refactor: Follow Hugo leaf vs branch conventions

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description: An overview of several network architectures commonly used by instant messaging applications.
---
There are several network architectures commonly used to relay messages between people. These networks can provide different privacy guarantees, which is why it's worth considering your [threat model](../../basics/threat-modeling/_index.md) when deciding which app to use.
There are several network architectures commonly used to relay messages between people. These networks can provide different privacy guarantees, which is why it's worth considering your [threat model](../../basics/threat-modeling/index.md) when deciding which app to use.
- [Recommended Instant Messengers](../../../tools/services/messengers/_index.md)
- [Recommended Instant Messengers](../../../tools/services/messengers/index.md)
- [Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why)
## Centralized Networks
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ P2P networks do not use servers, as peers communicate directly between each othe
- Messages can only be sent when both peers are online, however, your client may store messages locally to wait for the contact to return online.
- Generally increases battery usage on mobile devices, because the client must stay connected to the distributed network to learn about who is online.
- Some common messenger features may not be implemented or incompletely, such as message deletion.
- Your IP address and that of the contacts you're communicating with may be exposed if you do not use the software in conjunction with a [VPN](../../../tools/services/vpn/_index.md) or [Tor](../../../tools/software/tor/_index.md). Many countries have some form of mass surveillance and/or metadata retention.
- Your IP address and that of the contacts you're communicating with may be exposed if you do not use the software in conjunction with a [VPN](../../../tools/services/vpn/index.md) or [Tor](../../../tools/software/tor/index.md). Many countries have some form of mass surveillance and/or metadata retention.
## Anonymous Routing
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ P2P networks do not use servers, as peers communicate directly between each othe
A messenger using [anonymous routing](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_628) hides either the identity of the sender, the receiver, or evidence that they have been communicating. Ideally, a messenger should hide all three.
There are [many](https://doi.org/10.1145/3182658) ways to implement anonymous routing. One of the most famous is [onion routing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing) (i.e. [Tor](../tor-overview/_index.md)), which communicates encrypted messages through a virtual [overlay network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overlay_network) that hides the location of each node as well as the recipient and sender of each message. The sender and recipient never interact directly and only meet through a secret rendezvous node so that there is no leak of IP addresses nor physical location. Nodes cannot decrypt messages, nor the final destination; only the recipient can. Each intermediary node can only decrypt a part that indicates where to send the still encrypted message next, until it arrives at the recipient who can fully decrypt it, hence the "onion layers."
There are [many](https://doi.org/10.1145/3182658) ways to implement anonymous routing. One of the most famous is [onion routing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing) (i.e. [Tor](../tor-overview/index.md)), which communicates encrypted messages through a virtual [overlay network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overlay_network) that hides the location of each node as well as the recipient and sender of each message. The sender and recipient never interact directly and only meet through a secret rendezvous node so that there is no leak of IP addresses nor physical location. Nodes cannot decrypt messages, nor the final destination; only the recipient can. Each intermediary node can only decrypt a part that indicates where to send the still encrypted message next, until it arrives at the recipient who can fully decrypt it, hence the "onion layers."
Self-hosting a node in an anonymous routing network does not provide the host with additional privacy benefits, but rather contributes to the whole network's resilience against identification attacks for everyone's benefit.