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@@ -9,13 +9,14 @@ Em termos gerais, categorizamos as nossas recomendações no tipo de [ameaças](
- <span class="pg-purple">:material-incognito: Anonimato</span> - Protege a sua atividade online da sua identidade real, protegendo-o de pessoas que estão a tentar descobrir *a sua * identidade.
- <span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: Ataques direcionados</span> - Estar protegido contra hackers ou outros agentes maliciosos que estão a tentar obter acesso aos *seus* dados ou dispositivos.
- <span class="pg-orange">:material-bug-outline: Ataques passivos</span> - Estar protegido contra coisas como malware, violações de dados e outros ataques que são feitos contra muitas pessoas ao mesmo tempo.
- <span class="pg-viridian">:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks</span> - A vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party.
- <span class="pg-teal">:material-server-network: Fornecedores de serviços</span> - Proteger os seus dados dos fornecedores de serviços (por exemplo, com E2EE, que torna os seus dados ilegíveis para o servidor).
- <span class="pg-blue">:material-eye-outline: Vigilância em massa</span> - Proteção contra agências governamentais, organizações, sites e serviços que trabalham em conjunto para seguir as suas atividades.
- <span class="pg-brown">:material-account-cash: Capitalismo de vigilância</span> - Proteger-se das grandes redes de marketing, como o Google e o Facebook, bem como de uma miríade de outros coletores de dados de terceiros.
- <span class="pg-green">:material-account-search: Exposição pública</span> - Limitar as informações sobre si que estão acessíveis online - para motores de busca ou para o público em geral.
- <span class="pg-blue-gray">:material-close-outline: Censura</span> - Evitar a censura ao acesso de informações ou quando nos expressamos online.
Algumas destas ameaças podem ser mais importantes para si do que outras, dependendo das suas preocupações específicas. Por exemplo, um programador de software com acesso a dados valiosos ou críticos pode estar principalmente preocupado com <span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: Ataques direcionados</span>, mas provavelmente quererá também proteger os seus dados pessoais de serem apanhados em programas de <span class="pg-blue">:material-eye-outline: Vigilância em massa</span>. Da mesma forma, muitas pessoas podem estar principalmente preocupadas com a <span class="pg-green">:material-account-search: Exposição pública</span> dos seus dados pessoais, mas podem também importar-se com questões de segurança, como <span class="pg-orange">:material-bug-outline: Ataques passivos</span>- como o malware que afeta os seus dispositivos.
Algumas destas ameaças podem ser mais importantes para si do que outras, dependendo das suas preocupações específicas. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with <span class="pg-viridian">:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks</span> and <span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks</span>. They will likely still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in <span class="pg-blue">:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance</span> programs. Da mesma forma, muitas pessoas podem estar principalmente preocupadas com a <span class="pg-green">:material-account-search: Exposição pública</span> dos seus dados pessoais, mas podem também importar-se com questões de segurança, como <span class="pg-orange">:material-bug-outline: Ataques passivos</span>- como o malware que afeta os seus dispositivos.
## Anonimato vs. Privacidade
@@ -57,6 +58,31 @@ Por definição, os **browsers**, os **clientes de e-mail** e as **suites de esc
If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). Deve também certificar-se de que a sua unidade está encriptada e que o sistema operativo utiliza um TPM, Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) ou [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) para limitar as tentativas de introdução da frase-chave de encriptação. Deve evitar partilhar o seu computador com pessoas em quem não confia, uma vez que a maioria dos sistemas operativos de computador de secretária não encripta os dados separadamente por utilizador.
<span class="pg-viridian">:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks</span>
Supply chain attacks are frequently a form of <span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: Targeted Attack</span> towards businesses, governments, and activists, although they can end up compromising the public at large as well.
<div class="admonition example" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Example</p>
A notable example of this occurred in 2017 when M.E.Doc, a popular accounting software in Ukraine, was infected with the *NotPetya* virus, subsequently infecting people who downloaded that software with ransomware. NotPetya itself was a ransomware attack which impacted 2000+ companies in various countries, and was based on the *EternalBlue* exploit developed by the NSA to attack Windows computers over the network.
</div>
There are few ways in which this type of attack might be carried out:
1. A contributor or employee might work their way into a position of power within a project or organization, then abuse that position by adding malicious code.
2. A developer may be coerced by an outside party to add malicious code.
3. An individual or group might identify a third party software dependency (also known as a library) and work to infiltrate it with the above two methods, knowing that it will be used by "downstream" software developers.
These sorts of attacks can require a lot of time and preparation to perform and are risky because they can be detected, particularly in open source projects if they are popular and have outside interest. Unfortunately they're also one of the most dangerous as they are very hard to mitigate entirely. We would encourage readers only use software which has a good reputation and makes an effort to reduce risk by:
1. Only adopting popular software that has been around for a while. The more interest in a project the greater likelihood that external parties will notice malicious changes. A malicious actor will also need to spend more time gaining community trust with meaningful contributions.
2. Finding software which releases binaries with widely-used, trusted build infrastructure platforms, as opposed to developer workstations or self-hosted servers. Some systems like GitHub Actions let you inspect the build script that runs publicly for extra confidence. This lessens the likelihood that malware on a developer's machine could infect their packages, and gives confidence that the binaries produced are in fact produced correctly.
3. Looking for code signing on individual source code commits and releases, which creates an auditable trail of who did what. For example: Was the malicious code in the software repository? Which developer added it? Was it added during the build process?
4. Checking whether the source code has meaningful commit messages (such as [conventional commits](https://conventionalcommits.org)) which explain what the change is supposed to accomplish. Clear messages can make it easier for outsiders to the project to verify, audit, and find bugs.
5. Noting the number of contributors or maintainers a program has. A lone developer may be more susceptible to being coerced into adding malicious code by an external party, or to negligently enable undesirable behavior. This may very well mean software developed by "Big Tech" has more scrutiny than a lone developer who doesn't answer to anyone.
## Privacidade dos prestadores de serviços
<span class="pg-teal">:material-server-network: Fornecedores de serviços</span>