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refactor: Follow Hugo leaf vs branch conventions
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description: An overview of several network architectures commonly used by instant messaging applications.
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---
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There are several network architectures commonly used to relay messages between people. These networks can provide different privacy guarantees, which is why it's worth considering your [threat model](../../basics/threat-modeling/_index.md) when deciding which app to use.
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There are several network architectures commonly used to relay messages between people. These networks can provide different privacy guarantees, which is why it's worth considering your [threat model](../../basics/threat-modeling/index.md) when deciding which app to use.
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- [Recommended Instant Messengers](../../../tools/services/messengers/_index.md)
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- [Recommended Instant Messengers](../../../tools/services/messengers/index.md)
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- [Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why)
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## Centralized Networks
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- Messages can only be sent when both peers are online, however, your client may store messages locally to wait for the contact to return online.
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- Generally increases battery usage on mobile devices, because the client must stay connected to the distributed network to learn about who is online.
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- Some common messenger features may not be implemented or incompletely, such as message deletion.
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- Your IP address and that of the contacts you're communicating with may be exposed if you do not use the software in conjunction with a [VPN](../../../tools/services/vpn/_index.md) or [Tor](../../../tools/software/tor/_index.md). Many countries have some form of mass surveillance and/or metadata retention.
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- Your IP address and that of the contacts you're communicating with may be exposed if you do not use the software in conjunction with a [VPN](../../../tools/services/vpn/index.md) or [Tor](../../../tools/software/tor/index.md). Many countries have some form of mass surveillance and/or metadata retention.
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## Anonymous Routing
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A messenger using [anonymous routing](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_628) hides either the identity of the sender, the receiver, or evidence that they have been communicating. Ideally, a messenger should hide all three.
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There are [many](https://doi.org/10.1145/3182658) ways to implement anonymous routing. One of the most famous is [onion routing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing) (i.e. [Tor](../tor-overview/_index.md)), which communicates encrypted messages through a virtual [overlay network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overlay_network) that hides the location of each node as well as the recipient and sender of each message. The sender and recipient never interact directly and only meet through a secret rendezvous node so that there is no leak of IP addresses nor physical location. Nodes cannot decrypt messages, nor the final destination; only the recipient can. Each intermediary node can only decrypt a part that indicates where to send the still encrypted message next, until it arrives at the recipient who can fully decrypt it, hence the "onion layers."
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There are [many](https://doi.org/10.1145/3182658) ways to implement anonymous routing. One of the most famous is [onion routing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing) (i.e. [Tor](../tor-overview/index.md)), which communicates encrypted messages through a virtual [overlay network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overlay_network) that hides the location of each node as well as the recipient and sender of each message. The sender and recipient never interact directly and only meet through a secret rendezvous node so that there is no leak of IP addresses nor physical location. Nodes cannot decrypt messages, nor the final destination; only the recipient can. Each intermediary node can only decrypt a part that indicates where to send the still encrypted message next, until it arrives at the recipient who can fully decrypt it, hence the "onion layers."
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Self-hosting a node in an anonymous routing network does not provide the host with additional privacy benefits, but rather contributes to the whole network's resilience against identification attacks for everyone's benefit.
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