Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit somewhere else in the world. Originally, they were designed so that you could securely connect to a network even if you weren't *physically* there; you're *virtually* on a *private network*.
VPNs encrypt your traffic between your device and a server owned by your VPN provider. From the perspective of anyone between you and the VPN server, it looks like you're connecting to the VPN server. From the perspective of anyone between the VPN server and your destination site, all they can see is the VPN server connecting to the website.
They usually can't see the content of your traffic since encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, but they can see the [domains you request](../advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns). A VPN will prevent your ISP from seeing what domains you connect to, although the VPN provider is still able to see all your traffic.
==VPNs can't encrypt data outside of the connection between your device and the VPN server.== VPN providers can see and modify your traffic the same way your ISP could. And there is no way to verify a VPN provider's "no logging" policies in any way.
Any website you connect to will see the VPN provider's IP address instead of yours. This can be useful if you want to avoid leaking your IP address to outside parties if you are worried about a DDoS or other attack against your network.
A VPN can't prevent tracking all on its own, but it can offer a few benefits.
You can connect to a server in a different city or country than you live in, making it appear like you're somwhere you're not. This is easily circumvented using things like your browser's language and timezone settings, so this shouldn't be relied on.
Because you share a pool of IP addresses with many other users, it becomes more difficult to track you. Do note that most people do not have static IP addresses, so even without a VPN your IP address will change even without a VPN.
VPNs can't provide anonymity. Your VPN provider will still see your real IP address, and often has a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. You can't rely on "no logging" policies to protect your data. Use [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) instead.
Encryption offered by VPN providers is between your devices and their servers. It guarantees that this specific link is secure. This is a step up from using unencrypted proxies where an adversary on the network can intercept the communications between your devices and said proxies and modify them. However, encryption between your apps or browsers with the service providers are not handled by this encryption.
In order to keep what you actually do on the websites you visit private and secure, you must use HTTPS. This will keep your passwords, session tokens, and queries safe from the VPN provider. Always check for the lock icon in your browser's URL bar to mitigate downgrade attacks like [SSL Strip](https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Marlinspike/BlackHat-DC-09-Marlinspike-Defeating-SSL.pdf).
Unless your VPN provider hosts the encrypted DNS servers, **no**. Using DOH/DOT (or any other form of encrypted DNS) with third-party servers will simply add more entities to trust and does **absolutely nothing** to improve your privacy/security. Your VPN provider can still see which websites you visit based on the IP addresses and other methods. Instead of trusting only your VPN provider, you are now trusting both the VPN provider **and** the DNS provider.
A common reason to recommend encrypted DNS is that it helps against DNS spoofing. However, your browser should already be checking for [TLS certificates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Digital_certificates) with **HTTPS** and warn you about it. If you are not using **HTTPS**, then an adversary can still just modify anything other than your DNS queries and the end result will be little different.
**You shouldn't use encrypted DNS with Tor**. This will direct all of your DNS requests through a single circuit and allow the encrypted DNS provider to deanonymize you.
By using a VPN with Tor, you're essentially creating a permanent entry node, often with a money trail attached. This provides zero additional benefits to you, while increasing the attack surface of your connection dramatically. If you wish to hide your Tor usage from your ISP or your government, Tor has a built-in solution for that: **Tor bridges**. [Read more about Tor bridges and why using a VPN is not necessary](../advanced/tor-overview.md).
Do not use that feature. The point of using Tor is that you ==don't have to trust it==, unlike VPNs which require you to trust your provider. Currently Tor only supports the [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol) protocol. [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol) (used in [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC) for voice and video sharing, the new [HTTP3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) protocol, etc.), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol) and other packets will be dropped. To compensate for this, VPN providers typically will route all non-TCP packets through their VPN server (your first hop). This is the case with [ProtonVPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn/). Additionally, when using this Tor over VPN setup, you do not have control over other important Tor features such as [Isolated Destination Address](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (using a different Tor circuit for every domain you visit).
The feature should be viewed as a convenient way to access the Tor Network, not to stay anonymous. For proper anonymity, use the Tor Browser, TorSocks, or a Tor gateway.
Most VPN services are owned by the same [few companies](https://vpnpro.com/blog/hidden-vpn-owners-unveiled-97-vpns-23-companies/). These shady companies run lots of smaller VPN services to create the illusion that you have more choice than you actually do and to maximize profit. Typically, these providers that feed into their shell company have terrible privacy policies and shouldn't be trusted with your internet traffic. You should be very strict about which provider you decide to use.
You should also be wary that many VPN review sites are merely advertising vehicles open to the highest bidder; a paid review can't possibly be impartial. ==Privacy Guides never accepts payment or affiliate programs for our content.==
Multi-Party Relays use multiple nodes owned by different parties, such that no individual party knows enough to track you. This is the idea behind Tor, but now there are some paid services that try to emulate this model.
- ["Do I need a VPN?"](https://www.doineedavpn.com), a tool developed by IVPN to challenge aggressive VPN marketing by helping individuals decide if a VPN is right for them.
- [Hidden VPN owners unveiled: 101 VPN products run by just 23 companies](https://vpnpro.com/blog/hidden-vpn-owners-unveiled-97-vpns-23-companies/)
- [This Chinese company is secretly behind 24 popular apps seeking dangerous permissions](https://vpnpro.com/blog/chinese-company-secretly-behind-popular-apps-seeking-dangerous-permissions/)
- [The Trouble with VPN and Privacy Review Sites](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2019/11/20/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-review-sites/)
