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i18n/pt-BR/basics/common-threats.md

@@ -9,13 +9,14 @@ Em resumo, nós agrupamos nossas recomendações considerando as [ameaças](thre
 - <span class="pg-purple">:material-incognito: Anonimato</span> — Proteger sua atividade on-line de sua identidade real, proteger você de pessoas que estão tentando descobrir especificamente *sua* identidade.
 - <span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: Ataques Direcionados</span> — Estar protegido contra hackers ou outros agentes mal-intencionados que estão tentando obter acesso especificamente aos *seus* dados ou dispositivos.
 - <span class="pg-orange">:material-bug-outline: Ataques Passivos</span> — Estar protegido contra coisas como vírus (malware), violações de dados e outros ataques feitos contra muitas pessoas ao mesmo tempo.
+- <span class="pg-viridian">:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks</span> - A vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party.
 - <span class="pg-teal">:material-server-network: Provedores de Serviço</span> — Proteger seus dados de provedores de serviços (por exemplo, com ponta-a-ponta (E2EE), que torna seus dados ilegíveis para o servidor).
 - <span class="pg-blue">:material-eye-outline: Vigilância em Massa</span> — Proteção contra agências governamentais, organizações, sites e serviços que trabalham juntos para rastrear suas atividades.
 - <span class="pg-brown">:material-account-cash: Capitalismo de Vigilância</span> — Proteção contra grandes redes de publicidade, como Google e Facebook, bem como uma infinidade de outros coletores de dados de terceiros.
 - <span class="pg-green">:material-account-search: Exposição Pública</span> — Limitar as informações sobre você que podem ser acessadas on-line — para mecanismos de pesquisa ou para o público em geral.
 - <span class="pg-blue-gray">:material-close-outline: Censura</span> — Evitar a censura que afeta o acesso às informações ou que você mesmo seja censurado ao falar on-line.
 
-Algumas dessas ameaças podem ser mais importantes para você do que outras, dependendo de suas preocupações específicas. Por exemplo, um desenvolvedor de aplicativos com acesso a dados valiosos ou confidenciais pode estar preocupado principalmente com <span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: Ataques Direcionados</span>, mas provavelmente ainda quer proteger seus dados pessoais de serem incluídos em campanhas de <span class="pg-blue">:material-eye-outline: Vigilância Em Massa</span>. Da mesma forma, muitas pessoas podem estar preocupadas principalmente com a <span class="pg-green">:material-account-search: Exposição Pública</span> de seus dados pessoais, mas ainda assim devem ser cautelosas com questões voltadas para a segurança, como <span class="pg-orange">:material-bug-outline: Ataques Passivos</span> — como vírus (malware) que afeta seus dispositivos.
+Algumas dessas ameaças podem ser mais importantes para você do que outras, dependendo de suas preocupações específicas. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with <span class="pg-viridian">:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks</span> and <span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks</span>. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in <span class="pg-blue">:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance</span> programs. Da mesma forma, muitas pessoas podem estar preocupadas principalmente com a <span class="pg-green">:material-account-search: Exposição Pública</span> de seus dados pessoais, mas ainda assim devem ser cautelosas com questões voltadas para a segurança, como <span class="pg-orange">:material-bug-outline: Ataques Passivos</span> — como vírus (malware) que afeta seus dispositivos.
 
 ## Anonimato vs Privacidade
 
@@ -57,6 +58,31 @@ Por padrão, **navegadores da Internet**, **clientes de e-mail** e **aplicativos
 
 If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user.
 
+<span class="pg-viridian">:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks</span>
+
+Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of <span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: Targeted Attack</span> towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well.
+
+<div class="admonition example" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Example</p>
+
+A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting software in Ukraine, was infected with the *NotPetya* virus, subsequently infecting people who downloaded that software with ransomware. NotPetya itself was a ransomware attack which impacted 2000+ companies in various countries, and was based on the *EternalBlue* exploit developed by the NSA to attack Windows computers over the network.
+
+</div>
+
+There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out:
+
+1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code.
+2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code.
+3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers.
+
+These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by:
+
+1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions.
+2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly.
+3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process?
+4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs.
+5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone.
+
 ## Privacidade dos Prestadores de Serviços
 
 <span class="pg-teal">:material-server-network: Service Providers</span>