mirror of
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refactor: Follow Hugo leaf vs branch conventions
This commit is contained in:
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@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Often people sign up for services without thinking. Maybe it's a streaming servi
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There are risks associated with every new service that you use. Data breaches; disclosure of customer information to third parties; rogue employees accessing data; all are possibilities that must be considered when giving your information out. You need to be confident that you can trust the service, which is why we don't recommend storing valuable data on anything but the most mature and battle-tested products. That usually means services which provide E2EE and have undergone a cryptographic audit. An audit increases assurance that the product was designed without glaring security issues caused by an inexperienced developer.
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It can also be difficult to delete the accounts on some services. Sometimes [overwriting data](../account-deletion/_index.md#overwriting-account-information) associated with an account can be possible, but in other cases the service will keep an entire history of changes to the account.
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It can also be difficult to delete the accounts on some services. Sometimes [overwriting data](../account-deletion/index.md#overwriting-account-information) associated with an account can be possible, but in other cases the service will keep an entire history of changes to the account.
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## Terms of Service & Privacy Policy
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@@ -27,15 +27,15 @@ There are usually multiple ways to sign up for an account, each with their own b
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### Email and password
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The most common way to create a new account is by an email address and password. When using this method, you should use a password manager and follow [best practices](../passwords-overview/_index.md) regarding passwords.
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The most common way to create a new account is by an email address and password. When using this method, you should use a password manager and follow [best practices](../passwords-overview/index.md) regarding passwords.
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> [!TIP]
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> You can use your password manager to organize other authentication methods too! Just add the new entry and fill the appropriate fields, you can add notes for things like security questions or a backup key.
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You will be responsible for managing your login credentials. For added security, you can set up [MFA](../multi-factor-authentication/_index.md) on your accounts.
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You will be responsible for managing your login credentials. For added security, you can set up [MFA](../multi-factor-authentication/index.md) on your accounts.
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[Recommended password managers](../../../tools/software/passwords/_index.md){ .md-button }
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[Recommended password managers](../../../tools/software/passwords/index.md){ .md-button }
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#### Email aliases
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@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ If you don't want to give your real email address to a service, you have the opt
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Should a service get hacked, you might start receiving phishing or spam emails to the address you used to sign up. Using unique aliases for each service can assist in identifying exactly what service was hacked.
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[Recommended email aliasing services](../../../tools/services/email-aliasing/_index.md){ .md-button }
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[Recommended email aliasing services](../../../tools/services/email-aliasing/index.md){ .md-button }
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### "Sign in with..." (OAuth)
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@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ But there are disadvantages:
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- **Privacy**: The OAuth provider you log in with will know the services you use.
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- **Centralization**: If the account you use for OAuth is compromised, or you aren't able to log in to it, all other accounts connected to it are affected.
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OAuth can be especially useful in those situations where you could benefit from deeper integration between services. Our recommendation is to limit using OAuth to only where you need it, and always protect the main account with [MFA](../multi-factor-authentication/_index.md).
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OAuth can be especially useful in those situations where you could benefit from deeper integration between services. Our recommendation is to limit using OAuth to only where you need it, and always protect the main account with [MFA](../multi-factor-authentication/index.md).
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All the services that use OAuth will be as secure as your underlying OAuth provider's account. For example, if you want to secure an account with a hardware key, but that service doesn't support hardware keys, you can secure the account you use with OAuth with a hardware key instead, and now you essentially have hardware MFA on all your accounts. It is worth noting though that weak authentication on your OAuth provider account means that any account tied to that login will also be weak.
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@@ -43,13 +43,13 @@ Residents of the EEA have additional rights regarding data erasure specified in
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In some situations where you plan to abandon an account, it may make sense to overwrite the account information with fake data. Once you've made sure you can log in, change all the information in your account to falsified information. The reason for this is that many sites will retain information you previously had even after account deletion. The hope is that they will overwrite the previous information with the newest data you entered. However, there is no guarantee that there won't be backups with the prior information.
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For the account email, either create a new alternate email account via your provider of choice or create an alias using an [email aliasing service](../../../tools/services/email-aliasing/_index.md). You can then delete your alternate email address once you are done. We recommend against using temporary email providers, as oftentimes it is possible to reactivate temporary emails.
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For the account email, either create a new alternate email account via your provider of choice or create an alias using an [email aliasing service](../../../tools/services/email-aliasing/index.md). You can then delete your alternate email address once you are done. We recommend against using temporary email providers, as oftentimes it is possible to reactivate temporary emails.
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### Delete
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You can check [JustDeleteMe](https://justdeleteme.xyz) for instructions on deleting the account for a specific service. Some sites will graciously have a "Delete Account" option, while others will go as far as to force you to speak with a support agent. The deletion process can vary from site to site, with account deletion being impossible on some.
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For services that don't allow account deletion, the best thing to do is falsify all your information as previously mentioned and strengthen account security. To do so, enable [MFA](../multi-factor-authentication/_index.md) and any extra security features offered. As well, change the password to a randomly-generated one that is the maximum allowed size (a [password manager](../../../tools/software/passwords/_index.md) can be useful for this).
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For services that don't allow account deletion, the best thing to do is falsify all your information as previously mentioned and strengthen account security. To do so, enable [MFA](../multi-factor-authentication/index.md) and any extra security features offered. As well, change the password to a randomly-generated one that is the maximum allowed size (a [password manager](../../../tools/software/passwords/index.md) can be useful for this).
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If you're satisfied that all information you care about is removed, you can safely forget about this account. If not, it might be a good idea to keep the credentials stored with your other passwords and occasionally re-login to reset the password.
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: Privacy isn't a straightforward topic, and it's easy to get caught
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These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. <mark>Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.</mark> When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis.
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Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../common-threats/_index.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations){ .pg-viridian }, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](../common-threats/_index.md) page.[^1]
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Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../common-threats/index.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations){ .pg-viridian }, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](../common-threats/index.md) page.[^1]
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On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering.
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@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ We talk about "shifting trust" a lot when discussing solutions like VPNs (which
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## "Privacy-focused solutions are inherently trustworthy"
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Focusing solely on the privacy policies and marketing of a tool or provider can blind you to its weaknesses. When you're looking for a more private solution, you should determine what the underlying problem is and find technical solutions to that problem. For example, you may want to avoid Google Drive, which gives Google access to all of your data. The underlying problem in this case is lack of E2EE, so you should make sure that the provider you switch to actually implements E2EE, or use a tool (like [Cryptomator](../../../tools/software/encryption/_index.md#cryptomator-cloud)) which provides E2EE on any cloud provider. Switching to a "privacy-focused" provider (that doesn't implement E2EE) doesn't solve your problem: it just shifts trust from Google to that provider.
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Focusing solely on the privacy policies and marketing of a tool or provider can blind you to its weaknesses. When you're looking for a more private solution, you should determine what the underlying problem is and find technical solutions to that problem. For example, you may want to avoid Google Drive, which gives Google access to all of your data. The underlying problem in this case is lack of E2EE, so you should make sure that the provider you switch to actually implements E2EE, or use a tool (like [Cryptomator](../../../tools/software/encryption/index.md#cryptomator-cloud)) which provides E2EE on any cloud provider. Switching to a "privacy-focused" provider (that doesn't implement E2EE) doesn't solve your problem: it just shifts trust from Google to that provider.
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The privacy policies and business practices of providers you choose are very important, but should be considered secondary to technical guarantees of your privacy: You shouldn't shift trust to another provider when trusting a provider isn't a requirement at all.
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@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ One of the clearest threat models is one where people *know who you are* and one
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2. **Unknown identity** - An unknown identity could be a stable pseudonym that you regularly use. It is not anonymous because it doesn't change. If you're part of an online community, you may wish to retain a persona that others know. This pseudonym isn't anonymous because—if monitored for long enough—details about the owner can reveal further information, such as the way they write, their general knowledge about topics of interest, etc.
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You may wish to use a VPN for this, to mask your IP address. Financial transactions are more difficult to mask: You could consider using anonymous cryptocurrencies, such as [Monero](../../../tools/software/cryptocurrency/_index.md#monero). Employing altcoin shifting may also help to disguise where your currency originated. Typically, exchanges require KYC (know your customer) to be completed before they'll allow you to exchange fiat currency into any kind of cryptocurrency. Local meet-up options may also be a solution; however, those are often more expensive and sometimes also require KYC.
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You may wish to use a VPN for this, to mask your IP address. Financial transactions are more difficult to mask: You could consider using anonymous cryptocurrencies, such as [Monero](../../../tools/software/cryptocurrency/index.md#monero). Employing altcoin shifting may also help to disguise where your currency originated. Typically, exchanges require KYC (know your customer) to be completed before they'll allow you to exchange fiat currency into any kind of cryptocurrency. Local meet-up options may also be a solution; however, those are often more expensive and sometimes also require KYC.
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3. **Anonymous identity** - Even with experience, anonymous identities are difficult to maintain over long periods of time. They should be short-term and short-lived identities which are rotated regularly.
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description: Your threat model is personal to you, but these are some of the things many visitors to this site care about.
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---
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Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](../threat-modeling/_index.md) or goals that apply to most people. <mark>You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities</mark>, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat.
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Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](../threat-modeling/index.md) or goals that apply to most people. <mark>You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities</mark>, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat.
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<span class="pg-purple">:material-incognito: **Anonymity**</span>
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@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ To minimize the damage that a malicious piece of software *could* do, you should
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> [!TIP]
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> Mobile operating systems generally have better application sandboxing than desktop operating systems: Apps can't obtain root access, and require permission for access to system resources.
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>
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> Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS has similar sandboxing capabilities to Android, and macOS has full system permission control (and developers can opt in to sandboxing for applications). However, these operating systems do transmit identifying information to their respective OEMs. Linux tends to not submit information to system vendors, but it has poor protection against exploits and malicious apps. This can be mitigated somewhat with specialized distributions which make significant use of virtual machines or containers, such as [Qubes OS](../../../tools/os/desktop/_index.md#qubes-os).
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> Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS has similar sandboxing capabilities to Android, and macOS has full system permission control (and developers can opt in to sandboxing for applications). However, these operating systems do transmit identifying information to their respective OEMs. Linux tends to not submit information to system vendors, but it has poor protection against exploits and malicious apps. This can be mitigated somewhat with specialized distributions which make significant use of virtual machines or containers, such as [Qubes OS](../../../tools/os/desktop/index.md#qubes-os).
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## Attacks against Specific Individuals
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<div class="admonition note" markdown>
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<p class="admonition-title">Note on Web-based Encryption</p>
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In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../../../tools/services/messengers/_index.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering).
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In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../../../tools/services/messengers/index.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering).
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On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt.
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@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible
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</div>
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Even with E2EE, service providers can still profile you based on **metadata**, which typically isn't protected. While the service provider can't read your messages, they can still observe important things, such as whom you're talking to, how often you message them, and when you're typically active. Protection of metadata is fairly uncommon, and—if it's within your [threat model](../threat-modeling/_index.md)—you should pay close attention to the technical documentation of the software you're using to see if there's any metadata minimization or protection at all.
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Even with E2EE, service providers can still profile you based on **metadata**, which typically isn't protected. While the service provider can't read your messages, they can still observe important things, such as whom you're talking to, how often you message them, and when you're typically active. Protection of metadata is fairly uncommon, and—if it's within your [threat model](../threat-modeling/index.md)—you should pay close attention to the technical documentation of the software you're using to see if there's any metadata minimization or protection at all.
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## Mass Surveillance Programs
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@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ Additionally, even companies outside the *AdTech* or tracking industry can share
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The best way to keep your data private is simply not making it public in the first place. Deleting unwanted information you find about yourself online is one of the best first steps you can take to regain your privacy.
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- [View our guide on account deletion :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../account-deletion/_index.md)
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- [View our guide on account deletion :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../account-deletion/index.md)
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On sites where you do share information, checking the privacy settings of your account to limit how widely that data is spread is very important. For example, enable "private mode" on your accounts if given the option: This ensures that your account isn't being indexed by search engines, and that it can't be viewed without your permission.
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Censorship on corporate platforms is increasingly common, as platforms like Twitter and Facebook give in to public demand, market pressures, and pressures from government agencies. Government pressures can be covert requests to businesses, such as the White House [requesting the takedown](https://nytimes.com/2012/09/17/technology/on-the-web-a-fine-line-on-free-speech-across-globe.html) of a provocative YouTube video, or overt, such as the Chinese government requiring companies to adhere to a strict regime of censorship.
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People concerned with the threat of censorship can use technologies like [Tor](../../advanced/tor-overview/_index.md) to circumvent it, and support censorship-resistant communication platforms like [Matrix](../../../tools/software/social-networks/_index.md#element), which doesn't have a centralized account authority that can close accounts arbitrarily.
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People concerned with the threat of censorship can use technologies like [Tor](../../advanced/tor-overview/index.md) to circumvent it, and support censorship-resistant communication platforms like [Matrix](../../../tools/software/social-networks/index.md#element), which doesn't have a centralized account authority that can close accounts arbitrarily.
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> [!TIP]
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> While evading censorship itself can be easy, hiding the fact that you are doing it can be very problematic.
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>
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> You should consider which aspects of the network your adversary can observe, and whether you have plausible deniability for your actions. For example, using [encrypted DNS](../../advanced/dns-overview/_index.md#what-is-encrypted-dns) can help you bypass rudimentary, DNS-based censorship systems, but it can't truly hide what you are visiting from your ISP. A VPN or Tor can help hide what you are visiting from network administrators, but can't hide that you're using those networks in the first place. Pluggable transports (such as Obfs4proxy, Meek, or Shadowsocks) can help you evade firewalls that block common VPN protocols or Tor, but your circumvention attempts can still be detected by methods like probing or [deep packet inspection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection).
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> You should consider which aspects of the network your adversary can observe, and whether you have plausible deniability for your actions. For example, using [encrypted DNS](../../advanced/dns-overview/index.md#what-is-encrypted-dns) can help you bypass rudimentary, DNS-based censorship systems, but it can't truly hide what you are visiting from your ISP. A VPN or Tor can help hide what you are visiting from network administrators, but can't hide that you're using those networks in the first place. Pluggable transports (such as Obfs4proxy, Meek, or Shadowsocks) can help you evade firewalls that block common VPN protocols or Tor, but your circumvention attempts can still be detected by methods like probing or [deep packet inspection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection).
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You must always consider the risks of trying to bypass censorship, the potential consequences, and how sophisticated your adversary may be. You should be cautious with your software selection, and have a backup plan in case you are caught.
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## Email Encryption Overview
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The standard way to add E2EE to emails between different email providers is by using OpenPGP. There are different implementations of the OpenPGP standard, the most common being [GnuPG](../../../tools/software/encryption/_index.md#gnu-privacy-guard) and [OpenPGP.js](https://openpgpjs.org).
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The standard way to add E2EE to emails between different email providers is by using OpenPGP. There are different implementations of the OpenPGP standard, the most common being [GnuPG](../../../tools/software/encryption/index.md#gnu-privacy-guard) and [OpenPGP.js](https://openpgpjs.org).
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Even if you use OpenPGP, it does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if the private key of either you or the message recipient is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. This is why we recommend [instant messengers](../../../tools/services/messengers/_index.md) which implement forward secrecy over email for person-to-person communications whenever possible.
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Even if you use OpenPGP, it does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if the private key of either you or the message recipient is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. This is why we recommend [instant messengers](../../../tools/services/messengers/index.md) which implement forward secrecy over email for person-to-person communications whenever possible.
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There is another standard which is popular with business called [S/MIME](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME), however it requires a certificate issued from a [Certificate Authority](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) (not all of them issue S/MIME certificates, and often a yearly payment is required). In some cases it is more usable than PGP because it has support in popular/mainstream email applications like Apple Mail, [Google Workplace](https://support.google.com/a/topic/9061730), and [Outlook](https://support.office.com/article/encrypt-messages-by-using-s-mime-in-outlook-on-the-web-878c79fc-7088-4b39-966f-14512658f480). However, S/MIME does not solve the issue of lack of forward secrecy, and isn't particularly more secure than PGP.
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@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ There is another standard which is popular with business called [S/MIME](https:/
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The [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD) standard allows email clients to discover the OpenPGP key for other mailboxes, even those hosted on a different provider. Email clients which support WKD will ask the recipient's server for a key based on the email address' domain name. For example, if you emailed `jonah@privacyguides.org`, your email client would ask `privacyguides.org` for Jonah's OpenPGP key, and if `privacyguides.org` has a key for that account, your message would be automatically encrypted.
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In addition to the [email clients we recommend](../../../tools/software/email-clients/_index.md) which support WKD, some webmail providers also support WKD. Whether *your own* key is published to WKD for others to use depends on your domain configuration. If you use an [email provider](../../../tools/services/email/_index.md#openpgp-compatible-services) which supports WKD, such as Proton Mail or Mailbox Mail, they can publish your OpenPGP key on their domain for you.
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In addition to the [email clients we recommend](../../../tools/software/email-clients/index.md) which support WKD, some webmail providers also support WKD. Whether *your own* key is published to WKD for others to use depends on your domain configuration. If you use an [email provider](../../../tools/services/email/index.md#openpgp-compatible-services) which supports WKD, such as Proton Mail or Mailbox Mail, they can publish your OpenPGP key on their domain for you.
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If you use your own custom domain, you will need to configure WKD separately. If you control your domain name, you can set up WKD regardless of your email provider. One easy way to do this is to use the "[WKD as a Service](https://keys.openpgp.org/about/usage#wkd-as-a-service)" feature from the `keys.openpgp.org` server: Set a CNAME record on the `openpgpkey` subdomain of your domain pointed to `wkd.keys.openpgp.org`, then upload your key to [keys.openpgp.org](https://keys.openpgp.org). Alternatively, you can [self-host WKD on your own web server](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKDHosting).
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@@ -29,11 +29,11 @@ If you use a shared domain from a provider which doesn't support WKD, like `@gma
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### What Email Clients Support E2EE?
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Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../../../tools/software/email-clients/_index.md). Depending on the authentication method, this may lead to decreased security if either the provider or the email client does not support [OAuth](../account-creation/_index.md#sign-in-with-oauth) or a bridge application as [multifactor authentication](../multi-factor-authentication/_index.md) is not possible with plain password authentication.
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Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../../../tools/software/email-clients/index.md). Depending on the authentication method, this may lead to decreased security if either the provider or the email client does not support [OAuth](../account-creation/index.md#sign-in-with-oauth) or a bridge application as [multifactor authentication](../multi-factor-authentication/index.md) is not possible with plain password authentication.
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### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
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|
||||
A smart card (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../../../tools/hardware/security-keys/_index.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smart card and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
|
||||
A smart card (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../../../tools/hardware/security-keys/index.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smart card and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
|
||||
|
||||
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smart card to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Some devices will have a "hardware security program", which is a collaboration b
|
||||
|
||||
- [Windows Secured-core PCs](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-highly-secure-11) meet a higher security criteria specified by Microsoft. These protections aren't only applicable to Windows users; Users of other operating systems can still take advantage of features like [DMA protection](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt) and the ability to completely distrust Microsoft certificates.
|
||||
- [Android Ready SE](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) is a collaboration between vendors to ensure their devices follow [best practices](https://source.android.com/docs/security/best-practices/hardware) and include tamper resistant hardware backed storage for things like encryption keys.
|
||||
- macOS running on an Apple SoC takes advantage of [hardware security](../../os/macos/_index.md#hardware-security) which may not be available with third party operating systems.
|
||||
- macOS running on an Apple SoC takes advantage of [hardware security](../../os/macos/index.md#hardware-security) which may not be available with third party operating systems.
|
||||
- [ChromeOS security](https://chromium.org/chromium-os/developer-library/reference/security/security-whitepaper) is at its best when running on a Chromebook as it is able to make use of available hardware features such as the [hardware root-of-trust](https://chromium.org/chromium-os/developer-library/reference/security/security-whitepaper/#hardware-root-of-trust-and-verified-boot).
|
||||
|
||||
Even if you don't use these operating systems, participation in these programs may indicate that the manufacturer is following best practices when it comes to hardware security and updates.
|
||||
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ Android defines three [security classes](https://source.android.com/docs/securit
|
||||
|
||||
### Device Encryption
|
||||
|
||||
If your device is [encrypted](../../../tools/software/encryption/_index.md), your data is most secure when your device is completely powered off (as opposed to merely asleep), i.e. before you've entered your encryption key or lock screen password for the first time. On phones, this state of higher security is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and "After First Unlock" (AFU) once you enter the correct password after a reboot/power-on. AFU is considerably less secure against digital forensics toolkits and other exploits, compared to BFU. Therefore, if you are concerned about an attacker with physical access to your device, you should turn it off fully whenever you aren't using it.
|
||||
If your device is [encrypted](../../../tools/software/encryption/index.md), your data is most secure when your device is completely powered off (as opposed to merely asleep), i.e. before you've entered your encryption key or lock screen password for the first time. On phones, this state of higher security is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and "After First Unlock" (AFU) once you enter the correct password after a reboot/power-on. AFU is considerably less secure against digital forensics toolkits and other exploits, compared to BFU. Therefore, if you are concerned about an attacker with physical access to your device, you should turn it off fully whenever you aren't using it.
|
||||
|
||||
This may be impractical, so consider whether it's worth it, but in either case even AFU mode is effective against most threats, given you are using a strong encryption key.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ Some threats can't be protected against by your internal components alone. Many
|
||||
|
||||
Hardware keys are devices that use strong cryptography to authenticate you to a device or account. The idea is that because they can not be copied, you can use them to secure accounts in such a way that they can only be accessed with physical possession of the key, eliminating many remote attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
[Recommended Hardware Keys :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../../../tools/hardware/security-keys/_index.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Learn More about Hardware Keys :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../multi-factor-authentication/_index.md#hardware-security-keys){ .md-button }
|
||||
[Recommended Hardware Keys :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../../../tools/hardware/security-keys/index.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Learn More about Hardware Keys :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../multi-factor-authentication/index.md#hardware-security-keys){ .md-button }
|
||||
|
||||
### Camera/Microphone
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -135,6 +135,6 @@ The most important thing to think about with routers is keeping them up-to-date.
|
||||
|
||||
If your router does not support automatic updates, you will need to go to the manufacturer's site to download the updates and apply them manually.
|
||||
|
||||
Many consumer-grade routers aren't supported for very long. If your router isn't supported by the manufacturer anymore, you can check if it's supported by [FOSS firmware](../../../tools/os/router-firmware/_index.md). You can also buy routers that come with FOSS firmware installed by default; these tend to be supported longer than most routers.
|
||||
Many consumer-grade routers aren't supported for very long. If your router isn't supported by the manufacturer anymore, you can check if it's supported by [FOSS firmware](../../../tools/os/router-firmware/index.md). You can also buy routers that come with FOSS firmware installed by default; these tend to be supported longer than most routers.
|
||||
|
||||
Some ISPs provide a combined router/modem. It can be beneficial for security to purchase a separate router and set your ISP router/modem into modem-only mode. This way, even when your ISP-provided router is no longer getting updates, you can still get security updates and patches. It also means any problems that affect your modem won't affect your router and vice versa.
|
||||
+3
-3
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Unlike [WebAuthn](#fido-fast-identity-online), TOTP offers no protection against
|
||||
|
||||
An adversary could set up a website to imitate an official service in an attempt to trick you into giving out your username, password and current TOTP code. If the adversary then uses those recorded credentials they may be able to log into the real service and hijack the account.
|
||||
|
||||
Although not perfect, TOTP is secure enough for most people, and when [hardware security keys](../../../tools/hardware/security-keys/_index.md) are not supported [authenticator apps](../../../tools/software/multi-factor-authentication/_index.md) are still a good option.
|
||||
Although not perfect, TOTP is secure enough for most people, and when [hardware security keys](../../../tools/hardware/security-keys/index.md) are not supported [authenticator apps](../../../tools/software/multi-factor-authentication/index.md) are still a good option.
|
||||
|
||||
### Hardware security keys
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ When configuring your MFA method, keep in mind that it is only as secure as your
|
||||
|
||||
You should always have backups for your MFA method. Hardware security keys can get lost, stolen or simply stop working over time. It is recommended that you have a pair of hardware security keys with the same access to your accounts instead of just one.
|
||||
|
||||
When using TOTP with an authenticator app, be sure to back up your recovery keys or the app itself, or copy the "shared secrets" to another instance of the app on a different phone or to an encrypted container (e.g. [VeraCrypt](../../../tools/software/encryption/_index.md#veracrypt-disk)).
|
||||
When using TOTP with an authenticator app, be sure to back up your recovery keys or the app itself, or copy the "shared secrets" to another instance of the app on a different phone or to an encrypted container (e.g. [VeraCrypt](../../../tools/software/encryption/index.md#veracrypt-disk)).
|
||||
|
||||
### Initial Set Up
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ If you have to use email for MFA, make sure that the email account itself is sec
|
||||
|
||||
If you use SMS MFA, use a carrier who will not switch your phone number to a new SIM card without account access, or use a dedicated VoIP number from a provider with similar security to avoid a [SIM swap attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam).
|
||||
|
||||
[MFA tools we recommend](../../../tools/software/multi-factor-authentication/_index.md){ .md-button }
|
||||
[MFA tools we recommend](../../../tools/software/multi-factor-authentication/index.md){ .md-button }
|
||||
|
||||
## More Places to Set Up MFA
|
||||
|
||||
+6
-6
@@ -18,19 +18,19 @@ This is called [credential stuffing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credential_st
|
||||
|
||||
<mark>You should **never** rely on yourself to come up with a good password.</mark> We recommend using [randomly generated passwords](#passwords) or [diceware passphrases](#diceware-passphrases) with sufficient entropy to protect your accounts and devices.
|
||||
|
||||
All of our [recommended password managers](../../../tools/software/passwords/_index.md) include a built-in password generator that you can use.
|
||||
All of our [recommended password managers](../../../tools/software/passwords/index.md) include a built-in password generator that you can use.
|
||||
|
||||
### Rotating Passwords
|
||||
|
||||
You should avoid changing passwords that you have to remember (such as your password manager's master password) too often unless you have reason to believe it has been compromised, as changing it too often exposes you to the risk of forgetting it.
|
||||
|
||||
When it comes to passwords that you don't have to remember (such as passwords stored inside your password manager), if your [threat model](../threat-modeling/_index.md) calls for it, we recommend going through important accounts (especially accounts that don't use multifactor authentication) and changing their password every couple of months, in case they have been compromised in a data breach that hasn't become public yet. Most password managers allow you to set an expiry date for your password to make this easier to manage.
|
||||
When it comes to passwords that you don't have to remember (such as passwords stored inside your password manager), if your [threat model](../threat-modeling/index.md) calls for it, we recommend going through important accounts (especially accounts that don't use multifactor authentication) and changing their password every couple of months, in case they have been compromised in a data breach that hasn't become public yet. Most password managers allow you to set an expiry date for your password to make this easier to manage.
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- TODO: Admonition -->
|
||||
<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Checking for data breaches</p>
|
||||
|
||||
If your password manager lets you check for compromised passwords, make sure to do so and promptly change any password that may have been exposed in a data breach. Alternatively, you could follow [Have I Been Pwned's Latest Breaches feed](https://feeds.feedburner.com/HaveIBeenPwnedLatestBreaches) with the help of a [news aggregator](../../../tools/software/news-aggregators/_index.md).
|
||||
If your password manager lets you check for compromised passwords, make sure to do so and promptly change any password that may have been exposed in a data breach. Alternatively, you could follow [Have I Been Pwned's Latest Breaches feed](https://feeds.feedburner.com/HaveIBeenPwnedLatestBreaches) with the help of a [news aggregator](../../../tools/software/news-aggregators/index.md).
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -158,13 +158,13 @@ The best way to store your passwords is by using a password manager. They allow
|
||||
|
||||
There are many good options to choose from, both cloud-based and local. Choose one of our recommended password managers and use it to establish strong passwords across all of your accounts. We recommend securing your password manager with a [diceware passphrase](#diceware-passphrases) comprised of at least seven words.
|
||||
|
||||
[List of recommended password managers](../../../tools/software/passwords/_index.md){ .md-button }
|
||||
[List of recommended password managers](../../../tools/software/passwords/index.md){ .md-button }
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- TODO: Admonition -->
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Don't place your passwords and TOTP tokens inside the same password manager</p>
|
||||
|
||||
When using [TOTP codes as multifactor authentication](../multi-factor-authentication/_index.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp), the best security practice is to keep your TOTP codes in a [separate app](../../../tools/software/multi-factor-authentication/_index.md).
|
||||
When using [TOTP codes as multifactor authentication](../multi-factor-authentication/index.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp), the best security practice is to keep your TOTP codes in a [separate app](../../../tools/software/multi-factor-authentication/index.md).
|
||||
|
||||
Storing your TOTP tokens in the same place as your passwords, while convenient, reduces the accounts to a single factor in the event that an adversary gains access to your password manager.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -174,4 +174,4 @@ Furthermore, we do not recommend storing single-use recovery codes in your passw
|
||||
|
||||
### Backups
|
||||
|
||||
You should store an [encrypted](../../../tools/software/encryption/_index.md) backup of your passwords on multiple storage devices or a cloud storage provider. This can help you access your passwords if something happens to your primary device or the service you are using.
|
||||
You should store an [encrypted](../../../tools/software/encryption/index.md) backup of your passwords on multiple storage devices or a cloud storage provider. This can help you access your passwords if something happens to your primary device or the service you are using.
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ Making a security plan will help you to understand the threats that are unique t
|
||||
|
||||
For people looking to increase their privacy and security online, we've compiled a list of common threats our visitors face or goals our visitors have, to give you some inspiration and demonstrate the basis of our recommendations.
|
||||
|
||||
- [Common Goals and Threats :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../common-threats/_index.md)
|
||||
- [Common Goals and Threats :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../common-threats/index.md)
|
||||
|
||||
## Sources
|
||||
|
||||
+8
-8
@@ -9,12 +9,12 @@ Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit
|
||||
|
||||
[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: Do you need a VPN?](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2024/12/12/do-you-need-a-vpn){ .md-button }
|
||||
|
||||
Normally, an ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (i.e. modem). Encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, so they may not be able to see exactly what you're posting or reading, but they can get an idea of the [domains you request](../../advanced/dns-overview/_index.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).
|
||||
Normally, an ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (i.e. modem). Encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, so they may not be able to see exactly what you're posting or reading, but they can get an idea of the [domains you request](../../advanced/dns-overview/index.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).
|
||||
|
||||
Using a VPN hides even this information from your ISP, by shifting the trust you place in your network to a server somewhere else in the world. As a result, the ISP then only sees that you are connected to a VPN and nothing about the activity that you're passing through it.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> When we refer to "Virtual Private Networks" on this website, we are usually referring to **commercial** [VPN providers](../../../tools/services/vpn/_index.md), who you pay a monthly fee to in exchange for routing your internet traffic securely through their public servers. There are many other forms of VPN, such as ones you host yourself or ones operated by workplaces which allow you to securely connect to internal/employee network resources, however, these VPNs are usually designed for accessing remote networks securely, rather than protecting the privacy of your internet connection.
|
||||
> When we refer to "Virtual Private Networks" on this website, we are usually referring to **commercial** [VPN providers](../../../tools/services/vpn/index.md), who you pay a monthly fee to in exchange for routing your internet traffic securely through their public servers. There are many other forms of VPN, such as ones you host yourself or ones operated by workplaces which allow you to securely connect to internal/employee network resources, however, these VPNs are usually designed for accessing remote networks securely, rather than protecting the privacy of your internet connection.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## How does a VPN work?
|
||||
@@ -46,9 +46,9 @@ VPNs cannot encrypt data outside the connection between your device and the VPN
|
||||
|
||||
## When isn't a VPN suitable?
|
||||
|
||||
Using a VPN in cases where you're using your [real-life or well-known identity](../common-misconceptions/_index.md#complicated-is-better) online is unlikely to be useful. Doing so may trigger spam and fraud detection systems, such as if you were to log into your bank's website.
|
||||
Using a VPN in cases where you're using your [real-life or well-known identity](../common-misconceptions/index.md#complicated-is-better) online is unlikely to be useful. Doing so may trigger spam and fraud detection systems, such as if you were to log into your bank's website.
|
||||
|
||||
It's important to remember that a VPN will not provide you with absolute anonymity because the VPN provider itself will still have access to your real IP address, destination website information, and often a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. "No logging" policies are merely a promise; if you need complete safety from the network itself, consider using [Tor](../../advanced/tor-overview/_index.md) in addition to or instead of a VPN.
|
||||
It's important to remember that a VPN will not provide you with absolute anonymity because the VPN provider itself will still have access to your real IP address, destination website information, and often a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. "No logging" policies are merely a promise; if you need complete safety from the network itself, consider using [Tor](../../advanced/tor-overview/index.md) in addition to or instead of a VPN.
|
||||
|
||||
You also should not trust a VPN to secure your connection to an unencrypted, HTTP destination. In order to keep what you actually do on the websites you visit private and secure, you must use HTTPS. This will keep your passwords, session tokens, and queries safe from the VPN provider and other potential adversaries in between the VPN server and your destination. You should enable HTTPS-only mode in your browser (if it's supported) to mitigate attacks which try to downgrade your connection from HTTPS to HTTP.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -60,9 +60,9 @@ Another common reason encrypted DNS is recommended is that it prevents DNS spoof
|
||||
|
||||
## Should I use Tor *and* a VPN?
|
||||
|
||||
Maybe, Tor is not necessarily suitable for everybody in the first place. Consider your [threat model](../threat-modeling/_index.md), because if your adversary is not capable of extracting information from your VPN provider, using a VPN alone may provide enough protection.
|
||||
Maybe, Tor is not necessarily suitable for everybody in the first place. Consider your [threat model](../threat-modeling/index.md), because if your adversary is not capable of extracting information from your VPN provider, using a VPN alone may provide enough protection.
|
||||
|
||||
If you do use Tor then you are *probably* best off connecting to the Tor network via a commercial VPN provider. However, this is a complex subject which we've written more about on our [Tor overview](../../advanced/tor-overview/_index.md) page.
|
||||
If you do use Tor then you are *probably* best off connecting to the Tor network via a commercial VPN provider. However, this is a complex subject which we've written more about on our [Tor overview](../../advanced/tor-overview/index.md) page.
|
||||
|
||||
## Should I access Tor through VPN providers that provide "Tor nodes"?
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ You should not use that feature: The primary advantage of using Tor is that you
|
||||
|
||||
Currently, Tor only supports the TCP protocol. UDP (used by [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC), [HTTP3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3), and other protocols), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol), and other packets will be dropped. To compensate for this, VPN providers typically will route all non-TCP packets through their VPN server (your first hop). This is the case with [ProtonVPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn). Additionally, when using this Tor over VPN setup, you do not have control over other important Tor features such as [Isolated Destination Address](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (using a different Tor circuit for every domain you visit).
|
||||
|
||||
The feature should be viewed as a *convenient* way to access hidden services on Tor, not to stay anonymous. For proper anonymity, use the actual [Tor Browser](../../../tools/software/tor/_index.md).
|
||||
The feature should be viewed as a *convenient* way to access hidden services on Tor, not to stay anonymous. For proper anonymity, use the actual [Tor Browser](../../../tools/software/tor/index.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## Commercial VPN Ownership
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ Most VPN services are owned by the same [few companies](https://vpnpro.com/blog/
|
||||
|
||||
You should also be wary that many VPN review sites are merely advertising vehicles open to the highest bidder. <mark>Privacy Guides does not make money from recommending external products, and never uses affiliate programs.</mark>
|
||||
|
||||
[Our VPN Recommendations](../../../tools/services/vpn/_index.md){ .md-button }
|
||||
[Our VPN Recommendations](../../../tools/services/vpn/index.md){ .md-button }
|
||||
|
||||
## Modern VPN Alternatives
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -26,13 +26,13 @@ Many people get the concepts of **privacy**, **security**, and **anonymity** con
|
||||
<!-- markdownlint-disable-next-line -->
|
||||
**Anonymity**
|
||||
|
||||
: Anonymity is the ability to act without a persistent identifier. You might achieve this online with [Tor](../../../tools/software/tor/_index.md), which allows you to browse the internet with a random IP address and network connection instead of your own.
|
||||
: Anonymity is the ability to act without a persistent identifier. You might achieve this online with [Tor](../../../tools/software/tor/index.md), which allows you to browse the internet with a random IP address and network connection instead of your own.
|
||||
|
||||
: **Pseudonymity** is a similar concept, but it allows you to have a persistent identifier without it being tied to your real identity. If everybody knows you as `@GamerGuy12` online, but nobody knows your real name, that is your pseudonym.
|
||||
|
||||
All of these concepts overlap, but it is possible to have any combination of these. The sweet spot for most people is when all three of these concepts overlap. However, it's trickier to achieve than many initially believe. Sometimes, you have to compromise on some of these, and that's okay too. This is where **threat modeling** comes into play, allowing you to make informed decisions about the [software and services](../../../tools/_index.md) you use.
|
||||
|
||||
[:material-book-outline: Learn More About Threat Modeling](../threat-modeling/_index.md){ .md-button }
|
||||
[:material-book-outline: Learn More About Threat Modeling](../threat-modeling/index.md){ .md-button }
|
||||
|
||||
## Privacy vs. Secrecy
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user