refactor: Follow Hugo leaf vs branch conventions

content/tools/advanced/alternative-networks/index.md

@@ -3,13 +3,13 @@ title: "Alternative Networks"
 description: These tools allow you to access networks other than the World Wide Web.
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>
-[{{< badge content="Service Providers" color="indigo" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats/_index.md#privacy-from-service-providers)
-[{{< badge content="Mass Surveillance" color="blue" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats/_index.md#mass-surveillance-programs)
-[{{< badge content="Surveillance Capitalism" color="purple" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats/_index.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model)
+[{{< badge content="Service Providers" color="indigo" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats/index.md#privacy-from-service-providers)
+[{{< badge content="Mass Surveillance" color="blue" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats/index.md#mass-surveillance-programs)
+[{{< badge content="Surveillance Capitalism" color="purple" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats/index.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model)
 
 ## Anonymizing Networks
 
-When it comes to anonymizing networks, we want to specially note that [Tor](../../../wiki/advanced/tor-overview/_index.md) is our top choice. It is by far the most utilized, robustly studied, and actively developed anonymous network. Using other networks could be more likely to endanger your [:material-incognito: Anonymity](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats/_index.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple }, unless you know what you're doing.
+When it comes to anonymizing networks, we want to specially note that [Tor](../../../wiki/advanced/tor-overview/index.md) is our top choice. It is by far the most utilized, robustly studied, and actively developed anonymous network. Using other networks could be more likely to endanger your [:material-incognito: Anonymity](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats/index.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple }, unless you know what you're doing.
 
 <div class="pg-card-logos">
 {{< cards >}}
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ When it comes to anonymizing networks, we want to specially note that [Tor](../.
 
 ### Tor
 
-The **Tor** network is a group of volunteer-operated servers that allows you to connect for free and improve your privacy and security on the Internet. Individuals and organizations can also share information over the Tor network with ".onion hidden services" without compromising their privacy. Because Tor traffic is difficult to block and trace, Tor is an effective [:material-close-outline: Censorship](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats/_index.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray } circumvention tool.
+The **Tor** network is a group of volunteer-operated servers that allows you to connect for free and improve your privacy and security on the Internet. Individuals and organizations can also share information over the Tor network with ".onion hidden services" without compromising their privacy. Because Tor traffic is difficult to block and trace, Tor is an effective [:material-close-outline: Censorship](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats/index.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray } circumvention tool.
 
 {{< cards >}}
   {{< card link="https://torproject.org" title="Homepage" icon="home" >}}
@@ -31,9 +31,9 @@ The **Tor** network is a group of volunteer-operated servers that allows you to
 
 The recommended way to access the Tor network is via the official Tor Browser, which we have covered in more detail on a dedicated page:
 
-[Tor Browser Info :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../../software/tor/_index.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[Tor Browser Info :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../../software/tor/index.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 
-[Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../../../wiki/advanced/tor-overview/_index.md){ .md-button }
+[Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../../../wiki/advanced/tor-overview/index.md){ .md-button }
 
 You can access the Tor network using other tools; making this determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
 
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ Unlike Tor, all I2P traffic is internal to the I2P network, which means regular
 
 Also, unlike Tor, every I2P node will relay traffic for other users by default, instead of relying on dedicated relay volunteers to run nodes. There are approximately [10,000](https://metrics.torproject.org/networksize.html) relays and bridges on the Tor network compared to ~50,000 on I2P, meaning there is potentially more ways for your traffic to be routed to maximize anonymity. I2P also tends to be more performant than Tor, although this is likely a side effect of Tor being more focused on regular "clearnet" internet traffic and thus using more bottle necked exit nodes. Hidden service performance is generally considered to be much better on I2P compared to Tor. While running P2P applications like BitTorrent is challenging on Tor (and can massively impact Tor network performance), it is very easy and performant on I2P.
 
-There are downsides to I2P's approach, however. Tor relying on dedicated exit nodes means more people in less safe environments can use it, and the relays that do exist on Tor are likely to be more performant and stable, as they generally aren't run on residential connections. Tor is also far more focused on **browser privacy** (i.e. anti-fingerprinting), with a dedicated [Tor Browser](../../software/tor/_index.md) to make browsing activity as anonymous as possible. I2P is used via your [regular web browser](../../software/desktop-browsers/_index.md), and while you can configure your browser to be more privacy-protecting, you probably still won't have the same browser fingerprint as other I2P users (there's no "crowd" to blend in with in that regard).
+There are downsides to I2P's approach, however. Tor relying on dedicated exit nodes means more people in less safe environments can use it, and the relays that do exist on Tor are likely to be more performant and stable, as they generally aren't run on residential connections. Tor is also far more focused on **browser privacy** (i.e. anti-fingerprinting), with a dedicated [Tor Browser](../../software/tor/index.md) to make browsing activity as anonymous as possible. I2P is used via your [regular web browser](../../software/desktop-browsers/index.md), and while you can configure your browser to be more privacy-protecting, you probably still won't have the same browser fingerprint as other I2P users (there's no "crowd" to blend in with in that regard).
 
 Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.