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---
layout: evergreen
title: Android
mathjax: true
description: "Android is a secure operating system that has strong <a href='https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox'>app sandboxing</a>, <a href='https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot'>verified boot</a>, and a robust <a href='https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview'>permission</a> control system.
The main privacy concern with most Android devices is that they usually include <a href='https://developers.google.com/android/guides/overview'>Google Play Services</a>. This component is proprietary, closed source, has a privileged role on your phone and may collect private user information. It is not a part of the <a href='https://source.android.com/'>Android Open Source Project (AOSP)</a> nor is it included with the below derivatives."
---
<h2 id="mobile-only-recommendations" class="anchor">
<a href="#aosp-derivatives"><i class="fas fa-link anchor-icon"></i></a>
AOSP Derivatives
</h2>
{% for item_hash in site.data.operating-systems.android %}
{% assign item = item_hash[1] %}
{% if item.type == "Recommendation" %}
{% include recommendation-card.html %}
{% endif %}
{% endfor %}
<h2 id="android-security-privacy" class="anchor">
<a href="#android-security-privacy"><i class="fas fa-link anchor-icon"></i></a>
Android security and privacy features
</h2>
<h5><strong>User Profiles</strong></h5>
<p>Multiple user profiles (Settings → System → Multiple users) are the simplest way to isolate in Android. With user profiles you can limit a user from making calls, SMS or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles is a more secure method of isolation.</p>
<h5><strong>Work Profile</strong></h5>
<p><a href="https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949">Work profiles</a> are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles.</p>
<p>A <strong>device controller</strong> such as <a href="/android/#recommended-apps">Shelter</a> is required, unless you're using CalyxOS which includes one.</p>
<p>The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such as <em>File Shuttle</em> and <em>contact search blocking</em> or any kind of isolation features must be implemented by the controller. The user must also fully trust the device controller app, as it has full access to the data inside of the work profile.</p>
<p>This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously.</p>
<h5><strong>Verified Boot</strong></h5>
<p><a href='https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot'>Verified boot</a> is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack">Evil maid</a> attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with <a href="https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection">rollback protection</a>.</p>
<p>Android 10 and above has moved away from full disk encryption (FDE) to more flexible <a href="https://source.android.com/security/encryption/file-based">file based </a> encryption.</p>
<p>Each user's data is encrypted using their own unique encryption key, and the operating system files are left unencrypted. Verified boot ensures the integrity of the operating system files preventing an adversary with physical access from tampering or installing malware on the device. In the unlikely case that malware is able to exploit other parts of the system and gain higher privileged access, verified boot will prevent and revert changes to the system partition upon reboot of the device.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) are only obliged to support verified boot on their stock Android distribution. Only a few OEMs such as Google support custom Android Verified Boot (AVB) key enrollment on their devices. Some AOSP derivatives such as LineageOS or /e/ OS do not support verified boot even on hardware with verified boot support for third party operating systems. We recommend that you check for support <strong>before</strong> purchasing a new device. AOSP derivatives which do not support verified boot are <strong>not</strong> recommended.</p>
<h5><strong>VPN Killswitch</strong></h5>
<p>Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in (⚙️ Settings → Network & internet → VPN → ⚙️ → Block connections without VPN).</p>
<h5><strong>Global Toggles</strong></h5>
<p>Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bluetooth">Bluetooth</a> and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until renabled.</p>
<h2 id="recommended-apps" class="anchor">
<a href="#recommended-apps"><i class="fas fa-link anchor-icon"></i></a>
Recommended Apps
</h2>
{% for item_hash in site.data.operating-systems.android-applications %}
{% assign item = item_hash[1] %}
{% if item.type == "Recommendation" %}
{% include recommendation-card.html %}
{% endif %}
{% endfor %}
<h2 id="general-recommendations" class="anchor">
<a href="#general-recommendations"><i class="fas fa-link anchor-icon"></i></a>
General Recommendations
</h2>
<h5><strong>Android Rooting</strong></h5>
<p>Rooting Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete Android security model. This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful <a href='https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot'>verified boot</a>. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that verified boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface">attack surface</a> and may assist in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation">privilege escalation</a> vulnerabilities and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux">SELinux</a> policy bypasses.</p>
<p>Adblockers (AdAway) which modify the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)">hosts file</a> and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For Adblocking we suggest encrypted <a href="/providers/dns/">DNS</a> or <a href="/providers/vpn/">VPN</a> server blocking solutions instead. RethinkDNS, TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN) preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as Orbot or a real VPN server.</p>
<p>AFWall+ works based on the <a href="#graphene-calyxos">packet filtering approach</a> and is bypassable in some situations.</p>
<p>We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps.</p>
<h5><strong>Firmware Updates</strong></h5>
<p>Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) - phone manufacturers have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly <a href="https://source.android.com/security/bulletin">Android Security Bulletins</a>.</p>
<p>As the components of the phone such as the processor and radio technologies rely on closed source components, the updates must be provided by the respective manufacturers. Therefore it is important that you purchase a device within an active support cycle. <a href="https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2020/12/16/qualcomm-and-google-announce-collaboration-extend-android-os-support-and">Qualcomm</a> and <a href="https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-security-extending-updates-knox/">Samsung</a> support their devices for 4 years while cheaper products often have shorter support. With the introduction of the <a href=https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/4457705>Pixel 6</a>, Google now makes their own system on chip (SoC) and they will provide 5 years of support.</p>
<p>Fairphone claims that they will support their device for <a href="https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2021/09/fairphone-4-has-an-incredible-5-year-warranty-aims-for-6-years-of-updates/">6 years</a>. However, as they use Qualcomm SoC there has been some <a href="https://twitter.com/DanielMicay/status/1444028533186117633">skepticism</a> surrounding that claim.</p>
<p>Devices that have reached their end-of-life (EoL) and are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer, cannot receive firmware updates from OEM vendors or after market Android distributors. This means that security issues with those devices will remain unfixed.</p>
<h5><strong>Android versions</strong></h5>
<p>It's also important to make sure that you're not using an <a href="https://endoflife.date/android">end-of-life</a> version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, <a href="https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes">prior to Android 10</a>, any user apps with the <a href="https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE"><code>READ_PHONE_STATE</code></a> permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity">IMEI</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier">MEID</a>, your SIM card's <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity">IMSI</a>, whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only shipped by the OEM or Android distribution.</p>
<h5><strong>Android Permissions</strong></h5>
<p><a href="https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview">Permissions on Android</a> grant users control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes <a href="https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions">improvements</a> on the permission system in each successive version. All user installed apps are strictly <a href="https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox">sandboxed</a>, therefore there is no need to install any antivirus apps. The savings you make from not purchasing or subscribing to security apps is better spent on paying for a supported device in the future.</p>
<p>Should you want to run an app that you're unsure about consider using a user or work <a href="/android/#android-security-privacy">profile</a>.</p>
<h5><strong>SafetyNet and Play Integrity API</strong></h5>
<p><a href="https://developer.android.com/training/safetynet/attestation">SafetyNet</a> and the <a href="https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity">Play Integrity APIs</a> are generally used for <a href="https://grapheneos.org/usage#banking-apps">banking apps</a>. Many banking apps will work fine in GrapheneOS with sandboxed Play services, however some non-financal apps have their own crude anti-tampering mechanisms which might fail. GrapheneOS passes the <code>basicIntegrity</code> check, but not the certification check <code>ctsProfileMatch</code>. Devices with Android 8 or later have hardware attestation support which cannot be bypassed without leaked keys or serious vulnerabilities.</p>
<p>As for Google Wallet, we don't recommend this due to their <a href="https://payments.google.com/payments/apis-secure/get_legal_document?ldo=0&ldt=privacynotice&ldl=en">privacy policy</a>, which states you must opt-out if you don't want your credit rating and personal information shared with affiliate marketing services.</p>
<h5><strong>Android Device Shopping</strong></h5>
<p>Google Pixels are known to have good security and properly support <a href="https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot">verified boot</a>. Some other phones such as the Fairphone and Oneplus devices also support custom Android verified boot (AVB) key enrollment. However, there have been issues with their older models. In the past they were using <a href="https://social.coop/@dazinism/105346943304083054">test keys</a> or not doing proper verification, making verified boot on those devices useless.</p>
<p>Avoid buying phones from mobile network operators. These often have a <strong>locked bootloader</strong> and do not support <a href="https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/locking_unlocking">OEM unlocking</a>. These phone variants will prevent you from installing any kind of alternative Android distribution. Phones that cannot be unlocked will often have an <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity">IMEI</a> starting with "35", that includes phones from purchased from Verizon, Telus, Rogers, EE etc.</p>
<p>Be very <strong>careful</strong> about buying second hand phones from online marketplaces. Always check the reputation of the seller. If the device is stolen there's a possibility of <a href="https://www.gsma.com/security/resources/imei-blacklisting/">IMEI blacklisting</a>. There is also a risk involved with you being associated with the activity of the previous owner.</p>
We have these general tips:
<ul>
<li>If you're after a bargain on a Pixel device, we suggest buying an "<strong>a</strong>" model, just after the next flagship is released. Discounts are usually available because Google will be trying to clear their stock.</li>
<li>Consider price beating options and specials offered at <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brick_and_mortar">brick and mortar</a> stores.</li>
<li>Look at online community bargain sites in your country. These can alert you to good sales.</li>
<li>The price per day for a device can be calculated as \({\text {EoL Date}-\text{Current Date} \over \text{Cost}}\). Google provides a <a href="https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705">list</a> of their supported devices.</li>
<li>Do not buy devices that have reached or are near their end-of-life, additional firmware updates must be provided by the manufacturer.</li>
<li>Do not buy preloaded LineageOS or /e/ OS phones or any Android phones without proper <a href="https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot">verified boot</a> support and firmware updates. These devices also have no way for you to check whether they've been tampered with.</li>
<li>In short, if a device or Android distribution is not listed here, there is probably a good reason, so check our <a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/discussions">discussions</a> page.</li>
</ul>
<p>The installation of GrapheneOS on a Pixel phone is easy with their <a href="https://grapheneos.org/install/web">web installer</a>. If you don't feel comfortable doing it yourself and are willing to spend a bit of extra money, check out the <a href="https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop">NitroPhone</a> as they come preloaded with GrapheneOS from the reputable <a href="https://www.nitrokey.com/about">Nitrokey</a> company. The GrapheneOS project is not currently affiliated with any vendor and cannot ensure the quality or security of their products.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://calyxinstitute.org/membership/calyxos">CalyxOS membership</a> also entitles you to a device preloaded with CalyxOS.</p>
<h2 id="graphene-calyxos" class="anchor">
<a href="#graphene-calyxos"><i class="fas fa-link anchor-icon"></i></a>
Security comparison of GrapheneOS and CalyxOS
</h2>
<h5><strong>Profiles</strong></h5>
<p>CalyxOS includes a device controller app so there is no need to install a third party app like <a href="/android/#recommended-apps">Shelter</a>. GrapheneOS plans to introduce nested profile support with better isolation in the future.</p>
<p>GrapheneOS extends the <a href="/android/#android-security-privacy">user profile</a> feature allowing a user to press an "End Session" button. This button clears the encryption key from memory. There are plans to add a <a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/88">cross profile notifications system</a> in the future.</p>
<h5><strong>INTERNET permission vs packet filtering</strong></h5>
<p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Packet_filter">Packet filter</a> based solutions such <a href="https://calyxos.org/docs/tech/datura-details">Datura Firewall</a>, <a href="https://gitlab.com/LineageOS/issues/android/-/issues/3228">LineageOS</a> (DivestOS), AFWall+ and NetGuard, are not ideal as they can leak and don't prevent an app from proxying a network request through another app using an <a href="https://developer.android.com/guide/components/intents-filters">intent</a>.</p>
<p>Android has a built-in <a href="https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting"><code>INTERNET</code></a> permission. This is enforced by the operating system. On AOSP and most of its derivatives, it is treated as an install time permission. GrapheneOS changes it to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Runtime_(program_lifecycle_phase)">runtime</a> permission, meaning that it can be revoked to deny internet access to a specific app.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting"><code>INTERNET</code></a> permission is a strong way of controlling internet access. It also blocks direct access to the internet and access to other APIs that rely on the <a href="https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting"><code>INTERNET</code></a> permission. The only way for an app to circumvent it is for it to communicate with another app that has been granted <a href="https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting"><code>INTERNET</code></a> permission via mutual consent. Such communication can be prevented by putting apps into seperate profiles.</p>
<p>Some apps might crash if their <a href="https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting"><code>INTERNET</code></a> permission is revoked. CalyxOS instead uses a <a href="https://calyxos.org/docs/tech/datura-details">firewall</a> to achieve a similar outcome however, in some circumstances CalyxOS's approach may leak (<a href="https://gitlab.com/CalyxOS/calyxos/-/issues/572">#572</a>, <a href="https://gitlab.com/CalyxOS/calyxos/-/issues/581">#581</a>).
<h5><strong>Sandboxed Play Services vs Privileged MicroG</strong></h5>
<p>When Google Play services are used on GrapheneOS, they run as a user app and are contained within a user or work profile.</p>
<p>Sandboxed Play Services are confined using the highly restrictive, default <a href="https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts"><code>untrusted_app</code></a> domain provided by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux">SELinux</a>. Permissions for apps to use Play Services can be revoked at any time by the user.</p>
<p>MicroG is a reimplementation of Google Play Services. This means it needs to be updated every time Android has a major version update (or the Android API changes). It also needs to run in the highly privileged <a href="https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts"><code>system_app</code></a> SELinux domain like the normal Play Services and is less secure than the Sandboxed Play Service approach. We do not believe MicroG provides any privacy advantages over Sandboxed Play Services except for the option to <em>shift trust</em> of the location backend from Google to another provider such as Mozilla or DejaVu.</p>
<h5><strong>Privileged App Extensions</strong></h5>
<p>Android 12 comes with special support for seamless app updates with <a href="https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2020/09/listening-to-developer-feedback-to.html">third party app stores</a>. The popular Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) repository <a href="https://f-droid.org">F-Droid</a> doesn't implement this feature and requires a <a href="https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.fdroid.privileged">privileged extension</a> to be included with the Android distribution in order to have unattended app installation.</p>
<p>GrapheneOS doesn't compromise on security, therefore they do not include the F-Droid extension therefore, users have to confirm all updates manually if they want to use F-Droid. GrapheneOS officially recommends <a href="https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-play-services">Sandboxed Play Services</a> instead. Many FOSS Android apps are also in Google Play but sometimes they are not (like <a href="/video-streaming/">NewPipe</a>).</p>
<p>CalyxOS includes the <a href="https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.fdroid.privileged">privileged extension</a>, which may lower device security. Seamless app updates should be possible with <a href="https://auroraoss.com">Aurora Store</a> in Android 12.</p>
<h5><strong>Additional Hardening</strong></h5>
<p>GrapheneOS improves upon <a href="https://source.android.com/">AOSP</a> security with:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Hardened WebView:</strong> Vanadium WebView requires <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/64-bit_computing">64-bit</a> processes on the <a href="https://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/WebView">WebView</a> process and disables legacy <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/32-bit_computing">32-bit</a> processes. It uses hardened compiler options such as <a href="https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Code-Gen-Options.html"><code>-fwrapv</code></a> and <a href="https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.9.3/gcc/Optimize-Options.html"><code>-fstack-protector-strong</code></a>, which can help protect against <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stack_buffer_overflow">stack buffer overflows</a>. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/API">API</a>s such as the <a href="https://chromestatus.com/feature/4537134732017664">battery status API</a> are disabled for privacy reasons. All system apps on GrapheneOS use the Vanadium WebView which means user installed apps that use WebView will also benefit from Vanadium's hardening. The <a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/tree/12/patches">Vanadium patch set</a> is a lot more comprehensive than CalyxOS's <a href="https://gitlab.com/CalyxOS/chromium-patches">Chromium patch set</a> which is derived from it.</li>
<li><strong>Hardened Kernel:</strong> GrapheneOS kernel includes some hardening from the <a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/linux-hardened">linux-hardened</a> project and the <a href="https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project">Kernel Self Protection Project (KSPP)</a>. CalyxOS uses the <a href="https://calyxos.org/docs/development/build/kernel/">same kernel</a> as regular Android with some minor modifications.</li>
<li><strong>Hardened Memory Allocator:</strong> GrapheneOS uses the <a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc">hardened malloc</a> subproject as its memory allocator. This focuses on hardening against <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_corruption">memory heap corruption</a>. CalyxOS uses the default AOSP <a href="https://source.android.com/devices/tech/debug/scudo">Scudo Malloc</a>, which is generally <a href="https://twitter.com/danielmicay/status/1033671709197398016">less effective</a>. Hardened Malloc has uncovered vulnerabilities in AOSP which have been <a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_system_core/commit/be11b59725aa6118b0e1f0712572e835c3d50746">fixed</a> by GrapheneOS such as <a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-0703">CVE-2021-0703</a>.</li>
<li><strong>Secure Exec Spawning:</strong> GrapheneOS <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spawn_(computing)">spawns</a> fresh processes as opposed to using the <a href="https://ayusch.com/android-internals-the-android-os-boot-process">Zygote model</a> used by AOSP and CalyxOS. The Zygote model weakens <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Address_space_layout_randomization">Address Space Layout Randomization</a> (ASLR) and is considered <a href="https://wenke.gtisc.gatech.edu/papers/morula.pdf">less secure</a>. Creating <a href="https://grapheneos.org/usage#exec-spawning">fresh processes</a> is safer but will have some performance penalty when launching a new application. These penalties are not really noticeable unless you have an <a href="https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705">old device</a> with slow storage such as the Pixel 3a/3a XL as it has <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MultiMediaCard#eMMC">eMMC</a>.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Please note that these are just a few examples and are not an extensive list of GrapheneOS's hardening</strong>.</p>

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---
layout: evergreen
title: Android
mathjax: true
description: |
Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system.
The main privacy concern with most Android devices is that they usually include [Google Play Services](https://developers.google.com/android/guides/overview). This component is proprietary, closed source, has a privileged role on your phone and may collect private user information. It is not a part of the [Android Open Source Project](https://source.android.com/) (AOSP) nor is it included with the below derivatives.
---
## AOSP Derivatives
{% for item_hash in site.data.operating-systems.android %}
{% assign item = item_hash[1] %}
{% if item.type == "Recommendation" %}
{% include recommendation-card.html %}
{% endif %}
{% endfor %}
## Android security and privacy features
### User Profiles
Multiple user profiles (Settings → System → Multiple users) are the simplest way to isolate in Android. With user profiles you can limit a user from making calls, SMS or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles is a more secure method of isolation.
### Work Profile
[Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles.
A **device controller** such as [Shelter](#recommended-apps) is required, unless you're using CalyxOS which includes one.
The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such as *File Shuttle* and *contact search blocking* or any kind of isolation features must be implemented by the controller. The user must also fully trust the device controller app, as it has full access to the data inside of the work profile.
This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously.
### Verified Boot
[Verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [Evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection).
Android 10 and above has moved away from full-disk encryption (FDE) to more flexible [file-based encryption](https://source.android.com/security/encryption/file-based).
Each user's data is encrypted using their own unique encryption key, and the operating system files are left unencrypted. Verified boot ensures the integrity of the operating system files preventing an adversary with physical access from tampering or installing malware on the device. In the unlikely case that malware is able to exploit other parts of the system and gain higher privileged access, verified boot will prevent and revert changes to the system partition upon reboot of the device.
Unfortunately, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) are only obliged to support verified boot on their stock Android distribution. Only a few OEMs such as Google support custom Android Verified Boot (AVB) key enrollment on their devices. Some AOSP derivatives such as LineageOS or /e/ OS do not support verified boot even on hardware with verified boot support for third party operating systems. We recommend that you check for support **before** purchasing a new device. AOSP derivatives which do not support verified boot are **not** recommended.
### VPN Killswitch
Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in ⚙️ Settings → Network & internet → VPN → ⚙️ → Block connections without VPN.
### Global Toggles
Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling [Bluetooth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bluetooth) and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until renabled.
## Recommended Apps
{% for item_hash in site.data.operating-systems.android-applications %}
{% assign item = item_hash[1] %}
{% if item.type == "Recommendation" %}
{% include recommendation-card.html %}
{% endif %}
{% endfor %}
## General Recommendations
### Avoid Root
Rooting Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete Android security model. This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful [verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that verified boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and [SELinux](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux) policy bypasses.
Adblockers (AdAway) which modify the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)">hosts file</a> and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For Adblocking we suggest encrypted <a href="/providers/dns/">DNS</a> or <a href="/providers/vpn/">VPN</a> server blocking solutions instead. RethinkDNS, TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN) preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as Orbot or a real VPN server.
AFWall+ works based on the <a href="#graphene-calyxos">packet filtering approach</a> and is bypassable in some situations.
We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps.
### Firmware Updates
Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) - phone manufacturers have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin).
As the components of the phone such as the processor and radio technologies rely on closed source components, the updates must be provided by the respective manufacturers. Therefore it is important that you purchase a device within an active support cycle. [Qualcomm](https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2020/12/16/qualcomm-and-google-announce-collaboration-extend-android-os-support-and) and [Samsung](https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-security-extending-updates-knox/) support their devices for 4 years while cheaper products often have shorter support. With the introduction of the [Pixel 6](https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/4457705), Google now makes their own system on chip (SoC) and they will provide 5 years of support.
Devices that have reached their end-of-life (EoL) and are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer, cannot receive firmware updates from OEM vendors or after market Android distributors. This means that security issues with those devices will remain unfixed.
### Android versions
It's also important to make sure that you're not using an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any user apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only shipped by the OEM or Android distribution.
### Android Permissions
[Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant users control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All user installed apps are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore there is no need to install any antivirus apps. The savings you make from not purchasing or subscribing to security apps is better spent on paying for a supported device in the future.
Should you want to run an app that you're unsure about consider using a user or work [profile](/android/#android-security-privacy).
### SafetyNet and Play Integrity API
[SafetyNet](https://developer.android.com/training/safetynet/attestation) and the [Play Integrity APIs](https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity) are generally used for [banking apps](https://grapheneos.org/usage#banking-apps). Many banking apps will work fine in GrapheneOS with sandboxed Play services, however some non-financal apps have their own crude anti-tampering mechanisms which might fail. GrapheneOS passes the `basicIntegrity` check, but not the certification check `ctsProfileMatch`. Devices with Android 8 or later have hardware attestation support which cannot be bypassed without leaked keys or serious vulnerabilities.
As for Google Wallet, we don't recommend this due to their [privacy policy](https://payments.google.com/payments/apis-secure/get_legal_document?ldo=0&ldt=privacynotice&ldl=en), which states you must opt-out if you don't want your credit rating and personal information shared with affiliate marketing services.
### Android Device Shopping
Google Pixels are known to have good security and properly support [verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Some other phones such as the Fairphone and Oneplus devices also support custom Android verified boot (AVB) key enrollment. However, there have been issues with their older models. In the past they were using [test keys](https://social.coop/@dazinism/105346943304083054) or not doing proper verification, making verified boot on those devices useless.
Avoid buying phones from mobile network operators. These often have a **locked bootloader** and do not support [OEM unlocking](https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/locking_unlocking). These phone variants will prevent you from installing any kind of alternative Android distribution. Phones that cannot be unlocked will often have an [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity) starting with "35", that includes phones from purchased from Verizon, Telus, Rogers, EE etc.
Be very **careful** about buying second hand phones from online marketplaces. Always check the reputation of the seller. If the device is stolen there's a possibility of [IMEI blacklisting](https://www.gsma.com/security/resources/imei-blacklisting/). There is also a risk involved with you being associated with the activity of the previous owner.
We have these general tips:
* If you're after a bargain on a Pixel device, we suggest buying an "**a**" model, just after the next flagship is released. Discounts are usually available because Google will be trying to clear their stock.
* Consider price beating options and specials offered at [brick and mortar](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brick_and_mortar) stores.
* Look at online community bargain sites in your country. These can alert you to good sales.
* The price per day for a device can be calculated as \\({\\text {EoL Date}-\\text{Current Date} \\over \\text{Cost}}\\). Google provides a [list](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) of their supported devices.
* Do not buy devices that have reached or are near their end-of-life, additional firmware updates must be provided by the manufacturer.
* Do not buy preloaded LineageOS or /e/ OS phones or any Android phones without proper [verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) support and firmware updates. These devices also have no way for you to check whether they've been tampered with.
* In short, if a device or Android distribution is not listed here, there is probably a good reason, so check our [discussions](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/discussions) page.
The installation of GrapheneOS on a Pixel phone is easy with their [web installer](https://grapheneos.org/install/web). If you don't feel comfortable doing it yourself and are willing to spend a bit of extra money, check out the [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) as they come preloaded with GrapheneOS from the reputable [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/about) company. The GrapheneOS project is not currently affiliated with any vendor and cannot ensure the quality or security of their products.
A [CalyxOS membership](https://calyxinstitute.org/membership/calyxos) also entitles you to a device preloaded with CalyxOS.
## Security comparison of GrapheneOS and CalyxOS
### Profiles
CalyxOS includes a device controller app so there is no need to install a third party app like [Shelter](/android/#recommended-apps). GrapheneOS plans to introduce nested profile support with better isolation in the future.
GrapheneOS extends the [user profile](/android/#android-security-privacy) feature allowing a user to press an "End Session" button. This button clears the encryption key from memory. There are plans to add a [cross profile notifications system](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/88) in the future.
### INTERNET permission vs packet filtering
[Packet filter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Packet_filter) based solutions such [Datura Firewall](https://calyxos.org/docs/tech/datura-details), [LineageOS](https://gitlab.com/LineageOS/issues/android/-/issues/3228) (DivestOS), AFWall+ and NetGuard, are not ideal as they can leak and don't prevent an app from proxying a network request through another app using an [intent](https://developer.android.com/guide/components/intents-filters).
Android has a built-in [`INTERNET`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) permission. This is enforced by the operating system. On AOSP and most of its derivatives, it is treated as an install time permission. GrapheneOS changes it to [runtime](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Runtime_(program_lifecycle_phase)) permission, meaning that it can be revoked to deny internet access to a specific app.
The [`INTERNET`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) permission is a strong way of controlling internet access. It also blocks direct access to the internet and access to other APIs that rely on the [`INTERNET`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) permission. The only way for an app to circumvent it is for it to communicate with another app that has been granted [`INTERNET`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) permission via mutual consent. Such communication can be prevented by putting apps into seperate profiles.
Some apps might crash if their [`INTERNET`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) permission is revoked. CalyxOS instead uses a [firewall](https://calyxos.org/docs/tech/datura-details) to achieve a similar outcome however, in some circumstances CalyxOS's approach may leak ([#572](https://gitlab.com/CalyxOS/calyxos/-/issues/572), [#581](https://gitlab.com/CalyxOS/calyxos/-/issues/581)).
### Sandboxed Play Services vs Privileged MicroG
When Google Play services are used on GrapheneOS, they run as a user app and are contained within a user or work profile.
Sandboxed Play Services are confined using the highly restrictive, default [`untrusted_app`](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts) domain provided by [SELinux](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux). Permissions for apps to use Play Services can be revoked at any time by the user.
MicroG is a reimplementation of Google Play Services. This means it needs to be updated every time Android has a major version update (or the Android API changes). It also needs to run in the highly privileged [`system_app`](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts) SELinux domain like the normal Play Services and is less secure than the Sandboxed Play Service approach. We do not believe MicroG provides any privacy advantages over Sandboxed Play Services except for the option to _shift trust_ of the location backend from Google to another provider such as Mozilla or DejaVu.
### Privileged App Extensions
Android 12 comes with special support for seamless app updates with [third party app stores](https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2020/09/listening-to-developer-feedback-to.html). The popular Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) repository [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org) doesn't implement this feature and requires a [privileged extension](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.fdroid.privileged) to be included with the Android distribution in order to have unattended app installation.
GrapheneOS doesn't compromise on security, therefore they do not include the F-Droid extension therefore, users have to confirm all updates manually if they want to use F-Droid. GrapheneOS officially recommends [Sandboxed Play Services](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-play-services) instead. Many FOSS Android apps are also in Google Play but sometimes they are not (like [NewPipe](/software/video-streaming/)).
CalyxOS includes the [privileged extension](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.fdroid.privileged), which may lower device security. Seamless app updates should be possible with [Aurora Store](https://auroraoss.com) in Android 12.
### Additional Hardening
GrapheneOS improves upon [AOSP](https://source.android.com/) security with:
* **Hardened WebView:** Vanadium WebView requires [64-bit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/64-bit_computing) processes on the [WebView](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/WebView) process and disables legacy [32-bit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/32-bit_computing) processes. It uses hardened compiler options such as [`-fwrapv`](https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Code-Gen-Options.html) and [`-fstack-protector-strong`](https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.9.3/gcc/Optimize-Options.html), which can help protect against [stack buffer overflows](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stack_buffer_overflow). [API](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/API)s such as the [battery status API](https://chromestatus.com/feature/4537134732017664) are disabled for privacy reasons. All system apps on GrapheneOS use the Vanadium WebView which means user installed apps that use WebView will also benefit from Vanadium's hardening. The [Vanadium patch set](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/tree/12/patches) is a lot more comprehensive than CalyxOS's [Chromium patch set](https://gitlab.com/CalyxOS/chromium-patches) which is derived from it.
* **Hardened Kernel:** GrapheneOS kernel includes some hardening from the [linux-hardened](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/linux-hardened) project and the [Kernel Self Protection Project (KSPP)](https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project). CalyxOS uses the [same kernel](https://calyxos.org/docs/development/build/kernel/) as regular Android with some minor modifications.
* **Hardened Memory Allocator:** GrapheneOS uses the [hardened malloc](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc) subproject as its memory allocator. This focuses on hardening against [memory heap corruption](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_corruption). CalyxOS uses the default AOSP [Scudo Malloc](https://source.android.com/devices/tech/debug/scudo), which is generally [less effective](https://twitter.com/danielmicay/status/1033671709197398016). Hardened Malloc has uncovered vulnerabilities in AOSP which have been [fixed](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_system_core/commit/be11b59725aa6118b0e1f0712572e835c3d50746) by GrapheneOS such as [CVE-2021-0703](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-0703).
* **Secure Exec Spawning:** GrapheneOS [spawns](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spawn_(computing)) fresh processes as opposed to using the [Zygote model](https://ayusch.com/android-internals-the-android-os-boot-process) used by AOSP and CalyxOS. The Zygote model weakens [Address Space Layout Randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Address_space_layout_randomization) (ASLR) and is considered [less secure](https://wenke.gtisc.gatech.edu/papers/morula.pdf). Creating [fresh processes](https://grapheneos.org/usage#exec-spawning) is safer but will have some performance penalty when launching a new application. These penalties are not really noticeable unless you have an [old device](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) with slow storage such as the Pixel 3a/3a XL as it has [eMMC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MultiMediaCard#eMMC).
**Please note that these are just a few examples and are not an extensive list of GrapheneOS's hardening**.

23
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@@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
---
layout: evergreen
title: Browser Recommendations
description: "These are our current web browser recommendations and settings you can use to preserve your privacy. We recommend keeping extensions to a minimum: they have privileged access within your browser, require you to trust the developer, can make you <a href='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint'>stand out</a>, and <a href='https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/chromium-extensions/c/0ei-UCHNm34/m/lDaXwQhzBAAJ'>weaken</a> site isolation."
description: |
These are our current web browser recommendations and settings you can use to preserve your privacy. We recommend keeping extensions to a minimum: they have privileged access within your browser, require you to trust the developer, can make you [stand out](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint), and [weaken](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/chromium-extensions/c/0ei-UCHNm34/m/lDaXwQhzBAAJ) site isolation.
---
<h2 id="general-recommendations" class="anchor">
<a href="#general-recommendations"><i class="fas fa-link anchor-icon"></i></a>
General Recommendations
</h2>
## General Recommendations
{% for item_hash in site.data.software.browsers %}
{% assign item = item_hash[1] %}
@@ -18,10 +16,7 @@ General Recommendations
{% endfor %}
<h2 id="desktop-only-recommendations" class="anchor">
<a href="#desktop-only-recommendations"><i class="fas fa-link anchor-icon"></i></a>
Desktop Only Recommendations
</h2>
## Desktop Browser Recommendations
{% for item_hash in site.data.software.browsers-desktop %}
{% assign item = item_hash[1] %}
@@ -32,10 +27,7 @@ Desktop Only Recommendations
{% endfor %}
<h2 id="mobile-only-recommendations" class="anchor">
<a href="#mobile-only-recommendations"><i class="fas fa-link anchor-icon"></i></a>
Mobile Only Recommendations
</h2>
## Mobile Browser Recommendations
<p>On Android, Mozilla's engine <a href="https://mozilla.github.io/geckoview/">GeckoView</a> has yet to support <a href="https://hacks.mozilla.org/2021/05/introducing-firefox-new-site-isolation-security-architecture">site isolation</a> or enable <a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1565196">isolatedProcess</a>. Firefox Android also doesn't yet have <a href="https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/fenix/issues/16952#issuecomment-907960218">HTTPS-Only mode</a> built-in. These features are supported in Bromite as it uses <a href="https://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/WebView">Chromium WebView</a> which is included in all Android operating systems. We do not recommend Firefox or any Gecko based browsers at this time.</p>
@@ -50,10 +42,7 @@ Mobile Only Recommendations
{% endfor %}
<h2 id="additional-resources" class="anchor">
<a href="#additional-resources"><i class="fas fa-link anchor-icon"></i></a>
Additional Resources
</h2>
## Additional Resources
{% for item_hash in site.data.software.browsers-resources %}
{% assign item = item_hash[1] %}

16
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@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
---
layout: evergreen
title: Cloud Storage
description: "If you are currently using a Cloud Storage Service like Dropbox, Google Drive, Microsoft OneDrive or Apple iCloud, you are putting complete trust in your service provider to not look at your files.
Consider reducing the need to trust your provider, by using an alternative below that supports <a href='https://wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_encryption'>end-to-end-encryption (E2EE)</a>."
---
{% for item_hash in site.data.providers.cloud %}
{% assign item = item_hash[1] %}
{% if item.type == "Recommendation" %}
{% include recommendation-card.html %}
{% endif %}
{% endfor %}

168
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@@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
---
layout: evergreen
title: Real-Time Communication
description: "We only recommend messengers that support strong <a href='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_encryption'>end-to-end encryption (E2EE)</a> and have been been independently <a href='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_security_audit#The_audited_systems'>audited</a> to ensure their cryptography works as intended. The selection listed here is <a href='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_and_open-source_software'>free and open-source</a> software, ensuring that the code can be verified by experts now and in the future."
---
<h2 id="im" class="anchor">
<a href="#im"><i class="fas fa-link anchor-icon"></i></a>
Encrypted Instant Messengers
</h2>
{% for item_hash in site.data.software.messengers %}
{% assign item = item_hash[1] %}
{% if item.type == "Recommendation" %}
{% include recommendation-card.html %}
{% endif %}
{% endfor %}
<h2 id="network-types" class="anchor">
<a href="#network-types"><i class="fas fa-link anchor-icon"></i></a>
Types of communication networks
</h2>
<p>There are several network architectures commonly used to relay messages between users. These networks can provide different different privacy guarantees, which is why it's worth considering your <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Threat_model">threat model</a> when making a decision about which app to use.</p>
<h3 id="centralized" class="anchor">
<a href="#centralized"><i class="fas fa-link anchor-icon"></i></a>
Centralized
</h3>
<div class="clearfix">
<img src="/assets/img/layout/network-centralized.svg" width="150" height="150" class="img-fluid float-left ml-2" style="float: left" alt="Centralized network" />
<p>Centralized messengers are those where all participants are on the same server or network of servers controlled by the same organization.</p>
<p>Some self-hosted messengers allow you to set up your own server. Self-hosting can provide additional privacy guarantees such as no usage logs or limited access to metadata (data about who is talking to whom etc). Self-hosted centralized messengers are isolated and everyone must be on the same server to communicate.</p>
</div>
<div class="container">
<div class="row">
<div class="col-md-6">
<h4>Advantages</h4>
<ul>
<li>New features and changes can be implemented more quickly.</li>
<li>Easier to get started with and to find contacts.</li>
<li>Most mature and stable features ecosystems, as they are easier to program in a centralized software.</li>
<li>Privacy issues may be reduced when you trust a server that you're self-hosting.</li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="col-md-6">
<h4>Disadvantages</h4>
<ul>
<li>Can include <a href="https://drewdevault.com/2018/08/08/Signal.html">restricted control or access</a>. This can include things like:</li>
<ul>
<li>Being <a href="https://github.com/LibreSignal/LibreSignal/issues/37#issuecomment-217211165">forbidden from connecting third-party clients</a> to the centralized network that might provide for greater customization or better user experience. Often defined in Terms and Conditions of usage.</li>
<li>Poor or no documentation for third-party developers.</li>
</ul>
<li>The <a href="https://blog.privacytools.io/delisting-wire">ownership</a>, privacy policy, and operations of the service can change easily when a single entity controls it, potentially compromising the service later on.</li>
<li>Self hosting requires effort and knowledge of how to set up a service.</li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<h3 id="federated" class="anchor">
<a href="#federated"><i class="fas fa-link anchor-icon"></i></a>
Federated
</h3>
<div class="clearfix">
<img src="/assets/img/layout/network-decentralized.svg" width="200" class="img-fluid float-left ml-2" style="float: left" alt="Decentralized network" />
<p>Federated messengers use multiple, independent, decentralized servers that are able to talk to each other (email is one example of a federated service). Federation allows system administrators to control their own server and still be a part of the larger communications network.</p>
<p>When self-hosted, users of a federated server can discover and communicate with users of other servers, although some servers may choose to remain private by being non-federated (e.g., work team server).</p>
</div>
<div class="container">
<div class="row">
<div class="col-md-6">
<h3>Advantages</h3>
<ul>
<li>Allows for greater control over your own data when running your own server.</li>
<li>Allows you to choose who to trust your data with by choosing between multiple "public" servers.</li>
<li>Often allows for third party clients which can provide a more native, customized, or accessible experience.</li>
<li>Server software can be verified that it matches public source code, assuming you have access to the server or you trust the person who does (e.g., a family member)</li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="col-md-6">
<h3>Disadvantages</h3>
<ul>
<li>Adding new features is more complex, because these features need to be standardized and tested to ensure they work with all servers on the network.</li>
<li>Due to the previous point, features can be lacking, or incomplete or working in unexpected ways compared to centralized platforms, such as message relay when offline or message deletion.</li>
<li>Some metadata may be available (e.g., information like "who is talking to whom," but not actual message content if E2EE is used).</li>
<li>Federated servers generally require trusting your server's administrator. They may be a hobbyist or otherwise not a "security professional," and may not serve standard documents like a privacy policy or terms of service detailing how your data is utilized.</li>
<li>Server administrators sometimes choose to block other servers, which are a source of unmoderated abuse or break general rules of accepted behavior. This will hinder your ability to communicate with users on those servers.</li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<h3 id="peer-to-peer" class="anchor">
<a href="#peer-to-peer"><i class="fas fa-link anchor-icon"></i></a>
Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
</h3>
<div class="clearfix">
<p>
<img src="/assets/img/layout/network-distributed.svg" width="150" height="150" class="img-fluid float-left ml-2" style="float: left" alt="Distributed network" />
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer-to-peer">Peer-to-peer</a> messengers connect to a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_networking">distributed network</a> of nodes to relay messages to the recipient without a third-party server. Clients (peers) usually find each other through the use of a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_computing">distributed computing</a> network. Examples of this include <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_hash_table">DHT (distributed hash table)</a> (used with technologies like <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent_(protocol)">torrents</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/InterPlanetary_File_System">IPFS</a>, for example). Another approach is proximity based networks, where a connection is established over WiFi or Bluetooth (for example, Briar or the <a href="https://www.scuttlebutt.nz">Scuttlebutt</a> social network protocol). Once a peer has found a route to its contact via any of these methods, a direct connection between them is made. Although messages are usually encrypted, an observer can still deduce the location and identity of the sender and recipient.
</p>
<p>P2P networks do not use servers, as users communicate directly between each others, and hence cannot be self-hosted. However, some additional services may rely on centralized servers, such as users discovery or offline messages relaying, which can benefit from self-hosting.</p>
</div>
<div class="container">
<div class="row">
<div class="col-md-6">
<h3>Advantages</h3>
<ul>
<li>Minimal information is exposed to third parties.</li>
<li>Modern P2P platforms implement end-to-end encryption by default. There are no servers that could potentially intercept and decrypt your transmissions, unlike centralized and federated models.</li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="col-md-6">
<h3>Disadvantages</h3>
<ul>
<li>Reduced feature set:</li>
<ul>
<li>Messages can only be sent when both peers are online, however, your client may store messages locally to wait for the contact to return online.</li>
<li>Generally increases battery usage on mobile devices, because the client must stay connected to the distributed network to learn about who is online.</li>
<li>Some common messenger features may not be implemented or incompletely, such as message deletion.</li>
</ul>
<li>Your <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IP_address">IP address</a> and that of the contacts you're communicating with may be exposed if you do not use the software in conjunction with a <a href="/providers/vpn">VPN</a> or <a href="/software/networks">self contained network</a>, such as <a href="https://www.torproject.org">Tor</a> or <a href="https://geti2p.net/">I2P</a>. Many countries have some form of mass surveillance and/or metadata retention.</li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<h3 id="anonymous-routing" class="anchor">
<a href="#anonymous-routing"><i class="fas fa-link anchor-icon"></i></a>
Anonymous Routing
</h3>
<div class="clearfix">
<p><img src="/assets/img/layout/network-anonymous-routing.svg" width="150" height="150" class="img-fluid float-left ml-2" style="float: left" alt="Anonymous routing network" />
A messenger using <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_628">anonymous routing</a> hides either the identity of the sender, the receiver, or evidence that they have been communicating. Ideally, a messenger should hide all three.</p>
<p>There are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3182658">many different ways</a> to implement anonymous routing. One of the most famous is <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing">onion routing</a> (e.g., <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tor_(anonymity_network)">Tor</a>), which communicates encrypted messages through a virtual <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overlay_network">overlay network</a> that hides the location of each node as well as the recipient and sender of each message. The sender and recipient never interact directly, and only meet through a secret rendezvous node, so that there is no leak of IP addresses nor physical location. Nodes cannot decrypt messages nor the final destination, only the recipient can. Each intermediary node can only decrypt a part that indicates where to send the still encrypted message next, until it arrives at the recipient who can fully decrypt it, hence the "onion layers".</p>
<p>Self-hosting a node in an anonymous routing network does not provide the hoster with additional privacy benefits, but rather contributes to the whole network's resilience against identification attacks for everyone's benefit.</p>
</div>
<div class="container">
<div class="row">
<div class="col-md-6">
<h3>Advantages</h3>
<ul>
<li>Minimal to no information is exposed to other parties.</li>
<li>Messages can be relayed in a decentralized manner even if one of the parties is offline.</li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="col-md-6">
<h3>Disadvantages</h3>
<ul>
<li>Slow message propagation.</li>
<li>Often limited to fewer media types, mostly text since the network is slow.</li>
<li>Less reliable if nodes are selected by randomized routing, some nodes may be very far from the sender and receiver, adding latency or even failing to transmit messages if one of the nodes goes offline.</li>
<li>More complex to get started as the creation and secured backup of a cryptographic private key is required.</li>
<li>Just like other decentralized platforms, adding features is more complex for developers than on a centralized platform, hence features may be lacking or incompletely implemented, such as offline message relaying or message deletion.</li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</div>

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---
layout: evergreen
title: Search Engines
description: "Use a search engine that doesn't build an advertising profile based on your searches.
The recommendations here are based on the merits of each service's privacy policy. There is <strong>no guarantee</strong> that these privacy policies are honored.
Consider using a <a href='/providers/vpn'>VPN</a> or <a href='https://www.torproject.org/'>Tor</a> if your threat model requires hiding your IP address from the search provider."
---
{% for item_hash in site.data.providers.search-engines %}
{% assign item = item_hash[1] %}
{% if item.type == "Recommendation" %}
{% include recommendation-card.html %}
{% endif %}
{% endfor %}

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---
layout: evergreen
title: What are threat models?
---
<p>Balancing security, privacy, and usability is one of the first and most difficult tasks you’ll face on your privacy journey. Everything is a trade-off: The more secure something is, the more restricting or inconvenient it generally is, et cetera. Often people find that the problem with the tools they see recommended is they’re just too hard to start using!</p>
<p>If you wanted to use the <strong>most</strong> secure tools available, you’d have to sacrifice <em>a lot</em> of usability. And even then, <mark>nothing is ever fully secure.</mark> There’s <strong>high</strong> security, but never <strong>full</strong> security. That’s why threat models are important.</p>
<p><strong>So, what are these threat models anyways?</strong></p>
<p><mark>A threat model is a list of the most probable threats to your security/privacy endeavors.</mark> Since it’s impossible to protect yourself against <strong>every</strong> attack(er), you should focus on the <strong>most probable</strong> threats. In computer security, a threat is a potential event that could undermine your efforts to stay private and secure.</p>
<p>By focusing on the threats that matter to you, this narrows down your thinking about the protection you need, so you can choose the tools that are right for the job.</p>
<h2>Examples of threat models</h2>
<ul>
<li>An investigative journalist’s threat model might be <span class="text-muted">(protecting themselves against)</span> a foreign government.</li>
<li>A company’s manager’s threat model might be <span class="text-muted">(protecting themselves against)</span> a hacker hired by competition to do corporate espionage.</li>
<li>The average citizen’s threat model might be <span class="text-muted">(hiding their data from)</span> large tech corporations.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Creating your threat model</h2>
<p>To identify what could happen to the things you value and determine from whom you need to protect them, you want to answer these five questions:</p>
<ol>
<li>What do I want to protect?</li>
<li>Who do I want to protect it from?</li>
<li>How likely is it that I will need to protect it?</li>
<li>How bad are the consequences if I fail?</li>
<li>How much trouble am I willing to go through to try to prevent potential consequences?</li>
</ol>
<div class="card">
<div class="card-body">
<h4>Example: Protecting your belongings</h4>
<ul><li>To demonstrate how these questions work, let’s build a plan to keep your house and possessions safe.</li></ul>
<h5>What do you want to protect? (Or, <em>what do you have that is worth protecting?</em>)</h5>
<ul><li>Your assets might include jewelry, electronics, important documents, or photos.</li></ul>
<h5>Who do you want to protect it from?</h5>
<ul><li>Your adversaries might include burglars, roommates, or guests.</li></ul>
<h5>How likely is it that you will need to protect it?</h5>
<ul><li>Does your neighborhood have a history of burglaries? How trustworthy are your roommates/guests? What are the capabilities of your adversaries? What are the risks you should consider?</li></ul>
<h5>How bad are the consequences if you fail?</h5>
<ul><li>Do you have anything in your house that you cannot replace? Do you have the time or money to replace these things? Do you have insurance that covers goods stolen from your home?</li></ul>
<h5>How much trouble are you willing to go through to prevent these consequences?</h5>
<ul><li>Are you willing to buy a safe for sensitive documents? Can you afford to buy a high-quality lock? Do you have time to open a security box at your local bank and keep your valuables there?</li></ul>
<p>Only once you have asked yourself these questions will you be in a position to assess what measures to take. If your possessions are valuable, but the probability of a break-in is low, then you may not want to invest too much money in a lock. But, if the probability of a break-in is high, you’ll want to get the best lock on the market, and consider adding a security system.</p>
<p>Making a security plan will help you to understand the threats that are unique to you and to evaluate your assets, your adversaries, and your adversaries’ capabilities, along with the likelihood of risks you face.</p>
</div>
</div>
<p class="mt-3">Now, let's take a closer look at the questions in our list:</p>
<h3>What do I want to protect?</h3>
<p>An “asset” is something you value and want to protect. In the context of digital security, <mark>an asset is usually some kind of information</mark>. For example, your emails, contact lists, instant messages, location, and files are all possible assets. Your devices themselves may also be assets.</p>
<p><em>Make a list of your assets: data that you keep, where it’s kept, who has access to it, and what stops others from accessing it.</em></p>
<h3>Who do I want to protect it from?</h3>
<p>To answer this question, it’s important to identify who might want to target you or your information. <mark>A person or entity that poses a threat to your assets is an “adversary.”</mark> Examples of potential adversaries are your boss, your former partner, your business competition, your government, or a hacker on a public network.</p>
<p><em>Make a list of your adversaries, or those who might want to get ahold of your assets. Your list may include individuals, a government agency, or corporations.</em></p>
<p>Depending on who your adversaries are, under some circumstances this list might be something you want to destroy after you’re done security planning.</p>
<h3>How likely is it that I will need to protect it?</h3>
<p><mark>Risk is the likelihood that a particular threat against a particular asset will actually occur.</mark> It goes hand-in-hand with capability. While your mobile phone provider has the capability to access all of your data, the risk of them posting your private data online to harm your reputation is low.</p>
<p>It is important to distinguish between what might happen and the probability it may happen. For instance, there is a threat that your building might collapse, but the risk of this happening is far greater in San Francisco (where earthquakes are common) than in Stockholm (where they are not).</p>
<p>Assessing risks is both a personal and a subjective process. Many people find certain threats unacceptable no matter the likelihood they will occur because the mere presence of the threat at any likelihood is not worth the cost. In other cases, people disregard high risks because they don’t view the threat as a problem.</p>
<p><em>Write down which threats you are going to take seriously, and which may be too rare or too harmless (or too difficult to combat) to worry about.</em></p>
<h3>How bad are the consequences if I fail?</h3>
<p>There are many ways that an adversary could gain access to your data. For example, an adversary can read your private communications as they pass through the network, or they can delete or corrupt your data.</p>
<p><mark>The motives of adversaries differ widely, as do their tactics.</mark> A government trying to prevent the spread of a video showing police violence may be content to simply delete or reduce the availability of that video. In contrast, a political opponent may wish to gain access to secret content and publish that content without you knowing.</p>
<p>Security planning involves understanding how bad the consequences could be if an adversary successfully gains access to one of your assets. To determine this, you should consider the capability of your adversary. For example, your mobile phone provider has access to all your phone records. A hacker on an open Wi-Fi network can access your unencrypted communications. Your government might have stronger capabilities.</p>
<p><em>Write down what your adversary might want to do with your private data.</em></p>
<h3>How much trouble am I willing to go through to try to prevent potential consequences?</h3>
<p><mark>There is no perfect option for security.</mark> Not everyone has the same priorities, concerns, or access to resources. Your risk assessment will allow you to plan the right strategy for you, balancing convenience, cost, and privacy.</p>
<p>For example, an attorney representing a client in a national security case may be willing to go to greater lengths to protect communications about that case, such as using encrypted email, than a mother who regularly emails her daughter funny cat videos.</p>
<p><em>Write down what options you have available to you to help mitigate your unique threats. Note if you have any financial constraints, technical constraints, or social constraints.</em></p>
<hr class="m-5" />
<div class="row">
<div class="col-12 col-lg-6">
<h2>Further reading</h2>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Threat_model">Wikipedia: Threat model</a></li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="col-12 col-lg-6">
<h2>Sources</h2>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/your-security-plan">EFF Surveillance Self Defense: Your Security Plan</a></li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>

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---
layout: evergreen
title: What are threat models?
---
Balancing security, privacy, and usability is one of the first and most difficult tasks you'll face on your privacy journey. Everything is a trade-off: The more secure something is, the more restricting or inconvenient it generally is, et cetera. Often people find that the problem with the tools they see recommended is they're just too hard to start using!
If you wanted to use the **most** secure tools available, you'd have to sacrifice _a lot_ of usability. And even then, <mark>nothing is ever fully secure.</mark> There's **high** security, but never **full** security. That's why threat models are important.
**So, what are these threat models anyways?**
<mark>A threat model is a list of the most probable threats to your security/privacy endeavors.</mark> Since it's impossible to protect yourself against **every** attack(er), you should focus on the **most probable** threats. In computer security, a threat is a potential event that could undermine your efforts to stay private and secure.
By focusing on the threats that matter to you, this narrows down your thinking about the protection you need, so you can choose the tools that are right for the job.
Examples of threat models
-------------------------
* An investigative journalist's threat model might be <span class="text-muted">(protecting themselves against)</span> a foreign government.
* A company's manager's threat model might be <span class="text-muted">(protecting themselves against)</span> a hacker hired by competition to do corporate espionage.
* The average citizen's threat model might be <span class="text-muted">(hiding their data from)</span> large tech corporations.
Creating your threat model
--------------------------
To identify what could happen to the things you value and determine from whom you need to protect them, you want to answer these five questions:
1. What do I want to protect?
2. Who do I want to protect it from?
3. How likely is it that I will need to protect it?
4. How bad are the consequences if I fail?
5. How much trouble am I willing to go through to try to prevent potential consequences?
{% capture markdown_text %}
#### Example: Protecting your belongings
* To demonstrate how these questions work, let's build a plan to keep your house and possessions safe.
##### What do you want to protect? (Or, _what do you have that is worth protecting?_)
* Your assets might include jewelry, electronics, important documents, or photos.
##### Who do you want to protect it from?
* Your adversaries might include burglars, roommates, or guests.
##### How likely is it that you will need to protect it?
* Does your neighborhood have a history of burglaries? How trustworthy are your roommates/guests? What are the capabilities of your adversaries? What are the risks you should consider?
##### How bad are the consequences if you fail?
* Do you have anything in your house that you cannot replace? Do you have the time or money to replace these things? Do you have insurance that covers goods stolen from your home?
##### How much trouble are you willing to go through to prevent these consequences?
* Are you willing to buy a safe for sensitive documents? Can you afford to buy a high-quality lock? Do you have time to open a security box at your local bank and keep your valuables there?
Only once you have asked yourself these questions will you be in a position to assess what measures to take. If your possessions are valuable, but the probability of a break-in is low, then you may not want to invest too much money in a lock. But, if the probability of a break-in is high, you'll want to get the best lock on the market, and consider adding a security system.
Making a security plan will help you to understand the threats that are unique to you and to evaluate your assets, your adversaries, and your adversaries' capabilities, along with the likelihood of risks you face.
{% endcapture %}
{% include card.html %}
Now, let's take a closer look at the questions in our list:
### What do I want to protect?
An “asset” is something you value and want to protect. In the context of digital security, <mark>an asset is usually some kind of information.</mark> For example, your emails, contact lists, instant messages, location, and files are all possible assets. Your devices themselves may also be assets.
_Make a list of your assets: data that you keep, where it's kept, who has access to it, and what stops others from accessing it._
### Who do I want to protect it from?
To answer this question, it's important to identify who might want to target you or your information. <mark>A person or entity that poses a threat to your assets is an “adversary.”</mark> Examples of potential adversaries are your boss, your former partner, your business competition, your government, or a hacker on a public network.
_Make a list of your adversaries, or those who might want to get ahold of your assets. Your list may include individuals, a government agency, or corporations._
Depending on who your adversaries are, under some circumstances this list might be something you want to destroy after you're done security planning.
### How likely is it that I will need to protect it?
<mark>Risk is the likelihood that a particular threat against a particular asset will actually occur.</mark> It goes hand-in-hand with capability. While your mobile phone provider has the capability to access all of your data, the risk of them posting your private data online to harm your reputation is low.
It is important to distinguish between what might happen and the probability it may happen. For instance, there is a threat that your building might collapse, but the risk of this happening is far greater in San Francisco (where earthquakes are common) than in Stockholm (where they are not).
Assessing risks is both a personal and a subjective process. Many people find certain threats unacceptable no matter the likelihood they will occur because the mere presence of the threat at any likelihood is not worth the cost. In other cases, people disregard high risks because they don't view the threat as a problem.
_Write down which threats you are going to take seriously, and which may be too rare or too harmless (or too difficult to combat) to worry about._
### How bad are the consequences if I fail?
There are many ways that an adversary could gain access to your data. For example, an adversary can read your private communications as they pass through the network, or they can delete or corrupt your data.
<mark>The motives of adversaries differ widely, as do their tactics.</mark> A government trying to prevent the spread of a video showing police violence may be content to simply delete or reduce the availability of that video. In contrast, a political opponent may wish to gain access to secret content and publish that content without you knowing.
Security planning involves understanding how bad the consequences could be if an adversary successfully gains access to one of your assets. To determine this, you should consider the capability of your adversary. For example, your mobile phone provider has access to all your phone records. A hacker on an open Wi-Fi network can access your unencrypted communications. Your government might have stronger capabilities.
_Write down what your adversary might want to do with your private data._
### How much trouble am I willing to go through to try to prevent potential consequences?
<mark>There is no perfect option for security.</mark> Not everyone has the same priorities, concerns, or access to resources. Your risk assessment will allow you to plan the right strategy for you, balancing convenience, cost, and privacy.
For example, an attorney representing a client in a national security case may be willing to go to greater lengths to protect communications about that case, such as using encrypted email, than a mother who regularly emails her daughter funny cat videos.
_Write down what options you have available to you to help mitigate your unique threats. Note if you have any financial constraints, technical constraints, or social constraints._
{% include hr.html %}
<div class="row">
<div class="col-12 col-lg-6">
<h2>Further reading</h2>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Threat_model">Wikipedia: Threat model</a></li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="col-12 col-lg-6">
<h2>Sources</h2>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/your-security-plan">EFF Surveillance Self Defense: Your Security Plan</a></li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>

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---
layout: evergreen
title: Video Streaming
description: "The primary threat when using a video streaming platform is that your streaming habits and subscription lists could be used to profile you. You should combine these tools with a <a href='/providers/vpn/'>VPN</a> or <a href='https://www.torproject.org/'>Tor</a> to make it harder to profile your usage."
---
<h2 id="clients" class="anchor">
<a href="#clients"><i class="fas fa-link anchor-icon"></i></a>
Client
</h2>
{% for item_hash in site.data.software.video-streaming-clients %}
{% assign item = item_hash[1] %}
{% if item.type == "Recommendation" %}
{% include recommendation-card.html %}
{% endif %}
{% endfor %}
<h2 id="web-based-front-ends" class="anchor">
<a href="#web-based-front-ends"><i class="fas fa-link anchor-icon"></i></a>
Web based front ends
</h2>
<p>The recommended frontend below is useful if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser. It does not provide privacy by itself and we don't recommend logging into any accounts. It can be used with a <a href='/providers/vpn/'>VPN</a> or <a href='https://www.torproject.org/'>Tor</a>.</p>
{% for item_hash in site.data.software.video-streaming-front-ends %}
{% assign item = item_hash[1] %}
{% if item.type == "Recommendation" %}
{% include recommendation-card.html %}
{% endif %}
{% endfor %}