diff --git a/i18n/ar/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/ar/basics/common-misconceptions.md index b0066544..6832f170 100644 --- a/i18n/ar/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/ar/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis. -Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] +Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering. diff --git a/i18n/ar/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/ar/basics/common-threats.md index 7d8bf19a..7b040b0b 100644 --- a/i18n/ar/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/ar/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: Your threat model is personal to you, but these are some of the thi Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside of these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat. -- :material-incognito: Anonymity - Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. -- :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks - Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. -- :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks - Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks - A vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. -- :material-server-network: Service Providers - Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). -- :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance - Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. -- :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism - Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. -- :material-account-search: Public Exposure - Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. -- :material-close-outline: Censorship - Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. Some of these threats may be more important to you than others, depending on your specific concerns. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks and :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Similarly, many people may be primarily concerned with :material-account-search: Public Exposure of their personal data, but they should still be wary of security-focused issues, such as :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks—like malware affecting their devices. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS ha +## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks Targeted attacks against a specific person are more problematic to deal with. Common attacks include sending malicious documents via email, exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g. in browsers and operating systems), and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you should employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typi If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting so There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out: -1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code. 3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers. -These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: +These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. +1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. -5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. +5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. -## Privacy From Service Providers +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: Service Providers @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between y In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering). -On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice -Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, breaching human rights, it's most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others. +Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^2] -Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - Your IP address - Browser cookies @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: - Your browser or device fingerprint - Payment method correlation -\[This list isn't exhaustive]. - If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism > Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/ar/desktop.md b/i18n/ar/desktop.md index 13549cc2..13e2c2a0 100644 --- a/i18n/ar/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/ar/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - Free and open source. - Receives regular software and kernel updates. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Supports full-disk encryption during installation. - Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. diff --git a/i18n/ar/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/ar/os/linux-overview.md index 103c202d..69b537ed 100644 --- a/i18n/ar/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/ar/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/ar/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/ar/os/windows/index.md index 8217591b..6238bb21 100644 --- a/i18n/ar/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/ar/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Privacy Notes -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/bn-IN/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/bn-IN/basics/common-misconceptions.md index b0066544..6832f170 100644 --- a/i18n/bn-IN/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/bn-IN/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis. -Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] +Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering. diff --git a/i18n/bn-IN/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/bn-IN/basics/common-threats.md index 7d8bf19a..7b040b0b 100644 --- a/i18n/bn-IN/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/bn-IN/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: Your threat model is personal to you, but these are some of the thi Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside of these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat. -- :material-incognito: Anonymity - Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. -- :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks - Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. -- :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks - Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks - A vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. -- :material-server-network: Service Providers - Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). -- :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance - Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. -- :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism - Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. -- :material-account-search: Public Exposure - Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. -- :material-close-outline: Censorship - Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. Some of these threats may be more important to you than others, depending on your specific concerns. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks and :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Similarly, many people may be primarily concerned with :material-account-search: Public Exposure of their personal data, but they should still be wary of security-focused issues, such as :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks—like malware affecting their devices. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS ha
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks Targeted attacks against a specific person are more problematic to deal with. Common attacks include sending malicious documents via email, exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g. in browsers and operating systems), and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you should employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typi If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting so There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out: -1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code. 3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers. -These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: +These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. +1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. -5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. +5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. -## Privacy From Service Providers +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: Service Providers @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between y In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering). -On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice -Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, breaching human rights, it's most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others. +Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^2] -Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - Your IP address - Browser cookies @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: - Your browser or device fingerprint - Payment method correlation -\[This list isn't exhaustive]. - If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism > Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/bn-IN/desktop.md b/i18n/bn-IN/desktop.md index 13549cc2..13e2c2a0 100644 --- a/i18n/bn-IN/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/bn-IN/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - Free and open source. - Receives regular software and kernel updates. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Supports full-disk encryption during installation. - Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. diff --git a/i18n/bn-IN/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/bn-IN/os/linux-overview.md index 103c202d..69b537ed 100644 --- a/i18n/bn-IN/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/bn-IN/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/bn-IN/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/bn-IN/os/windows/index.md index 8217591b..6238bb21 100644 --- a/i18n/bn-IN/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/bn-IN/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Privacy Notes -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/bn/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/bn/basics/common-misconceptions.md index b0066544..6832f170 100644 --- a/i18n/bn/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/bn/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis. -Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] +Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering. diff --git a/i18n/bn/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/bn/basics/common-threats.md index 7d8bf19a..7b040b0b 100644 --- a/i18n/bn/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/bn/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: Your threat model is personal to you, but these are some of the thi Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside of these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat. -- :material-incognito: Anonymity - Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. -- :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks - Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. -- :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks - Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks - A vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. -- :material-server-network: Service Providers - Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). -- :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance - Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. -- :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism - Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. -- :material-account-search: Public Exposure - Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. -- :material-close-outline: Censorship - Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. Some of these threats may be more important to you than others, depending on your specific concerns. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks and :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Similarly, many people may be primarily concerned with :material-account-search: Public Exposure of their personal data, but they should still be wary of security-focused issues, such as :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks—like malware affecting their devices. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS ha
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks Targeted attacks against a specific person are more problematic to deal with. Common attacks include sending malicious documents via email, exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g. in browsers and operating systems), and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you should employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typi If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting so There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out: -1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code. 3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers. -These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: +These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. +1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. -5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. +5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. -## Privacy From Service Providers +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: Service Providers @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between y In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering). -On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice -Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, breaching human rights, it's most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others. +Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^2] -Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - Your IP address - Browser cookies @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: - Your browser or device fingerprint - Payment method correlation -\[This list isn't exhaustive]. - If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism > Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/bn/desktop.md b/i18n/bn/desktop.md index 13549cc2..13e2c2a0 100644 --- a/i18n/bn/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/bn/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - Free and open source. - Receives regular software and kernel updates. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Supports full-disk encryption during installation. - Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. diff --git a/i18n/bn/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/bn/os/linux-overview.md index 103c202d..69b537ed 100644 --- a/i18n/bn/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/bn/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/bn/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/bn/os/windows/index.md index 8217591b..6238bb21 100644 --- a/i18n/bn/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/bn/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Privacy Notes -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/cs/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/cs/basics/common-misconceptions.md index b0066544..6832f170 100644 --- a/i18n/cs/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/cs/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis. -Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] +Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering. diff --git a/i18n/cs/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/cs/basics/common-threats.md index 7d8bf19a..7b040b0b 100644 --- a/i18n/cs/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/cs/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: Your threat model is personal to you, but these are some of the thi Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside of these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat. -- :material-incognito: Anonymity - Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. -- :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks - Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. -- :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks - Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks - A vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. -- :material-server-network: Service Providers - Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). -- :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance - Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. -- :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism - Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. -- :material-account-search: Public Exposure - Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. -- :material-close-outline: Censorship - Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. Some of these threats may be more important to you than others, depending on your specific concerns. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks and :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Similarly, many people may be primarily concerned with :material-account-search: Public Exposure of their personal data, but they should still be wary of security-focused issues, such as :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks—like malware affecting their devices. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS ha
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks Targeted attacks against a specific person are more problematic to deal with. Common attacks include sending malicious documents via email, exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g. in browsers and operating systems), and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you should employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typi If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting so There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out: -1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code. 3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers. -These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: +These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. +1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. -5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. +5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. -## Privacy From Service Providers +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: Service Providers @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between y In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering). -On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice -Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, breaching human rights, it's most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others. +Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^2] -Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - Your IP address - Browser cookies @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: - Your browser or device fingerprint - Payment method correlation -\[This list isn't exhaustive]. - If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism > Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/cs/desktop.md b/i18n/cs/desktop.md index 13549cc2..13e2c2a0 100644 --- a/i18n/cs/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/cs/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - Free and open source. - Receives regular software and kernel updates. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Supports full-disk encryption during installation. - Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. diff --git a/i18n/cs/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/cs/os/linux-overview.md index 103c202d..69b537ed 100644 --- a/i18n/cs/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/cs/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/cs/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/cs/os/windows/index.md index 8217591b..6238bb21 100644 --- a/i18n/cs/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/cs/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Privacy Notes -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/de/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/de/basics/common-misconceptions.md index 5ab20f4f..a4ead810 100644 --- a/i18n/de/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/de/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis. -Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] +Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering. diff --git a/i18n/de/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/de/basics/common-threats.md index 8407b76c..e6751895 100644 --- a/i18n/de/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/de/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: Deine persönliche Bedrohungsanalyse kannst nur du selber durchfüh Wir ordnen unsere Empfehlungen nach [Bedrohungen](threat-modeling.md) beziehungsweise Zielen, die für die meisten Menschen gelten. ==Dich können keine, eine, einige oder alle dieser Themen betreffen==, und du solltest die von dir eingesetzten Werkzeuge und Dienste von deinen Zielen abhängig machen. Du kannst auch spezifische Bedrohungen außerhalb dieser Kategorien haben, das ist völlig in Ordnung! Wichtig ist, dass du die Vorteile und Schwächen der von dir gewählten Werkzeuge kennst, denn praktisch keines davon schützt dich vor jeder Bedrohung. -- :material-incognito: Anonymität - Trennen deiner Online-Aktivitäten von deiner realen Identität, um dich vor Personen zu schützen, die gezielt versuchen *deine* Identität aufzudecken. -- :material-target-account: Gezielte Angriffe - Schutz vor Hackern oder anderen böswilligen Akteuren, die versuchen, sich Zugang zu *deinen* Daten oder Geräten zu verschaffen. -- :material-bug-outline: Passive Angriffe - Schutz vor Malware, Datenleaks und anderen Angriffen, die sich gegen viele Menschen gleichzeitig richten. -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain-Angriffe - Eine Schwachstelle oder ein Exploit, die, bzw. der entweder direkt oder über eine Abhängigkeit aus einer weiteren Quelle in ansonsten gute Software eingeschleust wird. -- :material-server-network: Diensteanbieter - Schutz deiner Daten vor Dienstleistern (z. B. mit E2EE, welche deine Daten für den Server unlesbar macht). -- :material-eye-outline: Massenüberwachung - Schutz vor Regierungsbehörden, Organisationen, Webseiten und Diensten, die zusammenarbeiten, um deine Aktivitäten zu verfolgen. -- :material-account-cash: Überwachungskapitalismus - Schütz dich vor großen Werbenetzwerken wie Google und Facebook sowie vor einer Vielzahl anderer Datensammler. -- :material-account-search: Öffentliche Bloßstellung - Begrenzung der Informationen über dich online—für Suchmaschinen oder die allgemeine Öffentlichkeit. -- :material-close-outline: Zensur - Umgehen von beschränktem Zugang zu Informationen oder vermeiden selbst zensiert zu werden. +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. Einige dieser Bedrohungen können für dich wichtiger sein als andere, je nach deinen spezifischen Anliegen. Ein Softwareentwickler, der Zugang zu wertvollen oder kritischen Daten hat, könnte sich beispielsweise in erster Linie über :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain-Angriffe und :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks Sorgen machen. Sie werden wahrscheinlich immer noch ihre persönlichen Daten davor schützen wollen, von :material-eye-outline: Massenüberwachungsprogrammen erfasst zu werden. Ebenso sind viele Menschen vielleicht in erster Linie besorgt über die :material-account-search: Öffentliche Bloßstellung ihrer persönlichen Daten, sollten aber trotzdem auf sicherheitsrelevante Probleme achten, wie z. B. :material-bug-outline: Passive Angriffe - wie Malware, die ihre Geräte befallen. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS ha
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks Targeted attacks against a specific person are more problematic to deal with. Common attacks include sending malicious documents via email, exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g. in browsers and operating systems), and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you should employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typi If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting so There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out: -1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code. 3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers. -These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: +These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. +1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. -5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. +5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. -## Datenschutz bei Dienstanbietern +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: Diensteanbieter @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between y In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering). -On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice -Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, breaching human rights, it's most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others. +Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^2] -Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - Your IP address - Browser cookies @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: - Your browser or device fingerprint - Payment method correlation -\[This list isn't exhaustive]. - If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism > Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/de/desktop.md b/i18n/de/desktop.md index ae9fb860..d306071c 100644 --- a/i18n/de/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/de/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - Free and open source. - Receives regular software and kernel updates. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Supports full-disk encryption during installation. - Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. diff --git a/i18n/de/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/de/os/linux-overview.md index 3c4fe4e0..269b13eb 100644 --- a/i18n/de/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/de/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/de/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/de/os/windows/index.md index 8217591b..6238bb21 100644 --- a/i18n/de/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/de/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Privacy Notes -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/el/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/el/basics/common-misconceptions.md index 97c92cc2..9bfa3283 100644 --- a/i18n/el/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/el/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: Αυτοί οι μύθοι πηγάζουν από μια σειρά προκαταλήψεων, ωστόσο το αν ο πηγαίος κώδικας είναι διαθέσιμος και πως αδειοδοτείται το λογισμικό δεν επηρεάζουν εγγενώς την ασφάλειά του με οποιονδήποτε τρόπο. ==Το λογισμικό ανοικτού κώδικα έχει τη δυνατότητα ** να είναι πιο ασφαλές από το ιδιόκτητο λογισμικό, αλλά δεν υπάρχει καμία απολύτως εγγύηση ότι αυτό υφίσταται στην πράξη.== Όταν αξιολογείς λογισμικό, θα πρέπει να εξετάζεις τη φήμη και την ασφάλεια κάθε εργαλείου σε ατομική βάση. -Το λογισμικό ανοικτού κώδικα *μπορεί να ελεγχθεί από τρίτα μέρη* και είναι συχνά πιο διαφανές όσον αφορά ενδεχόμενες αδυναμίες από ότι τα αντίστοιχα ιδιόκτητα λογισμικά. Επιπροσθέτως σου επιτρέπει να ελέγξεις τον κώδικα και να απενεργοποιήσεις οποιαδήποτε ύποπτη λειτουργία ανακαλύψεις. Ωστόσο, *εκτός και αν προβείς στον παραπάνω έλεγχο*, δεν υπάρχει καμία εγγύηση, ότι ο κώδικας έχει ποτέ αξιολογηθεί, ιδίως στην περίπτωση μικρότερων έργων λογισμικού. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] +Το λογισμικό ανοικτού κώδικα *μπορεί να ελεγχθεί από τρίτα μέρη* και είναι συχνά πιο διαφανές όσον αφορά ενδεχόμενες αδυναμίες από ότι τα αντίστοιχα ιδιόκτητα λογισμικά. Επιπροσθέτως σου επιτρέπει να ελέγξεις τον κώδικα και να απενεργοποιήσεις οποιαδήποτε ύποπτη λειτουργία ανακαλύψεις. Ωστόσο, *εκτός και αν προβείς στον παραπάνω έλεγχο*, δεν υπάρχει καμία εγγύηση, ότι ο κώδικας έχει ποτέ αξιολογηθεί, ιδίως στην περίπτωση μικρότερων έργων λογισμικού. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] Από την άλλη πλευρά, το ιδιόκτητο λογισμικό είναι λιγότερο διαφανές, αλλά αυτό δε σημαίνει ότι δεν είναι ασφαλές. Σημαντικά έργα ιδιόκτητου λογισμικού μπορούν να ελεγχθούν εσωτερικά, καθώς και από οργανισμούς τρίτων μερών και ανεξάρτητοι ερευνητές ασφάλειας είναι ακόμη σε θέση να βρουν ευπάθειες με τεχνικές όπως η αντίστροφη μηχανική. diff --git a/i18n/el/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/el/basics/common-threats.md index b6eba3cb..c16c9d0e 100644 --- a/i18n/el/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/el/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: Το μοντέλο απειλής σου είναι προσωπι Γενικά, κατηγοριοποιούμε τις συστάσεις μας σε [απειλές](threat-modeling.md) ή στόχους που αφορούν τα περισσότερα άτομα. ==Ίσως νοιάζεσαι για μία ή περισσότερες (ή και καμία) από αυτές==· τα εργαλεία και οι υπηρεσίες που χρησιμοποιείς εξαρτώνται από τους στόχους σου. Μπορεί να έχεις και συγκεκριμένες απειλές εκτός αυτών των κατηγοριών, πράγμα που είναι απολύτως κατανοητό! Το σημαντικό είναι να κατανοήσεις τα πλεονεκτήματα και τα ελαττώματα των εργαλείων που επιλέγεις, μιας και κανένα από αυτά δεν θα σε προστατεύσει από κάθε απειλή. -- :material-incognito: Ανωνυμία - Θωράκιση της διαδικτυακής σου δραστηριότητας από την πραγματική σου ταυτότητα, προστατεύοντάς σε από άτομα που προσπαθούν να αποκαλύψουν συγκεκριμένα *την* ταυτότητά σου. -- :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks - Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. -- :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks - Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks - A vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. -- :material-server-network: Service Providers - Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). -- :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance - Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. -- :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism - Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. -- :material-account-search: Public Exposure - Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. -- :material-close-outline: Censorship - Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. Some of these threats may be more important to you than others, depending on your specific concerns. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks and :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Similarly, many people may be primarily concerned with :material-account-search: Public Exposure of their personal data, but they should still be wary of security-focused issues, such as :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks—like malware affecting their devices. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS ha
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks Targeted attacks against a specific person are more problematic to deal with. Common attacks include sending malicious documents via email, exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g. in browsers and operating systems), and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you should employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typi If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting so There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out: -1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code. 3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers. -These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: +These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. +1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. -5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. +5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. -## Privacy From Service Providers +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: Service Providers @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between y In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering). -On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice -Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, breaching human rights, it's most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others. +Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^2] -Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - Your IP address - Browser cookies @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: - Your browser or device fingerprint - Payment method correlation -\[This list isn't exhaustive]. - If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism > Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/el/desktop.md b/i18n/el/desktop.md index 13549cc2..13e2c2a0 100644 --- a/i18n/el/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/el/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - Free and open source. - Receives regular software and kernel updates. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Supports full-disk encryption during installation. - Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. diff --git a/i18n/el/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/el/os/linux-overview.md index 103c202d..69b537ed 100644 --- a/i18n/el/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/el/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/el/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/el/os/windows/index.md index 8217591b..6238bb21 100644 --- a/i18n/el/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/el/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Privacy Notes -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/eo/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/eo/basics/common-misconceptions.md index b0066544..6832f170 100644 --- a/i18n/eo/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/eo/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis. -Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] +Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering. diff --git a/i18n/eo/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/eo/basics/common-threats.md index 0e826333..8c79b5b0 100644 --- a/i18n/eo/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/eo/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: Via modelo de minaco estas propra, sed ĉi tiuj estas iuj el la afe Ĝenerale, ni kategoriigas niajn rekomendojn en [minacoj](threat-modeling.md) aŭ celoj pri kiuj la plej multaj homoj zorgas. ==Eble vi zorgus pri neniu, unu, kelkaj, aŭ ĉiuj el tiuj ebloj==, kaj la ilojn kaj servojn vi uzus, dependas de kiaj viaj celoj estas. Eble vi ankaŭ havas specifajn minacojn ekster ĉi tiuj kategorioj, kiu tute bonas! La plej grava parto estas evoluigi komprenon de la avantaĝoj kaj mankoj de la iloj kiujn vi elektas uzi, ĉar preskaŭ neniuj el ili protektos vin kontraŭ ĉiuj minacoj. -- :material-incognito: Anonimeco - Protekti vian enretan agadon kontraŭ via reala idento, protektante vin kontraŭ homoj kiuj celas trovi *vian* identon, specife. -- :material-target-account: Laŭcelaj Atakoj - Esti protektita kontraŭ retentruduloj aŭ aliaj malbonintencaj agantoj kiuj celas eniri al *viaj* datumoj aŭ aparatoj, specife. -- :material-bug-outline: Malaktivaj Atakoj - Esti protektita kontraŭ aferoj kiel malicaj programoj, datumaj breĉoj, kaj aliaj atakoj kiuj okazas kontraŭ multaj homoj samtempe. -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks - A vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. -- :material-server-network: Provizantoj de Servoj - Protekti vian datumon kontraŭ provizantoj de servoj (ekz. per E2EE, kiu faras vian datumon nelegebla por la servilo). -- :material-eye-outline: Amasgvatado - Protekto kontraŭ registaraj agentejoj, organizoj, retejoj, kaj servicoj kiuj kunlaboras por supri vian agadon. -- :material-account-cash: Gvatkapitalismo - Protekti vin kontraŭ grandaj reklam-servoj, kiaj Google kaj Facebook, kaj kontraŭ tuta gamo da triaj datum-kolektantoj. -- :material-account-search: Publika Ekspozicio - Limigi la informon pri vi, kiuj estas alireblaj interrete per serĉiloj aŭ de la popolo. -- :material-close-outline: Cenzuro - Eviti cenzuritan aliron al informo aŭ esti cenzurita kiam vi esprimas vin interrete. +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. Kelkaj el tiuj minacoj eble estas plej gravaj por vi ol aliaj, depende de viaj specifaj zorgoj. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks and :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Simile, multaj homoj eble ĉefe zorgas pri la :material-account-search: Publika Ekspozicio de siaj personaj datumoj, sed oni ankaŭ zorgus pri aferoj de sekureco, kiel :material-bug-outline: Malaktivaj Atakoj—kiel malicaj programoj infektantaj de siaj aparatoj. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS ha
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks Targeted attacks against a specific person are more problematic to deal with. Common attacks include sending malicious documents via email, exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g. in browsers and operating systems), and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you should employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typi If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting so There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out: -1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code. 3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers. -These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: +These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. +1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. -5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. +5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. -## Privateco Kontraŭ Servaj Provizantoj +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: Provizantoj de Servoj @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between y In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering). -On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice -Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, breaching human rights, it's most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others. +Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^2] -Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - Your IP address - Browser cookies @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: - Your browser or device fingerprint - Payment method correlation -\[This list isn't exhaustive]. - If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism > Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/eo/desktop.md b/i18n/eo/desktop.md index 13549cc2..13e2c2a0 100644 --- a/i18n/eo/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/eo/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - Free and open source. - Receives regular software and kernel updates. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Supports full-disk encryption during installation. - Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. diff --git a/i18n/eo/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/eo/os/linux-overview.md index 103c202d..69b537ed 100644 --- a/i18n/eo/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/eo/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/eo/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/eo/os/windows/index.md index 8217591b..6238bb21 100644 --- a/i18n/eo/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/eo/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Privacy Notes -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/es/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/es/basics/common-misconceptions.md index 30c4a946..895fc5fb 100644 --- a/i18n/es/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/es/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: Estos mitos provienen de varios prejuicios, pero el hecho de que el código fuente esté disponible y la forma en que se licencie el software no afecta intrínsecamente a su seguridad de ninguna manera. ==El software de código abierto tiene el *potencial* de ser más seguro que el software propietario, pero no hay ninguna garantía de que sea así.== Cuando evalúes el software, debes examinar la reputación y la seguridad de cada herramienta de forma individual. -El software de código abierto *puede* ser auditado por terceros, y a menudo es más transparente sobre las vulnerabilidades potenciales que sus contrapartes propietarias. También te permite revisar el código y desactivar cualquier funcionalidad sospechosa que encuentres. Sin embargo, *a menos que lo hagas*, no hay garantía de que el código haya sido evaluado alguna vez, especialmente en los proyectos de software más pequeños. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] +El software de código abierto *puede* ser auditado por terceros, y a menudo es más transparente sobre las vulnerabilidades potenciales que sus contrapartes propietarias. También te permite revisar el código y desactivar cualquier funcionalidad sospechosa que encuentres. Sin embargo, *a menos que lo hagas*, no hay garantía de que el código haya sido evaluado alguna vez, especialmente en los proyectos de software más pequeños. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] Por otro lado, el software propietario es menos transparente, pero eso no implica que no sea seguro. Los grandes proyectos de software propietario pueden ser auditados internamente y por agencias de terceros, y los investigadores de seguridad independientes pueden seguir encontrando vulnerabilidades con técnicas como la ingeniería inversa. diff --git a/i18n/es/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/es/basics/common-threats.md index 2a102a3c..29ab831f 100644 --- a/i18n/es/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/es/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: Tu modelo de amenaza es personal, pero éstas son algunas de las co En términos generales, clasificamos nuestras recomendaciones en las [amenazas](threat-modeling.md) u objetivos que se aplican a la mayoría de las personas. ==Puede que no te preocupe ninguna, una, varias o todas estas posibilidades==, y las herramientas y servicios que utilices dependerán de cuáles sean tus objetivos. Es posible que también tengas amenazas específicas fuera de estas categorías, ¡lo cual está perfectamente bien! Lo importante es desarrollar una comprensión de los beneficios y las deficiencias de las herramientas que elijas utilizar, porque prácticamente ninguna de ellas te protegerá de todas las amenazas. -- :material-incognito: Anonimato - Proteger tu actividad en línea de tu identidad real, protegiendote de las personas que están tratando de descubrir *tu* identidad específicamente. -- :material-target-account: Ataques dirigidos - Estar protegido de los hackers u otros actores maliciosos que están tratando de acceder a *tus* datos o dispositivos específicamente. -- :material-bug-outline: Ataques pasivos - Estar protegido de cosas como el malware, las filtraciones de datos y otros ataques que se realizan contra muchas personas a la vez. -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Ataques a la cadena de suministros - Una vulnerabilidad introducida en un buen software, ya sea directamente o a través de una dependencia de un tercero. -- :material-server-network: Proveedores de servicios - Proteger tus datos de los proveedores de servicios (por ejemplo, con E2EE, que hace que tus datos sean ilegibles para el servidor). -- :material-eye-outline: Vigilancia masiva - Protección contra las agencias gubernamentales, organizaciones, sitios web y servicios que trabajan juntos para rastrear tus actividades. -- :material-account-cash: Capitalismo de la vigilancia - Protegerse de las grandes redes de publicidad, como Google y Facebook, así como de una miríada de otros recolectores de datos de terceros. -- :material-account-search: Exposición pública - Limitar la información sobre ti que es accesible en línea, para los motores de búsqueda o el público en general. -- :material-close-outline: Censura - Evitar el acceso censurado a la información o ser censurado uno mismo al hablar en línea. +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. Algunas de estas amenazas pueden ser más importantes para ti que otras, dependiendo de tus preocupaciones específicas. Por ejemplo, un desarrollador de software con acceso a información importante o crítica podría estar preocupado por los :material-package-variant-closed-remove: ataques a la cadena de suministros y los :material-target-account: ataques dirigidos. Es probable que ellos quieran protejer sus datos personales de ser barridos en programas de :material-eye-outline:Espionaje Masivo. Del mismo modo, muchas personas pueden estar preocupadas principalmente por la :material-account-search: Exposición pública de sus datos personales, pero aún así deben tener cuidado con los problemas centrados en la seguridad, como los :material-bug-outline: Ataques pasivos-como el malware que afecta a sus dispositivos. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ Los sistemas operativos de escritorio generalmente se retrasan en el aislamiento
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: Ataques dirigidos Los ataques dirigidos contra una persona concreta son más problemáticos de tratar. Los ataques más comunes son el envío de documentos maliciosos por correo electrónico, la explotación de vulnerabilidades (por ejemplo, en los navegadores y sistemas operativos) y los ataques físicos. Si esto te preocupa, deberías emplear estrategias de mitigación de amenazas más avanzadas. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ Por su diseño, los **navegadores web**, los **clientes de correo electrónico** Si te preocupan los **ataques físicos** deberías utilizar un sistema operativo con una implementación de arranque seguro verificado, como Android, iOS, macOS o [Windows (con TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). También deberías asegurarte de que tu disco esté encriptado y de que el sistema operativo utiliza un TPM o Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) o [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) para limitar los intentos de introducir la frase de contraseña de encriptación. Deberías evitar compartir tu ordenador con personas que no sean de tu confianza, ya que la mayoría de los sistemas operativos de escritorio no cifran los datos por separado para cada usuario. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Ataques a la cadena de suministro Los ataques dirigidos a la cadena de suministro suelen ser una forma de :material-target-account:ataques dirigidos a negocios, gobiernos y activistas, aunque también pueden terminar comprometiendo al público. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ Un ejemplo importante de esto sucedió en 2017 cuando M.E.Doc, un software de co Hay algunas maneras de realizar este ataque: -1. Un colaborador o empleado puede obtener una posición de poder dentro de un proyecto u organización, para luego abusar de dicha posición y agregar código malicioso. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. Un desarrollador puede ser coaccionado por un tercero para agregar código malicioso. 3. Un individuo o grupo podría identificar una dependencia en software de terceros (también conocida como librería) y trabajar para infiltrarse con los dos métodos anteriores, conociendo que serán utilizadas por otros desarrolladores de software. -Estos tipos de ataques pueden requerir mucho tiempo y preparación para ser realizados y son riesgosos porque pueden ser detectados, especialmente en proyectos de código abierto si estos son populares y tienen interés externo. Desafortunadamente, estos también son uno de los más peligrosos, porque son muy difíciles de mitigar en su totalidad. Recomendamos a los lectores utilizar únicamente programas que poseen una buena reputación y se esfuerzan por reducir los riesgos: +Estos tipos de ataques pueden requerir mucho tiempo y preparación para ser realizados y son riesgosos porque pueden ser detectados, especialmente en proyectos de código abierto si estos son populares y tienen interés externo. Desafortunadamente, estos también son uno de los más peligrosos, porque son muy difíciles de mitigar en su totalidad. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Adoptar únicamente programas populares que han estado disponibles durante un tiempo. Entre mayor es el interés por un proyecto, mayor será la probabilidad de que terceros noten cambios maliciosos. Un actor malicioso también necesitará más tiempo para obtener la confianza de la comunidad con aportes significativos. +1. Adoptar únicamente programas populares que han estado disponibles durante un tiempo. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. Un actor malicioso también necesitará más tiempo para obtener la confianza de la comunidad con aportes significativos. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Algunos sistemas como GitHub Actions te permiten inspeccionar el script de construcción que se ejecuta públicamente para mayor confianza. Esto reduce la probabilidad de que un malware en la computadora del desarrollador pueda infectar sus paquetes y proporciona la confianza de que los binarios son producidos correctamente. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. Por ejemplo: ¿el código malicioso se encontraba en el repositorio del programa? ¿Cuál desarrollador lo agregó? ¿Se agregó durante el proceso de compilación? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Los mensajes limpios pueden facilitar a las personas ajenas al proyecto la verificación, la auditoría y la búsqueda de errores. -5. Anotar la cantidad de colaboradores o mantenedores en un programa. Un desarrollador solitario puede ser más susceptible de ser coaccionado para agregar código malicioso por una tercera parte, o permitir de manera negligente un comportamiento no deseado. Esto puede significar que los programas desarrollados por las "grandes tecnológicas" tienen un escrutinio mayor al de un desarrollador solitario que no responde ante nadie. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Los mensajes limpios pueden facilitar a las personas ajenas al proyecto la verificación, la auditoría y la búsqueda de errores. +5. Anotar la cantidad de colaboradores o mantenedores en un programa. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. Esto puede significar que los programas desarrollados por las "grandes tecnológicas" tienen un escrutinio mayor al de un desarrollador solitario que no responde ante nadie. -## Privacidad de los proveedores de servicios +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: Proveedores de servicios @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ Afortunadamente, E2EE puede aliviar este problema encriptando las comunicaciones En la práctica, la eficacia de las diferentes implementaciones de E2EE varía. Las aplicaciones, como [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), se ejecutan de forma nativa en tu dispositivo, y cada copia de la aplicación es la misma en diferentes instalaciones. Si el proveedor de servicios introdujera un [backdoor](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Puerta_trasera) en su aplicación -en un intento de robar tus claves privadas- podría ser detectado posteriormente con [ingeniería inversa](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ingenier%C3%Ada_inversa). -Por otro lado, las implementaciones E2EE basadas en la web, como el webmail de Proton Mail o *Web Vault* de Bitwarden, dependen de que el servidor sirva dinámicamente código JavaScript al navegador para manejar la criptografía. Un servidor malicioso puede dirigirse a ti y enviarte un código JavaScript malicioso para robar tu clave de cifrado (y sería extremadamente difícil de notar). Dado que el servidor puede elegir servir diferentes clientes de la web a diferentes personas -incluso si te diste cuenta del ataque- sería increíblemente difícil probar la culpabilidad del proveedor. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. Un servidor malicioso puede dirigirse a ti y enviarte un código JavaScript malicioso para robar tu clave de cifrado (y sería extremadamente difícil de notar). Dado que el servidor puede elegir servir diferentes clientes de la web a diferentes personas -incluso si te diste cuenta del ataque- sería increíblemente difícil probar la culpabilidad del proveedor. Por lo tanto, siempre que sea posible, hay que utilizar aplicaciones nativas en lugar de clientes web. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ En Francia puedes consultar el [sitio web de Technopolice](https://technopolice. -Los gobiernos suelen justificar los programas de vigilancia masiva como medios necesarios para combatir el terrorismo y prevenir la delincuencia. Sin embargo, al vulnerar los derechos humanos, se utiliza con mayor frecuencia para atacar desproporcionadamente a grupos minoritarios y disidentes políticos, entre otros. +Los gobiernos suelen justificar los programas de vigilancia masiva como medios necesarios para combatir el terrorismo y prevenir la delincuencia. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: La lección del 11-S sobre la privacidad: La Vigilancia Masiva No es el Camino a Seguir

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ Ante las revelaciones de Edward Snowden sobre programas del gobierno como [PRISM A pesar de la creciente vigilancia masiva en Estados Unidos, el gobierno ha descubierto que los programas de vigilancia masiva como Section 215 han tenido "poco valor único" con respecto a la detención de delitos reales o complots terroristas, con esfuerzos que duplican en gran medida los propios programas de vigilancia selectiva del FBI.[^2] -En línea, puedes ser rastreado a través de varios métodos: +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - Tu dirección IP - Cookies del navegador @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ En línea, puedes ser rastreado a través de varios métodos: - La huella digital de tu navegador o dispositivo - Correlación del método de pago -\[Esta lista no es exhaustiva]. - Si estás preocupado sobre los programas de vigilancia masiva, puedes usar estrategias como la compartamentalización de tus identidades en línea, mezclarte con otros usuarios o, cuando sea posible, evitar brindar información que te identifique. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: Capitalismo de Vigilancia > El capitalismo de vigilancia es un sistema económico centrado en la captura y mercantilización de datos personales con el propósito principal de obtener ganancias.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/es/desktop.md b/i18n/es/desktop.md index 726fa2d6..079fc427 100644 --- a/i18n/es/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/es/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ La elección de una distribución Linux adecuada para ti dependerá de una gran - Gratis y de código abierto. - Recibe actualizaciones periódicas del software y del kernel. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Admite el cifrado de disco completo durante la instalación. - No congela las publicaciones periódicas durante más de 1 año. diff --git a/i18n/es/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/es/os/linux-overview.md index ee17e19c..573c95cd 100644 --- a/i18n/es/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/es/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch y las distribuciones basadas en Arch no son recomendables para quienes se i For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Cualquiera que utilice el [Repositorio de Usuario de Arch (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **debe** sentirse cómodo auditando los PKGBUILDs que descargue de ese servicio. Los paquetes AUR son contenidos producidos por la comunidad y no se examinan de ninguna manera, por lo que son vulnerables a los ataques a la cadena de suministro de software, como de hecho ha sucedido en [en el pasado](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Cualquiera que utilice el [Repositorio de Usuario de Arch (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **debe** sentirse cómodo auditando los PKGBUILDs que descargue de ese servicio. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). El AUR debe utilizarse siempre con moderación, y a menudo hay muchos malos consejos en diversas páginas que dirigen a la gente a utilizar ciegamente [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) sin suficiente advertencia. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/es/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/es/os/windows/index.md index 2a62c2db..799d247f 100644 --- a/i18n/es/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/es/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Notas de Privacidad -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/fa/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/fa/basics/common-misconceptions.md index b0066544..6832f170 100644 --- a/i18n/fa/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/fa/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis. -Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] +Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering. diff --git a/i18n/fa/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/fa/basics/common-threats.md index 7d8bf19a..7b040b0b 100644 --- a/i18n/fa/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/fa/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: Your threat model is personal to you, but these are some of the thi Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside of these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat. -- :material-incognito: Anonymity - Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. -- :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks - Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. -- :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks - Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks - A vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. -- :material-server-network: Service Providers - Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). -- :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance - Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. -- :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism - Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. -- :material-account-search: Public Exposure - Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. -- :material-close-outline: Censorship - Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. Some of these threats may be more important to you than others, depending on your specific concerns. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks and :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Similarly, many people may be primarily concerned with :material-account-search: Public Exposure of their personal data, but they should still be wary of security-focused issues, such as :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks—like malware affecting their devices. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS ha
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks Targeted attacks against a specific person are more problematic to deal with. Common attacks include sending malicious documents via email, exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g. in browsers and operating systems), and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you should employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typi If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting so There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out: -1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code. 3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers. -These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: +These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. +1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. -5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. +5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. -## Privacy From Service Providers +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: Service Providers @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between y In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering). -On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice -Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, breaching human rights, it's most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others. +Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^2] -Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - Your IP address - Browser cookies @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: - Your browser or device fingerprint - Payment method correlation -\[This list isn't exhaustive]. - If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism > Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/fa/desktop.md b/i18n/fa/desktop.md index 13549cc2..13e2c2a0 100644 --- a/i18n/fa/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/fa/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - Free and open source. - Receives regular software and kernel updates. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Supports full-disk encryption during installation. - Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. diff --git a/i18n/fa/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/fa/os/linux-overview.md index db704373..da9af28b 100644 --- a/i18n/fa/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/fa/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/fa/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/fa/os/windows/index.md index 8217591b..6238bb21 100644 --- a/i18n/fa/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/fa/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Privacy Notes -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/fr/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/fr/basics/common-misconceptions.md index fbf45fba..7db9075a 100644 --- a/i18n/fr/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/fr/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: Ces mythes découlent d'un certain nombre de préjugés, mais le fait que le code source soit disponible ou non et la manière dont les logiciels sont concédés sous licence n'affectent en rien leur sécurité. ==Les logiciels open-source ont le *potentiel* d'être plus sécurisé que les logiciels propriétaires, mais il n'y a absolument aucune garantie que ce soit le cas.== Lorsque vous évaluez un logiciel, vous devez examiner la réputation et la sécurité de chaque outil individuellement. -Les logiciels libres *peuvent* être audités par des tiers et sont souvent plus transparents sur les vulnérabilités potentielles que leurs homologues propriétaires. Ils vous permettent également d'examiner le code et de désactiver vous-même toute fonctionnalité suspecte. Cependant, *à moins que vous ne le fassiez*, il n'y a aucune garantie que le code ait jamais été évalué, en particulier pour les petits projets. Le processus de développement ouvert a aussi parfois été exploité pour introduire de nouvelles vulnérabilités connues sous le nom d' attaques de la chaîne d'approvisionnement (:material-package-variant-closed-remove: ), qui sont examinées plus en détail dans notre page sur les [menaces communes](common-threats.md).[^1] +Les logiciels libres *peuvent* être audités par des tiers et sont souvent plus transparents sur les vulnérabilités potentielles que leurs homologues propriétaires. Ils vous permettent également d'examiner le code et de désactiver vous-même toute fonctionnalité suspecte. Cependant, *à moins que vous ne le fassiez*, il n'y a aucune garantie que le code ait jamais été évalué, en particulier pour les petits projets. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] Par ailleurs, les logiciels propriétaires sont moins transparents, mais cela ne signifie pas qu'ils ne sont pas sécurisés. Des projets logiciels propriétaires majeurs peuvent être audités en interne et par des agences tierces, et des chercheurs indépendants en sécurité peuvent toujours trouver des vulnérabilités avec des techniques telles que la rétro-ingénierie. diff --git a/i18n/fr/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/fr/basics/common-threats.md index 3baac013..fe9c1ee0 100644 --- a/i18n/fr/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/fr/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: Votre modèle de menace vous est personnel, mais ce sont là quelqu Pour faire simple, nous classons nos recommandations dans ces catégories générales de [menaces](threat-modeling.md) ou d'objectifs qui s'appliquent à la plupart des gens. ==Vous pouvez vous sentir concerné par une, plusieurs, toutes, ou bien aucune de ces possibilités==. Les outils et les services que vous utilisez dépendent également de vos objectifs. Il est possible que vous ayez des menaces spécifiques ne rentrant dans aucune de ces catégories, ce qui est tout à fait normal ! L'important est de bien comprendre les avantages et les inconvénients des outils que vous choisissez d'utiliser, car pratiquement aucun d'entre eux ne vous protégera contre toutes les menaces possibles. -- :material-incognito: Anonymat - Séparer votre activité en ligne de votre identité réelle, vous vous protégez des personnes qui tentent de découvrir explicitement *votre* identité -- :material-target-account: Attaques Ciblées - Se protéger contre les pirates informatiques dévoués ou d'autres agents malintentionnés essayant d'accéder spécifiquement à *vos* données ou appareils -- :material-bug-outline: Attaques Passives - Se protéger des logiciels malveillants, des fuites de données, et autres attaques qui sont faites contre des groupes de personnes -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Attaques de la chaîne d'approvisionnement - Une vulnérabilité ou un exploit introduit dans un logiciel par ailleurs bon, soit directement, soit par l'intermédiaire d'une dépendance d'un tiers. -- :material-server-network: Fournisseurs de Services - Protéger vos données des fournisseurs de services, en utilisant par exemple un chiffrement de bout en bout rendant vos données illisibles par le serveur -- :material-eye-outline: Surveillance de Masse - Protection contre les agences gouvernementales, organisations, sites web et services qui collaborent pour suivre vos activités en ligne -- :material-account-cash: Capitalisme de Surveillance - Se protéger des grands réseaux publicitaires comme Google et Facebook, ainsi que d'une myriade d'autres collecteurs de données tiers -- :material-account-search: Exposition Publique - Limiter les informations en ligne vous concernant, accessibles par les moteurs de recherche ou par le grand public -- :material-close-outline: Censure - Éviter les accès censurés à l'information et d'être soi-même censuré lorsqu'on discute en ligne +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. Certaines de ces menaces peuvent peser plus que d'autres en fonction de vos préoccupations. Par exemple, un développeur de logiciels ayant accès à des données précieuses ou critiques peut être principalement concerné par les :material-package-variant-closed-remove: attaques de la chaîne d'approvisionnement et les :material-target-account: attaques ciblées. Il voudra probablement tout de même protéger ses données personnelles pour éviter qu'elles ne soient englobées dans des programmes de :material-eye-outline: surveillance de masse. De même, une « personne lambda » peut être principalement concernée par l':material-account-search: Exposition Publique de ses données personnelles, mais devrait tout de même se méfier des problèmes de sécurité tels que les :material-bug-outline: Attaques Passives comme les logiciels malveillants affectant ses appareils. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ Les systèmes d'exploitation de bureau sont généralement à la traîne en ce q
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: Attaques ciblées Les attaques ciblées contre une personne spécifique sont plus difficiles à gérer. Les voies d'attaque les plus courantes sont l'envoi de documents malveillants par courrier électronique, l'exploitation de vulnérabilités dans le navigateur et les systèmes d'exploitation, et les attaques physiques. Si cela vous préoccupe, il vous sera nécessaire de recourir à des stratégies plus avancées d'atténuation des menaces. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ Les attaques ciblées contre une personne spécifique sont plus difficiles à g Si vous êtes préoccupé par les **attaques physiques**, vous devriez utiliser un système d'exploitation doté d'une implémentation sécurisée de démarrage vérifié, comme Android, iOS, macOS ou [Windows (avec TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). Vous devriez également vous assurer que votre disque est chiffré et que le système d'exploitation utilise un TPM, une [Enclave sécurisée](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) ou un [Element sécurisé](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) pour limiter le taux de tentatives de saisie de la phrase de passe. Vous devriez éviter de partager votre ordinateur avec des personnes en qui vous n'avez pas confiance, car la plupart des systèmes d'exploitation de bureau ne chiffrent pas les données séparément par utilisateur. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Attaques de la chaîne d'approvisionnement Les attaques de la chaîne d'approvisionnement sont souvent une forme d':material-target-account: attaque ciblée visant les entreprises, les gouvernements et les activistes, bien qu'elles puissent également compromettre le grand public. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ Un exemple notable s'est produit en 2017 lorsque M.E.Doc, un logiciel de comptab Ce type d'attaque peut être mené de plusieurs manières : -1. Un collaborateur ou un employé peut se frayer un chemin jusqu'à une position de pouvoir au sein d'un projet ou d'une organisation, puis abuser de cette position en ajoutant un code malveillant. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. Un développeur peut être contraint par un tiers d'ajouter un code malveillant. 3. Un individu ou un groupe peut identifier une dépendance logicielle tierce (également connue sous le nom de bibliothèque) et s'efforcer de l'infiltrer à l'aide des deux méthodes susmentionnées, en sachant qu'elle sera utilisée par les développeurs de logiciels "en aval". -Ces types d'attaques peuvent nécessiter beaucoup de temps et de préparation et sont risquées car elles peuvent être détectées, en particulier dans les projets open source s'ils sont populaires et s'ils suscitent un intérêt extérieur. Malheureusement, ce sont aussi parmi les plus dangereuses, car il est très difficile de les atténuer complètement. Nous encourageons les lecteurs à n'utiliser que des logiciels qui ont une bonne réputation et qui s'efforcent de réduire les risques en : +Ces types d'attaques peuvent nécessiter beaucoup de temps et de préparation et sont risquées car elles peuvent être détectées, en particulier dans les projets open source s'ils sont populaires et s'ils suscitent un intérêt extérieur. Malheureusement, ce sont aussi parmi les plus dangereuses, car il est très difficile de les atténuer complètement. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. N'adoptant que des logiciels populaires qui existent depuis un certain temps. Plus l'intérêt pour un projet est grand, plus il y a de chances que des parties externes remarquent les changements malveillants. Un acteur malveillant devra également consacrer plus de temps à gagner la confiance de la communauté par des contributions significatives. +1. N'adoptant que des logiciels populaires qui existent depuis un certain temps. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. Un acteur malveillant devra également consacrer plus de temps à gagner la confiance de la communauté par des contributions significatives. 2. Trouvant des logiciels qui publient des binaires avec des plates-formes d'infrastructure de construction fiables et largement utilisées, par opposition aux stations de travail des développeurs ou aux serveurs auto-hébergés. Certains systèmes comme GitHub Actions vous permettent d'inspecter le script de construction qui s'exécute publiquement pour plus de confiance. Cela réduit la probabilité qu'un logiciel malveillant présent sur la machine d'un développeur puisse infecter ses paquets, et permet de s'assurer que les binaires produits sont bien produits correctement. 3. Recherchant la signature de code sur les commits individuels et les versions du code source, ce qui crée une trace vérifiable de qui a fait quoi. Par exemple : le code malveillant se trouvait-il dans le dépôt du logiciel ? Quel développeur l'a ajouté ? A-t-il été ajouté au cours du processus de construction ? -4. Vérifiant si le code source comporte des messages de commit significatifs (tels que les [commits conventionnels](https://conventionalcommits.org)) qui expliquent ce que la modification est censée accomplir. Des messages clairs peuvent faciliter la vérification, l'audit et la détection des bugs pour les personnes extérieures au projet. -5. Notant le nombre de contributeurs ou de mainteneurs d'un programme. Un développeur isolé peut être plus susceptible d'être contraint d'ajouter un code malveillant par un tier, ou d'activer par négligence un comportement indésirable. Cela pourrait bien signifier que les logiciels développés par les "Géants du Web" font l'objet d'un examen plus approfondi que ceux d'un développeur isolé qui n'a de comptes à rendre à personne. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Des messages clairs peuvent faciliter la vérification, l'audit et la détection des bugs pour les personnes extérieures au projet. +5. Notant le nombre de contributeurs ou de mainteneurs d'un programme. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. Cela pourrait bien signifier que les logiciels développés par les "Géants du Web" font l'objet d'un examen plus approfondi que ceux d'un développeur isolé qui n'a de comptes à rendre à personne. -## Protection de ses données des fournisseurs de services +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: Fournisseurs de service @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ Heureusement, le chiffrement de bout en bout peut atténuer ce problème en rend Dans la pratique, l'efficacité des différentes mises en œuvre du chiffrement de bout en bout varie. Des applications telles que [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal) s'exécutent nativement sur votre appareil, et chaque copie de l'application est la même sur différentes installations. Si le fournisseur de services venait à ouvrir une porte dérobée dans son application pour tenter de voler vos clés privées, cela pourrait être détecté ultérieurement par rétro-ingénierie. -D'autre part, les implémentations de chiffrement de bout en bout basées sur le web, telles que l'application web de Proton Mail ou le coffre-fort web de Bitwarden, reposent sur le serveur qui sert dynamiquement du code JavaScript au navigateur pour gérer les opérations cryptographiques. Un serveur malveillant pourrait cibler une personne spécifique et lui envoyer un code JavaScript malveillant pour voler sa clé de chiffrement, et il serait extrêmement difficile pour l'utilisateur de s'en rendre compte. Même si cette personne s'aperçoit de la tentative de vol de sa clé, il serait incroyablement difficile de prouver que c'est le fournisseur qui tente de le faire, car le serveur peut choisir de servir différents clients web à différentes personnes. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. Un serveur malveillant pourrait cibler une personne spécifique et lui envoyer un code JavaScript malveillant pour voler sa clé de chiffrement, et il serait extrêmement difficile pour l'utilisateur de s'en rendre compte. Même si cette personne s'aperçoit de la tentative de vol de sa clé, il serait incroyablement difficile de prouver que c'est le fournisseur qui tente de le faire, car le serveur peut choisir de servir différents clients web à différentes personnes. Par conséquent, lorsque vous comptez sur le chiffrement de bout en bout, vous devriez choisir d'utiliser des applications natives plutôt que des clients web, dans la mesure du possible. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ En France, vous pouvez consulter le [site Technolopolice](https://technopolice.f -Les gouvernements justifient souvent les programmes de surveillance de masse comme des moyens nécessaires pour combattre le terrorisme et prévenir la criminalité. Cependant, en violation des droits de l'homme, ces programmes de surveillance sont, entre autres, le plus souvent utilisés pour cibler de manière disproportionnée les minorités et les dissidents politiques. +Les gouvernements justifient souvent les programmes de surveillance de masse comme des moyens nécessaires pour combattre le terrorisme et prévenir la criminalité. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ Face aux révélations d'Edward Snowden sur des programmes gouvernementaux tels Malgré la surveillance de masse croissante aux États-Unis, le gouvernement a constaté que les programmes de surveillance de masse comme la section 215 ont eu "peu de valeur unique" en ce qui concerne l'arrêt de crimes réels ou de complots terroristes, les efforts faisant largement double emploi avec les programmes de surveillance ciblée du FBI.[^2] -Vous pouvez être pisté de plusieurs manières en ligne : +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - Votre adresse IP - Les cookies de votre navigateur @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ Vous pouvez être pisté de plusieurs manières en ligne : - L'empreinte numérique de votre navigateur ou de votre appareil - La corrélation des modes de paiement -\[Cette liste n'est pas exhaustive]. - Si vous êtes préoccupé par les programmes de surveillance de masse, vous pouvez utiliser des stratégies comme cloisonner vos identités virtuelles, vous fondre dans la masse des utilisateurs, ou, dans la mesure du possible, simplement éviter de renseigner des informations qui pourraient permettre de vous identifier. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: Capitalisme de surveillance > Le capitalisme de surveillance est un système économique centré sur la collecte et la marchandisation des données personnelles dont le principal but est de faire du profit.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/fr/desktop.md b/i18n/fr/desktop.md index d6f00548..9aefbed8 100644 --- a/i18n/fr/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/fr/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Le choix d'une distribution Linux qui vous convient dépend d'une grande variét - Gratuites et open source. - Reçoivent régulièrement des mises à jour des logiciels et du noyau. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Prennent en charge le chiffrement complet du disque pendant l'installation. - Ne gêlent pas les mises à jour régulières pendant plus d'un an. diff --git a/i18n/fr/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/fr/os/linux-overview.md index 66056f69..903a58f5 100644 --- a/i18n/fr/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/fr/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch et les distributions basées sur Arch ne sont pas recommandées pour ceux q For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Toute personne utilisant le [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **doit** être à l'aise avec l'audit des PKGBUILDs qu'elle télécharge depuis ce service. Les paquets AUR sont des contenus produits par la communauté et ne font l'objet d'aucune vérification. Ils sont donc vulnérables aux attaques de la chaîne d'approvisionnement des logiciels, ce qui s'est d'ailleurs produit [dans le passé](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Toute personne utilisant le [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **doit** être à l'aise avec l'audit des PKGBUILDs qu'elle télécharge depuis ce service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). Le AUR doit toujours être utilisé avec parcimonie, et l'on trouve souvent de nombreux mauvais conseils sur diverses pages qui incitent les gens à utiliser aveuglément [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) sans avertissement suffisant. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/fr/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/fr/os/windows/index.md index 161190a6..b66d6d05 100644 --- a/i18n/fr/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/fr/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Remarques concernant la vie privée -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/he/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/he/basics/common-misconceptions.md index 703b1859..38deef10 100644 --- a/i18n/he/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/he/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: מיתוסים אלו נובעים ממספר דעות קדומות, אך האם קוד המקור זמין ואופן רישיון התוכנה אינו משפיע מטבעו על אבטחתה בשום צורה. == לתוכנת קוד פתוח יש את ה*פוטנציאל* להיות מאובטח יותר מתוכנה קניינית, אבל אין שום ערובה שזה המצב.== כאשר אתה מעריך תוכנה, עליך להסתכל על המוניטין והאבטחה של כל כלי על בסיס אישי. -תוכנת קוד פתוח *ניתנת* לביקורת על ידי צדדים שלישיים, ולעתים קרובות היא שקופה יותר לגבי נקודות תורפה אפשריות מאשר עמיתים קנייניים. זה גם מאפשר לך לסקור את הקוד ולהשבית כל פונקציונליות חשודה שתמצא בעצמך. עם זאת, *אלא אם כן תעשה זאת*, אין ערובה שהקוד הוערך אי פעם, במיוחד עם פרויקטי תוכנה קטנים יותר. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] +תוכנת קוד פתוח *ניתנת* לביקורת על ידי צדדים שלישיים, ולעתים קרובות היא שקופה יותר לגבי נקודות תורפה אפשריות מאשר עמיתים קנייניים. זה גם מאפשר לך לסקור את הקוד ולהשבית כל פונקציונליות חשודה שתמצא בעצמך. עם זאת, *אלא אם כן תעשה זאת*, אין ערובה שהקוד הוערך אי פעם, במיוחד עם פרויקטי תוכנה קטנים יותר. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] בצד השני, תוכנה קניינית פחות שקופה, אבל זה לא מרמז על כך שהיא לא מאובטחת. פרויקטי תוכנה קנייניים גדולים ניתנים לביקורת פנימית ועל ידי סוכנויות צד שלישי, וחוקרי אבטחה בלתי תלויים עדיין יכולים למצוא נקודות תורפה עם טכניקות כמו הנדסה לאחור. diff --git a/i18n/he/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/he/basics/common-threats.md index f629d62d..81da070e 100644 --- a/i18n/he/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/he/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: מודל האיום שלך הוא אישי עבורך, אך אלו באופן כללי, אנו מסווגים את ההמלצות שלנו ל[איומים](threat-modeling.md) או יעדים שחלים על רוב האנשים. ==ייתכן שאתה מודאג מאף אחת, אחת, כמה, או מכל האפשרויות האלה==, והכלים והשירותים שבהם אתה משתמש תלויים במטרותיך. ייתכן שיש לך איומים ספציפיים גם מחוץ לקטגוריות האלה, וזה בסדר גמור! החלק החשוב הוא פיתוח הבנה של היתרונות והחסרונות של הכלים שבהם אתה בוחר להשתמש, כי למעשה אף אחד מהם לא יגן עליך מכל איום. -- :material-incognito: אנונימיות - הגנה על הפעילות המקוונת שלך מהזהות האמיתית שלך, הגנה עליך מפני אנשים שמנסים לחשוף את הזהות *שלך* ספציפית. -- :material-target-account: התקפות ממוקדות - הגנה מפני האקרים או שחקנים זדוניים אחרים שמנסים לקבל גישה לנתונים או מכשירים ספציפיים *שלך*. -- :material-bug-outline: התקפות פסיביות - הגנה מפני דברים כמו תוכנות זדוניות, פרצות נתונים והתקפות אחרות שנעשות נגד אנשים רבים בו-זמנית. -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks - A vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. -- :material-server-network: ספקי שירותים - הגנה על הנתונים שלך מפני ספקי שירות (למשל באמצעות E2EE, מה שהופך את הנתונים שלך לבלתי קריאים לשרת). -- :material-eye-outline: מעקב המוני - הגנה מפני סוכנויות ממשלתיות, ארגונים, אתרים ושירותים הפועלים יחד כדי לעקוב אחר הפעילויות שלך. -- :material-account-cash: קפיטליזם מעקב - הגנה על עצמך מפני רשתות פרסום גדולות, כמו גוגל ופייסבוק, כמו גם ממספר עצום של אוספי נתונים אחרים של צד שלישי. -- :material-account-search: חשיפה ציבורית - הגבלת המידע אודותיך הנגיש באינטרנט - למנועי חיפוש או לציבור הרחב. -- :material-close-outline: צנזורה - הימנעות מגישה מצונזרת למידע או מצונזר בעצמך כשאתה מדבר באינטרנט. +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. חלק מהאיומים הללו עשויים להיות חשובים לך יותר מאחרים, בהתאם לדאגות הספציפיות שלך. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks and :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. באופן דומה, אנשים רבים עשויים להיות מודאגים בעיקר מ:material-account-search: חשיפה ציבורית של הנתונים האישיים שלהם, אך הם עדיין צריכים להיזהר מבעיות ממוקדות אבטחה, כגון :material-bug-outline: התקפות פסיביות—כמו תוכנות זדוניות המשפיעות על המכשירים שלהם. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ description: מודל האיום שלך הוא אישי עבורך, אך אלו
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: התקפות ממוקדות התקפות ממוקדות נגד אדם ספציפי הן בעייתיות יותר להתמודדות. התקפות נפוצות כוללות שליחת מסמכים זדוניים באמצעות מייל, ניצול פגיעויות (למשל בדפדפנים ובמערכות הפעלה) והתקפות פיזיות. אם זה מדאיג אותך, עליך להשתמש באסטרטגיות מתקדמות יותר להפחתת איומים. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ description: מודל האיום שלך הוא אישי עבורך, אך אלו If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). עליך גם לוודא שהכונן שלך מוצפן ושמערכת ההפעלה משתמשת ב-TPM או ב-Secure [מובלע](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) או [אלמנט](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) כדי להגביל ניסיונות להזין את ביטוי הסיסמה להצפנה. עליך להימנע משיתוף המחשב שלך עם אנשים שאינך סומך עליהם, מכיוון שרוב מערכות ההפעלה שולחניות אינן מצפינות נתונים בנפרד לכל משתמש. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting so There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out: -1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code. 3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers. -These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: +These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. +1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. -5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. +5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. -## פרטיות מספקי שירות +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: ספקי שירות @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and בפועל, היעילות של יישומי E2EE שונים משתנה. אפליקציות, כגון [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), פועלות באופן מקורי במכשיר שלך, וכל עותק של האפליקציה זהה בהתקנות שונות. אם ספק השירות היה מציג [דלת אחורית](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) באפליקציה שלו - בניסיון לגנוב את המפתחות הפרטיים שלך - ניתן היה לזהות אותו מאוחר יותר באמצעות [הפוך הנדסה](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering). -מצד שני, יישומי E2EE מבוססי אינטרנט, כמו דואר האינטרנט של Proton Mail או *כספת האינטרנט* של Bitwarden, מסתמכים על השרת שמגיש באופן דינמי קוד JavaScript לדפדפן כדי לטפל בהצפנה. שרת זדוני יכול למקד אותך ולשלוח לך קוד JavaScript זדוני כדי לגנוב את מפתח ההצפנה שלך (והיה קשה מאוד לשים לב אליו). מכיוון שהשרת יכול לבחור לשרת לקוחות אינטרנט שונים לאנשים שונים - גם אם שמתם לב להתקפה - יהיה קשה מאוד להוכיח את אשמתו של הספק. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. שרת זדוני יכול למקד אותך ולשלוח לך קוד JavaScript זדוני כדי לגנוב את מפתח ההצפנה שלך (והיה קשה מאוד לשים לב אליו). מכיוון שהשרת יכול לבחור לשרת לקוחות אינטרנט שונים לאנשים שונים - גם אם שמתם לב להתקפה - יהיה קשה מאוד להוכיח את אשמתו של הספק. לכן, עליך להשתמש ביישומים מקוריים על פני לקוחות אינטרנט במידת האפשר. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice -ממשלות לעתים קרובות מצדיקות תוכניות מעקב המוניות כאמצעים הכרחיים למאבק בטרור ולמניעת פשע. עם זאת, תוך הפרת זכויות אדם, הוא משמש לרוב כדי למקד באופן לא פרופורציונלי קבוצות מיעוט ומתנגדים פוליטיים, בין היתר. +ממשלות לעתים קרובות מצדיקות תוכניות מעקב המוניות כאמצעים הכרחיים למאבק בטרור ולמניעת פשע. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS למרות המעקב ההמוני הגובר בארצות הברית, הממשלה מצאה שלתוכניות מעקב המוני כמו סעיף 215 היה "ערך ייחודי מועט" ביחס לעצירת פשעים או מזימות טרור בפועל, כאשר מאמצים משכפלים במידה רבה את תוכניות המעקב הממוקדות של ה-FBI עצמו.[^2] -באינטרנט, ניתן לעקוב אחריך במגוון שיטות: +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - כתובת ה-IP שלך - עוגיות דפדפן @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS - טביעת האצבע של הדפדפן או המכשיר שלך - מתאם שיטת תשלום -\[רשימה זו אינה ממצה]. - If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: קפיטליזם מעקב > קפיטליזם מעקב הוא שיטה כלכלית המרוכזת סביב לכידה וסחורה של נתונים אישיים למטרת הליבה של עשיית רווחים.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/he/desktop.md b/i18n/he/desktop.md index df94e762..9fc0a486 100644 --- a/i18n/he/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/he/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - Free and open source. - מקבל עדכוני תוכנה וליבה קבועים. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - תומך בהצפנת דיסק מלא במהלך ההתקנה. - לא מקפיא מהדורות רגילות במשך יותר משנה. diff --git a/i18n/he/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/he/os/linux-overview.md index 96f2d98d..24d72b5f 100644 --- a/i18n/he/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/he/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ The atomic update method can achieve reliability with this model and is used for For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -כל מי שמשתמש ב[Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **חייב** להרגיש בנוח ביקורת PKGBUILD שהם מורידים מהשירות הזה. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +כל מי שמשתמש ב[Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **חייב** להרגיש בנוח ביקורת PKGBUILD שהם מורידים מהשירות הזה. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). תמיד יש להשתמש ב-AUR במשורה, ולעתים קרובות יש הרבה עצות רעות בדפים שונים שמפנים אנשים להשתמש באופן עיוור ב[עוזרים של AUR](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) ללא אזהרה מספקת. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/he/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/he/os/windows/index.md index 22a7b27f..2be722da 100644 --- a/i18n/he/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/he/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## הערות פרטיות -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/hi/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/hi/basics/common-misconceptions.md index b0066544..6832f170 100644 --- a/i18n/hi/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/hi/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis. -Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] +Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering. diff --git a/i18n/hi/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/hi/basics/common-threats.md index 7d8bf19a..7b040b0b 100644 --- a/i18n/hi/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/hi/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: Your threat model is personal to you, but these are some of the thi Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside of these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat. -- :material-incognito: Anonymity - Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. -- :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks - Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. -- :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks - Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks - A vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. -- :material-server-network: Service Providers - Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). -- :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance - Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. -- :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism - Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. -- :material-account-search: Public Exposure - Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. -- :material-close-outline: Censorship - Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. Some of these threats may be more important to you than others, depending on your specific concerns. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks and :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Similarly, many people may be primarily concerned with :material-account-search: Public Exposure of their personal data, but they should still be wary of security-focused issues, such as :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks—like malware affecting their devices. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS ha
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks Targeted attacks against a specific person are more problematic to deal with. Common attacks include sending malicious documents via email, exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g. in browsers and operating systems), and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you should employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typi If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting so There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out: -1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code. 3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers. -These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: +These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. +1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. -5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. +5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. -## Privacy From Service Providers +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: Service Providers @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between y In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering). -On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice -Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, breaching human rights, it's most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others. +Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^2] -Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - Your IP address - Browser cookies @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: - Your browser or device fingerprint - Payment method correlation -\[This list isn't exhaustive]. - If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism > Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/hi/desktop.md b/i18n/hi/desktop.md index 13549cc2..13e2c2a0 100644 --- a/i18n/hi/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/hi/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - Free and open source. - Receives regular software and kernel updates. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Supports full-disk encryption during installation. - Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. diff --git a/i18n/hi/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/hi/os/linux-overview.md index 103c202d..69b537ed 100644 --- a/i18n/hi/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/hi/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/hi/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/hi/os/windows/index.md index 8217591b..6238bb21 100644 --- a/i18n/hi/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/hi/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Privacy Notes -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/hu/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/hu/basics/common-misconceptions.md index 75de0f5f..5cd3c0e1 100644 --- a/i18n/hu/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/hu/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: Ezek a mítoszok számos előítéletből fakadnak, de az, hogy a forráskód elérhető-e, és hogy a szoftverek licencelése hogyan történik, nem befolyásolja annak biztonságát semmilyen módon. ==A nyílt forráskódú szoftverek potenciálisan ** biztonságosabbak, mint a jogvédett szoftverek, de egyáltalán nem garantálható, hogy ez így is van.== Egy szoftver elbírálásánál az egyes eszközök hírnevét és biztonságát egyénileg kell megvizsgálni. -Nyílt forráskódú szoftverek felülvizsgál*hatók* harmadik felek által, és gyakran átláthatóbbak lehetséges sebezhetőségek esetében, mint a jogvédett szoftverek. Azt is lehetővé teszi, hogy felülvizsgáld a kódot, és letiltsd a gyanús funkciókat, amiket találsz. Azonban, *ha nem így teszel*, nincs garancia arra, hogy a kód valaha is el lett bírálva, különösen a kisebb szoftverprojektek esetében. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] +Nyílt forráskódú szoftverek felülvizsgál*hatók* harmadik felek által, és gyakran átláthatóbbak lehetséges sebezhetőségek esetében, mint a jogvédett szoftverek. Azt is lehetővé teszi, hogy felülvizsgáld a kódot, és letiltsd a gyanús funkciókat, amiket találsz. Azonban, *ha nem így teszel*, nincs garancia arra, hogy a kód valaha is el lett bírálva, különösen a kisebb szoftverprojektek esetében. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] A másik oldalon a jogvédett szoftverek kevésbé átláthatóak, de ez nem jelenti azt, hogy nem biztonságosak. A nagyobb jogvédett szoftverprojektek belső és harmadik fél által is felülvizsgálhatók, és független biztonsági kutatók továbbra is találhatnak sebezhetőségeket olyan technikákkal, mint a reverse engineering. diff --git a/i18n/hu/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/hu/basics/common-threats.md index 065f8618..0e4011ad 100644 --- a/i18n/hu/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/hu/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: Your threat model is personal to you, but these are some of the thi Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside of these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat. -- :material-incognito: Anonymity - Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. -- :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks - Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. -- :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks - Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks - A vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. -- :material-server-network: Service Providers - Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). -- :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance - Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. -- :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism - Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. -- :material-account-search: Public Exposure - Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. -- :material-close-outline: Censorship - Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. Some of these threats may be more important to you than others, depending on your specific concerns. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks and :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Similarly, many people may be primarily concerned with :material-account-search: Public Exposure of their personal data, but they should still be wary of security-focused issues, such as :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks—like malware affecting their devices. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS ha
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks Targeted attacks against a specific person are more problematic to deal with. Common attacks include sending malicious documents via email, exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g. in browsers and operating systems), and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you should employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typi If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting so There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out: -1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code. 3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers. -These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: +These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. +1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. -5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. +5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. -## Privacy From Service Providers +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: Service Providers @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between y In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering). -On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice -Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, breaching human rights, it's most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others. +Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^2] -Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - Your IP address - Browser cookies @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: - Your browser or device fingerprint - Payment method correlation -\[This list isn't exhaustive]. - If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism > Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/hu/desktop.md b/i18n/hu/desktop.md index 13445179..80d952d4 100644 --- a/i18n/hu/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/hu/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - Free and open source. - Receives regular software and kernel updates. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Supports full-disk encryption during installation. - Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. diff --git a/i18n/hu/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/hu/os/linux-overview.md index 103c202d..69b537ed 100644 --- a/i18n/hu/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/hu/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/hu/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/hu/os/windows/index.md index 8217591b..6238bb21 100644 --- a/i18n/hu/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/hu/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Privacy Notes -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/id/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/id/basics/common-misconceptions.md index d21838c1..45c03fbc 100644 --- a/i18n/id/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/id/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: Mitos-mitos ini berasal dari sejumlah prasangka, tetapi apakah kode sumber tersedia dan bagaimana perangkat lunak dilisensikan tidak secara inheren memengaruhi keamanannya dengan cara apa pun. ==Perangkat lunak sumber terbuka memiliki *potensi* untuk lebih aman daripada perangkat lunak sumber tertutup, tetapi sama sekali tidak ada jaminan bahwa hal ini benar adanya.== Ketika Anda mengevaluasi perangkat lunak, Anda harus melihat reputasi dan keamanan setiap alat secara individu. -Perangkat lunak sumber terbuka *dapat* diaudit oleh pihak ketiga, dan sering kali lebih transparan mengenai potensi kerentanan daripada perangkat lunak sumber tertutup. Ini juga memungkinkan Anda untuk meninjau kode dan menonaktifkan fungsionalitas yang mencurigakan yang Anda temukan. Namun, *kecuali jika Anda melakukannya*, tidak ada jaminan bahwa kode pernah dievaluasi, terutama dengan proyek perangkat lunak yang lebih kecil. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] +Perangkat lunak sumber terbuka *dapat* diaudit oleh pihak ketiga, dan sering kali lebih transparan mengenai potensi kerentanan daripada perangkat lunak sumber tertutup. Ini juga memungkinkan Anda untuk meninjau kode dan menonaktifkan fungsionalitas yang mencurigakan yang Anda temukan. Namun, *kecuali jika Anda melakukannya*, tidak ada jaminan bahwa kode pernah dievaluasi, terutama dengan proyek perangkat lunak yang lebih kecil. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] Di sisi lain, perangkat lunak sumber tertutup itu kurang transparan, tetapi bukan berarti tidak aman. Proyek-proyek perangkat lunak sumber tertutup utama dapat diaudit secara internal dan oleh lembaga pihak ketiga, dan para peneliti keamanan independen masih bisa menemukan kerentanan dengan teknik seperti rekayasa balik. diff --git a/i18n/id/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/id/basics/common-threats.md index b2b92010..07feb351 100644 --- a/i18n/id/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/id/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: Model ancaman Anda bersifat pribadi bagi Anda, tetapi ini adalah be Secara garis besar, kami mengkategorikan rekomendasi kami ke dalam [ancaman](threat-modeling.md) atau tujuan yang berlaku untuk kebanyakan orang. ==Anda mungkin tidak peduli dengan tidak ada, satu, beberapa, atau semua kemungkinan ini==, dan alat dan layanan yang Anda gunakan tergantung pada tujuan Anda. Anda mungkin juga memiliki ancaman khusus di luar kategori ini, dan itu tidak masalah! Bagian yang penting adalah mengembangkan pemahaman tentang manfaat dan kekurangan alat yang Anda pilih untuk digunakan, karena hampir tidak ada satu pun yang akan melindungi Anda dari setiap ancaman. -- :material-incognito: Anonimitas - Melindungi aktivitas daring Anda dari identitas asli Anda, melindungi Anda dari orang-orang yang mencoba mengungkap identitas *Anda* secara khusus. -- :material-target-account: Serangan yang Ditargetkan - Terlindungi dari peretas atau aktor jahat lainnya yang mencoba untuk mendapatkan akses ke data atau perangkat *Anda* secara khusus. -- :material-bug-outline: Serangan Pasif - Terlindungi dari hal-hal seperti malware, pembobolan data, dan serangan lain yang dilakukan terhadap banyak orang sekaligus. -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks - A vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. -- :material-server-network: Penyedia Layanan - Melindungi data Anda dari penyedia layanan (misalnya dengan E2EE, yang membuat data Anda tidak dapat dibaca oleh server). -- :material-eye-outline: Pengawasan Massal - Perlindungan dari lembaga, organisasi, situs web, dan layanan pemerintah yang bekerja sama untuk melacak aktivitas Anda. -- :material-account-cash: Kapitalisme Pengawasan - Melindungi diri Anda dari jaringan periklanan besar, seperti Google dan Facebook, serta segudang pengumpul data pihak ketiga lainnya. -- :material-account-search: Paparan Publik - Membatasi informasi tentang Anda yang dapat diakses secara daring—pada mesin pencari atau masyarakat umum. -- :material-close-outline: Penyensoran - Menghindari akses yang disensor terhadap informasi atau disensor ketika berbicara secara daring. +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. Beberapa ancaman ini mungkin lebih penting bagi Anda daripada yang lain, tergantung pada kekhawatiran Anda. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks and :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Demikian pula, banyak orang mungkin lebih peduli dengan :material-account-search: Paparan Publik pada data pribadi mereka, tetapi mereka tetap harus waspada terhadap masalah yang berfokus pada keamanan, seperti :material-bug-outline: Serangan Pasif—seperti perangkat lunak jahat yang memengaruhi perangkat mereka. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ Sistem operasi desktop umumnya tertinggal dalam hal kotak pasir yang tepat. Chro
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: Serangan Bertarget Serangan yang ditargetkan terhadap orang tertentu akan lebih sulit ditangani. Serangan yang umum terjadi termasuk mengirim dokumen berbahaya melalui surel, mengeksploitasi kerentanan (misalnya pada peramban dan sistem operasi), dan serangan fisik. Jika hal ini menjadi perhatian Anda, Anda harus menggunakan strategi mitigasi ancaman yang lebih canggih. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ Secara rancangan, **peramban web**, **klien surel**, dan **aplikasi perkantoran* If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). Anda juga harus memastikan bahwa penyimpanan Anda dienkripsi, dan bahwa sistem operasi menggunakan TPM atau Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) atau [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) untuk menilai batas upaya memasukkan frasa sandi enkripsi. Anda sebaiknya menghindari berbagi komputer dengan orang yang tidak Anda percayai, karena sebagian besar sistem operasi desktop tidak mengenkripsi data secara terpisah per pengguna. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting so There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out: -1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code. 3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers. -These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: +These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. +1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. -5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. +5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. -## Privasi Dari Penyedia Layanan +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: Penyedia Layanan @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ Untungnya, E2EE dapat mengatasi masalah ini dengan mengenkripsi komunikasi antar Dalam praktiknya, efektivitas implementasi E2EE yang berbeda bervariasi. Aplikasi, seperti [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), berjalan secara asli pada perangkat Anda, dan setiap salinan aplikasi sama pada instalasi yang berbeda. Jika penyedia layanan memperkenalkan sebuah [pintu belakang](https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pintu_belakang_(komputer)) dalam aplikasi mereka—dalam upaya untuk mencuri kunci pribadi Anda—nantinya dapat dideteksi dengan [rekayasa balik] (https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rekayasa_balik). -Di sisi lain, implementasi E2EE berbasis web, seperti surel web Proton Mail atau *Web Vault* dari Bitwarden, bergantung pada server yang secara dinamis menyajikan kode JavaScript ke peramban untuk menangani kriptografi. Sebuah server jahat dapat menargetkan Anda dan mengirimkan kode JavaScript berbahaya untuk mencuri kunci enkripsi Anda (dan akan sangat sulit untuk diketahui). Karena server dapat memilih untuk melayani klien web yang berbeda untuk orang yang berbeda—bahkan jika Anda menyadari serangan itu—akan sangat sulit untuk membuktikan kesalahan penyedia. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. Sebuah server jahat dapat menargetkan Anda dan mengirimkan kode JavaScript berbahaya untuk mencuri kunci enkripsi Anda (dan akan sangat sulit untuk diketahui). Karena server dapat memilih untuk melayani klien web yang berbeda untuk orang yang berbeda—bahkan jika Anda menyadari serangan itu—akan sangat sulit untuk membuktikan kesalahan penyedia. Oleh karena itu, Anda seharusnya menggunakan aplikasi asli daripada klien web bila memungkinkan. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice -Pemerintah sering kali membenarkan program pengawasan massal sebagai cara yang diperlukan untuk memerangi terorisme dan mencegah kejahatan. Namun, melanggar hak asasi manusia, hal ini paling sering digunakan untuk menargetkan kelompok minoritas dan pembangkang politik secara tidak proporsional. +Pemerintah sering kali membenarkan program pengawasan massal sebagai cara yang diperlukan untuk memerangi terorisme dan mencegah kejahatan. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS Meskipun pengawasan massal semakin meningkat di Amerika Serikat, pemerintah telah menemukan bahwa program pengawasan massal seperti Bagian 215 hanya memiliki "sedikit nilai unik" dalam hal menghentikan kejahatan aktual atau plot teroris, dengan upaya-upaya yang sebagian besar menduplikasi program pengawasan yang ditargetkan oleh FBI.[^2] -Secara daring, Anda dapat dilacak melalui berbagai metode: +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - Alamat IP Anda - Kuki peramban @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ Secara daring, Anda dapat dilacak melalui berbagai metode: - Sidik jari peramban atau perangkat Anda - Korelasi metode pembayaran -\[Daftar ini tidak lengkap]. - If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: Kapitalisme Pengawasan > Kapitalisme pengawasan adalah sistem ekonomi yang berpusat di sekitar penangkapan dan komodifikasi data pribadi untuk tujuan utama mencari keuntungan.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/id/desktop.md b/i18n/id/desktop.md index 93860fcc..dff4d215 100644 --- a/i18n/id/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/id/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - Gratis dan bersumber terbuka. - Receives regular software and kernel updates. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Supports full-disk encryption during installation. - Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. diff --git a/i18n/id/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/id/os/linux-overview.md index 14becb42..d33387f2 100644 --- a/i18n/id/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/id/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch dan distribusi berbasis Arch tidak direkomendasikan bagi mereka yang baru m For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Siapa pun yang menggunakan [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **tidak boleh** segan untuk mengaudit PKGBUILD yang mereka unduh dari layanan tersebut. Paket AUR adalah konten yang diproduksi oleh komunitas dan tidak diperiksa dengan cara apa pun, dan oleh karena itu rentan terhadap serangan rantai pasok perangkat lunak, yang kenyataannya telah terjadi [pada masa lalu](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Siapa pun yang menggunakan [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **tidak boleh** segan untuk mengaudit PKGBUILD yang mereka unduh dari layanan tersebut. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). AUR harus selalu digunakan dengan hemat, dan sering kali ada banyak saran buruk di berbagai halaman yang mengarahkan orang untuk secara membabi buta menggunakan [pembantu AUR](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) tanpa peringatan yang memadai. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/id/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/id/os/windows/index.md index 8217591b..6238bb21 100644 --- a/i18n/id/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/id/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Privacy Notes -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/it/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/it/basics/common-misconceptions.md index f2a0557c..087d7cda 100644 --- a/i18n/it/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/it/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: Questi miti derivano da una serie di pregiudizi, ma la disponibilità del codice sorgente e le modalità di licenza del software, non influiscono intrinsecamente sulla sua sicurezza, in alcun modo. ==I software open source hanno il *potenziale* di essere più sicuri di quelli proprietari, ma non esiste assolutamente alcuna garanzia che sia così.== Quando valuti il software, dovresti esaminare la reputazione e la sicurezza di ogni strumento, su base individuale. -I software open source *possono* essere controllati da terze parti e, spesso, sono più trasparenti sulle potenziali vulnerabilità, rispetto alle controparti proprietarie. Inoltre, ti consentono di revisionare il codice e disabilitare qualsiasi funzionalità sospetta tu trovi. Tuttavia, *a meno che non lo faccia*, non esiste alcuna garanzia che il codice sia mai stato valutato, specialmente con i progetti software più piccoli. Il processo di sviluppo aperto è stato talvolta sfruttato per introdurre nuove vulnerabilità, note come :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Attacchi alla supply chain , di cui si parla più diffusamente nella pagina [Minacce comuni](common-threats.md).[^1] +I software open source *possono* essere controllati da terze parti e, spesso, sono più trasparenti sulle potenziali vulnerabilità, rispetto alle controparti proprietarie. Inoltre, ti consentono di revisionare il codice e disabilitare qualsiasi funzionalità sospetta tu trovi. Tuttavia, *a meno che non lo faccia*, non esiste alcuna garanzia che il codice sia mai stato valutato, specialmente con i progetti software più piccoli. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] D'altra parte, i software proprietari sono meno trasparenti, ma ciò non implica che non siano sicuri. I grandi progetti di software proprietari sono controllabili internamente e da agenzie di terze parti, e i ricercatori indipendenti sulla sicurezza possono comunque trovare vulnerabilità, con tecniche come l'ingegneria inversa. diff --git a/i18n/it/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/it/basics/common-threats.md index 4f0f710d..95eb9591 100644 --- a/i18n/it/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/it/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: Il tuo modello di minaccia è personale, ma queste sono alcuni aspe In linea di massima, le nostre raccomandazioni sono suddivise in [minacce](threat-modeling.md) o obiettivi che si applicano alla maggior parte delle persone. ==Potresti essere interessato a nessuna, una, alcune o tutte queste possibilità==, e gli strumenti e servizi che utilizzi dipendono dai tuoi obiettivi. Potreste avere minacce specifiche anche al di fuori di queste categorie, il che è perfettamente normale! La parte importante è lo sviluppo di una comprensione dei benefici e difetti degli strumenti che scegli di utilizzare, poiché virtualmente nessuno di essi ti proteggerà da ogni minaccia. -- :material-incognito: Anonimato - Proteggono la tua attività online dalla tua identità reale, proteggendoti da persone che mirano a scoprire la *tua* identità nello specifico. -- :material-target-account: Attacchi mirati - Protezione da hacker o altri malintenzionati, che mirano ad accedere ai *tuoi* dati o dispositivi, nello specifico. -- :material-bug-outline: Attacchi passivi - Protezione da malware, violazioni di dati e altri attacchi effettuati contro molte persone, in una singola volta. -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Attacchi alla supply chain - Una vulnerabilità o un exploit introdotto in un software altrimenti valido, direttamente o attraverso una dipendenza di terze parti. -- :material-server-network: Service Providers - Protezione dei tuoi dati dai fornitori del servizio (es., con l'E2EE, che rende i tuoi dati illeggibili dal server). -- :material-eye-outline: Sorveglianza di massa - Protezione dalle agenzie governative, organizzazioni, siti web e servizi che cooperano per tracciare le tue attività. -- :material-account-cash: Capitalismo di sorveglianza - Protezione dalle grandi reti pubblicitarie, come Google e Facebook, nonché da una miriade di altri raccoglitori di dati di terze parti. -- :material-account-search: Esposizione pubblica - Limitazione delle informazioni accessibili online su di te, ai motori di ricerca o al pubblico generale. -- :material-close-outline: Censura - Prevenzione dell'accesso censurato a informazioni, o della tua censura, comunicando online. +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. Alcune di queste minacce potrebbero essere per te più importanti di altre, a seconda delle tue preoccupazioni specifiche. Ad esempio, uno sviluppatore di software con accesso a dati preziosi o critici potrebbe essere interessato principalmente a :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Attacchi alla supply chain e :material-target-account: Attacchi mirati. Probabilmente vorranno ancora proteggere i loro dati personali dall'essere travolti nei programmi di :material-eye-outline: Sorveglianza di massa . Similmente, in molto potrebbero essere principalmente preoccupati dall':material-account-search: Esposizione Pubblica dei propri dati personali, pur rimanendo attendi ai problemi di sicurezza, come gli :material-bug-outline: Attacchi Passivi, come i malware che colpiscono i loro dispositivi. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ Generalmente, i sistemi operativi per desktop sono in ritardo, per l'adeguato sa
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: Attacchi Mirati Gli attacchi mirati contro una persona specifica sono più problematici da affrontare. Gli attacchi comuni includono l'invio di documenti dannosi via email, lo sfruttamento delle vulnerabilità (es., nei browser e nei sistemi operativi) e gli attacchi fisici. Se per voi queste sono preoccupazioni, dovresti impiegare strategie di mitigazione delle minacce più avanzate. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ Per loro natura, i **browser web**, i **client email** e le **applicazioni per u Se temi un **attacco fisico**, dovresti utilizzare un sistema operativo con un'implementazione sicura dell'avvio protetto, come Android, iOS, macOS, o [Windows (con TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). Inoltre, dovresti assicurarti che la tua unità sia crittografata e che il sistema operativo utilizzi un TPM o Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) od [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se), per limitare la frequenza dei tentativi di inserire la frase segreta crittografica. Dovresti evitare di condividere il tuo computer con persone di cui non ti fidi, poiché gran parte dei sistemi operativi per desktop non crittografa i dati separatamente, per ogni utente. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Attacchi alla supply chain Gli attacchi alla supply chain sono spesso una forma di :material-target-account: Attacchi mirati verso aziende, governi e attivisti, sebbene possano finire per compromettere anche il pubblico. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ Un esempio degno di nota è successo nel 2017 quando M.E.Doc, un software di con Ci sono pochi modi in cui questo tipo di attacco potrebbe essere effettuato: -1. Un collaboratore o un dipendente potrebbe farsi strada in una posizione di potere all'interno di un progetto o di un'organizzazione, per poi abusarne aggiungendo codice malevolo. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. Uno sviluppatore può essere costretto da un soggetto esterno ad aggiungere codice malevolo. 3. Un individuo o un gruppo potrebbe identificare una dipendenza software di terze parti (nota anche come libreria) e lavorare per infiltrarla con i due metodi sopra descritti, sapendo che verrà utilizzata dagli sviluppatori di software "a valle". -Questi tipi di attacchi possono richiedere molto tempo e preparazione per essere eseguiti e sono rischiosi perché possono essere rilevati, in particolare nei progetti open source se sono popolari e hanno interessi esterni. Purtroppo sono anche uno dei più pericolosi, in quanto molto difficili da mitigare completamente. Invitiamo i lettori a utilizzare solo software che godono di buona reputazione e che si sforzano di mitigare i rischi: +Questi tipi di attacchi possono richiedere molto tempo e preparazione per essere eseguiti e sono rischiosi perché possono essere rilevati, in particolare nei progetti open source se sono popolari e hanno interessi esterni. Purtroppo sono anche uno dei più pericolosi, in quanto molto difficili da mitigare completamente. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Adottando solo software popolari che esistono da tempo. Maggiore è l'interesse per un progetto, maggiore è la probabilità che le parti esterne notino cambiamenti malevoli. Un attore malintenzionato dovrà inoltre dedicare più tempo a guadagnare la fiducia della comunità con contributi significativi. +1. Adottando solo software popolari che esistono da tempo. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. Un attore malintenzionato dovrà inoltre dedicare più tempo a guadagnare la fiducia della comunità con contributi significativi. 2. Trovando software che rilasci il codice sorgente con piattaforme d'infrastruttura di compilazione affidabili e ampiamente diffuse, rispetto alle workstation degli sviluppatori oppure a server self-hosted. Alcuni sistemi come GitHub Actions consentono di ispezionare lo script di compilazione che viene eseguito pubblicamente per una maggiore sicurezza. In questo modo si riduce la probabilità che il malware presente sul computer di uno sviluppatore possa infettare i suoi pacchetti e si ha la certezza che i codici sorgente prodotti siano effettivamente corretti. 3. Cercando la firma del codice sui singoli commit e rilasci di codice sorgente, per creare una traccia verificabile di chi ha fatto cosa. Ad esempio: Il codice malevolo era presente nell'archivio del software? Quale sviluppatore l'ha aggiunto? È stato aggiunto durante la compilazione? -4. Controllando se il codice sorgente ha messaggi di commit significativi (come i [commit convenzionali](https://conventionalcommits.org)) che spiegano che cambiamento la modifica dovrebbe realizzare. Messaggi chiari possono facilitare la verifica, la revisione e la ricerca di bug da parte di persone esterne al progetto. -5. Annotando il numero di collaboratori o manutentori di un programma. Uno sviluppatore solitario può essere più suscettibile alla costrizione ad aggiungere codice malevolo da una parte esterna o di abilitare per negligenza un comportamento indesiderato. Questo potrebbe significare che il software sviluppato da "Big Tech" è soggetto a maggiori controlli rispetto a uno sviluppatore solitario che non risponde a nessuno. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Messaggi chiari possono facilitare la verifica, la revisione e la ricerca di bug da parte di persone esterne al progetto. +5. Annotando il numero di collaboratori o manutentori di un programma. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. Questo potrebbe significare che il software sviluppato da "Big Tech" è soggetto a maggiori controlli rispetto a uno sviluppatore solitario che non risponde a nessuno. -## Privacy dai fornitori del servizio +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: Fornitori di Servizi @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ Fortunatamente, l'E2EE può alleviare questo problema crittografando le comunica In pratica, l'efficacia delle diverse implementazioni E2EE varia. Le applicazioni, come [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), operano nativamente sul tuo dispositivo e ogni copia dell'applicazione è la stessa tra diverse installazioni. Se il fornitore del servizio introducesse una [backdoor](https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor) nella propria applicazione, tentando di rubare le tue chiavi private, sarebbe successivamente rilevabile con l'[ingegneria inversa](https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering). -D'altra parte, le implementazioni E2EE basate sul web, come la webmail di Proton Mail o il *Web Vault* di Bitwarden, si affidano al fatto che il server serve dinamicamente il codice in JavaScript al browser, per gestire la crittografia. Un server malintenzionato può prenderti di mira, inviandoti codice dannoso in JavaScript per rubare la tua chiave crittografica (cosa estremamente difficile da notare). Poiché il server può scegliere di servire client differenti a persone differenti, anche se notassi l'attacco, sarebbe incredibilmente difficile provare la colpevolezza del fornitore. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. Un server malintenzionato può prenderti di mira, inviandoti codice dannoso in JavaScript per rubare la tua chiave crittografica (cosa estremamente difficile da notare). Poiché il server può scegliere di servire client differenti a persone differenti, anche se notassi l'attacco, sarebbe incredibilmente difficile provare la colpevolezza del fornitore. Dunque, dovresti utilizzare le applicazioni native, invece dei client web, quando possibile. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In Francia puoi consultare il [sito web di Technopolice](https://technopolice.fr -Spesso, i governi, giustificano i programmi di sorveglianza di massa come mezzi necessari per combattere il terrorismo e prevenire il crimine. Tuttavia, violando i diritti umani, sono spesso utilizzati per colpire in modo sproporzionato gruppi di minoranza e dissidenti politici, tra gli altri. +Spesso, i governi, giustificano i programmi di sorveglianza di massa come mezzi necessari per combattere il terrorismo e prevenire il crimine. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: La lezione sulla privacy dell'11 settembre: La sorveglianza di massa non è la strada da seguire

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ Di fronte alle rivelazioni di Edward Snowden su programmi governativi come [PRIS Nonostante la crescente sorveglianza di massa negli Stati Uniti, il governo ha riscontrato che i programmi di sorveglianza di massa come la Sezione 215 hanno avuto "poco valore univoco", per quanto riguarda l'arresto di crimini reali o di complotti terroristici, con sforzi che, in gran parte, duplicano i programmi di sorveglianza mirata del FBI.[^2] -Online è possibile essere rintracciati con svariati metodi: +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - Il tuo indirizzo IP - I cookie del browser @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ Online è possibile essere rintracciati con svariati metodi: - L'impronta digitale del tuo browser o dispositivo - Correlazione del metodo di pagamento -\[Questo elenco non è completo]. - Se sei preoccupato per i programmi di sorveglianza di massa, puoi usare strategie come separare le tue identità online, confonderti con altri utenti o, quando possibile, semplicemente evitare di fornire informazioni identificative. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: Capitalismo di sorveglianza > Il capitalismo di sorveglianza è un sistema economico incentrato sulla cattura e commercializzazione dei dati personali, con l'obiettivo principale di trarre profitto.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/it/desktop.md b/i18n/it/desktop.md index bec21da5..b5cf32c6 100644 --- a/i18n/it/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/it/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ La scelta di una distro Linux adatta a te dipende da una grande varietà di pref - Gratuito e open source. - Ricevono aggiornamenti regolari del software e del kernel. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Supportano la crittografia del disco completo durante l'installazione. - Non interrompono le versioni regolari per più di 1 anno. diff --git a/i18n/it/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/it/os/linux-overview.md index 730b7256..948695cf 100644 --- a/i18n/it/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/it/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch e le distribuzioni basate su Arch sono sconsigliate per coloro che sono all For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Chiunque utilizzi il [Repository di Arch User (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **deve** essere a proprio agio nel controllare i PKGBUILD che scarica da tale servizio. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Chiunque utilizzi il [Repository di Arch User (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **deve** essere a proprio agio nel controllare i PKGBUILD che scarica da tale servizio. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). L'AUR dovrebbe sempre essere utilizzata con parsimonia e, spesso, esistono molti cattivi consigli, su varie pagine, che indirizzano le persone a utilizzare ciecamente gli [aiutanti AUR](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers), senza avvertimenti sufficienti. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/it/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/it/os/windows/index.md index f7df3fa6..b98f5f8d 100644 --- a/i18n/it/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/it/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Note sulla Privacy -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/ja/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/ja/basics/common-misconceptions.md index 342a3c2d..7af3f284 100644 --- a/i18n/ja/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/ja/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis. -Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] +Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering. diff --git a/i18n/ja/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/ja/basics/common-threats.md index d270de4b..2463558f 100644 --- a/i18n/ja/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/ja/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: Your threat model is personal to you, but these are some of the thi Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside of these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat. -- :material-incognito: Anonymity - Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. -- :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks - Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. -- :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks - Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks - A vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. -- :material-server-network: Service Providers - Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). -- :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance - Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. -- :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism - Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. -- :material-account-search: Public Exposure - Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. -- :material-close-outline: Censorship - Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. Some of these threats may be more important to you than others, depending on your specific concerns. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks and :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Similarly, many people may be primarily concerned with :material-account-search: Public Exposure of their personal data, but they should still be wary of security-focused issues, such as :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks—like malware affecting their devices. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS ha
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks Targeted attacks against a specific person are more problematic to deal with. Common attacks include sending malicious documents via email, exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g. in browsers and operating systems), and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you should employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typi If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting so There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out: -1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code. 3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers. -These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: +These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. +1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. -5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. +5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. -## サービスプロバイダーからのプライバシー保護 +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: Service Providers @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between y In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering). -On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice -Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, breaching human rights, it's most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others. +Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^2] -Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - あなたのIPアドレス - ブラウザーのクッキー @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: - Your browser or device fingerprint - Payment method correlation -\[This list isn't exhaustive]. - If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism > Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/ja/desktop.md b/i18n/ja/desktop.md index 77fe630c..f41a1f8c 100644 --- a/i18n/ja/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/ja/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - 自由でオープンソースであること。 - 定期的にソフトウェアとカーネルのアップデートを受け取ること。 -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - インストール時にフルディスク暗号化をサポートしていること。 - 通常のリリースが1年以上凍結されないこと。 diff --git a/i18n/ja/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/ja/os/linux-overview.md index 3ea36346..2d54677c 100644 --- a/i18n/ja/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/ja/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/ja/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/ja/os/windows/index.md index 9990fc44..fc9eeb35 100644 --- a/i18n/ja/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/ja/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## プライバシーに関する注意事項 -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/ko/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/ko/basics/common-misconceptions.md index fecb33cd..aa905fda 100644 --- a/i18n/ko/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/ko/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: 이런 오해는 여러 편견에서 비롯된 것입니다. 소스 코드 공개 여부이나 라이선스 방식 자체는 보안에 어떠한 영향도 미치지 않습니다. ==오픈 소스 소프트웨어는 독점 소프트웨어보다 보안이 뛰어날 *가능성*이 존재하지만, 반드시 그러하리라는 보장은 없습니다.== 특정 소프트웨어를 평가할 때는 해당 소프트웨어의 평판과 보안을 개별적으로 판단해야 합니다. -오픈 소스 소프트웨어는 제3자로부터 검증(감사)받는 것이 *가능하고*, 잠재적인 취약점을 취급하는 데에 있어서 독점 소프트웨어보다 투명하게 이루어지는 경우가 많습니다. 하고자 한다면 자신이 직접 코드를 검토할 수도 있으며, 의심스러운 기능은 비활성화 하는 것도 가능합니다. 하지만 이론상 가능한 것과는 별개로 (특히 소규모 소프트웨어 프로젝트일수록) 해당 코드가 검증되었다는 보장은 없습니다. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] +오픈 소스 소프트웨어는 제3자로부터 검증(감사)받는 것이 *가능하고*, 잠재적인 취약점을 취급하는 데에 있어서 독점 소프트웨어보다 투명하게 이루어지는 경우가 많습니다. 하고자 한다면 자신이 직접 코드를 검토할 수도 있으며, 의심스러운 기능은 비활성화 하는 것도 가능합니다. 하지만 이론상 가능한 것과는 별개로 (특히 소규모 소프트웨어 프로젝트일수록) 해당 코드가 검증되었다는 보장은 없습니다. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] 반면 독점 소프트웨어는 투명성이 상대적으로 떨어지지만, 그렇다고 해서 안전하지 않다는 뜻은 아닙니다. 메이저 독점 소프트웨어는 내부 및 외부 기관에서 감사를 진행할 수 있으며, 외부 보안 연구원도 리버스 엔지니어링 등의 기술을 통해 취약점을 발견할 수 있습니다. diff --git a/i18n/ko/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/ko/basics/common-threats.md index 7dd6b6f7..113c733f 100644 --- a/i18n/ko/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/ko/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: 위협 모델은 개개인마다 다르지만, 이 사이트의 방 전반적으로, Privacy Guides의 권장 목록은 대부분의 사람들에게 적용되는 [위협](threat-modeling.md) 혹은 목표로 분류됩니다. 여러분이 사용하는 툴 및 서비스는 여러분의 목표에 따라 달라지며, ==이러한 위협 가능성에 대한 관심도는 사람마다 다를 수 있습니다.== 혹시나 여기에 정리되지 않은 종류의 위협을 겪고 있더라도 상관 없습니다! 핵심은 '사용하기로 선택한 툴의 장단점을 이해하는 것' 입니다. 모든 위협으로부터 여러분을 완벽히 보호할 수 있는 툴은 존재하지 않기 때문입니다. -- :material-incognito: 익명성 - 온라인 활동에서 실제 신원을 보호하여, *여러분의* 신원을 밝혀내려는 사람들로부터 여러분을 보호합니다. -- :material-target-account: 표적 공격 - *당신의* 데이터나 기기에 세부적으로 접근하려는 해커 및 그 외 악의적인 상대로부터 보호합니다. -- :material-bug-outline: 수동적 공격 - 멀웨어, 데이터 유출 등 다수의 사람을 한꺼번에 대상으로 삼는 공격으로부터 보호합니다. -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks - A vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. -- :material-server-network: 서비스 제공자 - (여러분의 데이터를 서버에서 읽을 수 없도록 하는 E2EE 등을 이용하여) 서비스 제공자로부터 여러분의 데이터를 보호합니다. -- :material-eye-outline: 대중 감시 - 여러분의 활동을 추적하기 위해 협력하는 정부 기관, 단체, 웹사이트, 서비스로부터 보호합니다. -- :material-account-cash: 감시 자본주의 - Google, Facebook 등의 거대 광고 네트워크 및 기타 수많은 제3자 데이터 수집 업체로부터 여러분을 보호합니다. -- :material-account-search: 공개 노출 - 여러분에 대한 정보를 (검색 엔진이나 일반 대중이) 온라인에서 접근하는 것을 제한합니다. -- :material-close-outline: 검열 - 정보 접근을 제한하는 검열을 회피하고, 온라인상에서 자신의 주장이 검열되는 것을 방지합니다. +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. 대응해야 할 위협의 우선 순위는 개인의 관심도에 따라 바뀔 수 있습니다. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks and :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. 마찬가지로, 대부분의 사람들이 가장 우려하는 위협은 개인 데이터의 :material-account-search: 공개 노출일 테지만, 기기 감염 멀웨어 등의 :material-bug-outline: 수동적 공격 보안 문제 또한 주의해야 합니다. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ description: 위협 모델은 개개인마다 다르지만, 이 사이트의 방
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: 표적 공격(Targeted Attacks) 특정 인물을 대상으로 하는 표적 공격은 더욱 대응하기 어렵습니다. 흔한 예시로는 이메일을 통한 악성 문서 전송, 브라우저 및 운영 체제 등의 취약점 악용, 물리적 공격 등이 있습니다. 표적 공격이 우려된다면, 보다 고급 위협 완화 전략이 필요합니다. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ description: 위협 모델은 개개인마다 다르지만, 이 사이트의 방 If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). 또한 드라이브를 암호화하고, 운영 체제에서 TPM/Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)/[Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se)를 이용해 암호 입력 시도를 제한해야 합니다. 대부분의 데스크톱 운영체제는 사용자별 데이터를 암호화하지 않으므로, 신뢰하지 않는 사람과 컴퓨터를 공유하지 말아야 합니다. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting so There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out: -1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code. 3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers. -These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: +These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. +1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. -5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. +5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. -## 서비스 제공 업체로부터의 프라이버시 +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: 서비스 제공자/제공 업체(Service Providers) @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and 실질적으로 모든 E2EE 구현체가 동일한 유효성을 갖는 것은 아닙니다. [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal) 같은 애플리케이션은 기기에서 네이티브로 실행되며, 여러번 설치하더라도 언제나 완벽히 동일한 애플리케이션이 설치됩니다. 서비스 제공 업체가 여러분의 개인 키를 탈취하기 위해 [백도어](https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%EB%B0%B1%EB%8F%84%EC%96%B4)를 도입하더라도, 차후에 [리버스 엔지니어링](https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%EC%97%AD%EA%B3%B5%ED%95%99)을 통해 탐지될 수 있습니다. -반면, Proton Mail 웹메일이나 Bitwarden **웹 보관함** 같은 웹 기반 E2EE 구현체의 경우, 서버에서 동적으로 제공하는 자바스크립트 코드에 암호화 처리를 의존합니다. 악성 서버는 사용자를 표적으로 삼아 악성 자바스크립트 코드를 전송해 암호화 키를 탈취 가능하며, 이 경우 사용자는 이를 알아차리기 매우 어렵습니다. 만약 사용자가 공격을 알아차리더라도 제공 업체의 책임을 입증하기란 매우 어렵습니다. 서버에서 사람마다 웹 클라이언트를 다르게 제공하는 것이 가능하기 때문입니다. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. 악성 서버는 사용자를 표적으로 삼아 악성 자바스크립트 코드를 전송해 암호화 키를 탈취 가능하며, 이 경우 사용자는 이를 알아차리기 매우 어렵습니다. 만약 사용자가 공격을 알아차리더라도 제공 업체의 책임을 입증하기란 매우 어렵습니다. 서버에서 사람마다 웹 클라이언트를 다르게 제공하는 것이 가능하기 때문입니다. 따라서, 가능하면 웹 클라이언트 대신 네이티브 애플리케이션을 사용해야 합니다. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice -정부는 테러 대응 및 범죄 예방에 필요한 수단으로 대중 감시 프로그램을 정당화하는 경우가 많습니다. 하지만 이는 분명한 인권 침해일 뿐만 아니라, 대중 감시는 소수 집단과 정치적 반체제 인사 등의 대상을 집중적으로 표적삼는 데에 가장 자주 사용됩니다. +정부는 테러 대응 및 범죄 예방에 필요한 수단으로 대중 감시 프로그램을 정당화하는 경우가 많습니다. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS 미국에서 대중 감시가 증가하고 있음에도 불구하고, 정부는 215조항과 같은 대중 감시 프로그램이 실제 범죄나 테러 음모를 저지하는 데 있어 '고유한 가치가 거의 없다'라는 사실을 발견했으며, 대부분의 노력은 FBI의 표적 감시 프로그램과 중복되는 것으로 나타났습니다.[^2] -온라인상에서 여러분은 다양한 방법을 통해 추적당할 수 있습니다. +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - 여러분의 IP 주소 - 브라우저 쿠키 @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS - 여러분의 브라우저/기기 핑거프린트 - 결제 수단 연관성 -\[이 목록뿐만이 아닙니다]. - If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: 감시 자본주의(Surveillance Capitalism) > 감시 자본주의는 이윤 창출을 주요 목적으로 하여 개인 데이터를 수집하고 상품화하는 데 중점을 둔 경제 시스템입니다.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/ko/desktop.md b/i18n/ko/desktop.md index 431b0128..458d0ed6 100644 --- a/i18n/ko/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/ko/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - Free and open source. - Receives regular software and kernel updates. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Supports full-disk encryption during installation. - Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. diff --git a/i18n/ko/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/ko/os/linux-overview.md index 1ace1225..39cd56ee 100644 --- a/i18n/ko/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/ko/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/ko/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/ko/os/windows/index.md index 8217591b..6238bb21 100644 --- a/i18n/ko/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/ko/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Privacy Notes -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/ku-IQ/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/ku-IQ/basics/common-misconceptions.md index b0066544..6832f170 100644 --- a/i18n/ku-IQ/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/ku-IQ/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis. -Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] +Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering. diff --git a/i18n/ku-IQ/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/ku-IQ/basics/common-threats.md index 7d8bf19a..7b040b0b 100644 --- a/i18n/ku-IQ/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/ku-IQ/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: Your threat model is personal to you, but these are some of the thi Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside of these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat. -- :material-incognito: Anonymity - Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. -- :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks - Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. -- :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks - Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks - A vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. -- :material-server-network: Service Providers - Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). -- :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance - Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. -- :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism - Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. -- :material-account-search: Public Exposure - Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. -- :material-close-outline: Censorship - Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. Some of these threats may be more important to you than others, depending on your specific concerns. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks and :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Similarly, many people may be primarily concerned with :material-account-search: Public Exposure of their personal data, but they should still be wary of security-focused issues, such as :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks—like malware affecting their devices. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS ha
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks Targeted attacks against a specific person are more problematic to deal with. Common attacks include sending malicious documents via email, exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g. in browsers and operating systems), and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you should employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typi If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting so There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out: -1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code. 3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers. -These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: +These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. +1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. -5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. +5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. -## Privacy From Service Providers +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: Service Providers @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between y In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering). -On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice -Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, breaching human rights, it's most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others. +Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^2] -Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - Your IP address - Browser cookies @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: - Your browser or device fingerprint - Payment method correlation -\[This list isn't exhaustive]. - If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism > Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/ku-IQ/desktop.md b/i18n/ku-IQ/desktop.md index 13549cc2..13e2c2a0 100644 --- a/i18n/ku-IQ/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/ku-IQ/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - Free and open source. - Receives regular software and kernel updates. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Supports full-disk encryption during installation. - Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. diff --git a/i18n/ku-IQ/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/ku-IQ/os/linux-overview.md index 103c202d..69b537ed 100644 --- a/i18n/ku-IQ/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/ku-IQ/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/ku-IQ/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/ku-IQ/os/windows/index.md index 8217591b..6238bb21 100644 --- a/i18n/ku-IQ/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/ku-IQ/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Privacy Notes -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/nl/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/nl/basics/common-misconceptions.md index 6bf8bf2e..c4f7a827 100644 --- a/i18n/nl/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/nl/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: Deze mythes komen voort uit een aantal vooroordelen, maar of de broncode beschikbaar is en hoe software in licentie wordt gegeven, heeft op geen enkele manier invloed op de beveiliging ervan. ==Open-source software heeft de *potentieel* om veiliger te zijn dan propriëtaire software, maar er is absoluut geen garantie dat dit het geval is.== Wanneer je software evalueert, moet je op individuele basis naar de reputatie en beveiliging van elke tool kijken. -Open-source software *kan* worden gecontroleerd door derden, en is vaak transparanter over mogelijke kwetsbaarheden dan propriëtaire tegenhangers. Ze kunnen ook flexibeler zijn, zodat je in de code kunt duiken en alle verdachte functionaliteit kunt uitschakelen die je zelf vindt. Echter, *tenzij je dit zelf doet*, is er geen garantie dat code ooit is geëvalueerd, vooral bij kleinere softwareprojecten. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] +Open-source software *kan* worden gecontroleerd door derden, en is vaak transparanter over mogelijke kwetsbaarheden dan propriëtaire tegenhangers. Ze kunnen ook flexibeler zijn, zodat je in de code kunt duiken en alle verdachte functionaliteit kunt uitschakelen die je zelf vindt. Echter, *tenzij je dit zelf doet*, is er geen garantie dat code ooit is geëvalueerd, vooral bij kleinere softwareprojecten. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] Aan de andere kant is propriëtaire software minder transparant, maar dat betekent niet dat het niet veilig is. Grote propriëtaire softwareprojecten kunnen intern en door derden worden gecontroleerd, en onafhankelijke veiligheidsonderzoekers kunnen nog steeds kwetsbaarheden vinden met technieken als reverse engineering. diff --git a/i18n/nl/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/nl/basics/common-threats.md index 2c17887a..b639b84b 100644 --- a/i18n/nl/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/nl/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: Jouw dreigingsmodel is persoonlijk voor je, maar dit zijn enkele va In grote lijnen delen wij onze aanbevelingen in in deze algemene categorieën van [bedreigingen](threat-modeling.md) of doelstellingen die voor de meeste mensen gelden. ==U kunt zich bezighouden met geen, een, enkele, of al deze mogelijkheden==, en de instrumenten en diensten die je gebruikt hangen af van wat jouw doelstellingen zijn. Misschien heb je ook specifieke bedreigingen buiten deze categorieën, en dat is prima! Het belangrijkste is dat je inzicht krijgt in de voordelen en tekortkomingen van de middelen die je gebruikt, want vrijwel geen enkel middel beschermt je tegen elke denkbare bedreiging. -- :material-incognito: Anonimiteit - Het afschermen van jouw online activiteiten van jouw echte identiteit, waardoor je beschermd bent tegen mensen die proberen te achterhalen *jouw* identiteit specifiek. -- :material-target-account: Gerichte aanvallen - Beschermd zijn tegen gerichte hackers of andere kwaadwillenden die toegang proberen te krijgen tot *jouw* gegevens of apparaten specifiek. -- :material-bug-outline: Passieve aanvallen - Beschermd zijn tegen zaken als malware, inbreuken op gegevens en andere aanvallen die tegen veel mensen tegelijk worden uitgevoerd -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks - A vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. -- :material-server-network: Dienstverleners - Bescherming van jouw gegevens tegen dienstverleners, bv. met end-to-endencryptie waardoor jouw gegevens onleesbaar worden voor de server. -- :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance - Bescherming tegen overheidsinstellingen, organisaties, websites en diensten die samenwerken om jouw activiteiten te volgen. -- :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism - Jezelf beschermen tegen grote advertentienetwerken zoals Google en Facebook, en een groot aantal andere gegevensverzamelaars van derden -- :material-account-search: Public Exposure - het beperken van de informatie over je die online toegankelijk is voor zoekmachines of het grote publiek. -- :material-close-outline: Censuur - Voorkomen van gecensureerde toegang tot informatie en zelf gecensureerd worden als je online spreekt +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. Sommige van deze bedreigingen kunnen zwaarder wegen dan andere, afhankelijk van jouw specifieke zorgen. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks and :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Op dezelfde manier is de "gemiddelde consument" misschien in de eerste plaats bezorgd over :material-account-search: Public Exposure van zijn persoonsgegevens, maar moet hij toch op zijn hoede zijn voor op beveiliging gerichte zaken zoals :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks zoals malware die zijn apparaten aantast. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ Apps kunnen geen root-toegang krijgen en hebben alleen toegang tot systeembronne
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: Gerichte aanvallen Gerichte aanvallen tegen een specifieke gebruiker zijn moeilijker aan te pakken. Gangbare aanvalsmethoden zijn het verzenden van schadelijke documenten via e-mails, het uitbuiten van kwetsbaarheden in de browser en het besturingssysteem, en fysieke aanvallen. Als dit voor je een punt van zorg is, moet je mogelijk meer geavanceerde strategieën ter beperking van bedreigingen toepassen. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ Gerichte aanvallen tegen een specifieke gebruiker zijn moeilijker aan te pakken. If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). Je moet er ook voor zorgen dat jouw schijf versleuteld is, en dat het besturingssysteem een TPM of Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) of [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) gebruikt voor het beperken van de snelheid waarmee pogingen worden gedaan om de wachtwoordzin voor de versleuteling in te voeren. Je moet voorkomen dat je jouw computer deelt met mensen die je niet vertrouwt, omdat de meeste desktopbesturingssystemen gegevens niet afzonderlijk per gebruiker versleutelen. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting so There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out: -1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code. 3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers. -These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: +These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. +1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. -5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. +5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. -## Privacy van dienstverleners +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: Dienstverleners @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ Gelukkig kan end-to-end encryptie dit probleem verlichten door de communicatie t In de praktijk varieert de doeltreffendheid van verschillende implementaties van end-to-end encryptie. Toepassingen zoals [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal) draaien op het toestel zelf, en elke kopie van de toepassing is hetzelfde voor verschillende installaties. Als de dienstverlener een backdoor in zijn applicatie zou aanbrengen om te proberen jouw privé-sleutels te stelen, zou dat later met reverse engineering kunnen worden opgespoord. -Anderzijds vertrouwen webgebaseerde end-to-end encryptie-implementaties, zoals Proton Mail's webmail of Bitwarden's web vault, erop dat de server dynamisch JavaScript-code naar de browser stuurt om cryptografische operaties uit te voeren. Een kwaadwillende server zou zich op een specifieke gebruiker kunnen richten en hem kwaadwillige JavaScript-code sturen om zijn encryptiesleutel te stelen, en het zou uiterst moeilijk zijn voor de gebruiker om zoiets ooit op te merken. Zelfs als de gebruiker de poging om zijn sleutel te stelen opmerkt, zou het ongelooflijk moeilijk zijn om te bewijzen dat het de provider is die dit probeert, omdat de server ervoor kan kiezen om verschillende webclients aan verschillende gebruikers aan te bieden. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. Een kwaadwillende server zou zich op een specifieke gebruiker kunnen richten en hem kwaadwillige JavaScript-code sturen om zijn encryptiesleutel te stelen, en het zou uiterst moeilijk zijn voor de gebruiker om zoiets ooit op te merken. Zelfs als de gebruiker de poging om zijn sleutel te stelen opmerkt, zou het ongelooflijk moeilijk zijn om te bewijzen dat het de provider is die dit probeert, omdat de server ervoor kan kiezen om verschillende webclients aan verschillende gebruikers aan te bieden. Wanneer je vertrouwt op end-to-end encryptie, moet je daarom waar mogelijk native applicaties verkiezen boven web clients. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice -Regeringen rechtvaardigen massasurveillanceprogramma's vaak als noodzakelijke middelen om terrorisme te bestrijden en misdaad te voorkomen. Het schendt echter de mensenrechten en wordt meestal gebruikt om zich buitenproportioneel te richten op onder andere minderheidsgroepen en politieke dissidenten. +Regeringen rechtvaardigen massasurveillanceprogramma's vaak als noodzakelijke middelen om terrorisme te bestrijden en misdaad te voorkomen. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS Ondanks de toenemende massasurveillance in de Verenigde Staten heeft de regering vastgesteld dat massasurveillanceprogramma's zoals Section 215 "weinig unieke waarde" hebben gehad wat betreft het stoppen van daadwerkelijke misdaden of terroristische complotten, waarbij de inspanningen grotendeels de eigen gerichte surveillanceprogramma's van de FBI dupliceren.[^2] -Ondanks de toenemende massasurveillance in de Verenigde Staten is de regering tot de conclusie gekomen dat massasurveillanceprogramma's zoals Sectie 215 "weinig unieke waarde" hebben gehad wat betreft het stoppen van echte misdaden of terroristische complotten, waarbij de inspanningen grotendeels een herhaling zijn van de eigen gerichte surveillanceprogramma's van de FBI.[^1] +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - Jouw IP-adres - Browser cookies @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ Ondanks de toenemende massasurveillance in de Verenigde Staten is de regering to - Jouw browser of apparaat vingerafdruk - Correlatie van betalingsmethodes -\[Deze lijst is niet uitputtend]. - If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: Surveillance kapitalisme > Het surveillance kapitalisme is een economisch systeem dat draait om het vastleggen en verhandelen van persoonsgegevens met als hoofddoel het maken van winst.[^2] diff --git a/i18n/nl/desktop.md b/i18n/nl/desktop.md index 0e2eca97..d5ff3fe7 100644 --- a/i18n/nl/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/nl/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - Free and open source. - Receives regular software and kernel updates. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Supports full-disk encryption during installation. - Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. diff --git a/i18n/nl/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/nl/os/linux-overview.md index 513e4d98..f5fa21a6 100644 --- a/i18n/nl/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/nl/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/nl/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/nl/os/windows/index.md index 2e374f6e..8f39677f 100644 --- a/i18n/nl/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/nl/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Privacy Opmerkingen -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/pl/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/pl/basics/common-misconceptions.md index b0066544..6832f170 100644 --- a/i18n/pl/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/pl/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis. -Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] +Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering. diff --git a/i18n/pl/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/pl/basics/common-threats.md index 7d8bf19a..7b040b0b 100644 --- a/i18n/pl/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/pl/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: Your threat model is personal to you, but these are some of the thi Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside of these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat. -- :material-incognito: Anonymity - Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. -- :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks - Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. -- :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks - Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks - A vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. -- :material-server-network: Service Providers - Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). -- :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance - Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. -- :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism - Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. -- :material-account-search: Public Exposure - Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. -- :material-close-outline: Censorship - Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. Some of these threats may be more important to you than others, depending on your specific concerns. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks and :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Similarly, many people may be primarily concerned with :material-account-search: Public Exposure of their personal data, but they should still be wary of security-focused issues, such as :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks—like malware affecting their devices. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS ha
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks Targeted attacks against a specific person are more problematic to deal with. Common attacks include sending malicious documents via email, exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g. in browsers and operating systems), and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you should employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typi If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting so There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out: -1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code. 3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers. -These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: +These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. +1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. -5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. +5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. -## Privacy From Service Providers +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: Service Providers @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between y In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering). -On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice -Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, breaching human rights, it's most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others. +Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^2] -Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - Your IP address - Browser cookies @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: - Your browser or device fingerprint - Payment method correlation -\[This list isn't exhaustive]. - If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism > Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/pl/desktop.md b/i18n/pl/desktop.md index 1cff547b..0ceb203d 100644 --- a/i18n/pl/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/pl/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - Free and open source. - Receives regular software and kernel updates. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Supports full-disk encryption during installation. - Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. diff --git a/i18n/pl/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/pl/os/linux-overview.md index e0984df0..72c8d7a8 100644 --- a/i18n/pl/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/pl/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/pl/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/pl/os/windows/index.md index 8217591b..6238bb21 100644 --- a/i18n/pl/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/pl/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Privacy Notes -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/pt-BR/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/pt-BR/basics/common-misconceptions.md index bd71c321..2641a206 100644 --- a/i18n/pt-BR/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/pt-BR/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: Estes mitos resultam de uma série de preconceitos, mas se o código fonte está disponível e a forma como o software é licenciado não afecta de modo algum a sua segurança de forma inerente. ==Software de código aberto tem o *potencial* para ser mais seguro do que um software proprietário, mas não existe qualquer garantia de que assim seja.== Quando se avalia o software, se deve olhar a reputação e a segurança de cada ferramenta numa base individual. -O software de código aberto *pode* ser auditado por terceiros, e é muitas vezes mais transparente sobre potenciais vulnerabilidades do que os seus equivalentes proprietários. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] +O software de código aberto *pode* ser auditado por terceiros, e é muitas vezes mais transparente sobre potenciais vulnerabilidades do que os seus equivalentes proprietários. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering. diff --git a/i18n/pt-BR/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/pt-BR/basics/common-threats.md index 2b5e0cba..9256c582 100644 --- a/i18n/pt-BR/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/pt-BR/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: Seu modelo de ameaça é personalizado para você, mas estas são a Em resumo, nós agrupamos nossas recomendações considerando as [ameaças](threat-modeling.md) ou objetivos que se aplicam à maioria das pessoas. ==Você pode estar preocupado com nenhuma, uma, poucas ou todas essas possibilidades==, e as ferramentas e serviços para você usar vão de depender de quais são seus objetivos. Você também pode ter ameaças específicas fora dessas categorias, o que é perfeitamente normal! A parte importante é desenvolver um entendimento dos benefícios e das deficiências das ferramentas que você escolher usar, pois, praticamente nenhuma delas o protegerá de todas as ameaças. -- :material-incognito: Anonimato — Proteger sua atividade on-line de sua identidade real, proteger você de pessoas que estão tentando descobrir especificamente *sua* identidade. -- :material-target-account: Ataques Direcionados — Estar protegido contra hackers ou outros agentes mal-intencionados que estão tentando obter acesso especificamente aos *seus* dados ou dispositivos. -- :material-bug-outline: Ataques Passivos — Estar protegido contra coisas como vírus (malware), violações de dados e outros ataques feitos contra muitas pessoas ao mesmo tempo. -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks - A vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. -- :material-server-network: Provedores de Serviço — Proteger seus dados de provedores de serviços (por exemplo, com ponta-a-ponta (E2EE), que torna seus dados ilegíveis para o servidor). -- :material-eye-outline: Vigilância em Massa — Proteção contra agências governamentais, organizações, sites e serviços que trabalham juntos para rastrear suas atividades. -- :material-account-cash: Capitalismo de Vigilância — Proteção contra grandes redes de publicidade, como Google e Facebook, bem como uma infinidade de outros coletores de dados de terceiros. -- :material-account-search: Exposição Pública — Limitar as informações sobre você que podem ser acessadas on-line — para mecanismos de pesquisa ou para o público em geral. -- :material-close-outline: Censura — Evitar a censura que afeta o acesso às informações ou que você mesmo seja censurado ao falar on-line. +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. Algumas dessas ameaças podem ser mais importantes para você do que outras, dependendo de suas preocupações específicas. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks and :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Da mesma forma, muitas pessoas podem estar preocupadas principalmente com a :material-account-search: Exposição Pública de seus dados pessoais, mas ainda assim devem ser cautelosas com questões voltadas para a segurança, como :material-bug-outline: Ataques Passivos — como vírus (malware) que afeta seus dispositivos. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ Sistemas operacionais de mesa geralmente ficam para trás em termos de isolament
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: Ataques Direcionados Ataques direcionados contra uma pessoa específica são mais problemáticos de lidar. Os ataques comuns incluem o envio de documentos maliciosos por e-mail, a exploração de vulnerabilidades (por exemplo, em navegadores e sistemas operacionais) e ataques físicos. Se isso for uma preocupação para você, deverá empregar estratégias mais avançadas de atenuação de ameaças. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ Por padrão, **navegadores da Internet**, **clientes de e-mail** e **aplicativos If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting so There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out: -1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code. 3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers. -These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: +These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. +1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. -5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. +5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. -## Privacidade dos Prestadores de Serviços +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: Service Providers @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between y In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering). -On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice -Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, breaching human rights, it's most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others. +Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^2] -Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - Your IP address - Cookies do navegador @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: - A impressão digital do seu navegador ou dispositivo - Correlação dos métodos de pagamento -\[Esta lista não é exaustiva]. - If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism > Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/pt-BR/desktop.md b/i18n/pt-BR/desktop.md index 78fc8cb9..6473d044 100644 --- a/i18n/pt-BR/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/pt-BR/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - Free and open source. - Receives regular software and kernel updates. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Supports full-disk encryption during installation. - Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. diff --git a/i18n/pt-BR/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/pt-BR/os/linux-overview.md index 64fd1c94..1dd62f98 100644 --- a/i18n/pt-BR/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/pt-BR/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/pt-BR/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/pt-BR/os/windows/index.md index 8217591b..6238bb21 100644 --- a/i18n/pt-BR/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/pt-BR/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Privacy Notes -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/pt/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/pt/basics/common-misconceptions.md index dec11125..11ffdc8c 100644 --- a/i18n/pt/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/pt/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: Estes mitos têm origem numa série de preconceitos, mas o facto de o código-fonte estar ou não disponível e como o software é licenciado não afetam de forma alguma a sua segurança. ==O software de código aberto tem o *potencial* de ser mais seguro do que o software proprietário, mas não há qualquer garantia de que seja esse o caso.== Ao avaliar o software, deve analisar a reputação e a segurança de cada ferramenta numa base individual. -O software de código aberto *pode* ser auditado por terceiros e é frequentemente mais transparente relativamente a potenciais vulnerabilidades do que as contrapartes proprietárias. Permite-lhe também rever o código e desativar qualquer funcionalidade suspeita que encontre. No entanto, *a menos que o faça*, não há garantia de que o código tenha sido alguma vez avaliado, especialmente em projetos de software menores. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] +O software de código aberto *pode* ser auditado por terceiros e é frequentemente mais transparente relativamente a potenciais vulnerabilidades do que as contrapartes proprietárias. Permite-lhe também rever o código e desativar qualquer funcionalidade suspeita que encontre. No entanto, *a menos que o faça*, não há garantia de que o código tenha sido alguma vez avaliado, especialmente em projetos de software menores. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] Por outro lado, o software proprietário é menos transparente, mas isso não significa que não seja seguro. Os principais projetos de software proprietário podem ser auditados internamente e por agências terceiras, e os investigadores de segurança independentes podem ainda encontrar vulnerabilidades com técnicas como a engenharia inversa. diff --git a/i18n/pt/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/pt/basics/common-threats.md index 97f47cda..9b240298 100644 --- a/i18n/pt/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/pt/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: Cada utilizador tem o seu modelo de ameaça, mas estes são alguns Em termos gerais, categorizamos as nossas recomendações no tipo de [ameaças](threat-modeling.md) ou objetivos que se aplicam à maioria das pessoas. ==Pode preocupar-se com nenhuma, uma, algumas ou todas estas possibilidades==, e as ferramentas e serviços que utiliza dependem dos seus objetivos. Também pode ter ameaças específicas fora destas categorias, o que é perfeitamente normal! O que importa realmente é que compreenda as vantagens e desvantagens das ferramentas que escolher, uma vez que praticamente nenhuma delas o protegerá de todas as ameaças. -- :material-incognito: Anonimato - Protege a sua atividade online da sua identidade real, protegendo-o de pessoas que estão a tentar descobrir *a sua * identidade. -- :material-target-account: Ataques direcionados - Estar protegido contra hackers ou outros agentes maliciosos que estão a tentar obter acesso aos *seus* dados ou dispositivos. -- :material-bug-outline: Ataques passivos - Estar protegido contra coisas como malware, violações de dados e outros ataques que são feitos contra muitas pessoas ao mesmo tempo. -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks - A vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. -- :material-server-network: Fornecedores de serviços - Proteger os seus dados dos fornecedores de serviços (por exemplo, com E2EE, que torna os seus dados ilegíveis para o servidor). -- :material-eye-outline: Vigilância em massa - Proteção contra agências governamentais, organizações, sites e serviços que trabalham em conjunto para seguir as suas atividades. -- :material-account-cash: Capitalismo de vigilância - Proteger-se das grandes redes de marketing, como o Google e o Facebook, bem como de uma miríade de outros coletores de dados de terceiros. -- :material-account-search: Exposição pública - Limitar as informações sobre si que estão acessíveis online - para motores de busca ou para o público em geral. -- :material-close-outline: Censura - Evitar a censura ao acesso de informações ou quando nos expressamos online. +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. Algumas destas ameaças podem ser mais importantes para si do que outras, dependendo das suas preocupações específicas. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks and :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Da mesma forma, muitas pessoas podem estar principalmente preocupadas com a :material-account-search: Exposição pública dos seus dados pessoais, mas podem também importar-se com questões de segurança, como :material-bug-outline: Ataques passivos- como o malware que afeta os seus dispositivos. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ Os sistemas operativos para desktop deixam a desejar no que diz respeito a uma a
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: Ataques direcionados Os ataques direcionados contra uma pessoa específica são mais problemáticos de tratar. Os ataques mais comuns incluem o envio de documentos maliciosos por e-mail, a exploração de vulnerabilidades (por exemplo, em navegadores e sistemas operativos) e ataques físicos. Se isto for uma preocupação para si, deve utilizar estratégias de mitigação de ameaças mais avançadas. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ Por definição, os **browsers**, os **clientes de e-mail** e as **suites de esc If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). Deve também certificar-se de que a sua unidade está encriptada e que o sistema operativo utiliza um TPM, Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) ou [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) para limitar as tentativas de introdução da frase-chave de encriptação. Deve evitar partilhar o seu computador com pessoas em quem não confia, uma vez que a maioria dos sistemas operativos de computador de secretária não encripta os dados separadamente por utilizador. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting so There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out: -1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code. 3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers. -These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: +These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. +1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. -5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. +5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. -## Privacidade dos prestadores de serviços +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: Fornecedores de serviços @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ Felizmente, a E2EE pode aliviar este problema, através da encriptação das com Na prática, a eficácia das diferentes implementações E2EE varia. As aplicações, como o [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), são executadas nativamente no seu dispositivo e todas as cópias da aplicação são as mesmas em diferentes instalações. Se o fornecedor de serviços introduzisse um [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) na sua aplicação - numa tentativa de roubar as suas chaves privadas - esse facto poderia mais tarde ser detetado através de [engenharia inversa] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering). -Por outro lado, as implementações E2EE baseadas na Web, como o webmail do Proton Mail ou o *Web Vault* da Bitwarden, dependem do servidor que fornece dinamicamente código JavaScript ao browser para tratar da criptografia. Um servidor malicioso pode visá-lo e enviar-lhe código JavaScript malicioso para roubar a sua chave de encriptação (e seria extremamente difícil de notar). Uma vez que o servidor pode optar por servir clientes Web diferentes a pessoas diferentes - mesmo que se tenha apercebido do ataque - seria incrivelmente difícil provar a culpa do fornecedor. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. Um servidor malicioso pode visá-lo e enviar-lhe código JavaScript malicioso para roubar a sua chave de encriptação (e seria extremamente difícil de notar). Uma vez que o servidor pode optar por servir clientes Web diferentes a pessoas diferentes - mesmo que se tenha apercebido do ataque - seria incrivelmente difícil provar a culpa do fornecedor. Por conseguinte, sempre que possível, deve utilizar aplicações nativas em vez de clientes Web. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice -Os governos justificam frequentemente os programas de vigilância em massa como meios necessários para combater o terrorismo e prevenir a criminalidade. No entanto, e violando os direitos humanos, é mais frequentemente utilizado para atingir de forma desproporcionada grupos minoritários e dissidentes políticos, entre outros. +Os governos justificam frequentemente os programas de vigilância em massa como meios necessários para combater o terrorismo e prevenir a criminalidade. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS Apesar da crescente vigilância em massa nos Estados Unidos, o governo concluiu que os programas de vigilância em massa, como a Secção 215, têm tido "pouco valor único" no que diz respeito a impedir crimes reais ou conspirações terroristas, com esforços que duplicam em grande parte os programas de vigilância direcionada do próprio FBI.[^2] -Enquanto online, pode ser seguido através de uma variedade de métodos: +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - O seu endereço IP - Cookies do browser @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ Enquanto online, pode ser seguido através de uma variedade de métodos: - A impressão digital do seu browser ou dispositivo - Correlação dos métodos de pagamento -\[Esta não é uma lista exaustiva]. - If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: Capitalismo de vigilância > O capitalismo de vigilância é um sistema económico centrado na captura e mercantilização de dados pessoais, com o objetivo principal de gerar lucro.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/pt/desktop.md b/i18n/pt/desktop.md index 1b52a5df..d1caefea 100644 --- a/i18n/pt/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/pt/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - Free and open source. - Receives regular software and kernel updates. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Supports full-disk encryption during installation. - Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. diff --git a/i18n/pt/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/pt/os/linux-overview.md index fb2e61ab..f0c32c6c 100644 --- a/i18n/pt/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/pt/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/pt/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/pt/os/windows/index.md index 8217591b..6238bb21 100644 --- a/i18n/pt/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/pt/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Privacy Notes -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/ru/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/ru/basics/common-misconceptions.md index 105ff3d4..07aef48e 100644 --- a/i18n/ru/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/ru/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: Эти мифы проистекают из ряда предрассудков, однако доступность исходного кода и способ лицензирования программного обеспечения по своей сути никак не влияют на его безопасность. ==Программное обеспечение с открытым исходным кодом имеет *потенциал* быть более безопасным, чем проприетарное программное обеспечение, но нет абсолютно никаких гарантий, что это так.== Когда вы оцениваете программное обеспечение, вы должны смотреть на репутацию и безопасность каждого инструмента в отдельности. -Программное обеспечение с открытым исходным кодом *может* проверяться третьими сторонами, и зачастую оно более прозрачно в отношении потенциальных уязвимостей, чем проприетарные аналоги. Оно также позволяет просматривать код и отключать любые подозрительные функции, которые вы обнаружите. Однако, *если вы не сделаете этого*, нет никакой гарантии того, что код когда-либо проверялся, особенно в небольших проектах. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] +Программное обеспечение с открытым исходным кодом *может* проверяться третьими сторонами, и зачастую оно более прозрачно в отношении потенциальных уязвимостей, чем проприетарные аналоги. Оно также позволяет просматривать код и отключать любые подозрительные функции, которые вы обнаружите. Однако, *если вы не сделаете этого*, нет никакой гарантии того, что код когда-либо проверялся, особенно в небольших проектах. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] С другой стороны, проприетарное программное обеспечение менее прозрачно, но это не означает, что оно небезопасно. Крупные проекты по разработке проприетарного программного обеспечения могут подвергаться внутреннему аудиту и аудиту сторонних организаций, а независимые исследователи безопасности все еще могут находить уязвимости с помощью таких методов, как реверс-инжиниринг. diff --git a/i18n/ru/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/ru/basics/common-threats.md index 51da8988..f485b9fd 100644 --- a/i18n/ru/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/ru/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: Модель угрозы уникальна для каждого, В широком смысле мы разделяем наши рекомендации по категориям [угроз](threat-modeling.md) или целей, которые применимы к большинству людей. ==Вас может волновать одна, несколько, все эти возможности или они могут не волновать вас вовсе==, и инструменты и услуги, которые вы используете, зависят от ваших целей. У тебя могут быть специфичные угрозы, не относящиеся к этим категориям, что определённо нормально! Важной частью является развитие понимания преимуществ и недостатков инструментов, которые ты решил использовать, потому что ни один из них не защитит тебя от всех угроз. -- :material-incognito: Анонимность - изоляция твоей деятельности в интернете от твоей настоящей личности, защита тебя от людей, пытающихся раскрыть *именно твою* личность. -- :material-target-account: Таргетированные атаки - защита от хакеров и других злоумышленников, которые пытаются получить доступ к *именно твоим* данным и устройствам. -- :material-bug-outline: Пассивные атаки - защита от таких вещей, как вредоносное ПО, утечка данных и других атак, которые совершаются одновременно против многих людей. -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks - A vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. -- :material-server-network: Поставщики услуг - защита твоих данных от поставщиков услуг (например, с помощью E2EE, которое делает твои данные нечитаемыми для сервера). -- :material-eye-outline: Массовая слежка - защита от правительственных агентств, организаций, веб-сайтов и служб, которые совместно отслеживают твою активность. -- :material-account-cash: Капитализм слежки - Защита от крупных рекламных сетей, таких как Google и Facebook, а также от множества других сторонних сборщиков данных. -- :material-account-search: Публичная экспозиция - ограничение информации о вас, которая доступна онлайн поисковым системам или широкой общественности. -- :material-close-outline: Цензура - избегание цензуры как для доступа к информации, так и для её создания онлайн. +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. В зависимости от твоих конкретных ситуаций, некоторые угрозы могут быть более важные, чем другие. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks and :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Аналогичным образом, многие люди могут быть в первую очередь обеспокоены :material-account-search: публичной экспозицией своих личных данных, но им все равно следует опасаться проблем, связанных с безопасностью, таких как :material-bug-outline: пассивные атаки - например, вредоносных программ, воздействующих на их устройства. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ description: Модель угрозы уникальна для каждого,
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: Целевые атаки С целенаправленными атаками на конкретного человека бороться сложнее. К распространенным атакам относятся рассылка вредоносных документов по электронной почте, использование уязвимостей (например, в браузерах и операционных системах) и физические атаки. Если это вас беспокоит, вам следует использовать более продвинутые стратегии защиты от угроз. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ description: Модель угрозы уникальна для каждого, If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). Также следует убедиться, что диск зашифрован и что операционная система использует TPM или [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) или [Secure Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) для ограничения количества попыток ввода парольной фразы шифрования. Вам следует избегать совместного использования компьютера с людьми, которым вы не доверяете, поскольку большинство настольных операционных систем не шифруют данные отдельно для каждого пользователя. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting so There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out: -1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code. 3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers. -These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: +These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. +1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. -5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. +5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. -## Конфиденциальность от поставщиков услуг +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: Поставщики услуг @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and На практике эффективность различных реализаций E2EE может варьироваться. Приложения, такие как [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), работают на вашем устройстве, и каждая копия приложения является одинаковой при различных установках. Если поставщик услуг внедрит [backdoor](https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%91%D1%8D%D0%BA%D0%B4%D0%BE%D1%80) в свое приложение - в попытке украсть ваши закрытые ключи - это можно будет обнаружить с помощью [reverse engineering](https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9E%D0%B1%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%8F_%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B7%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%BA%D0%B0). -С другой стороны, реализации E2EE, такие, как почта Proton Mail или *Web Vault* от Bitwarden, полагаются на то, что сервер динамически предоставляет браузеру код JavaScript для обработки криптографии. Вредоносный сервер может нацелиться на вас и отправить вам вредоносный код JavaScript, чтобы украсть ваш ключ шифрования (и это будет крайне сложно заметить). Поскольку сервер может выбирать для обслуживания разных веб-клиентов разных людей - даже если вы заметили атаку - доказать вину провайдера будет невероятно сложно. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. Вредоносный сервер может нацелиться на вас и отправить вам вредоносный код JavaScript, чтобы украсть ваш ключ шифрования (и это будет крайне сложно заметить). Поскольку сервер может выбирать для обслуживания разных веб-клиентов разных людей - даже если вы заметили атаку - доказать вину провайдера будет невероятно сложно. Поэтому при любой возможности следует использовать нативные приложения вместо веб-клиентов. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice -Правительства часто оправдывают программы массовой слежки как необходимые средства для борьбы с терроризмом и предотвращения преступлений. Однако, нарушая права человека, она чаще всего используется для непропорционального преследования меньшинств и политических диссидентов. +Правительства часто оправдывают программы массовой слежки как необходимые средства для борьбы с терроризмом и предотвращения преступлений. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS Несмотря на растущую массовую слежку в Соединенных Штатах, правительство обнаружило, что программы массовой слежки, такие как Раздел 215, имеют "мало уникальной ценности" в отношении пресечения реальных преступлений или террористических заговоров, а усилия в основном дублируют собственные целевые программы слежки ФБР.[^2] -В Интернете тебя можно отследить по различным параметрам: +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - Твой IP адрес - Файлы cookie в браузере @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS - Цифровой отпечаток твоего браузера или устройства - Корреляция способов оплаты -\[Этот список не является исчерпывающим]. - If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: Капитализм слежки > Капитализм слежки - это экономическая система, сосредоточенная вокруг сбора и коммерциализации персональных данных с основной целью получения прибыли.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/ru/desktop.md b/i18n/ru/desktop.md index 5d26eaf0..19ba33a6 100644 --- a/i18n/ru/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/ru/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - Free and open source. - Receives regular software and kernel updates. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Supports full-disk encryption during installation. - Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. diff --git a/i18n/ru/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/ru/os/linux-overview.md index bf6d463b..750fcad1 100644 --- a/i18n/ru/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/ru/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/ru/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/ru/os/windows/index.md index 8217591b..6238bb21 100644 --- a/i18n/ru/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/ru/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Privacy Notes -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/sv/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/sv/basics/common-misconceptions.md index b0066544..6832f170 100644 --- a/i18n/sv/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/sv/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis. -Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] +Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering. diff --git a/i18n/sv/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/sv/basics/common-threats.md index d6688f54..bfabc6ba 100644 --- a/i18n/sv/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/sv/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: Your threat model is personal to you, but these are some of the thi Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside of these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat. -- :material-incognito: Anonymity - Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. -- :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks - Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. -- :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks - Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks - A vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. -- :material-server-network: Service Providers - Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). -- :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance - Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. -- :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism - Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. -- :material-account-search: Public Exposure - Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. -- :material-close-outline: Censorship - Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. Some of these threats may be more important to you than others, depending on your specific concerns. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks and :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Similarly, many people may be primarily concerned with :material-account-search: Public Exposure of their personal data, but they should still be wary of security-focused issues, such as :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks—like malware affecting their devices. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ Skrivbordsoperativsystem släpar i allmänhet efter vid korrekt sandlåda. Chrom
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: Riktade attacker Riktade attacker mot en specifik person är mer problematiska att hantera. Vanliga attacker är att skicka skadliga dokument via e-post, utnyttja sårbarheter (t.ex. i webbläsare och operativsystem) och fysiska attacker. Om detta är ett problem för dig bör du använda mer avancerade strategier för att minska hoten. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ I **webbläsare**, **emailklienter** och **kontorsprogram** körs vanligtvis kod If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). Du bör också se till att enheten är krypterad och att operativsystemet använder en TPM eller Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) eller [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) för att begränsa försöken att ange krypteringsfrasen. Du bör undvika att dela din dator med personer du inte litar på, eftersom de flesta stationära operativsystem inte krypterar data separat per användare. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting so There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out: -1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code. 3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers. -These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: +These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. +1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. -5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. +5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. -## Sekretess från tjänsteleverantörer +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: Tjänsteleverantörer @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ Tack och lov kan E2EE lindra detta problem genom att kryptera kommunikationen me I praktiken varierar effektiviteten i olika E2EE-genomföranden. Applikationer, till exempel [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), körs naturligt på din enhet, och varje kopia av applikationen är densamma över olika installationer. Om tjänsteleverantören skulle införa en [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) i sitt program - i ett försök att stjäla dina privata nycklar - skulle det senare kunna upptäckas med [reverse engineering] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering). -Å andra sidan är webbaserade E2EE-implementationer, som Proton Mail-webmail eller Bitwardens *Web Vault*, beroende av att servern dynamiskt serverar JavaScript-kod till webbläsaren för att hantera kryptografi. En skadlig server kan rikta dig och skicka skadlig JavaScript-kod för att stjäla din krypteringsnyckel (och det skulle vara extremt svårt att märka). Eftersom servern kan välja att betjäna olika webbklienter till olika människor - även om du märkte attacken - skulle det vara otroligt svårt att bevisa leverantörens skuld. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. En skadlig server kan rikta dig och skicka skadlig JavaScript-kod för att stjäla din krypteringsnyckel (och det skulle vara extremt svårt att märka). Eftersom servern kan välja att betjäna olika webbklienter till olika människor - även om du märkte attacken - skulle det vara otroligt svårt att bevisa leverantörens skuld. Därför bör du använda inbyggda applikationer över webbklienter när det är möjligt. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice -Regeringar rättfärdigar ofta massövervakningsprogram som nödvändiga medel för att bekämpa terrorism och förebygga brottslighet. Men kränker de mänskliga rättigheterna, är det oftast används för att oproportionerligt rikta minoritetsgrupper och politiska dissidenter, bland annat. +Regeringar rättfärdigar ofta massövervakningsprogram som nödvändiga medel för att bekämpa terrorism och förebygga brottslighet. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS Trots den ökande massövervakningen i USA har regeringen konstaterat att massövervakningsprogram som avsnitt 215 har haft "litet unikt värde" när det gäller att stoppa faktiska brott eller terroristplaner, och att insatserna i stort sett har varit en kopia av FBI:s egna riktade övervakningsprogram.[^2] -På nätet kan du spåras på olika sätt: +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - Din IP-adress - Webbläsarcookies @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ På nätet kan du spåras på olika sätt: - Fingeravtryck från din webbläsare eller enhet - Betalningsmetod korrelation -\[Denna lista är inte uttömmande]. - If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: Övervakningskapitalism > Övervakningskapitalism är ett ekonomiskt system som är centrerat kring insamling och kommersialisering av personuppgifter i syfte att skapa vinst.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/sv/desktop.md b/i18n/sv/desktop.md index c12d02b0..e53e8afe 100644 --- a/i18n/sv/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/sv/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - Free and open source. - Receives regular software and kernel updates. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Supports full-disk encryption during installation. - Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. diff --git a/i18n/sv/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/sv/os/linux-overview.md index 75ca7102..96d7f66e 100644 --- a/i18n/sv/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/sv/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/sv/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/sv/os/windows/index.md index 8217591b..6238bb21 100644 --- a/i18n/sv/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/sv/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Privacy Notes -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/tr/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/tr/basics/common-misconceptions.md index b0066544..6832f170 100644 --- a/i18n/tr/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/tr/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis. -Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] +Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering. diff --git a/i18n/tr/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/tr/basics/common-threats.md index 7d8bf19a..7b040b0b 100644 --- a/i18n/tr/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/tr/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: Your threat model is personal to you, but these are some of the thi Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside of these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat. -- :material-incognito: Anonymity - Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. -- :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks - Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. -- :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks - Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks - A vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. -- :material-server-network: Service Providers - Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). -- :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance - Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. -- :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism - Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. -- :material-account-search: Public Exposure - Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. -- :material-close-outline: Censorship - Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. Some of these threats may be more important to you than others, depending on your specific concerns. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks and :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Similarly, many people may be primarily concerned with :material-account-search: Public Exposure of their personal data, but they should still be wary of security-focused issues, such as :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks—like malware affecting their devices. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS ha
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks Targeted attacks against a specific person are more problematic to deal with. Common attacks include sending malicious documents via email, exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g. in browsers and operating systems), and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you should employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typi If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting so There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out: -1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code. 3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers. -These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: +These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. +1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. -5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. +5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. -## Privacy From Service Providers +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: Service Providers @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between y In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering). -On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice -Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, breaching human rights, it's most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others. +Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^2] -Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - Your IP address - Browser cookies @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: - Your browser or device fingerprint - Payment method correlation -\[This list isn't exhaustive]. - If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism > Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/tr/desktop.md b/i18n/tr/desktop.md index b1992e51..d154b811 100644 --- a/i18n/tr/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/tr/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - Free and open source. - Receives regular software and kernel updates. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Supports full-disk encryption during installation. - Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. diff --git a/i18n/tr/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/tr/os/linux-overview.md index aaa2f89c..4a38ed81 100644 --- a/i18n/tr/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/tr/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/tr/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/tr/os/windows/index.md index 8217591b..6238bb21 100644 --- a/i18n/tr/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/tr/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Privacy Notes -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/uk/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/uk/basics/common-misconceptions.md index 68ce9d70..4314348b 100644 --- a/i18n/uk/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/uk/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: Ці міфи випливають з низки упереджень, але доступність вихідного коду та спосіб ліцензування програмного забезпечення жодним чином не впливають на його безпеку. == Програмне забезпечення з відкритим вихідним кодом має *потенціал* бути безпечнішим, ніж пропрієтарне програмне забезпечення, але немає жодних гарантій, що це так.== Коли ви оцінюєте програмне забезпечення, ви повинні дивитися на репутацію та безпеку кожного інструменту на індивідуальній основі. -Програмне забезпечення з відкритим кодом *може* перевірятися третіми сторонами і часто є більш прозорим щодо потенційних вразливостей, ніж пропрієтарні аналоги. Це також дає змогу ознайомитися з кодом та вимкнути всі підозрілі функції, які ви знайдете самі. Однак, *якщо ви не зробите цього*, немає ніякої гарантії, що код коли-небудь оцінювався, особливо для невеликих проєктів. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] +Програмне забезпечення з відкритим кодом *може* перевірятися третіми сторонами і часто є більш прозорим щодо потенційних вразливостей, ніж пропрієтарні аналоги. Це також дає змогу ознайомитися з кодом та вимкнути всі підозрілі функції, які ви знайдете самі. Однак, *якщо ви не зробите цього*, немає ніякої гарантії, що код коли-небудь оцінювався, особливо для невеликих проєктів. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] З іншого боку, пропрієтарне програмне забезпечення менш прозоре, але це не означає, що воно не є безпечним. Великі проєкти пропрієтарного програмного забезпечення можуть бути перевірені як внутрішніми, так і сторонніми організаціями, а незалежні дослідники безпеки все ще можуть знайти вразливості за допомогою таких методів, як зворотна інженерія. diff --git a/i18n/uk/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/uk/basics/common-threats.md index 5f461b22..625d2b03 100644 --- a/i18n/uk/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/uk/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: Ваша модель загроз є особистою, але ц Загалом, ми класифікуємо наші рекомендації на [загрози](threat-modeling.md) або цілі, які стосуються більшості людей. ==Ви можете бути зацікавлені в жодній, одній, кількох або всіх цих можливостях==, і інструменти та сервіси, які ви використовуєте, залежать від того, які цілі ви ставите перед собою. Ви також можете мати специфічні загрози поза цими категоріями, і це цілком нормально! Важливою частиною є розуміння переваг і недоліків інструментів, які ви обираєте, оскільки практично жоден з них не захистить вас від усіх можливих загроз. -- :material-incognito: Анонімність — розмежування вашої активності в Інтернеті від вашої реальної особистості, захист від людей, які намагаються розкрити саме *вашу* особистість. -- :material-target-account: Цільові атаки — захист від хакерів та інших зловмисників, які намагаються отримати доступ саме до *ваших* даних або пристроїв. -- :material-bug-outline: Пасивні атаки — захист від таких речей, як шкідливе програмне забезпечення, витік даних та інших атак, спрямованих проти багатьох людей одразу. -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks - A vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. -- :material-server-network: Постачальники послуг — захист ваших даних від постачальників послуг (наприклад, за допомогою E2EE, що робить ваші дані нечитабельними для сервера). -- :material-eye-outline: Масове спостереження — захист від державних установ, організацій, веб-сайтів та служб, які працюють разом, щоб відстежувати вашу діяльність. -- :material-account-cash: Капіталізм нагляду — захист від великих рекламних мереж, таких як Google і Facebook, а також безлічі інших сторонніх збирачів даних. -- :material-account-search: Публічний розголос — обмеження інформації про вас, яка доступна в Інтернеті - пошуковим системам або широкій громадськості. -- :material-close-outline: Цензура — уникнення цензурованого доступу до інформації або цензури під час спілкування в Інтернеті. +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. Деякі з цих загроз можуть бути важливішими для вас, ніж інші, залежно від ваших конкретних проблем. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks and :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Аналогічно, багато людей можуть бути в першу чергу стурбовані :material-account-search: публічним розголошенням їхніх персональних даних, але їм все одно слід остерігатися проблем, пов'язаних з безпекою, таких як :material-bug-outline: пасивні атаки — як-от шкідливе програмне забезпечення, що вражає їхні пристрої. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ description: Ваша модель загроз є особистою, але ц
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: Цілеспрямовані атаки З цілеспрямованими атаками на конкретну особу боротися складніше. Поширені атаки включають надсилання шкідливих документів електронною поштою, експлуатацію вразливостей (наприклад, у браузерах та операційних системах) і фізичні атаки. Якщо це викликає у вас занепокоєння, вам слід використовувати більш просунуті стратегії пом'якшення загроз. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ description: Ваша модель загроз є особистою, але ц If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). Також слід переконатися, що ваш диск зашифровано, а операційна система використовує TPM або Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) чи [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) для обмеження кількості спроб введення ключової фрази шифрування. Вам слід уникати спільного використання комп'ютера з людьми, яким ви не довіряєте, оскільки більшість настільних операційних систем не шифрують дані окремо для кожного користувача. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting so There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out: -1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code. 3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers. -These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: +These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. +1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. -5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. +5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. -## Конфіденційність від постачальників послуг +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: Постачальники послуг @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and На практиці ефективність різних реалізацій E2EE відрізняється. Такі додатки як [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal) працюють на вашому пристрої за замовчуванням, і кожна копія програми однакова для різних інсталяцій. Якщо постачальник послуг впровадить [бекдор](https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/Бекдор) у свій додаток — у спробі викрасти ваші приватні ключі — це можна буде пізніше виявити за допомогою [зворотної розробки](https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/Зворотня_розробка). -З іншого боку, веб-реалізації E2EE, такі як веб-пошта Proton Mail або *Web Vault* від Bitwarden, покладаються на сервер, який динамічно надає браузеру код JavaScript для провадження криптографії. Шкідливий сервер може вибрати вас і надіслати вам шкідливий JavaScript-код, щоб викрасти ваш ключ шифрування (і це буде надзвичайно важко помітити). Оскільки сервер може обслуговувати різних веб-клієнтів для різних людей — навіть якщо ви помітили атаку — довести провину провайдера буде неймовірно складно. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. Шкідливий сервер може вибрати вас і надіслати вам шкідливий JavaScript-код, щоб викрасти ваш ключ шифрування (і це буде надзвичайно важко помітити). Оскільки сервер може обслуговувати різних веб-клієнтів для різних людей — навіть якщо ви помітили атаку — довести провину провайдера буде неймовірно складно. Тому вам слід використовувати нативні додатки замість веб-клієнтів, коли це можливо. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice -Уряди часто виправдовують програми масового спостереження як необхідні засоби для боротьби з тероризмом і запобігання злочинності. Однак, порушуючи права людини, це найчастіше використовується для непропорційного переслідування груп меншин та політичних дисидентів, серед інших. +Уряди часто виправдовують програми масового спостереження як необхідні засоби для боротьби з тероризмом і запобігання злочинності. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS Незважаючи на зростання масового стеження в США, уряд виявив, що програми масового стеження, такі як Розділ 215, мають "невелику унікальну цінність" щодо припинення реальних злочинів або терористичних змов, а їхні зусилля значною мірою дублюють власні програми цільового стеження, що проводяться ФБР.[^2] -В Інтернеті вас можуть відстежувати різними способами: +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - Ваша IP-адреса - Файли cookie браузера @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS - Відбиток вашого браузера або пристрою - Кореляція способів оплати -\[Цей список не є вичерпним]. - If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: Капіталізм нагляду > Капіталізм нагляду - це економічна система, в основі якої лежить збір і комерціалізація персональних даних з метою отримання прибутку.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/uk/desktop.md b/i18n/uk/desktop.md index 13549cc2..13e2c2a0 100644 --- a/i18n/uk/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/uk/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - Free and open source. - Receives regular software and kernel updates. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Supports full-disk encryption during installation. - Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. diff --git a/i18n/uk/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/uk/os/linux-overview.md index 103c202d..69b537ed 100644 --- a/i18n/uk/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/uk/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/uk/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/uk/os/windows/index.md index 8217591b..6238bb21 100644 --- a/i18n/uk/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/uk/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Privacy Notes -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/vi/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/vi/basics/common-misconceptions.md index b0066544..6832f170 100644 --- a/i18n/vi/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/vi/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis. -Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] +Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering. diff --git a/i18n/vi/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/vi/basics/common-threats.md index 7d8bf19a..7b040b0b 100644 --- a/i18n/vi/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/vi/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: Your threat model is personal to you, but these are some of the thi Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside of these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat. -- :material-incognito: Anonymity - Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. -- :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks - Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. -- :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks - Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks - A vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. -- :material-server-network: Service Providers - Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). -- :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance - Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. -- :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism - Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. -- :material-account-search: Public Exposure - Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. -- :material-close-outline: Censorship - Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. Some of these threats may be more important to you than others, depending on your specific concerns. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks and :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Similarly, many people may be primarily concerned with :material-account-search: Public Exposure of their personal data, but they should still be wary of security-focused issues, such as :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks—like malware affecting their devices. @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS ha
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks Targeted attacks against a specific person are more problematic to deal with. Common attacks include sending malicious documents via email, exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g. in browsers and operating systems), and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you should employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies. @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typi If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user. +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting so There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out: -1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code. 3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers. -These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: +These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. +1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. -5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. +5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. -## Privacy From Service Providers +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: Service Providers @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between y In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering). -On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible. @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice -Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, breaching human rights, it's most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others. +Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^2] -Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - Your IP address - Browser cookies @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods: - Your browser or device fingerprint - Payment method correlation -\[This list isn't exhaustive]. - If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism > Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^3] diff --git a/i18n/vi/desktop.md b/i18n/vi/desktop.md index 7d0cef63..086ee82b 100644 --- a/i18n/vi/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/vi/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - Free and open source. - Receives regular software and kernel updates. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Supports full-disk encryption during installation. - Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. diff --git a/i18n/vi/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/vi/os/linux-overview.md index 103c202d..69b537ed 100644 --- a/i18n/vi/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/vi/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/vi/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/vi/os/windows/index.md index 8217591b..6238bb21 100644 --- a/i18n/vi/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/vi/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Privacy Notes -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/zh-Hant/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/zh-Hant/basics/common-misconceptions.md index 71a1e148..b6757f89 100644 --- a/i18n/zh-Hant/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/zh-Hant/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: 這些迷思源於許多偏見，原始碼是否開放以及軟體的許可並不會以任何方式影響其安全性。 ==開源軟件 *可能* 比商業軟件更安全，但絕對不能保證這一點。==評估軟體時，您應該根據每個工具的聲譽和安全性進行評估。 -開源軟體*能夠*由第三方人員進行審計，比起同類商用軟體，前者對待潛在漏洞更為透明。 它還允許您查看代碼並禁用您發現的任何可疑功能。 然而，*除非您真的這樣做了*，否則不能保證程式碼曾經被評估過，特別是小型軟體專案。 開放開發過程有時也被利用引入新的漏洞，稱為:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks，這些漏洞將在[常見威脅一章](common-threats.md)進一步討論。[^1] +開源軟體*能夠*由第三方人員進行審計，比起同類商用軟體，前者對待潛在漏洞更為透明。 它還允許您查看代碼並禁用您發現的任何可疑功能。 然而，*除非您真的這樣做了*，否則不能保證程式碼曾經被評估過，特別是小型軟體專案。 The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1] 另一方面，專有軟件不太透明，但這並不意味著它不安全。 主要的商用軟件專案會由內部和第三方機構進行審計，獨立的安全研究人員仍然可以通過逆向工程等技術發現漏洞。 diff --git a/i18n/zh-Hant/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/zh-Hant/basics/common-threats.md index 680c5a26..a7b640d2 100644 --- a/i18n/zh-Hant/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/zh-Hant/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: 您的威脅模型雖說是個人的事，但它也是本站許多 廣義來講，我們將建議歸類為適用於大多數人的 [威脅](threat-modeling.md) 或目標。 您可能會在意各種可能性的組合，而選用的工具和服務則取決於您的目標何在。 您也可能有超出這些類別之外的特定威脅，這完全有可能！ 重要的是要了解您選擇使用的工具的好處和缺點，因為幾乎沒有一種工具可以保護您免受任何威脅。 -- :material-incognito: 匿名 -保護您的在線活動免受您真實身份影響，保護您防範某些企圖揭露 *您* 身份的侵害。 -- :material-target-account: 針對性攻擊 -保護免受駭客或其他惡意行為者的攻擊，他們正試圖存取訪問 *您的* 資料或設備。 -- :material-bug-outline: 被動攻擊 -保護免受惡意軟體、數據洩露和其他同時針對多人的攻擊。 -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: 供應鏈攻擊 - 直接或透過第三方依賴軟體引入的弱點或破壞。 -- :material-server-network: 服務供應商 - 保護您的資料免受服務供應商侵害（例如，使用 E2EE ，使您保存在伺服器的資料無法被他人讀取）。 -- :material-eye-outline: 大規模監控 -保護您免受政府機構、組織、網站和服務共同追蹤您的活動。 -- :material-account-cash: 監控資本主義 - 保議自己不會被 Google， Facebook 等大型網路廣告以及其它無數第三方資料收集者監控。 -- :material-account-search: 公開曝光 -限制搜尋引擎或一般大眾可在網路上找到有關您的資訊。 -- :material-close-outline: 審查 -避免資訊被封鎖或自己的網路發言時受到審查。 +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. 其中一些威脅對您來說可能比其他威脅更嚴重，這取決於您的具體問題。 例如，有權存取有價值或關鍵資料的軟體開發人員可能主要關心 :material-package-variant-closed-remove: 供應鏈攻擊 和 :material-target-account: 針對性的攻擊。 他們可能仍然希望保護自己的個人資料免受 :material-eye-outline: 大規模監控 計劃的影響。 同樣，許多人主要關心其個人資料的 :material-account-search: 公開曝光 ，但他們仍應該警惕聚焦安全的問題，例如 :material-bug-outline: 被動攻擊—例如惡意軟件影響他們的設備。 @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ description: 您的威脅模型雖說是個人的事，但它也是本站許多
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: 針對性攻擊 針對特定人士的針對性攻擊更難處理。 常見的攻擊包括通過電子郵件發送惡意文件、利用(瀏覽器和操作系統的)漏洞以及物理攻擊。 如果這是您擔心這點，應該採用更先進的威脅減輕策略。 @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ description: 您的威脅模型雖說是個人的事，但它也是本站許多 若特別擔心 **物理攻擊**，就應選用具安全驗證開機的作業系統，例如 Android, iOS, macOS, 或[Windows (帶 TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process)。 應確保您的驅動器是加密的，並且操作系統使用 TPM或 Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) 或 [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) 來限制輸入加密密碼的嘗試率。 您應該避免與不信任的人共享您的電腦，因為大多數桌面作業系統不會單獨加密每個用戶的數據。 +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: 供應鏈攻擊 供應鏈攻擊往往是 :material-target-account: 針對性攻擊 的一種，其指向企業、政府和活動人士的利益，也可能最終損害廣大公眾的利益。 @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ description: 您的威脅模型雖說是個人的事，但它也是本站許多 執行此類攻擊的方式有以下幾種： -1. 貢獻者或員工可能會努力在專案或組織中獲得權力職位，然後濫用該職位添加惡意程式碼。 +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. 開發人員可能會受到外部脅迫添加惡意程式碼。 3. 個人或團體可能會識別第三方軟體依賴（也稱為庫），並透過上述兩種方法對其進行滲透，因為他們知道它將被「下游」軟體開發人員使用。 -此類攻擊可能需要大量時間和準備才能執行，且存在風險，因為它們可以被檢測到，特別是在開源專案中，如果很受歡迎受到外部關注的話。 不幸的是，它們也是最危險的之一，很難完全緩解。 我們鼓勵讀者僅使用具有良好聲譽的軟體，並透過以下方式努力降低風險： +此類攻擊可能需要大量時間和準備才能執行，且存在風險，因為它們可以被檢測到，特別是在開源專案中，如果很受歡迎受到外部關注的話。 不幸的是，它們也是最危險的之一，很難完全緩解。 We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. 只採用已經存在一段時間的流行軟體。 專案引發的興趣越大，外部各方注意到惡意更改的可能性就越大。 惡意行為者還需要花費更多時間透過有意義的貢獻來贏得社群信任。 +1. 只採用已經存在一段時間的流行軟體。 The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. 惡意行為者還需要花費更多時間透過有意義的貢獻來贏得社群信任。 2. 尋找透過廣泛使用的、可信任的建置基礎架構平台發布二進位檔案的軟體，而不是開發人員工作站或自架伺服器。 某些系統（例如 GitHub Actions）可檢查公開執行的建置腳本，以獲得額外的信心。 這降低了開發人員電腦上的惡意軟體感染其軟體包的可能性，讓人確信生成的二進位檔案是正確生成的。 3. 尋找單一原始碼提交和發布的程式碼簽名，這會建立誰做了什麼的可審計追蹤。 例如：惡意程式碼是否在軟體儲放庫中？ 哪個開發者添加的？ 是建置過程中新增的嗎？ -4. 檢查原始程式碼是否提交有意義的訊息（例如[常規提交](https://conventionalcommits.org)），這些訊息解釋了更改應完成的任務。 清晰的訊息可以讓外部人士更容易驗證、審核和發現錯誤。 -5. 注意程式的貢獻者或維護者的數量。 單獨開發人員可能更容易被外部方強迫添加惡意程式碼，或因疏忽導致不良行為。 這很可能意味著「大型科技公司」開發的軟體比不向任何人負責的單獨開發人員受到更多審查。 +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. 清晰的訊息可以讓外部人士更容易驗證、審核和發現錯誤。 +5. 注意程式的貢獻者或維護者的數量。 A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. 這很可能意味著「大型科技公司」開發的軟體比不向任何人負責的單獨開發人員受到更多審查。 -## 服務供應商的隱私權 +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: 服務提供商 @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ description: 您的威脅模型雖說是個人的事，但它也是本站許多 實際上，不同 E2EE 操作的效力各不相同。 應用程式，例如 [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal)，會在您的裝置上原生執行，且此應用程式在不同設備的安裝上都是如此。 如果服務提供商在他們的應用程序中引入[後門](https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) ----試圖竊取您的私鑰----它稍後可以通過[逆向工程](https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering)檢測。 -另一方面，執行網頁 E2EE，例如 Proton Mail 的網頁郵件或Bitwarden 的 *Web Vault*，依靠伺服器動態地向瀏覽器提供JavaScript 代碼來處理加密。 惡意伺服器可以針對您發送惡意 JavaScript 代碼以竊取您的加密密鑰（這將非常難以察覺）。 因為伺服器可以選擇為不同的人提供不同的網頁用戶端，即使您注意到攻擊也很難證明提供商有罪。 +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. 惡意伺服器可以針對您發送惡意 JavaScript 代碼以竊取您的加密密鑰（這將非常難以察覺）。 因為伺服器可以選擇為不同的人提供不同的網頁用戶端，即使您注意到攻擊也很難證明提供商有罪。 因此，您應該盡可能使用原生軟體程式多於網頁客戶端。 @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ description: 您的威脅模型雖說是個人的事，但它也是本站許多 -政府常認為大規模監控計劃是打擊恐怖主義和預防犯罪的必要手段。 然而，少數羣體和政治異見人士最常遭受不成比例地人權侵害。 +政府常認為大規模監控計劃是打擊恐怖主義和預防犯罪的必要手段。 However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ description: 您的威脅模型雖說是個人的事，但它也是本站許多 儘管在美國有越來越多的大規模監控，政府卻發現像依 215 條採取的監控計畫在阻卻犯案與恐怖陰謀上沒有實用價值，它們幾乎只是重複著 FBI 所做的特定監控計畫而已。[^2] -在網上，您可以通過各種方法進行追蹤： +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - 您的 IP 地址 - 瀏覽器 cookie @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ description: 您的威脅模型雖說是個人的事，但它也是本站許多 - 您的瀏覽器或裝置指紋 - 付款方式關聯 -\ [此列表並非詳盡無缺]。 - 如果您擔心大規模監控計劃，您可以隨時隨地策略性避免提供識別個資，例如劃分您的網路身份，與其他用戶混合。 +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: 監控資本主義 > 監控資本主義的核心是獲取個人資料並將之商品化，以謀求最大利潤的經濟體系。[^3] diff --git a/i18n/zh-Hant/desktop-browsers.md b/i18n/zh-Hant/desktop-browsers.md index 810f95cb..a2bf6dee 100644 --- a/i18n/zh-Hant/desktop-browsers.md +++ b/i18n/zh-Hant/desktop-browsers.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ meta_title: "尊重隱私的 PC 和 Mac 網路瀏覽器 - Privacy Guides" title: "桌面瀏覽器" icon: material/laptop -description: These privacy-protecting browsers are what we currently recommend for standard/non-anonymous internet browsing on desktop systems. +description: 這些保護隱私的瀏覽器是我們目前推薦在桌上型系統上使用的標準/非匿名網路瀏覽器。 cover: desktop-browsers.webp schema: - diff --git a/i18n/zh-Hant/desktop.md b/i18n/zh-Hant/desktop.md index bb21498e..213a4d74 100644 --- a/i18n/zh-Hant/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/zh-Hant/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually ou - 免費且開放原始碼。 - 必須定期接收軟體和內核更新。 -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - 安裝時必須支援全磁碟加密。 - 不可將定期更新發佈凍結超過1年。 diff --git a/i18n/zh-Hant/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/zh-Hant/os/linux-overview.md index 0a12bf75..0cc7fcf3 100644 --- a/i18n/zh-Hant/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/zh-Hant/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ The atomic update method can achieve reliability with this model and is used for For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -使用 [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **者必須** 對該服務下載的 PKGBUILD進行審計。 AUR 軟體套件是社區製作的內容，未經任何審查，很容易受到軟體供應鏈的攻擊， [事實上已發生過這類事件](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository)。 +使用 [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **者必須** 對該服務下載的 PKGBUILD進行審計。 AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). 應該少用 AUR，而往往各種網頁有很多不好的建議，指導人們盲目地使用 [AUR 幫助器](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) 卻沒有足夠警告。 Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/zh-Hant/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/zh-Hant/os/windows/index.md index 1e34b706..41e2d998 100644 --- a/i18n/zh-Hant/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/zh-Hant/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## 隱私筆記 -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/i18n/zh/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/zh/basics/common-misconceptions.md index 6c7a7cc2..9aa5d781 100644 --- a/i18n/zh/basics/common-misconceptions.md +++ b/i18n/zh/basics/common-misconceptions.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema: 这些神话源于一些偏见，但软件产品的来源和许可并不以任何方式内在地影响其安全性。 ==开源软件 *有可能* 比专有软件更安全, 但对于这一点没有绝对保证。== 在你评估软件时，需要去逐一检查每个工具的声誉和安全性。 - 开源软件 *，可以由第三方进行审计，而且通常比专有的同类软件对潜在的漏洞更加透明。 它还允许你审查代码并禁用你自己发现的任何可疑功能。 然而， *，除非你这样做*，否则不能保证代码曾经被评估过，特别是对于较小的软件项目。 The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1]

+ 开源软件 *，可以由第三方进行审计，而且通常比专有的同类软件对潜在的漏洞更加透明。 它还允许你审查代码并禁用你自己发现的任何可疑功能。 然而， *，除非你这样做*，否则不能保证代码曾经被评估过，特别是对于较小的软件项目。 The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities known as [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which are discussed further in our [Common Threats](common-threats.md) page.[^1]

从另一个角度看，专利软件的透明度较低，但这并不意味着它不安全。 主要的专利软件项目可以由内部和第三方机构进行审计，而独立的安全研究人员仍然可以通过逆向工程等技术找到漏洞。 diff --git a/i18n/zh/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/zh/basics/common-threats.md index e39b1b74..a0a8885d 100644 --- a/i18n/zh/basics/common-threats.md +++ b/i18n/zh/basics/common-threats.md @@ -6,15 +6,50 @@ description: 您的威胁模式是您自己量身定制的，但这些是本网 广义而言，可以将我们有关[威胁](threat-modeling.md) 或者适用于大多数人的目标的建议分为这几类。 ==你可能关注其中零个、 一个、 几个、 或所有这些可能性==， 你应该使用的工具和服务取决于你的目标。 你可能也有这些类别之外的特定威胁，这完全可以！ 重要的是要去了解您选择的这些工具的优缺点，因为也许任何工具都不能够保护您免受所有可以想象到的威胁。 -- :material-incognito: 匿名性 - 隔离你的线上活动和你的真实身份, 特别是要保护 *你的* 身份不被人揭露。 -- :material-target-account: 定向攻击 -防御专业黑客或恶意代理人获得，特别是 *你的* 数据或设备的访问权。 -- :material-bug-outline: 被动攻击 - 防御诸如恶意软件、数据泄露和其他一些同时针对许多人的攻击。 -- :material-package-variant-closed-remove: 供应链攻击 - 将漏洞或漏洞利用直接或通过第三方依赖引入到原本良好的软件中。 -- :material-server-network: 服务供应商 - 保护您的数据不受服务供应商的影响，例如，通过端到端加密使您的数据无法被服务器读取。 -- :material-eye-outline: 大规模监控 - 防止政府机构、组织、网站和服务联合起来共同追踪你的活动。 -- :material-account-cash: 监视资本主义 - 保护自己不受谷歌和Facebook等大型广告网络以及其他无数第三方数据收集者的影响 -- :material-account-search: 公开曝光 - 限制搜索引擎或一般公众在线访问到关于你的信息的能力。 -- :material-close-outline: 审查 - 避免信息的获取受到审查或者在网上的发言被审查。 +:material-incognito: **Anonymity** +: + +Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically. + +:material-target-account: **Targeted Attacks** +: + +Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically. + +:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks** +: + +Typically a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party. + +:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks** +: + +Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once. + +:material-server-network: **Service Providers** +: + +Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server). + +:material-eye-outline: **Mass Surveillance** +: + +Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities. + +:material-account-cash: **Surveillance Capitalism** +: + +Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors. + +:material-account-search: **Public Exposure** +: + +Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public. + +:material-close-outline: **Censorship** +: + +Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online. 其中一些威胁可能比其他威胁更重要，具体取决于您的关注点。 For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks and :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. 同样，"普通人 "可能主要关心他们的个人数据的 :material-account-search: ，公开曝光 ，但他们仍应警惕那些侧重于安全的问题，比如:material-bug-outline: ，被动攻击，就像那些会影响到设备的恶意软件 。 @@ -45,6 +80,8 @@ description: 您的威胁模式是您自己量身定制的，但这些是本网
+## Attacks against Specific Individuals + :material-target-account: 定向攻击 针对特定用户的有针对性的攻击更加难以处理。 常见的攻击途径包括通过电子邮件发送恶意文件，利用浏览器和操作系统的漏洞，以及物理攻击。 如果您担心这一点，则可能需要采用更高级的威胁缓解策略。 @@ -58,6 +95,8 @@ description: 您的威胁模式是您自己量身定制的，但这些是本网 If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). 你还应该确保你的驱动器是加密的，并且操作系统使用TPM或安全 [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) 或 [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) ，以限制输入加密口令的重试速率。 你应该避免与你不信任的人分享你的电脑，因为大多数桌面操作系统没有按用户单独加密数据。 +## Attacks against Certain Organizations + :material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of :material-target-account: Targeted Attack towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well. @@ -71,19 +110,19 @@ A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting so There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out: -1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code. +1. A contributor or employee might first work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, and then abuse that position by adding malicious code. 2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code. 3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers. -These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: +These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers to only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by: -1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. +1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project, the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions. 2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly. 3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process? -4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. -5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. +4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what each change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs. +5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enabling undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone. -## 来自服务提供商的隐私 +## Privacy from Service Providers :material-server-network: 服务提供商 @@ -98,7 +137,7 @@ These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and 在实践中，不同的端到端加密实现的有效性各不相同。 [Signal](../real-time-communication.md＃signal)这类应用程序在您的设备本地运行，并且应用程序副本在不同的安装下保持相同。 如果服务提供商在他们的应用程序中设置后门，试图窃取你的私钥，这可以在未来通过逆向工程检测出来。 -另一方面，基于Web的端到端加密实现（如Proton Mail的webmail或Bitwarden的web vault）依赖于服务器动态地向浏览器提供JavaScript代码来处理加密操作。 一个恶意的服务器可以针对一个特定的用户，向他们发送恶意的JavaScript代码来窃取他们的加密密钥，而用户是很难注意到这样的事情的。 即使用户注意到有人试图窃取他们的密钥，也很难证明是提供商试图这样做，因为服务器可以选择向不同的用户提供不同的网络客户端。 +On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. 一个恶意的服务器可以针对一个特定的用户，向他们发送恶意的JavaScript代码来窃取他们的加密密钥，而用户是很难注意到这样的事情的。 即使用户注意到有人试图窃取他们的密钥，也很难证明是提供商试图这样做，因为服务器可以选择向不同的用户提供不同的网络客户端。 因此，当依赖端到端加密时，你应该尽可能选择使用本地应用程序而不是网络客户端。 @@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice -政府经常为大规模监控项目辩护，认为这是打击恐怖主义和防止犯罪的必要手段。 然而，它侵犯人权，最常被用来不成比例地针对少数群体和持不同政见者等。 +政府经常为大规模监控项目辩护，认为这是打击恐怖主义和防止犯罪的必要手段。 However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.

ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward

@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS 尽管美国的大规模监控越来越多，但政府发现，像第215条这样的大规模监控计划在阻止实际犯罪或恐怖主义阴谋方面 "没有什么独特的价值"，其努力主要是重复联邦调查局自己的目标监控计划。[^2] -尽管美国的大规模监控越来越多，但政府发现，像第215条这样的大规模监控计划在阻止实际犯罪或恐怖主义阴谋方面 "没有什么独特的价值"，这份工作基本上只是在重复联邦调查局本身的目标监控计划。[^1] +Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods, including but not limited to: - 你的IP地址 - 浏览器 Cookie @@ -140,10 +179,10 @@ In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRIS - 你的浏览器或设备指纹 - 支付方式的关联 -\ [此列表并非详尽无遗]。 - If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information. +## Surveillance as a Business Model + :material-account-cash: 监视资本主义 > 监视资本主义是一种以获取个人数据和将个人数据商品化为核心，从而以此营利的经济体系。[^2] diff --git a/i18n/zh/desktop.md b/i18n/zh/desktop.md index 9300b394..52c028cb 100644 --- a/i18n/zh/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/zh/desktop.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o - Free and open source. - Receives regular software and kernel updates. -- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://www.x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. +- Avoids X11, as its last major release was [more than a decade](https://x.org/wiki/Releases) ago. - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the [isolation issues](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation) which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines); apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. - Supports full-disk encryption during installation. - Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. diff --git a/i18n/zh/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/zh/os/linux-overview.md index b746e90a..e255f826 100644 --- a/i18n/zh/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/zh/os/linux-overview.md @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (re For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](#mandatory-access-control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations ""){.pg-viridian}, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository). The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to the use of third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian-based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. diff --git a/i18n/zh/os/windows/index.md b/i18n/zh/os/windows/index.md index 8217591b..6238bb21 100644 --- a/i18n/zh/os/windows/index.md +++ b/i18n/zh/os/windows/index.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This section is a work in progress, because it takes considerably more time and ## Privacy Notes -Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. +Microsoft Windows, particularly those versions aimed at consumers like the **Home** version often don't prioritize privacy friendly features by [default](https://theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings). As a result we often see more [data collection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection) than necessary, without any real warnings that this is the default behavior. In an attempt to compete with Google in the advertising space, [Cortana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortana_\(virtual_assistant\)) has included unique identifiers such as an "advertising ID" in order to correlate usage and assist advertisers in targeted advertising. At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. It still cannot be disabled, but Microsoft added the ability to [reduce](https://extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects) the data that is sent to them. With Windows 11 there are a number of restrictions or defaults such as: diff --git a/includes/strings.zh-Hant.env b/includes/strings.zh-Hant.env index 29203a3d..c2b65b86 100644 --- a/includes/strings.zh-Hant.env +++ b/includes/strings.zh-Hant.env @@ -17,12 +17,12 @@ HOMEPAGE_RSS_STORIES_LINK="https://share.privacyguides.org/web-stories/feed/" HOMEPAGE_RSS_STORIES_TITLE="Privacy Guides 網路故事 RSS 訂閱" HOMEPAGE_RSS_FORUM_LINK="https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest.rss" HOMEPAGE_RSS_FORUM_TITLE="最新 Privacy Guides 論壇討論 RSS 訂閱" -HOMEPAGE_HEADER="The collaborative privacy advocacy community." -HOMEPAGE_SUBHEADER="Privacy Guides is a not-for-profit, volunteer-run project that hosts online communities and publishes news and recommendations surrounding privacy and security tools, services, and knowledge." -HOMEPAGE_BUTTON_GET_STARTED_NAME="Start Your Privacy Journey" -HOMEPAGE_BUTTON_GET_STARTED_TITLE="The first step of your privacy journey" -HOMEPAGE_BUTTON_TOOLS_NAME="Recommended Tools" -HOMEPAGE_BUTTON_TOOLS_TITLE="Recommended privacy tools, services, and knowledge" +HOMEPAGE_HEADER="協作隱私倡議社區。" +HOMEPAGE_SUBHEADER="Privacy Guides 是個非營利、由志工驅動的計劃，營運著線上社群、發佈新聞和推薦注重隱私與安全的工具、服務和知識。" +HOMEPAGE_BUTTON_GET_STARTED_NAME="開始您的隱私旅程" +HOMEPAGE_BUTTON_GET_STARTED_TITLE="隱私保護的第一步" +HOMEPAGE_BUTTON_TOOLS_NAME="推薦工具" +HOMEPAGE_BUTTON_TOOLS_TITLE="推薦的隱私工具、服務和知識" NAV_ABOUT="關於" NAV_ADVANCED="進階" NAV_ADVANCED_TOPICS="進階主題"