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103
i18n/id/advanced/communication-network-types.md
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103
i18n/id/advanced/communication-network-types.md
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---
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title: "Jenis Jaringan Komunikasi"
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icon: 'material/transit-connection-variant'
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description: Ikhtisar tentang beberapa arsitektur jaringan yang biasa digunakan oleh aplikasi perpesanan instan.
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---
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Ada beberapa arsitektur jaringan yang biasa digunakan untuk menyampaikan pesan antar orang. Jaringan ini dapat memberikan jaminan privasi yang berbeda, itulah sebabnya mengapa perlu mempertimbangkan [model ancaman](../basics/threat-modeling.md) Anda ketika memutuskan aplikasi mana yang akan digunakan.
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[Perpesanan Instan yang Direkomendasikan](../real-time-communication.md ""){.md-button}
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## Jaringan Terpusat
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{ align=left }
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Perpesanan terpusat adalah di mana semua peserta berada di server yang sama atau jaringan server yang dikendalikan oleh organisasi yang sama.
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Beberapa perpesanan yang dihosting sendiri memungkinkan Anda untuk mengatur server Anda sendiri. Hosting sendiri dapat memberikan jaminan privasi tambahan, seperti tidak ada catatan penggunaan atau akses terbatas ke metadata (data tentang siapa yang berbicara dengan siapa). Perpesanan terpusat yang dihosting sendiri terisolasi dan semua orang harus berada di server yang sama untuk berkomunikasi.
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**Keuntungan:**
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- Fitur dan perubahan baru dapat diterapkan dengan lebih cepat.
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- Lebih mudah untuk memulai dan menemukan kontak.
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- Kebanyakan yang matang dan stabil memfiturkan ekosistem, karena lebih mudah diprogram dalam perangkat lunak terpusat.
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- Masalah privasi dapat dikurangi ketika Anda mempercayai server yang Anda hosting sendiri.
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**Kekurangan:**
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- Dapat menyertakan [kontrol atau akses terbatas](https://drewdevault.com/2018/08/08/Signal.html). Ini dapat mencakup hal-hal seperti:
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- Dilarang [menghubungkan klien pihak ketiga](https://github.com/LibreSignal/LibreSignal/issues/37#issuecomment-217211165) ke jaringan terpusat yang mungkin memberikan penyesuaian yang lebih besar atau pengalaman yang lebih baik. Sering kali didefinisikan dalam Syarat dan Ketentuan penggunaan.
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- Dokumentasi yang buruk atau tidak ada sama sekali untuk pengembang pihak ketiga.
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- [Kepemilikan](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729191953/https://blog.privacytools.io/delisting-wire/), kebijakan privasi, dan operasi layanan dapat berubah dengan mudah ketika satu entitas mengendalikannya, yang berpotensi membahayakan layanan di kemudian hari.
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- Hosting mandiri membutuhkan upaya dan pengetahuan tentang cara menyiapkan layanan.
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## Jaringan Federasi
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{ align=left }
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Perpesanan federasi menggunakan beberapa server yang independen dan terdesentralisasi yang dapat berbicara satu sama lain (surel adalah salah satu contoh layanan federasi). Federasi memungkinkan administrator sistem untuk mengontrol server mereka sendiri dan tetap menjadi bagian dari jaringan komunikasi yang lebih besar.
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Ketika dihosting sendiri, anggota server federasi dapat menemukan dan berkomunikasi dengan anggota server lain, meskipun beberapa server dapat memilih untuk tetap pribadi dengan menjadi nonfederasi (misalnya, server tim kerja).
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**Keuntungan:**
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- Memungkinkan kontrol yang lebih besar atas data Anda saat menjalankan server Anda sendiri.
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- Memungkinkan Anda untuk memilih kepada siapa Anda akan memercayakan data Anda dengan memilih di antara beberapa server "publik".
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- Sering kali memungkinkan klien pihak ketiga yang dapat memberikan pengalaman yang lebih asli, disesuaikan, atau dapat diakses.
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- Perangkat lunak server dapat diverifikasi bahwa itu cocok dengan kode sumber publik, dengan asumsi Anda memiliki akses ke server atau Anda mempercayai orang yang memilikinya (misalnya, anggota keluarga).
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**Kekurangan:**
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||||
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- Menambahkan fitur baru lebih kompleks karena fitur ini perlu distandarisasi dan diuji untuk memastikan fitur tersebut bekerja dengan semua server di jaringan.
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- Karena alasan sebelumnya, fiturnya mungkin kurang, atau tidak lengkap atau bekerja dengan cara yang tidak terduga dibandingkan dengan platform terpusat, seperti pengarah pesan saat luring atau penghapusan pesan.
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- Beberapa metadata mungkin tersedia (misalnya, informasi seperti "siapa yang berbicara dengan siapa," tetapi bukan konten pesan yang sebenarnya jika E2EE digunakan).
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- Server federasi umumnya membutuhkan kepercayaan dari administrator server Anda. Mereka mungkin hanya seorang penghobi atau bukan "profesional keamanan", dan mungkin tidak menyajikan dokumen standar seperti kebijakan privasi atau persyaratan layanan yang merinci bagaimana data Anda digunakan.
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- Administrator server terkadang memilih untuk memblokir server lain, yang merupakan sumber penyalahgunaan yang tidak dimoderasi atau melanggar aturan umum perilaku yang dapat diterima. Hal ini akan menghalangi kemampuan Anda untuk berkomunikasi dengan anggota server tersebut.
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## Jaringan Peer-to-Peer
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{ align=left }
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Perpesanan P2P terhubung ke [jaringan node yang terdistribusi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_networking) untuk menyampaikan pesan ke penerima tanpa server pihak ketiga.
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Klien (peer) biasanya menemukan satu sama lain melalui penggunaan jaringan [komputasi terdistribusi](https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Komputasi_terdistribusi). Contohnya antara lain [Tabel Hash Terdistribusi](https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tabel_Hash_Terdistribusi) (DHT), yang digunakan oleh [torrent](https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent) dan [IPFS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/InterPlanetary_File_System) sebagai contoh. Pendekatan lain adalah jaringan berbasis kedekatan, di mana koneksi dibuat melalui WiFi atau Bluetooth (misalnya, Briar atau protokol jaringan sosial [Scuttlebutt](https://www.scuttlebutt.nz)).
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Setelah peer menemukan rute ke kontaknya melalui salah satu metode ini, koneksi langsung di antara mereka dibuat. Meskipun pesan biasanya dienkripsi, seorang pengamat masih dapat menyimpulkan lokasi dan identitas pengirim dan penerima.
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Jaringan P2P tidak menggunakan server, karena rekan-rekan berkomunikasi secara langsung antara satu sama lain dan karenanya tidak dapat dihosting sendiri. Namun, beberapa layanan tambahan mungkin bergantung pada server terpusat, seperti penemuan pengguna atau menyampaikan pesan luring, yang bisa mendapatkan keuntungan dari hosting mandiri.
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**Keuntungan:**
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- Informasi minimal diekspos ke pihak ketiga.
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- Platform P2P modern menerapkan E2EE secara bawaan. Tidak ada server yang berpotensi mencegat dan mendekripsi transmisi Anda, tidak seperti model terpusat dan federasi.
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**Kekurangan:**
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- Set fitur yang dikurangi:
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- Pesan hanya dapat dikirim ketika kedua rekan daring, namun, klien Anda dapat menyimpan pesan secara lokal untuk menunggu kontak kembali daring.
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- Umumnya meningkatkan penggunaan baterai di ponsel, karena klien harus tetap terhubung ke jaringan terdistribusi untuk mengetahui siapa saja yang sedang daring.
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- Beberapa fitur perpesanan yang umum mungkin tidak diimplementasikan atau tidak lengkap, seperti penghapusan pesan.
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- Alamat IP Anda dan alamat IP kontak yang berkomunikasi dengan Anda dapat terekspos jika Anda tidak menggunakan perangkat lunak ini bersama dengan [VPN](../vpn.md) atau [Tor](../tor.md). Banyak negara memiliki beberapa bentuk pengawasan massal dan/atau penyimpanan metadata.
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## Perutean Anonim
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{ align=left }
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Pengirim pesan yang menggunakan [perutean anonim](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_628) menyembunyikan identitas pengirim, penerima, atau bukti bahwa mereka telah berkomunikasi. Secara ideal, sebuah perpesanan seharusnya menyembunyikan ketiganya.
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|
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Ada [banyak](https://doi.org/10.1145/3182658) cara yang berbeda untuk menerapkan perutean anonim. Salah satu yang paling terkenal adalah [perutean bawang](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing) (yaitu [Tor](tor-overview.md)), yang mengkomunikasikan pesan terenkripsi melalui jaringan hamparan [virtual](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overlay_network) yang menyembunyikan lokasi setiap node serta penerima dan pengirim setiap pesan. Pengirim dan penerima tidak pernah berinteraksi secara langsung dan hanya bertemu melalui simpul pertemuan rahasia sehingga tidak ada kebocoran alamat IP atau lokasi fisik. Node tidak dapat mendekripsi pesan, atau tujuan akhir; hanya penerima yang dapat melakukannya. Setiap node perantara hanya dapat mendekripsi bagian yang menunjukkan ke mana harus mengirim pesan yang masih terenkripsi berikutnya, sampai pesan tersebut tiba di penerima yang dapat mendekripsi sepenuhnya, oleh karena itu disebut sebagai "lapisan bawang."
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Melayani sebuah node secara sendiri dalam jaringan perutean anonim tidak memberikan manfaat privasi tambahan kepada penyedia, tetapi berkontribusi pada ketahanan seluruh jaringan terhadap serangan identifikasi untuk keuntungan semua orang.
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**Keuntungan:**
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||||
- Tidak ada informasi atau informasi minimal yang diekspos ke pihak lain.
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- Pesan dapat disampaikan secara terdesentralisasi meskipun salah satu pihak sedang luring.
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**Kekurangan:**
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||||
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- Penyebaran pesan lambat.
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- Sering kali terbatas pada jenis media yang lebih sedikit, sebagian besar teks, karena jaringannya lambat.
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- Kurang diandalkan jika node dipilih dengan perutean acak, beberapa node mungkin sangat jauh dari pengirim dan penerima, menambah latensi atau bahkan gagal mengirimkan pesan jika salah satu node luring.
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- Lebih rumit untuk memulai, karena diperlukan pembuatan dan cadangan kunci kriptografi privat yang aman.
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||||
- Sama seperti platform terdesentralisasi lainnya, menambahkan fitur lebih kompleks bagi pengembang daripada platform terpusat. Oleh karena itu, fitur mungkin kurang atau tidak diterapkan secara lengkap, seperti pengiriman pesan secara luring atau penghapusan pesan.
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306
i18n/id/advanced/dns-overview.md
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306
i18n/id/advanced/dns-overview.md
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---
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title: "Ikhtisar DNS"
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icon: material/dns
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description: Sistem Nama Domain adalah "buku telepon internet," yang membantu peramban Anda menemukan situs web yang dicari.
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---
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[Sistem Penamaan Domain (DNS)](https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sistem_Penamaan_Domain) adalah 'buku telepon internet'. DNS menerjemahkan nama domain ke alamat IP sehingga peramban dan layanan lain dapat memuat sumber daya internet, melalui jaringan server yang terdesentralisasi.
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## Apa itu DNS?
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Ketika Anda mengunjungi situs web, alamat numerik akan dikembalikan. Misalnya, ketika Anda mengunjungi `privacyguides.org`, alamat `192.98.54.105` dikembalikan.
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DNS sudah ada sejak [masa-masa awal](https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sistem_Penamaan_Domain#Sejarah) internet. Permintaan DNS yang dibuat ke dan dari server DNS **tidak** secara umum dienkripsi. Dalam lingkungan perumahan, pelanggan diberikan server oleh ISP melalui [DHCP](https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protokol_Konfigurasi_Hos_Dinamik).
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Permintaan DNS yang tidak terenkripsi dapat dengan mudah **diawasi** dan **diubah** dalam transit. Di beberapa bagian dunia, kebanyakan ISP diperintahkan untuk melakukan [penyaringan DNS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) primitif. Saat Anda meminta alamat IP domain yang diblokir, server mungkin tidak merespons atau mungkin merespons dengan alamat IP yang berbeda. Karena protokol DNS tidak dienkripsi, ISP (atau operator jaringan apa pun) dapat menggunakan [DPI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection) untuk memantau permintaan. ISP juga dapat memblokir permintaan berdasarkan karakteristik umum, terlepas dari server DNS yang digunakan. DNS yang tidak terenkripsi selalu menggunakan [porta](https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Porta_(jaringan_komputer)) 53 dan selalu menggunakan UDP.
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Di bawah ini, kami mendiskusikan dan menyediakan tutorial untuk membuktikan apa yang mungkin dilihat oleh pengamat luar dengan menggunakan DNS biasa yang tidak terenkripsi dan [DNS terenkripsi](#apa-itu-dns-terenkripsi).
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### DNS yang tidak terenkripsi
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1. Dengan menggunakan [`tshark`](https://www.wireshark.org/docs/man-pages/tshark.html) (bagian dari proyek [Wireshark](https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wireshark)) kita bisa memantau dan merekam aliran paket internet. This command records packets that meet the rules specified:
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```bash
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tshark -w /tmp/dns.pcap udp port 53 and host 1.1.1.1 or host 8.8.8.8
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```
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2. We can then use [`dig`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dig_(command)) (Linux, MacOS etc) or [`nslookup`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nslookup) (Windows) to send the DNS lookup to both servers. Software such as web browsers do these lookups automatically, unless they are configured to use encrypted DNS.
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=== "Linux, macOS"
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```
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dig +noall +answer privacyguides.org @1.1.1.1
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dig +noall +answer privacyguides.org @8.8.8.8
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```
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=== "Windows"
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```
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nslookup privacyguides.org 1.1.1.1
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nslookup privacyguides.org 8.8.8.8
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```
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3. Next, we want to [analyse](https://www.wireshark.org/docs/wsug_html_chunked/ChapterIntroduction.html#ChIntroWhatIs) the results:
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||||
=== "Wireshark"
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
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wireshark -r /tmp/dns.pcap
|
||||
```
|
||||
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=== "tshark"
|
||||
|
||||
```
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tshark -r /tmp/dns.pcap
|
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```
|
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If you run the Wireshark command above, the top pane shows the "[frames](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethernet_frame)", and the bottom pane shows all the data about the selected frame. Enterprise filtering and monitoring solutions (such as those purchased by governments) can do the process automatically, without human interaction, and can aggregate those frames to produce statistical data useful to the network observer.
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||||
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||||
| No. | Time | Source | Destination | Protocol | Length | Info |
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| --- | -------- | --------- | ----------- | -------- | ------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
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| 1 | 0.000000 | 192.0.2.1 | 1.1.1.1 | DNS | 104 | Standard query 0x58ba A privacyguides.org OPT |
|
||||
| 2 | 0.293395 | 1.1.1.1 | 192.0.2.1 | DNS | 108 | Standard query response 0x58ba A privacyguides.org A 198.98.54.105 OPT |
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||||
| 3 | 1.682109 | 192.0.2.1 | 8.8.8.8 | DNS | 104 | Standard query 0xf1a9 A privacyguides.org OPT |
|
||||
| 4 | 2.154698 | 8.8.8.8 | 192.0.2.1 | DNS | 108 | Standard query response 0xf1a9 A privacyguides.org A 198.98.54.105 OPT |
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||||
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An observer could modify any of these packets.
|
||||
|
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## Apa itu "DNS terenkripsi"?
|
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|
||||
DNS terenkripsi dapat merujuk pada salah satu dari sejumlah protokol, yang paling umum adalah:
|
||||
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||||
### DNSCrypt
|
||||
|
||||
[**DNSCrypt**](https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNSCrypt) adalah salah satu metode pertama untuk mengenkripsi permintaan DNS. DNSCrypt beroperasi pada porta 443 dan bekerja dengan protokol transportasi TCP atau UDP. DNSCrypt belum pernah diajukan ke [Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)](https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Engineering_Task_Force) dan juga tidak melalui proses [Request for Comments (RFC)](https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Request_for_Comments), sehingga belum digunakan secara luas di luar beberapa [penerapan](https://dnscrypt.info/implementations). Sebagai hasilnya, sebagian besar telah digantikan oleh [DNS melalui HTTPS](#dns-melalui-https-doh) yang lebih populer.
|
||||
|
||||
### DNS melalui TLS (DoT)
|
||||
|
||||
[**DNS over TLS**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_TLS) is another method for encrypting DNS communication that is defined in [RFC 7858](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7858). Support was first implemented in Android 9, iOS 14, and on Linux in [systemd-resolved](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/resolved.conf.html#DNSOverTLS=) in version 237. Preference in the industry has been moving away from DoT to DoH in recent years, as DoT is a [complex protocol](https://dnscrypt.info/faq/) and has varying compliance to the RFC across the implementations that exist. DoT also operates on a dedicated port 853 which can be blocked easily by restrictive firewalls.
|
||||
|
||||
### DNS melalui HTTPS (DoH)
|
||||
|
||||
[**DNS over HTTPS**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_HTTPS) as defined in [RFC 8484](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8484) packages queries in the [HTTP/2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/2) protocol and provides security with HTTPS. Support was first added in web browsers such as Firefox 60 and Chrome 83.
|
||||
|
||||
Native implementation of DoH showed up in iOS 14, macOS 11, Microsoft Windows, and Android 13 (however, it won't be enabled [by default](https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/packages/modules/DnsResolver/+/1833144)). General Linux desktop support is waiting on the systemd [implementation](https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/8639) so [installing third-party software is still required](../dns.md#encrypted-dns-proxies).
|
||||
|
||||
## What can an outside party see?
|
||||
|
||||
In this example we will record what happens when we make a DoH request:
|
||||
|
||||
1. First, start `tshark`:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
tshark -w /tmp/dns_doh.pcap -f "tcp port https and host 1.1.1.1"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
2. Second, make a request with `curl`:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
curl -vI --doh-url https://1.1.1.1/dns-query https://privacyguides.org
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
3. After making the request, we can stop the packet capture with <kbd>CTRL</kbd> + <kbd>C</kbd>.
|
||||
|
||||
4. Analyse the results in Wireshark:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
wireshark -r /tmp/dns_doh.pcap
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
We can see the [connection establishment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol#Connection_establishment) and [TLS handshake](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ssl/what-happens-in-a-tls-handshake/) that occurs with any encrypted connection. When looking at the "application data" packets that follow, none of them contain the domain we requested or the IP address returned.
|
||||
|
||||
## Why **shouldn't** I use encrypted DNS?
|
||||
|
||||
In locations where there is internet filtering (or censorship), visiting forbidden resources may have its own consequences which you should consider in your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md). We do **not** suggest the use of encrypted DNS for this purpose. Use [Tor](https://torproject.org) or a [VPN](../vpn.md) instead. If you're using a VPN, you should use your VPN's DNS servers. When using a VPN, you are already trusting them with all your network activity.
|
||||
|
||||
When we do a DNS lookup, it's generally because we want to access a resource. Below, we will discuss some of the methods that may disclose your browsing activities even when using encrypted DNS:
|
||||
|
||||
### IP Address
|
||||
|
||||
The simplest way to determine browsing activity might be to look at the IP addresses your devices are accessing. For example, if the observer knows that `privacyguides.org` is at `198.98.54.105`, and your device is requesting data from `198.98.54.105`, there is a good chance you're visiting Privacy Guides.
|
||||
|
||||
This method is only useful when the IP address belongs to a server that only hosts few websites. It's also not very useful if the site is hosted on a shared platform (e.g. Github Pages, Cloudflare Pages, Netlify, WordPress, Blogger, etc). It also isn't very useful if the server is hosted behind a [reverse proxy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_proxy), which is very common on the modern Internet.
|
||||
|
||||
### Server Name Indication (SNI)
|
||||
|
||||
Server Name Indication is typically used when a IP address hosts many websites. This could be a service like Cloudflare, or some other [Denial-of-service attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial-of-service_attack) protection.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Start capturing again with `tshark`. We've added a filter with our IP address so you don't capture many packets:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
tshark -w /tmp/pg.pcap port 443 and host 198.98.54.105
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
2. Then we visit [https://privacyguides.org](https://privacyguides.org).
|
||||
|
||||
3. After visiting the website, we want to stop the packet capture with <kbd>CTRL</kbd> + <kbd>C</kbd>.
|
||||
|
||||
4. Next we want to analyze the results:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
wireshark -r /tmp/pg.pcap
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
We will see the connection establishment, followed by the TLS handshake for the Privacy Guides website. Around frame 5. you'll see a "Client Hello".
|
||||
|
||||
5. Expand the triangle ▸ next to each field:
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
▸ Transport Layer Security
|
||||
▸ TLSv1.3 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
|
||||
▸ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
|
||||
▸ Extension: server_name (len=22)
|
||||
▸ Server Name Indication extension
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
6. We can see the SNI value which discloses the website we are visiting. The `tshark` command can give you the value directly for all packets containing a SNI value:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
tshark -r /tmp/pg.pcap -Tfields -Y tls.handshake.extensions_server_name -e tls.handshake.extensions_server_name
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
This means even if we are using "Encrypted DNS" servers, the domain will likely be disclosed through SNI. The [TLS v1.3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#TLS_1.3) protocol brings with it [Encrypted Client Hello](https://blog.cloudflare.com/encrypted-client-hello/), which prevents this kind of leak.
|
||||
|
||||
Governments, in particular [China](https://www.zdnet.com/article/china-is-now-blocking-all-encrypted-https-traffic-using-tls-1-3-and-esni/) and [Russia](https://www.zdnet.com/article/russia-wants-to-ban-the-use-of-secure-protocols-such-as-tls-1-3-doh-dot-esni/), have either already [started blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication#Encrypted_Client_Hello) it or expressed a desire to do so. Recently, Russia has [started blocking foreign websites](https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/108) that use the [HTTP/3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) standard. This is because the [QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QUIC) protocol that is a part of HTTP/3 requires that `ClientHello` also be encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
### Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
|
||||
|
||||
Another way your browser can disclose your browsing activities is with the [Online Certificate Status Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_Certificate_Status_Protocol). When visiting an HTTPS website, the browser might check to see if the website's [certificate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_certificate) has been revoked. This is generally done through the HTTP protocol, meaning it is **not** encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
The OCSP request contains the certificate "[serial number](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_certificate#Common_fields)", which is unique. It is sent to the "OCSP responder" in order to check its status.
|
||||
|
||||
We can simulate what a browser would do using the [`openssl`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenSSL) command.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Get the server certificate and use [`sed`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sed) to keep just the important part and write it out to a file:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
openssl s_client -connect privacyguides.org:443 < /dev/null 2>&1 |
|
||||
sed -n '/^-*BEGIN/,/^-*END/p' > /tmp/pg_server.cert
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
2. Get the intermediate certificate. [Certificate Authorities (CA)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) normally don't sign a certificate directly; they use what is known as an "intermediate" certificate.
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
openssl s_client -showcerts -connect privacyguides.org:443 < /dev/null 2>&1 |
|
||||
sed -n '/^-*BEGIN/,/^-*END/p' > /tmp/pg_and_intermediate.cert
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
3. The first certificate in `pg_and_intermediate.cert` is actually the server certificate from step 1. We can use `sed` again to delete until the first instance of END:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
sed -n '/^-*END CERTIFICATE-*$/!d;:a n;p;ba' \
|
||||
/tmp/pg_and_intermediate.cert > /tmp/intermediate_chain.cert
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
4. Get the OCSP responder for the server certificate:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
openssl x509 -noout -ocsp_uri -in /tmp/pg_server.cert
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Our certificate shows the Lets Encrypt certificate responder. If we want to see all the details of the certificate we can use:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
openssl x509 -text -noout -in /tmp/pg_server.cert
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
5. Start the packet capture:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
tshark -w /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap -f "tcp port http"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
6. Make the OCSP request:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
openssl ocsp -issuer /tmp/intermediate_chain.cert \
|
||||
-cert /tmp/pg_server.cert \
|
||||
-text \
|
||||
-url http://r3.o.lencr.org
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
7. Open the capture:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
wireshark -r /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
There will be two packets with the "OCSP" protocol: a "Request" and a "Response". For the "Request" we can see the "serial number" by expanding the triangle ▸ next to each field:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
▸ Online Certificate Status Protocol
|
||||
▸ tbsRequest
|
||||
▸ requestList: 1 item
|
||||
▸ Request
|
||||
▸ reqCert
|
||||
serialNumber
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
For the "Response" we can also see the "serial number":
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
▸ Online Certificate Status Protocol
|
||||
▸ responseBytes
|
||||
▸ BasicOCSPResponse
|
||||
▸ tbsResponseData
|
||||
▸ responses: 1 item
|
||||
▸ SingleResponse
|
||||
▸ certID
|
||||
serialNumber
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
8. Or use `tshark` to filter the packets for the Serial Number:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
tshark -r /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap -Tfields -Y ocsp.serialNumber -e ocsp.serialNumber
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
If the network observer has the public certificate, which is publicly available, they can match the serial number with that certificate and therefore determine the site you're visiting from that. The process can be automated and can associate IP addresses with serial numbers. It is also possible to check [Certificate Transparency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_Transparency) logs for the serial number.
|
||||
|
||||
## Haruskah saya menggunakan DNS terenkripsi?
|
||||
|
||||
Kami membuat diagram aliran ini untuk menjelaskan kapan Anda *harus* menggunakan DNS terenkripsi:
|
||||
|
||||
``` mermaid
|
||||
grafik TB
|
||||
Mulai[Start] --> anonim{Mencoba menjadi<br> anonim?}
|
||||
anonim --> | Ya | tor(Gunakan Tor)
|
||||
anonim --> | Tidak | sensor{Menghindari<br> sensor?}
|
||||
sensor --> | Ya | vpnOrTor(Gunakan<br> VPN atau Tor)
|
||||
sensor --> | Tidak | privasi{Ingin privasi<br> dari ISP?}
|
||||
privasi --> | Ya | vpnOrTor
|
||||
privasi --> | Tidak | obnoxious{ISP melakukan<br> pengarahan<br> yang menjengkelkan?}
|
||||
obnoxious --> | Ya | encryptedDNS(Gunakan<br> DNS terenkripsi<br> dengan pihak ketiga)
|
||||
obnoxious --> | Tidak | ispDNS{Apakah ISP mendukung<br> DNS terenkripsi?}
|
||||
ispDNS --> | Ya | useISP(Gunakan<br> DNS terenkripsi<br> dengan ISP)
|
||||
ispDNS --> | Tidak | tidakAda(Tidak lakukan apa pun)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Encrypted DNS with a third-party should only be used to get around redirects and basic [DNS blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) when you can be sure there won't be any consequences or you're interested in a provider that does some rudimentary filtering.
|
||||
|
||||
[List of recommended DNS servers](../dns.md ""){.md-button}
|
||||
|
||||
## What is DNSSEC?
|
||||
|
||||
[Domain Name System Security Extensions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Extensions) (DNSSEC) is a feature of DNS that authenticates responses to domain name lookups. It does not provide privacy protections for those lookups, but rather prevents attackers from manipulating or poisoning the responses to DNS requests.
|
||||
|
||||
In other words, DNSSEC digitally signs data to help ensure its validity. In order to ensure a secure lookup, the signing occurs at every level in the DNS lookup process. As a result, all answers from DNS can be trusted.
|
||||
|
||||
The DNSSEC signing process is similar to someone signing a legal document with a pen; that person signs with a unique signature that no one else can create, and a court expert can look at that signature and verify that the document was signed by that person. These digital signatures ensure that data has not been tampered with.
|
||||
|
||||
DNSSEC implements a hierarchical digital signing policy across all layers of DNS. For example, in the case of a `privacyguides.org` lookup, a root DNS server would sign a key for the `.org` nameserver, and the `.org` nameserver would then sign a key for `privacyguides.org`’s authoritative nameserver.
|
||||
|
||||
<small>Adapted from [DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) overview](https://cloud.google.com/dns/docs/dnssec) by Google and [DNSSEC: An Introduction](https://blog.cloudflare.com/dnssec-an-introduction/) by Cloudflare, both licensed under [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).</small>
|
||||
|
||||
## What is QNAME minimization?
|
||||
|
||||
A QNAME is a "qualified name", for example `privacyguides.org`. QNAME minimisation reduces the amount of information sent from the DNS server to the [authoritative name server](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Name_server#Authoritative_name_server).
|
||||
|
||||
Instead of sending the whole domain `privacyguides.org`, QNAME minimization means the DNS server will ask for all the records that end in `.org`. Further technical description is defined in [RFC 7816](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7816).
|
||||
|
||||
## What is EDNS Client Subnet (ECS)?
|
||||
|
||||
The [EDNS Client Subnet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EDNS_Client_Subnet) is a method for a recursive DNS resolver to specify a [subnetwork](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subnetwork) for the [host or client](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Client_(computing)) which is making the DNS query.
|
||||
|
||||
It's intended to "speed up" delivery of data by giving the client an answer that belongs to a server that is close to them such as a [content delivery network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_delivery_network), which are often used in video streaming and serving JavaScript web apps.
|
||||
|
||||
This feature does come at a privacy cost, as it tells the DNS server some information about the client's location.
|
||||
84
i18n/id/advanced/payments.md
Normal file
84
i18n/id/advanced/payments.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: Pembayaran Pribadi
|
||||
icon: material/hand-coin
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Ada alasan mengapa data tentang kebiasaan membeli Anda dianggap sebagai cawan suci penargetan iklan: pembelian Anda dapat membocorkan harta karun data tentang Anda. Sayangnya, sistem keuangan saat ini dirancang antiprivasi, sehingga memungkinkan bank, perusahaan lain, dan pemerintah untuk melacak transaksi dengan mudah. Namun demikian, Anda memiliki banyak pilihan untuk melakukan pembayaran secara pribadi.
|
||||
|
||||
## Uang Tunai
|
||||
|
||||
Selama berabad-abad, **uang tunai** telah berfungsi sebagai bentuk utama pembayaran pribadi. Uang tunai memiliki sifat privasi yang sangat baik dalam banyak kasus, diterima secara luas di sebagian besar negara, dan **dapat dipertukarkan**, artinya tidak unik dan sepenuhnya dapat dipertukarkan.
|
||||
|
||||
Undang-undang pembayaran tunai bervariasi menurut negara. Di Amerika Serikat, pengungkapan khusus diperlukan untuk pembayaran tunai lebih dari $10.000 kepada IRS di [Formulir 8300](https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/form-8300-and-reporting-cash-payments-of-over-10000). Bisnis penerima wajib memverifikasi nama, alamat, pekerjaan, tanggal lahir, dan Nomor Jaminan Sosial atau NPWP penerima (dengan beberapa pengecualian). Batas bawah tanpa ID seperti $3.000 atau kurang dari itu ada untuk pertukaran dan pengiriman uang. Uang tunai juga memiliki nomor seri. Ini hampir tidak pernah dilacak oleh pedagang, tetapi dapat digunakan oleh penegak hukum dalam penyelidikan yang ditargetkan.
|
||||
|
||||
Meskipun demikian, ini biasanya merupakan pilihan terbaik.
|
||||
|
||||
## Kartu Prabayar & Kartu Hadiah
|
||||
|
||||
Membeli kartu hadiah dan kartu prabayar di sebagian besar toko kelontong dan minimarket dengan uang tunai relatif mudah. Kartu hadiah biasanya tidak dikenakan biaya, meskipun kartu prabayar sering kali dikenakan biaya, jadi perhatikan baik-baik biaya dan tanggal kedaluwarsanya. Beberapa toko mungkin akan meminta kartu identitas Anda pada saat pembayaran untuk mengurangi penipuan.
|
||||
|
||||
Kartu hadiah biasanya memiliki batas hingga $200 per kartu, tetapi ada juga yang menawarkan batas hingga $2.000 per kartu. Kartu prabayar (misalnya: dari Visa atau Mastercard) biasanya memiliki batas hingga $1.000 per kartu.
|
||||
|
||||
Kartu hadiah memiliki sisi negatif karena tunduk pada kebijakan merchant, yang dapat memiliki persyaratan dan batasan yang buruk. Misalnya, beberapa penjual tidak menerima pembayaran dengan kartu hadiah secara eksklusif, atau mereka mungkin membatalkan nilai kartu jika mereka menganggap Anda sebagai pengguna berisiko tinggi. Setelah Anda memiliki kredit penjual, penjual memiliki tingkat kontrol yang kuat atas kredit ini.
|
||||
|
||||
Kartu prabayar tidak mengizinkan penarikan tunai dari ATM atau pembayaran "peer-to-peer" di Venmo dan aplikasi serupa.
|
||||
|
||||
Uang tunai tetap menjadi pilihan terbaik untuk pembelian secara langsung bagi kebanyakan orang. Kartu hadiah dapat berguna untuk penghematan yang mereka bawa. Kartu prabayar dapat berguna untuk tempat-tempat yang tidak menerima uang tunai. Kartu hadiah dan kartu prabayar lebih mudah digunakan secara daring daripada uang tunai, dan lebih mudah diperoleh dengan mata uang kripto daripada uang tunai.
|
||||
|
||||
### Pasar Daring
|
||||
|
||||
Jika Anda memiliki [mata uang kripto](../cryptocurrency.md), Anda dapat membeli kartu hadiah dengan pasar kartu hadiah daring. Beberapa layanan ini menawarkan opsi verifikasi ID untuk batas yang lebih tinggi, tetapi mereka juga mengizinkan akun hanya dengan alamat surel. Batas dasar mulai dari $5.000-10.000 per hari untuk akun dasar, dan limit yang jauh lebih tinggi untuk akun terverifikasi ID (jika ditawarkan).
|
||||
|
||||
Saat membeli kartu hadiah secara daring, biasanya ada sedikit diskon. Kartu prabayar biasanya dijual secara daring dengan harga nominal atau dengan biaya. Jika Anda membeli kartu prabayar dan kartu hadiah dengan mata uang kripto, Anda sebaiknya memilih untuk membayar dengan Monero yang memberikan privasi yang kuat, lebih lanjut tentang hal ini di bawah ini. Membayar kartu hadiah dengan metode pembayaran yang dapat dilacak meniadakan manfaat yang dapat diberikan oleh kartu hadiah ketika dibeli dengan uang tunai atau Monero.
|
||||
|
||||
- [Pasar Kartu Hadiah Daring :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../financial-services.md#gift-card-marketplaces)
|
||||
|
||||
## Kartu Virtual
|
||||
|
||||
Cara lain untuk melindungi informasi Anda dari penjual daring adalah dengan menggunakan kartu virtual sekali pakai yang menyembunyikan informasi perbankan atau penagihan Anda yang sebenarnya. Hal ini terutama berguna untuk melindungi Anda dari pelanggaran data penjual, pelacakan yang kurang canggih atau korelasi pembelian oleh agen pemasaran, dan pencurian data daring. Mereka **tidak** membantu Anda dalam melakukan pembelian sepenuhnya secara anonim, dan mereka juga tidak menyembunyikan informasi apa pun dari lembaga perbankan itu sendiri. Lembaga keuangan biasa yang menawarkan kartu virtual tunduk pada undang-undang "Kenali Nasabah Anda" (KYC), yang berarti mereka mungkin memerlukan ID Anda atau informasi identifikasi lainnya.
|
||||
|
||||
- [Layanan Penyamaran Pembayaran yang Direkomendasikan :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../financial-services.md#payment-masking-services)
|
||||
|
||||
Ini cenderung menjadi pilihan yang baik untuk pembayaran berulang/langganan secara daring, sementara kartu hadiah prabayar lebih disukai untuk transaksi satu kali.
|
||||
|
||||
## Mata Uang Kripto
|
||||
|
||||
Mata uang kripto adalah bentuk mata uang digital yang dirancang untuk bekerja tanpa otoritas pusat seperti pemerintah atau bank. Meskipun *beberapa* proyek mata uang kripto memungkinkan Anda untuk melakukan transaksi pribadi secara daring, banyak yang menggunakan blockchain publik yang tidak memberikan privasi transaksi. Mata uang kripto juga cenderung merupakan aset yang sangat fluktuatif, artinya nilainya dapat berubah dengan cepat dan signifikan kapan saja. Oleh karena itu, kami umumnya tidak menyarankan penggunaan mata uang kripto sebagai penyimpan nilai jangka panjang. Jika Anda memutuskan untuk menggunakan mata uang kripto secara daring, pastikan Anda memiliki pemahaman penuh mengenai aspek privasinya terlebih dahulu, dan hanya menginvestasikan jumlah yang tidak akan menyebabkan kerugian besar.
|
||||
|
||||
!!! danger
|
||||
|
||||
Sebagian besar mata uang kripto beroperasi pada blockchain **publik**, yang berarti bahwa setiap transaksi diketahui oleh publik. Ini termasuk mata uang kripto yang paling terkenal seperti Bitcoin dan Ethereum. Transaksi dengan mata uang kripto ini tidak dapat dianggap sebagai transaksi pribadi dan tidak akan melindungi anonimitas Anda.
|
||||
|
||||
Selain itu, banyak atau bahkan sebagian besar mata uang kripto adalah penipuan. Lakukan transaksi dengan hati-hati hanya dengan proyek yang Anda percayai.
|
||||
|
||||
### Koin Privasi
|
||||
|
||||
Ada sejumlah proyek mata uang kripto yang bertujuan untuk memberikan privasi dengan membuat transaksi menjadi anonim. Kami menyarankan untuk menggunakan salah satu yang menyediakan anonimitas transaksi **secara bawaan** untuk menghindari kesalahan operasional.
|
||||
|
||||
- [Mata Uang Kripto yang Direkomendasikan :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../cryptocurrency.md#coins)
|
||||
|
||||
Koin privasi telah menjadi sasaran pengawasan yang semakin meningkat oleh badan-badan pemerintah. Pada tahun 2020, [IRS menerbitkan bounty $625,000](https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2020/09/14/irs-will-pay-up-to-625000-if-you-can-crack-monero-other-privacy-coins/?sh=2e9808a085cc) untuk alat yang dapat memecahkan Jaringan Lightning Bitcoin dan/atau privasi transaksi Monero. They ultimately [paid two companies](https://sam.gov/opp/5ab94eae1a8d422e88945b64181c6018/view) (Chainalysis and Integra Fec) a combined $1.25 million for tools which purport to do so (it is unknown which cryptocurrency network these tools target). Due to the secrecy surrounding tools like these, ==none of these methods of tracing cryptocurrencies have been independently confirmed.== However, it is quite likely that tools which assist targeted investigations into private coin transactions exist, and that privacy coins only succeed in thwarting mass surveillance.
|
||||
|
||||
### Other Coins (Bitcoin, Ethereum, etc.)
|
||||
|
||||
The vast majority of cryptocurrency projects use a public blockchain, meaning that all transactions are both easily traceable and permanent. As such, we strongly discourage the use of most cryptocurrency for privacy-related reasons.
|
||||
|
||||
Anonymous transactions on a public blockchain are *theoretically* possible, and the Bitcoin wiki [gives one example of a "completely anonymous" transaction](https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Privacy#Example_-_A_perfectly_private_donation). However, doing so requires a complicated setup involving Tor and "solo-mining" a block to generate completely independent cryptocurrency, a practice which has not been practical for nearly any enthusiast for many years.
|
||||
|
||||
==Your best option is to avoid these cryptocurrencies entirely and stick with one which provides privacy by default.== Attempting to use other cryptocurrency is outside the scope of this site and strongly discouraged.
|
||||
|
||||
### Wallet Custody
|
||||
|
||||
With cryptocurrency there are two forms of wallets: custodial wallets and noncustodial wallets. Custodial wallets are operated by centralized companies/exchanges, where the private key for your wallet is held by that company, and you can access them anywhere typically with a regular username and password. Noncustodial wallets are wallets where you control and manage the private keys to access it. Assuming you keep your wallet's private keys secured and backed up, noncustodial wallets provide greater security and censorship-resistance over custodial wallets, because your cryptocurrency can't be stolen or frozen by a company with custody over your private keys. Key custody is especially important when it comes to privacy coins: Custodial wallets grant the operating company the ability to view your transactions, negating the privacy benefits of those cryptocurrencies.
|
||||
|
||||
### Acquisition
|
||||
|
||||
Acquiring [cryptocurrencies](../cryptocurrency.md) like Monero privately can be difficult. P2P marketplaces like [LocalMonero](https://localmonero.co/), a platform which facilitates trades between people, are one option that can be used. If using an exchange which requires KYC is an acceptable risk for you as long as subsequent transactions can't be traced, a much easier option is to purchase Monero on an exchange like [Kraken](https://kraken.com/), or purchase Bitcoin/Litecoin from a KYC exchange which can then be swapped for Monero. Then, you can withdraw the purchased Monero to your own noncustodial wallet to use privately from that point forward.
|
||||
|
||||
If you go this route, make sure to purchase Monero at different times and in different amounts than where you will spend it. If you purchase $5000 of Monero at an exchange and make a $5000 purchase in Monero an hour later, those actions could potentially be correlated by an outside observer regardless of which path the Monero took. Staggering purchases and purchasing larger amounts of Monero in advance to later spend on multiple smaller transactions can avoid this pitfall.
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Considerations
|
||||
|
||||
When you're making a payment in-person with cash, make sure to keep your in-person privacy in mind. Security cameras are ubiquitous. Consider wearing non-distinct clothing and a face mask (such as a surgical mask or N95). Don’t sign up for rewards programs or provide any other information about yourself.
|
||||
|
||||
When purchasing online, ideally you should do so over [Tor](tor-overview.md). However, many merchants don’t allow purchases with Tor. You can consider using a [recommended VPN](../vpn.md) (paid for with cash, gift card, or Monero), or making the purchase from a coffee shop or library with free Wi-Fi. If you are ordering a physical item that needs to be delivered, you will need to provide a delivery address. You should consider using a PO box, private mailbox, or work address.
|
||||
94
i18n/id/advanced/tor-overview.md
Normal file
94
i18n/id/advanced/tor-overview.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "Tor Overview"
|
||||
icon: 'simple/torproject'
|
||||
description: Tor is a free to use, decentralized network designed for using the internet with as much privacy as possible.
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Tor is a free to use, decentralized network designed for using the internet with as much privacy as possible. If used properly, the network enables private and anonymous browsing and communications.
|
||||
|
||||
## Path Building to Clearnet Services
|
||||
|
||||
"Clearnet services" are websites which you can access with any browser, like [privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org). Tor lets you connect to these websites anonymously by routing your traffic through a network comprised of thousands of volunteer-run servers called nodes (or relays).
|
||||
|
||||
Every time you [connect to Tor](../tor.md), it will choose three nodes to build a path to the internet—this path is called a "circuit."
|
||||
|
||||
<figure markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
<figcaption>Tor circuit pathway</figcaption>
|
||||
</figure>
|
||||
|
||||
Each of these nodes has its own function:
|
||||
|
||||
### The Entry Node
|
||||
|
||||
The entry node, often called the guard node, is the first node to which your Tor client connects. The entry node is able to see your IP address, however it is unable to see what you are connecting to.
|
||||
|
||||
Unlike the other nodes, the Tor client will randomly select an entry node and stick with it for two to three months to protect you from certain attacks.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Middle Node
|
||||
|
||||
The middle node is the second node to which your Tor client connects. It can see which node the traffic came from—the entry node—and to which node it goes to next. The middle node cannot, see your IP address or the domain you are connecting to.
|
||||
|
||||
For each new circuit, the middle node is randomly selected out of all available Tor nodes.
|
||||
|
||||
### The Exit Node
|
||||
|
||||
The exit node is the point in which your web traffic leaves the Tor network and is forwarded to your desired destination. The exit node is unable to see your IP address, but it does know what site it's connecting to.
|
||||
|
||||
The exit node will be chosen at random from all available Tor nodes ran with an exit relay flag.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
## Path Building to Onion Services
|
||||
|
||||
"Onion Services" (also commonly referred to as "hidden services") are websites which can only be accessed by the Tor browser. These websites have a long randomly generated domain name ending with `.onion`.
|
||||
|
||||
Connecting to an Onion Service in Tor works very similarly to connecting to a clearnet service, but your traffic is routed through a total of **six** nodes before reaching the destination server. Just like before however, only three of these nodes are contributing to *your* anonymity, the other three nodes protect *the Onion Service's* anonymity, hiding the website's true IP and location in the same manner that Tor Browser is hiding yours.
|
||||
|
||||
<figure style="width:100%" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
<figcaption>Tor circuit pathway with Onion Services. Nodes in the <span class="pg-blue">blue</span> fence belong to your browser, while nodes in the <span class="pg-red">red</span> fence belong to the server, so their identity is hidden from you.</figcaption>
|
||||
</figure>
|
||||
|
||||
## Encryption
|
||||
|
||||
Tor encrypts each packet (a block of transmitted data) three times with the keys from the exit, middle, and entry node—in that order.
|
||||
|
||||
Once Tor has built a circuit, data transmission is done as follows:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Firstly: when the packet arrives at the entry node, the first layer of encryption is removed. In this encrypted packet, the entry node will find another encrypted packet with the middle node’s address. The entry node will then forward the packet to the middle node.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Secondly: when the middle node receives the packet from the entry node, it too will remove a layer of encryption with its key, and this time finds an encrypted packet with the exit node's address. The middle node will then forward the packet to the exit node.
|
||||
|
||||
3. Lastly: when the exit node receives its packet, it will remove the last layer of encryption with its key. The exit node will see the destination address and forward the packet to that address.
|
||||
|
||||
Below is an alternative diagram showing the process. Each node removes its own layer of encryption, and when the destination server returns data, the same process happens entirely in reverse. For example, the exit node does not know who you are, but it does know which node it came from, and so it adds its own layer of encryption and sends it back.
|
||||
|
||||
<figure markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
<figcaption>Sending and receiving data through the Tor Network</figcaption>
|
||||
</figure>
|
||||
|
||||
Tor allows us to connect to a server without any single party knowing the entire path. The entry node knows who you are, but not where you are going; the middle node doesn’t know who you are or where you are going; and the exit node knows where you are going, but not who you are. Because the exit node is what makes the final connection, the destination server will never know your IP address.
|
||||
|
||||
## Caveats
|
||||
|
||||
Though Tor does provide strong privacy guarantees, one must be aware that Tor is not perfect:
|
||||
|
||||
- Well-funded adversaries with the capability to passively watch most network traffic over the globe have a chance of deanonymizing Tor users by means of advanced traffic analysis. Nor does Tor protect you from exposing yourself by mistake, such as if you share too much information about your real identity.
|
||||
- Tor exit nodes can also monitor traffic that passes through them. This means traffic which is not encrypted, such as plain HTTP traffic, can be recorded and monitored. If such traffic contains personally identifiable information, then it can deanonymize you to that exit node. Thus, we recommend using HTTPS over Tor where possible.
|
||||
|
||||
If you wish to use Tor for browsing the web, we only recommend the **official** Tor Browser—it is designed to prevent fingerprinting.
|
||||
|
||||
- [Tor Browser :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../tor.md#tor-browser)
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Resources
|
||||
|
||||
- [Tor Browser User Manual](https://tb-manual.torproject.org)
|
||||
- [How Tor Works - Computerphile](https://invidious.privacyguides.net/embed/QRYzre4bf7I?local=true) <small>(YouTube)</small>
|
||||
- [Tor Onion Services - Computerphile](https://invidious.privacyguides.net/embed/lVcbq_a5N9I?local=true) <small>(YouTube)</small>
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: The first relay in your circuit is called an "entry guard" or "guard". It is a fast and stable relay that remains the first one in your circuit for 2-3 months in order to protect against a known anonymity-breaking attack. The rest of your circuit changes with every new website you visit, and all together these relays provide the full privacy protections of Tor. For more information on how guard relays work, see this [blog post](https://blog.torproject.org/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters) and [paper](https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/single_guard.pdf) on entry guards. ([https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2/](https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2/))
|
||||
|
||||
[^2]: Relay flag: a special (dis-)qualification of relays for circuit positions (for example, "Guard", "Exit", "BadExit"), circuit properties (for example, "Fast", "Stable"), or roles (for example, "Authority", "HSDir"), as assigned by the directory authorities and further defined in the directory protocol specification. ([https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html](https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html))
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user