mirror of
https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org.git
synced 2026-05-29 22:59:19 +00:00
style: Move tool pages to category folders
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---
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title: Advanced
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weight: 5
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---
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---
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title: "Alternative Networks"
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icon: material/vector-polygon
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description: These tools allow you to access networks other than the World Wide Web.
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cover: alternative-networks.webp
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---
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<small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>
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||||
- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
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- [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs){ .pg-blue }
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- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
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## Anonymizing Networks
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When it comes to anonymizing networks, we want to specially note that [Tor](advanced/tor-overview.md) is our top choice. It is by far the most utilized, robustly studied, and actively developed anonymous network. Using other networks could be more likely to endanger your [:material-incognito: Anonymity](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple }, unless you know what you're doing.
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### Tor
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<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
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{ align=right }
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The **Tor** network is a group of volunteer-operated servers that allows you to connect for free and improve your privacy and security on the Internet. Individuals and organizations can also share information over the Tor network with ".onion hidden services" without compromising their privacy. Because Tor traffic is difficult to block and trace, Tor is an effective [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray } circumvention tool.
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[:octicons-home-16:](https://torproject.org){ .card-link title=Homepage }
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[:simple-torbrowser:](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
|
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[:octicons-info-16:](https://tb-manual.torproject.org){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
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||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org){ .card-link title=Contribute }
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</div>
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The recommended way to access the Tor network is via the official Tor Browser, which we have covered in more detail on a dedicated page:
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[Tor Browser Info :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
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You can access the Tor network using other tools; making this determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
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<div class="admonition example" markdown>
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<p class="admonition-title">Try it out!</p>
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You can try connecting to *Privacy Guides* via Tor at [xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh6wh5jc4up35bqdflu6bkdc5cas5vjqd.onion](http://www.xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh6wh5jc4up35bqdflu6bkdc5cas5vjqd.onion).
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</div>
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#### Orbot
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<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
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{ align=right }
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**Orbot** is a mobile application which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
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[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
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[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
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[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
|
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|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
|
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- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
|
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- [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid)
|
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|
||||
</details>
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|
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</div>
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|
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We previously recommended enabling the *Isolate Destination Address* preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
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|
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=== "Android"
|
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|
||||
Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
|
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|
||||
Orbot is often outdated on Google Play and the Guardian Project's F-Droid repository, so consider downloading directly from the GitHub repository instead. All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
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|
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=== "iOS"
|
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|
||||
On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
|
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|
||||
#### Snowflake
|
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|
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<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
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|
||||
{ align=right }
|
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{ align=right }
|
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|
||||
**Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.
|
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|
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People who are censored can use Snowflake proxies to connect to the Tor network. Snowflake is a great way to contribute to the network even if you don't have the technical know-how to run a Tor relay or bridge.
|
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|
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[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://snowflake.torproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/wikis/Technical%20Overview){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
You can enable Snowflake in your browser by opening it in another tab and turning the switch on. You can leave it running in the background while you browse to contribute your connection. We don't recommend installing Snowflake as a browser extension, because adding third-party extensions can increase your attack surface.
|
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|
||||
[Run Snowflake in your Browser :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://snowflake.torproject.org/embed.html){ .md-button }
|
||||
|
||||
Snowflake does not increase your privacy in any way, nor is it used to connect to the Tor network within your personal browser. However, if your internet connection is uncensored, you should consider running it to help people in censored networks achieve better privacy themselves. There is no need to worry about which websites people are accessing through your proxy—their visible browsing IP address will match their Tor exit node, not yours.
|
||||
|
||||
Running a Snowflake proxy is low-risk, even more so than running a Tor relay or bridge which are already not particularly risky endeavors. However, it does still proxy traffic through your network which can be impactful in some ways, especially if your network is bandwidth-limited. Make sure you understand [how Snowflake works](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/wikis/home) before deciding whether to run a proxy.
|
||||
|
||||
### I2P (The Invisible Internet Project)
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**I2P** is a network layer which encrypts your connections and routes them via a network of computers distributed around the world. It is mainly focused on creating an alternative, privacy-protecting network rather than making regular internet connections anonymous.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://geti2p.net/en){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://geti2p.net/en/about/software){ .card-link title=Documentation }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/i2p/i2p.i2p){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://geti2p.net/en/get-involved){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.i2p.android)
|
||||
- [:simple-android: Android](https://geti2p.net/en/download#android)
|
||||
- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://geti2p.net/en/download#windows)
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://geti2p.net/en/download#mac)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://geti2p.net/en/download#unix)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Unlike Tor, all I2P traffic is internal to the I2P network, which means regular internet websites are **not** directly accessible from I2P. Instead, you can connect to websites which are hosted anonymously and directly on the I2P network, which are called "eepsites" and have domains which end in `.i2p`.
|
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|
||||
<div class="admonition example" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Try it out!</p>
|
||||
|
||||
You can try connecting to *Privacy Guides* via I2P at [privacyguides.i2p](http://privacyguides.i2p/?i2paddresshelper=fvbkmooriuqgssrjvbxu7nrwms5zyhf34r3uuppoakwwsm7ysv6q.b32.i2p).
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Also, unlike Tor, every I2P node will relay traffic for other users by default, instead of relying on dedicated relay volunteers to run nodes. There are approximately [10,000](https://metrics.torproject.org/networksize.html) relays and bridges on the Tor network compared to ~50,000 on I2P, meaning there is potentially more ways for your traffic to be routed to maximize anonymity. I2P also tends to be more performant than Tor, although this is likely a side effect of Tor being more focused on regular "clearnet" internet traffic and thus using more bottle necked exit nodes. Hidden service performance is generally considered to be much better on I2P compared to Tor. While running P2P applications like BitTorrent is challenging on Tor (and can massively impact Tor network performance), it is very easy and performant on I2P.
|
||||
|
||||
There are downsides to I2P's approach, however. Tor relying on dedicated exit nodes means more people in less safe environments can use it, and the relays that do exist on Tor are likely to be more performant and stable, as they generally aren't run on residential connections. Tor is also far more focused on **browser privacy** (i.e. anti-fingerprinting), with a dedicated [Tor Browser](tor.md) to make browsing activity as anonymous as possible. I2P is used via your [regular web browser](desktop-browsers.md), and while you can configure your browser to be more privacy-protecting, you probably still won't have the same browser fingerprint as other I2P users (there's no "crowd" to blend in with in that regard).
|
||||
|
||||
Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
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---
|
||||
title: "Device Integrity"
|
||||
icon: material/security
|
||||
description: These tools can be used to check your devices for compromise.
|
||||
cover: device-integrity.webp
|
||||
robots: nofollow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
These tools can be used to validate the integrity of your mobile devices and check them for indicators of compromise by spyware and malware such as Pegasus, Predator, or KingsPawn. This page focuses on **mobile security**, because mobile devices typically have read-only systems with well-known configurations, so detecting malicious modifications is easier than on traditional desktop systems. We may expand the focus of this page in the future.
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition note" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">This is an advanced topic</p>
|
||||
|
||||
These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functionality which most people do not need to worry about, and often require more in-depth technical knowledge to use effectively.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
It is **critical** to understand that scanning your device for public indicators of compromise is **not sufficient** to determine that a device is "clean", and not targeted with a particular spyware tool. Reliance on these publicly-available scanning tools can miss recent security developments and give you a false sense of security.
|
||||
|
||||
## General Advice
|
||||
|
||||
The majority of system-level exploits on modern mobile devices—especially zero-click compromises—are non-persistent, meaning they will not remain or run automatically after a reboot. For this reason, we highly recommend rebooting your device regularly. We recommend everybody reboot their devices once a week at minimum, but if non-persistent malware is of particular concern for you, we and many security experts recommend a daily reboot schedule.
|
||||
|
||||
This means an attacker would have to regularly re-infect your device to retain access, although we'll note this is not impossible. Rebooting your device also will not protect you against *persistent* malware, but this is less common on mobile devices due to modern security features like secure/verified boot.
|
||||
|
||||
## Post-Compromise Information & Disclaimer
|
||||
|
||||
If any of the following tools indicate a potential compromise by spyware such as Pegasus, Predator, or KingsPawn, we advise that you contact:
|
||||
|
||||
- If you are a human rights defender, journalist, or from a civil society organization: [Amnesty International's Security Lab](https://securitylab.amnesty.org/contact-us)
|
||||
- If a business or government device is compromised: the appropriate security liaison at your enterprise, department, or agency
|
||||
- Local law enforcement
|
||||
|
||||
**We are unable to help you directly beyond this.** We are happy to discuss your specific situation or circumstances and review your results in our [community](https://discuss.privacyguides.net) spaces, but it is unlikely we can assist you beyond what is written on this page.
|
||||
|
||||
The tools on this page are only capable of detecting indicators of compromise, not removing them. If you are concerned about having been compromised, we advise that you:
|
||||
|
||||
- Consider replacing the device completely
|
||||
- Consider changing your SIM/eSIM number
|
||||
- Not restore from a backup, because that backup may be compromised
|
||||
|
||||
These tools provide analysis based on the information they have the ability to access from your device, and publicly-accessible indicators of compromise. It is important to keep in mind two things:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Indicators of compromise are just that: *indicators*. They are not a definitive finding, and may occasionally be **false positives**. If an indicator of compromise is detected, it means you should do additional research into the *potential* threat.
|
||||
2. The indicators of compromise these tools look for are published by threat research organizations, but not all indicators are made available to the public! This means that these tools can present a **false negative**, if your device is infected with spyware which is not detected by any of the public indicators. Reliable and comprehensive digital forensic support and triage require access to non-public indicators, research, and threat intelligence.
|
||||
|
||||
## External Verification Tools
|
||||
|
||||
<small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
|
||||
|
||||
External verification tools run on your computer and scan your mobile device for forensic traces, which are helpful to identify potential compromise.
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition danger" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Danger</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Public indicators of compromise are insufficient to determine that a device is "clean", and not targeted with a particular spyware tool. Reliance on public indicators alone can miss recent forensic traces and give a false sense of security.
|
||||
|
||||
Reliable and comprehensive digital forensic support and triage require access to non-public indicators, research, and threat intelligence.
|
||||
|
||||
Such support is available to civil society through [Amnesty International's Security Lab](https://amnesty.org/en/tech) or [Access Now’s Digital Security Helpline](https://accessnow.org/help).
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
These tools can trigger false-positives. If any of these tools finds indicators of compromise, you need to dig deeper to determine your actual risk. Some reports may be false positives based on websites you've visited in the past, and findings which are many years old are likely either false-positives or indicate previous (and no longer active) compromise.
|
||||
|
||||
### Mobile Verification Toolkit
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Mobile Verification Toolkit** (**MVT**) is a collection of utilities which simplifies and automates the process of scanning mobile devices for potential traces of targeting or infection by known spyware campaigns. MVT was developed by Amnesty International and released in 2021 in the context of the [Pegasus Project](https://forbiddenstories.org/about-the-pegasus-project).
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mvt.re){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mvt-project/mvt){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://docs.mvt.re/en/latest/install)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://docs.mvt.re/en/latest/install)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Using MVT is insufficient to determine that a device is "clean", and not targeted with a particular spyware tool.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
MVT is *most* useful for scanning iOS devices. Android stores very little diagnostic information useful to triage potential compromises, and because of this, `mvt-android` capabilities are limited as well. On the other hand, encrypted iOS iTunes backups provide a large enough subset of files stored on the device to detect suspicious artifacts in many cases. This being said, MVT does still provide fairly useful tools for both iOS and Android analysis.
|
||||
|
||||
If you use iOS and are at high-risk, we have three additional suggestions for you:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Create and keep regular (monthly) iTunes backups. This allows you to find and diagnose past infections later with MVT, if new threats are discovered in the future.
|
||||
2. Trigger *sysdiagnose* logs often and back them up externally. These logs can provide invaluable data to future forensic investigators if need be.
|
||||
|
||||
The process to do so varies by model, but you can trigger it on newer phones by holding down *Power* + *Volume Up* + *Volume Down* until you feel a brief vibration. After a few minutes, the timestamped *sysdiagnose* log will appear in **Settings** > **Privacy & Security** > **Analytics & Improvements** > **Analytics Data**.
|
||||
|
||||
3. Enable [Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode).
|
||||
|
||||
MVT allows you to perform deeper scans/analysis if your device is jailbroken. Unless you know what you are doing, **do not jailbreak or root your device.** Jailbreaking your device exposes it to considerable security risks.
|
||||
|
||||
### iMazing (iOS)
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**iMazing** provides a free spyware analyzer tool for iOS devices which acts as a GUI-wrapper for [MVT](#mobile-verification-toolkit). This can be much easier to run compared to MVT itself, which is a command-line tool designed for technologists and forensic investigators.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://imazing.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://imazing.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://imazing.com/spyware-analyzer){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://imazing.com/download)
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://imazing.com/download)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
iMazing automates and interactively guides you through the process of using [MVT](#mobile-verification-toolkit) to scan your device for publicly-accessible indicators of compromise published by various threat researchers. All the information and warnings which apply to MVT apply to this tool as well, so we suggest you also familiarize yourself with the notes on MVT in the sections above.
|
||||
|
||||
## On-Device Verification
|
||||
|
||||
<small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
|
||||
- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
|
||||
|
||||
These are apps you can install which check your device and operating system for signs of tampering, and validate the identity of your device.
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Using these apps is insufficient to determine that a device is "clean", and not targeted with a particular spyware tool.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
### Auditor (Android)
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Auditor** is an app which leverages hardware security features to provide device integrity monitoring by actively validating the identity of a device and the integrity of its operating system. Currently, it only works with GrapheneOS or the stock operating system for [supported devices](https://attestation.app/about#device-support).
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://attestation.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://attestation.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://attestation.app/about){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://attestation.app/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://attestation.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.attestation.auditor.play)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases)
|
||||
- [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Auditor is not a scanning/analysis tool like some other tools on this page. Rather, it uses your device's hardware-backed keystore to allow you to verify the identity of your device and gain assurance that the operating system itself hasn't been tampered with or downgraded via verified boot. This provides a very robust integrity check of your device itself, but doesn't necessarily check whether the user-level apps running on your device are malicious.
|
||||
|
||||
Auditor performs attestation and intrusion detection with **two** devices, an *auditee* (the device being verified) and an *auditor* (the device performing the verification). The auditor can be any Android 10+ device (or a remote web service operated by [GrapheneOS](android/distributions.md#grapheneos)), while the auditee must be a specifically [supported device](https://attestation.app/about#device-support). Auditor works by:
|
||||
|
||||
- Using a [Trust On First Use (TOFU)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_on_first_use) model between an *auditor* and *auditee*, the pair establish a private key in the [hardware-backed keystore](https://source.android.com/security/keystore) of the *Auditor*.
|
||||
- The *auditor* can either be another instance of the Auditor app or the [Remote Attestation Service](https://attestation.app).
|
||||
- The *auditor* records the current state and configuration of the *auditee*.
|
||||
- Should tampering with the operating system of the *auditee* happen after the pairing is complete, the auditor will be aware of the change in the device state and configurations.
|
||||
- You will be alerted to the change.
|
||||
|
||||
It is important to note that Auditor can only effectively detect changes **after** the initial pairing, not necessarily during or before due to its TOFU model. To make sure that your hardware and operating system is genuine, [perform local attestation](https://grapheneos.org/install/web#verifying-installation) immediately after the device has been installed and prior to any internet connection.
|
||||
|
||||
No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
|
||||
|
||||
If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address from the attestation service, you could consider using [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [VPN](vpn.md).
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user