New Crowdin Translations (#2110)

Co-authored-by: Crowdin Bot <support+bot@crowdin.com>

i18n/uk/basics/common-misconceptions.md

@@ -2,6 +2,40 @@
 title: "Common Misconceptions"
 icon: 'material/robot-confused'
 description: Privacy isn't a straightforward topic, and it's easy to get caught up in marketing claims and other disinformation.
+schema:
+  - 
+    "@context": https://schema.org
+    "@type": FAQPage
+    mainEntity:
+      - 
+        "@type": Question
+        name: Is open source software inherently secure?
+        acceptedAnswer:
+          "@type": Answer
+          text: |
+            Whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. Open-source software has the potential to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case. When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis.
+      - 
+        "@type": Question
+        name: Can shifting trust to another provider increase privacy?
+        acceptedAnswer:
+          "@type": Answer
+          text: |
+            We talk about "shifting trust" a lot when discussing solutions like VPNs (which shift the trust you place in your ISP to the VPN provider). While this protects your browsing data from your ISP specifically, the VPN provider you choose still has access to your browsing data: Your data isn't completely secured from all parties.
+      - 
+        "@type": Question
+        name: Are privacy-focused solutions inherently trustworthy?
+        acceptedAnswer:
+          "@type": Answer
+          text: |
+            Focusing solely on the privacy policies and marketing of a tool or provider can blind you to its weaknesses. When you're looking for a more private solution, you should determine what the underlying problem is and find technical solutions to that problem. For example, you may want to avoid Google Drive, which gives Google access to all of your data. The underlying problem in this case is lack of E2EE, so you should make sure that the provider you switch to actually implements E2EE, or use a tool (like Cryptomator) which provides E2EE on any cloud provider. Switching to a "privacy-focused" provider (that doesn't implement E2EE) doesn't solve your problem: it just shifts trust from Google to that provider.
+      - 
+        "@type": Question
+        name: How complicated should my threat model be?
+        acceptedAnswer:
+          "@type": Answer
+          text: |
+            We often see people describing privacy threat models that are overly complex. Often, these solutions include problems like many different email accounts or complicated setups with lots of moving parts and conditions. The replies are usually answers to "What is the best way to do X?"
+            Finding the "best" solution for yourself doesn't necessarily mean you are after an infallible solution with dozens of conditions—these solutions are often difficult to work with realistically. As we discussed previously, security often comes at the cost of convenience.
 ---
 
 ## "Open-source software is always secure" or "Proprietary software is more secure"

i18n/uk/basics/common-threats.md

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 ---
-title: "Common Threats"
+title: "Поширені Загрози"
 icon: 'material/eye-outline'
-description: Your threat model is personal to you, but these are some of the things many visitors to this site care about.
+description: Ваша модель загроз є особистою, але це деякі з речей, які хвилюють багатьох відвідувачів цього сайту.
 ---
 
-Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside of these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat.
+Загалом, ми класифікуємо наші рекомендації на [загрози](threat-modeling.md) або цілі, які стосуються більшості людей. ==Ви можете бути зацікавлені в жодній, одній, кількох або всіх цих можливостях==, і інструменти та сервіси, які ви використовуєте, залежать від того, які цілі ви ставите перед собою. Ви також можете мати специфічні загрози поза цими категоріями, і це цілком нормально! Важливою частиною є розуміння переваг і недоліків інструментів, які ви обираєте, оскільки практично жоден з них не захистить вас від усіх можливих загроз.
 
-- <span class="pg-purple">:material-incognito: Anonymity</span> - Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically.
+- <span class="pg-purple">:material-incognito: Анонімність</span> - Розмежування вашої активності в Інтернеті від вашої реальної особистості, захист від людей, які намагаються розкрити саме *вашу* особистість.
 - <span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks</span> - Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically.
 - <span class="pg-orange">:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks</span> - Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once.
 - <span class="pg-teal">:material-server-network: Service Providers</span> - Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server).