, a threat is an event that could undermine your efforts to stay private and secure.
<mark>A threat model is a list of the most probable threats to your security and privacy endeavors.</mark> Since it's impossible to protect yourself against **every** attack(er), you should focus on the **most probable** threats. In computer security, a threat is an event that could undermine your efforts to stay private and secure.
Focusing on the threats that matter to you narrows down your thinking about the protection you need, so you can choose the tools that are right for the job.
@@ -27,13 +27,13 @@ To identify what could happen to the things you value and determine from whom yo
### What do I want to protect?
An “asset” is something you value and want to protect. In the context of digital security, ==an asset is usually some kind of information.== For example, your emails, contact lists, instant messages, location, and files are all possible assets. Your devices themselves may also be assets.
An “asset” is something you value and want to protect. In the context of digital security, <mark>an asset is usually some kind of information.</mark> For example, your emails, contact lists, instant messages, location, and files are all possible assets. Your devices themselves may also be assets.
*Make a list of your assets: data that you keep, where it's kept, who has access to it, and what stops others from accessing it.*
### Who do I want to protect it from?
To answer this question, it's important to identify who might want to target you or your information. ==A person or entity that poses a threat to your assets is an “adversary”.== Examples of potential adversaries are your boss, your former partner, your business competition, your government, or a hacker on a public network.
To answer this question, it's important to identify who might want to target you or your information. <mark>A person or entity that poses a threat to your assets is an “adversary”.</mark> Examples of potential adversaries are your boss, your former partner, your business competition, your government, or a hacker on a public network.
*Make a list of your adversaries or those who might want to get hold of your assets. Your list may include individuals, a government agency, or corporations.*
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Depending on who your adversaries are, this list might be something you want to
### How likely is it that I will need to protect it?
==Risk is the likelihood that a particular threat against a particular asset will actually occur.== It goes hand-in-hand with capability. While your mobile phone provider has the capability to access all of your data, the risk of them posting your private data online to harm your reputation is low.
<mark>Risk is the likelihood that a particular threat against a particular asset will actually occur.</mark> It goes hand-in-hand with capability. While your mobile phone provider has the capability to access all of your data, the risk of them posting your private data online to harm your reputation is low.
It is important to distinguish between what might happen and the probability it may happen. For instance, there is a threat that your building might collapse, but the risk of this happening is far greater in San Francisco (where earthquakes are common) than in Stockholm (where they are not).
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ Assessing risks is both a personal and subjective process. Many people find cert
There are many ways that an adversary could gain access to your data. For example, an adversary can read your private communications as they pass through the network, or they can delete or corrupt your data.
==The motives of adversaries differ widely, as do their tactics.== A government trying to prevent the spread of a video showing police violence may be content to simply delete or reduce the availability of that video. In contrast, a political opponent may wish to gain access to secret content and publish that content without you knowing.
<mark>The motives of adversaries differ widely, as do their tactics.</mark> A government trying to prevent the spread of a video showing police violence may be content to simply delete or reduce the availability of that video. In contrast, a political opponent may wish to gain access to secret content and publish that content without you knowing.
Security planning involves understanding how bad the consequences could be if an adversary successfully gains access to one of your assets. To determine this, you should consider the capability of your adversary. For example, your mobile phone provider has access to all of your phone records. A hacker on an open Wi-Fi network can access your unencrypted communications. Your government might have stronger capabilities.
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ Security planning involves understanding how bad the consequences could be if an
### How much trouble am I willing to go through to try to prevent potential consequences?
==There is no perfect option for security.== Not everyone has the same priorities, concerns, or access to resources. Your risk assessment will allow you to plan the right strategy for you, balancing convenience, cost, and privacy.
<mark>There is no perfect option for security.</mark> Not everyone has the same priorities, concerns, or access to resources. Your risk assessment will allow you to plan the right strategy for you, balancing convenience, cost, and privacy.
For example, an attorney representing a client in a national security case may be willing to go to greater lengths to protect communications about that case, such as using encrypted email, than a mother who regularly emails her daughter funny cat videos.
+5 -8
View File
@@ -13,12 +13,9 @@ Normally, an ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your
Using a VPN hides even this information from your ISP, by shifting the trust you place in your network to a server somewhere else in the world. As a result, the ISP then only sees that you are connected to a VPN and nothing about the activity that you're passing through it.
<div class="admonition note" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Note</p>
> [!NOTE]
> When we refer to "Virtual Private Networks" on this website, we are usually referring to **commercial** [VPN providers](../../tools/services/vpn/_index.md), who you pay a monthly fee to in exchange for routing your internet traffic securely through their public servers. There are many other forms of VPN, such as ones you host yourself or ones operated by workplaces which allow you to securely connect to internal/employee network resources, however, these VPNs are usually designed for accessing remote networks securely, rather than protecting the privacy of your internet connection.
When we refer to "Virtual Private Networks" on this website, we are usually referring to **commercial** [VPN providers](../vpn.md), who you pay a monthly fee to in exchange for routing your internet traffic securely through their public servers. There are many other forms of VPN, such as ones you host yourself or ones operated by workplaces which allow you to securely connect to internal/employee network resources, however, these VPNs are usually designed for accessing remote networks securely, rather than protecting the privacy of your internet connection.
</div>
## How does a VPN work?
@@ -73,15 +70,15 @@ You should not use that feature: The primary advantage of using Tor is that you
Currently, Tor only supports the TCP protocol. UDP (used by [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC), [HTTP3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3), and other protocols), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol), and other packets will be dropped. To compensate for this, VPN providers typically will route all non-TCP packets through their VPN server (your first hop). This is the case with [ProtonVPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn). Additionally, when using this Tor over VPN setup, you do not have control over other important Tor features such as [Isolated Destination Address](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (using a different Tor circuit for every domain you visit).
The feature should be viewed as a *convenient* way to access hidden services on Tor, not to stay anonymous. For proper anonymity, use the actual [Tor Browser](../tor.md).
The feature should be viewed as a *convenient* way to access hidden services on Tor, not to stay anonymous. For proper anonymity, use the actual [Tor Browser](../../tools/software/tor/_index.md).
## Commercial VPN Ownership
Most VPN services are owned by the same [few companies](https://vpnpro.com/blog/hidden-vpn-owners-unveiled-97-vpns-23-companies). These shady companies run lots of smaller VPN services to create the illusion that you have more choice than you actually do and to maximize profit. Typically, these providers that feed into their shell company have terrible privacy policies and shouldn't be trusted with your internet traffic. You should be very strict about which provider you decide to use.
You should also be wary that many VPN review sites are merely advertising vehicles open to the highest bidder. ==Privacy Guides does not make money from recommending external products, and never uses affiliate programs.==
You should also be wary that many VPN review sites are merely advertising vehicles open to the highest bidder. <mark>Privacy Guides does not make money from recommending external products, and never uses affiliate programs.</mark>
[Our VPN Recommendations](../vpn.md){ .md-button }
[Our VPN Recommendations](../../tools/services/vpn/_index.md){ .md-button }
## Modern VPN Alternatives
+5 -6
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
---
title: "Why Privacy Matters"
weight: 10
prev: ../_index.md
description: In the modern age of digital data exploitation, your privacy has never been more critical, and yet many believe it is already a lost cause. It is not.
---
In the modern age of digital data exploitation, your privacy has never been more critical, and yet many believe it is already a lost cause. It is not. <mark>Your privacy is up for grabs</mark>, and you need to care about it. Privacy is about power, and it is so important that this power ends up in the right hands.
@@ -27,11 +26,11 @@ Many people get the concepts of **privacy**, **security**, and **anonymity** con
<!-- markdownlint-disable-next-line -->
**Anonymity**
: Anonymity is the ability to act without a persistent identifier. You might achieve this online with [Tor](../tor.md), which allows you to browse the internet with a random IP address and network connection instead of your own.
: Anonymity is the ability to act without a persistent identifier. You might achieve this online with [Tor](../../tools/software/tor/_index.md), which allows you to browse the internet with a random IP address and network connection instead of your own.
: **Pseudonymity** is a similar concept, but it allows you to have a persistent identifier without it being tied to your real identity. If everybody knows you as `@GamerGuy12` online, but nobody knows your real name, that is your pseudonym.
All of these concepts overlap, but it is possible to have any combination of these. The sweet spot for most people is when all three of these concepts overlap. However, it's trickier to achieve than many initially believe. Sometimes, you have to compromise on some of these, and that's okay too. This is where **threat modeling** comes into play, allowing you to make informed decisions about the [software and services](../tools.md) you use.
All of these concepts overlap, but it is possible to have any combination of these. The sweet spot for most people is when all three of these concepts overlap. However, it's trickier to achieve than many initially believe. Sometimes, you have to compromise on some of these, and that's okay too. This is where **threat modeling** comes into play, allowing you to make informed decisions about the [software and services](../../tools/_index.md) you use.
[:material-book-outline: Learn More About Threat Modeling](threat-modeling.md){ .md-button }
@@ -39,7 +38,7 @@ All of these concepts overlap, but it is possible to have any combination of the
A common counter-argument to pro-privacy movements is the notion that one doesn't need privacy if they have **"nothing to hide."** This is a dangerous misconception, because it creates a sense that people who demand privacy must be deviant, criminal, or wrong.
==You shouldn't confuse privacy with secrecy.== We know what happens in the bathroom, but you still close the door. That's because you want privacy, not secrecy. There are always certain facts about us—say, personal health information, or sexual behavior—that we wouldn't want the whole world to know, and that's okay. The need for privacy is legitimate, and that's what makes us human. Privacy is about empowering your rights over your own information, not about hiding secrets.
<mark>You shouldn't confuse privacy with secrecy.</mark> We know what happens in the bathroom, but you still close the door. That's because you want privacy, not secrecy. There are always certain facts about us—say, personal health information, or sexual behavior—that we wouldn't want the whole world to know, and that's okay. The need for privacy is legitimate, and that's what makes us human. Privacy is about empowering your rights over your own information, not about hiding secrets.
## Is Privacy About Control?
@@ -47,9 +46,9 @@ A common definition of privacy is that it is the ability to *control* who has ac
Take cookie consent forms, for example. You may encounter these dozens of times per day on the various websites you visit, with a nice array of checkboxes and sliders which allow you to "curate" your preferences to exactly fit your needs. In the end, we just hit the "I Agree" button, because we just want to read the article or make a purchase. Nobody wants to complete a personal privacy audit on every single website they visit. This is an exercise in [choice architecture](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Choice_architecture), designed to make you take the easy route out instead of delving into a maze of configuration options that don't need to exist in the first place.
==Control over your privacy inside most apps is an illusion.== It's a shiny dashboard with all sorts of choices you can make about your data, but rarely the choices you're looking for, like "only use my data to help me." This type of control is meant to make you feel guilty about your choices, that you "had the choice" to make the apps you use more private, and you chose not to.
<mark>Control over your privacy inside most apps is an illusion.</mark> It's a shiny dashboard with all sorts of choices you can make about your data, but rarely the choices you're looking for, like "only use my data to help me." This type of control is meant to make you feel guilty about your choices, that you "had the choice" to make the apps you use more private, and you chose not to.
Privacy is something we need to have baked into the [software and services](../tools.md) we use by default, you can't bend most apps into being private on your own.
Privacy is something we need to have baked into the [software and services](../../tools/_index.md) we use by default, you can't bend most apps into being private on your own.
[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: 5 Steps to Improve Your Privacy](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/02/14/5-easy-steps-to-protect-yourself-online){ class="md-button" }