refactor: Follow Hugo leaf vs branch conventions

content/wiki/os/ios/index.md

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone.
 
 iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways.
 
-We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../../../tools/os/android/distributions/_index.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services.
+We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../../../tools/os/android/distributions/index.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services.
 
 ### Activation Lock
 
@@ -41,13 +41,13 @@ The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to
 
 Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple.
 
-The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../../../tools/services/cloud/_index.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../../../tools/_index.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks.
+The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../../../tools/services/cloud/index.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../../../tools/_index.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks.
 
 You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here.
 
 #### iCloud+
 
-A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../../../tools/services/vpn/_index.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../../../tools/services/email-aliasing/_index.md) just for these features alone.
+A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../../../tools/services/vpn/index.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../../../tools/services/email-aliasing/index.md) just for these features alone.
 
 [**Private Relay**](https://apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/icloud-relay) is a proxy service which relays all of your Safari traffic, your DNS queries, and unencrypted traffic on your device through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic that's already encrypted.
 
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is l
 
 Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make trade-offs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security.
 
-Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** → **Passcode Options** → **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](../../basics/passwords-overview/_index.md).
+Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** → **Passcode Options** → **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](../../basics/passwords-overview/index.md).
 
 If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode.
 
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ Set wired accessories to ask for permission when you connect them. Select **Wire
 
 ### E2EE Calls
 
-Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE. Alternatively, you can use [another app](../../../tools/services/messengers/_index.md) like Signal for E2EE calls.
+Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE. Alternatively, you can use [another app](../../../tools/services/messengers/index.md) like Signal for E2EE calls.
 
 ### Encrypted iMessage
 
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Rather than allow an app to access all the photos on your device, you can allow
 
 ![Private Access](private-access-light.png#only-light) ![Private Access](private-access-dark.png#only-dark)
 
-Some apps also support **Private Access**, which functions similarly to the **Limited Access** permission. However, photos shared to apps using Private Access include their location by default. We recommend unchecking this setting if you do not [remove photo metadata](../../../tools/software/data-redaction/_index.md) beforehand.
+Some apps also support **Private Access**, which functions similarly to the **Limited Access** permission. However, photos shared to apps using Private Access include their location by default. We recommend unchecking this setting if you do not [remove photo metadata](../../../tools/software/data-redaction/index.md) beforehand.
 
 ### Contact Permissions
 
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ You can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature on su
 - Tap the button labeled **Clean Up**
 - Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated, and it will attempt to delete anything else.
 
-Our warning [against blurring text](../../../tools/software/data-redaction/_index.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app.
+Our warning [against blurring text](../../../tools/software/data-redaction/index.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app.
 
 <div class="annotate" markdown>
 
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to h
 
 ### Before First Unlock
 
-If your threat model includes [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](../../basics/common-threats/_index.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } that involve forensic tools, and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation.
+If your threat model includes [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](../../basics/common-threats/index.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } that involve forensic tools, and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation.
 
 iPhones [automatically reboot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/protecting-user-data-in-the-face-of-attack-secf5549a4f5/1/web/1#:~:text=On%20an%20iPhone%20or%20iPad%20with%20iOS%2018%20and%20iPadOS%2018%20or%20later%2C%20a%20new%20security%20protection%20will%20restart%20devices%20if%20they%20remain%20locked%20for%20a%20prolonged%20period%20of%20time.) if they're not unlocked after a period of time.