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style!: Remove all mkdocs-material icon references
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@@ -9,12 +9,12 @@ robots: nofollow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large
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The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system.
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[:octicons-home-16:](https://source.android.com)
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[:octicons-info-16:](https://source.android.com/docs)
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[:octicons-code-16:](https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main)
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[Homepage](https://source.android.com)
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[Documentation](https://source.android.com/docs)
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[Source Code](https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main)
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{ .pg:buttons }
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[Our Android Advice :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../../../tools/os/android/_index.md)
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[Our Android Advice](../../../tools/os/android/_index.md)
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{ .pg:buttons }
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## Security Protections
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@@ -79,16 +79,14 @@ An app may request a permission for a specific feature it has. For example, any
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> [!WARNING]
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> If an app is mostly a web-based service, the tracking may occur on the server side. [Facebook](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.facebook.katana/latest) shows "no trackers" but certainly does track users' interests and behavior across the site. Apps may evade detection by not using standard code libraries produced by the advertising industry, though this is unlikely.
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> [!NOTE]
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> Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest) may show some trackers such as [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49). This library includes [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) which can provide [push notifications](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps. This [is the case](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) with Bitwarden. That doesn't mean that Bitwarden is using all the analytics features that are provided by Google Firebase Analytics.
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## Privacy Features
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### User Profiles
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Multiple **user profiles** can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **System** → **Users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android.
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Multiple **user profiles** can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android.
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With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation.
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@@ -104,7 +102,7 @@ This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it
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### Private Space
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**Private Space** is a feature introduced in Android 15 that adds another way of isolating individual apps. You can set up a private space in the owner profile by navigating to :gear: **Settings** → **Security & privacy** → **Private space**. Once set up, your private space resides at the bottom of the app drawer.
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**Private Space** is a feature introduced in Android 15 that adds another way of isolating individual apps. You can set up a private space in the owner profile by navigating to **Settings** → **Security & privacy** → **Private space**. Once set up, your private space resides at the bottom of the app drawer.
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Like user profiles, a private space is encrypted using its own encryption key, and you have the option to set up a different unlock method. Like work profiles, you can use apps from both the owner profile and private space simultaneously. Apps launched from a private space are distinguished by an icon depicting a key within a shield.
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@@ -112,7 +110,7 @@ Unlike work profiles, Private Space is a feature native to Android that does not
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### VPN kill switch
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Android 7 and above supports a VPN kill switch, and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
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Android 7 and above supports a VPN kill switch, and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → Settings → **Block connections without VPN**.
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### Global Toggles
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@@ -151,14 +149,14 @@ If you have an EOL device shipped with Android 10 or above and are unable to run
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All devices with Google Play Services installed automatically generate an [advertising ID](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/6048248) used for targeted advertising. Disable this feature to limit the data collected about you.
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On Android distributions with [sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), go to :gear: **Settings** → **Apps** → **Sandboxed Google Play** → **Google Settings** → **All services** → **Ads**.
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On Android distributions with [sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), go to **Settings** → **Apps** → **Sandboxed Google Play** → **Google Settings** → **All services** → **Ads**.
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- [x] Select **Delete advertising ID**
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On Android distributions with privileged Google Play Services (which includes the stock installation on most devices), the setting may be in one of several locations. Check
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- :gear: **Settings** → **Google** → **Ads**
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- :gear: **Settings** → **Privacy** → **Ads**
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- **Settings** → **Google** → **Ads**
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- **Settings** → **Privacy** → **Ads**
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You will either be given the option to delete your advertising ID or to *Opt out of interest-based ads* (this varies between OEM distributions of Android). If presented with the option to delete the advertising ID, that is preferred. If not, then make sure to opt out and reset your advertising ID.
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@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You wil
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#### Wi-Fi
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You can enable [hardware address randomization](https://support.apple.com/en-us/102509#triswitch) to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks, and on the same network over time. On the network you are currently connected to, tap the :material-information: button:
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You can enable [hardware address randomization](https://support.apple.com/en-us/102509#triswitch) to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks, and on the same network over time. On the network you are currently connected to, tap the info button:
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- [x] Set **Private Wi-Fi Address** to **Fixed** or **Rotating**
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@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ Apple Intelligence can integrate with [ChatGPT](https://support.apple.com/guide/
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You can also have it ask for confirmation every time if you leave ChatGPT integration on:
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- [x] Turn on **Confirm Requests**
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- [x] Turn on **Confirm Requests**
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If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here.
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@@ -157,7 +157,6 @@ iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long per
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> [!WARNING]
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> With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it.
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- [x] Turn on **Erase Data**
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#### Privacy & Security
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@@ -255,7 +254,6 @@ Sometimes you might want to hand your phone to someone to make a call or do a sp
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> [!WARNING]
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> Guided Access isn't foolproof, as it's possible you could leak data unintentionally or the feature could be bypassed. You should only use Guided Access for situations where you casually hand your phone to someone to use. You should not use it as a tool to protect against advanced adversaries.
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### Redacting Elements in Images
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If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so.
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@@ -263,7 +261,7 @@ If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing
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You can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature on supported devices to pixelate faces or remove objects from images.
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- Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction
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- Tap the :material-tune:
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- Tap **Adjust**
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- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up**
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- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated, and it will attempt to delete anything else.
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@@ -272,7 +270,7 @@ Our warning [against blurring text](../../../tools/software/data-redaction/index
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<div class="annotate" markdown>
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- Tap the image you have selected for redaction
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- Tap the :material-tune: → :material-dots-horizontal: (1) → Markup → :material-plus:
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- Tap **Adjust** → **More** (⋯) → Markup → **Add**
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- Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle
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- On the toolbar, tap the circle and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit.
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@@ -294,7 +292,7 @@ Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to h
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### Before First Unlock
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If your threat model includes [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](../../basics/common-threats/index.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } that involve forensic tools, and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation.
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If your threat model includes [Targeted Attacks](../../basics/common-threats/index.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red } that involve forensic tools, and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation.
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iPhones [automatically reboot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/protecting-user-data-in-the-face-of-attack-secf5549a4f5/1/web/1#:~:text=On%20an%20iPhone%20or%20iPad%20with%20iOS%2018%20and%20iPadOS%2018%20or%20later%2C%20a%20new%20security%20protection%20will%20restart%20devices%20if%20they%20remain%20locked%20for%20a%20prolonged%20period%20of%20time.) if they're not unlocked after a period of time.
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@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system a
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Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page.
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[Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../../../tools/os/desktop/index.md)
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[Our Linux Recommendations](../../../tools/os/desktop/index.md)
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{ .pg:buttons }
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## Security Notes
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@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re
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For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit).
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Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../../basics/common-threats/index.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations){ .pg-viridian }, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository).
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Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [Supply Chain Attacks](../../basics/common-threats/index.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations){ .pg-viridian }, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository).
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The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora.
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@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ SELinux on [Fedora](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/quick-docs/selinux-gett
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Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS](../../../tools/software/encryption/index.md#linux-unified-key-setup) FDE. If this option isn’t set at installation time, you will have to back up your data and re-install, as encryption is applied after [disk partitioning](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_partitioning), but before [file systems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_system) are formatted. We also suggest securely erasing your storage device:
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- [Secure Data Erasure :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/05/25/secure-data-erasure)
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- [Secure Data Erasure](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/05/25/secure-data-erasure)
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### Swap
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@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ Click on **About** and type your desired device name into the **Name** field.
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You should automatically install all available updates to make sure your Mac has the latest security fixes.
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Click the small :material-information-outline: icon next to **Automatic Updates**:
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Click the small icon next to **Automatic Updates**:
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- [x] Turn on **Download new updates when available**
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> [!WARNING]
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> Any request made with ChatGPT will be sent to ChatGPT's servers, there is no on-device processing and no PCC like with Apple Intelligence.
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#### Privacy & Security
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Whenever an application requests a permission, it will show up here. You can decide which applications you want to allow or deny specific permissions.
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@@ -163,7 +162,6 @@ macOS employs defense in depth by relying on multiple layers of software and har
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> [!WARNING]
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> macOS allows you to install beta updates. These are unstable and may come with [extra telemetry](https://beta.apple.com/privacy) since they're for testing purposes. Because of this, we recommend you avoid beta software in general.
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#### Signed System Volume
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macOS's system components are protected in a read-only [signed system volume](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/signed-system-volume-security-secd698747c9/web), meaning that neither you nor malware can alter important system files.
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@@ -180,11 +178,10 @@ System Integrity Protection makes critical file locations read-only to protect a
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##### App Sandbox
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On macOS, whether an app is sandboxed is determined by the developer when they sign it. The [App Sandbox](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/xcode/configuring-the-macos-app-sandbox) protects against vulnerabilities in the apps you run by limiting what a malicious actor can access in the event that the app is exploited. The App Sandbox *alone* can't protect against [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../../basics/common-threats/index.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations){ .pg-viridian } by malicious developers. For that, sandboxing needs to be enforced by someone other than the developer themselves, as it is on the [App Store](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/gatekeeper-and-runtime-protection-sec5599b66df/1/web/1#:~:text=All%20apps%20from%20the%20App%20Store%20are%20sandboxed%20to%20restrict%20access%20to%20data%20stored%20by%20other%20apps.).
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On macOS, whether an app is sandboxed is determined by the developer when they sign it. The [App Sandbox](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/xcode/configuring-the-macos-app-sandbox) protects against vulnerabilities in the apps you run by limiting what a malicious actor can access in the event that the app is exploited. The App Sandbox *alone* can't protect against [Supply Chain Attacks](../../basics/common-threats/index.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations){ .pg-viridian } by malicious developers. For that, sandboxing needs to be enforced by someone other than the developer themselves, as it is on the [App Store](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/gatekeeper-and-runtime-protection-sec5599b66df/1/web/1#:~:text=All%20apps%20from%20the%20App%20Store%20are%20sandboxed%20to%20restrict%20access%20to%20data%20stored%20by%20other%20apps.).
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> [!WARNING]
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> Software downloaded from outside the official App Store is not required to be sandboxed. If your threat model prioritizes defending against [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](../../basics/common-threats/index.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }, then you may want to check if the software you download outside the App Store is sandboxed, which is up to the developer to *opt in*.
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> Software downloaded from outside the official App Store is not required to be sandboxed. If your threat model prioritizes defending against [Passive Attacks](../../basics/common-threats/index.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }, then you may want to check if the software you download outside the App Store is sandboxed, which is up to the developer to *opt in*.
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You can check if an app uses the App Sandbox in a few ways:
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@@ -193,7 +190,6 @@ You can check if apps that are already running are sandboxed using the [Activity
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> [!WARNING]
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> Just because one of an app's processes is sandboxed doesn't mean they all are.
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Alternatively, you can check apps before you run them by running this command in the terminal:
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``` zsh
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