@@ -149,6 +109,4 @@ On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks
Onion Browser does not provide the same levels of privacy protections as Tor Browser does on desktop platforms. For casual use it is a perfectly fine way to access hidden services, but if you're concerned about being traced or monitored by advanced adversaries you should not rely on this as an anonymity tool.
-[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside Orbot, but this still comes with some limitations on iOS (noted in the Orbot section above).
-
-[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot), but this still comes with some limitations on iOS.
diff --git a/i18n/hu/alternative-networks.md b/i18n/hu/alternative-networks.md
index 32bc2fc9..3f5d52e8 100644
--- a/i18n/hu/alternative-networks.md
+++ b/i18n/hu/alternative-networks.md
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ The recommended way to access the Tor network is via the official Tor Browser, w
[Tor Browser Info :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
+You can access the Tor network using other tools; making this determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Az emberek számának növelése, akik mindennaposan használják a Tor-t, segít csökkenteni a Tor rossz hírnevét, és csökkenti az ISP-k (internetszolgáltatók) és kormányok által összeállított "Tor felhasználók listáinak" minőségét.
+
+
+{ align=right }
+
+**Orbot** is a mobile application which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
+
+
+Downloads
+
+- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
+- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+- [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid)
+
+
+
+
+
+We previously recommended enabling the _Isolate Destination Address_ preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
+
+\=== "Android"
+
+```
+Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+Orbot is often outdated on Google Play and the Guardian Project's F-Droid repository, so consider downloading directly from the GitHub repository instead. All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
+```
+
+\=== "iOS"
+
+```
+On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
+```
+
#### Snowflake
-{ align=right }
-{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
**Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.
@@ -110,4 +154,5 @@ Also, unlike Tor, every I2P node will relay traffic for other users by default,
There are downsides to I2P's approach, however. Tor relying on dedicated exit nodes means more people in less safe environments can use it, and the relays that do exist on Tor are likely to be more performant and stable, as they generally aren't run on residential connections. Tor is also far more focused on **browser privacy** (i.e. anti-fingerprinting), with a dedicated [Tor Browser](tor.md) to make browsing activity as anonymous as possible. I2P is used via your [regular web browser](desktop-browsers.md), and while you can configure your browser to be more privacy-protecting, you probably still won't have the same browser fingerprint as other I2P users (there's no "crowd" to blend in with in that regard).
-Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
+[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+ Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
diff --git a/i18n/hu/android/index.md b/i18n/hu/android/index.md
index 0378a299..a8389eb0 100644
--- a/i18n/hu/android/index.md
+++ b/i18n/hu/android/index.md
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ There are also many private alternatives to the apps that come pre-installed on
When you buy an Android phone, the default operating system comes bundled with apps and functionality that are not part of the Android Open Source Project. Many of these apps—even apps like the dialer which provide basic system functionality—require invasive integrations with Google Play Services, which in turn asks for privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, and numerous other things on your device in order for those basic system apps and many other apps to function in the first place. Frameworks like Google Play Services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android.
-This problem could be solved by using an alternative Android distribution, commonly known as a _custom ROM_, that does not come with such invasive integration. Sajnos sok egyedi Android disztribúció gyakran megsérti az Android biztonsági modellt azzal, hogy nem támogat olyan kritikus biztonsági funkciókat, mint az AVB, a rollback védelem, firmware-frissítések, stb. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require [more permissive](https://github.com/LineageOS/android_system_sepolicy/search?q=userdebug\&type=code) SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
+This problem could be solved by using an alternative Android distribution, commonly known as a _custom ROM_, that does not come with such invasive integration. Sajnos sok egyedi Android disztribúció gyakran megsérti az Android biztonsági modellt azzal, hogy nem támogat olyan kritikus biztonsági funkciókat, mint az AVB, a rollback védelem, firmware-frissítések, stb. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require more permissive SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
Ideális esetben, amikor egyedi Android disztribúciót választasz, győződj meg arról, hogy az, az Android biztonsági modellt követi. At the very least, the distribution should have production builds, support for AVB, rollback protection, timely firmware and operating system updates, and SELinux in [enforcing mode](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts#enforcement_levels). All of our recommended Android distributions satisfy these criteria:
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Ideális esetben, amikor egyedi Android disztribúciót választasz, győződj m
[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_\(Android\)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_\(operating_system\)#Security_and_privacy). Ez csökkentheti az adatvédelmet, ha van olyan biztonsági rés, amelynek kihasználását a csökkent biztonság elősegíti. A gyakori rootolási módszerek a boot partíció közvetlen megváltoztatásával járnak, ami lehetetlenné teszi egy sikeres Verified Boot elvégzését. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition, meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the attack surface of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
-Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. Továbbá ezek nem a megfelelő módon oldják meg a rendeltetésüknek megfelelő feladatokat. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as [Orbot](../tor.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
+Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (like AdAway) and firewalls which require root access persistently (like AFWall+) are dangerous and should not be used. Továbbá ezek nem a megfelelő módon oldják meg a rendeltetésüknek megfelelő feladatokat. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy-enhancing services such as [Orbot](../alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_\(computing\)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
diff --git a/i18n/hu/device-integrity.md b/i18n/hu/device-integrity.md
index 1fa8a731..677c4a23 100644
--- a/i18n/hu/device-integrity.md
+++ b/i18n/hu/device-integrity.md
@@ -188,4 +188,4 @@ It is important to note that Auditor can only effectively detect changes **after
No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
-If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service.
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address from the attestation service, you could consider using [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [VPN](vpn.md).
diff --git a/i18n/hu/tools.md b/i18n/hu/tools.md
index 3a5280c4..94ac894a 100644
--- a/i18n/hu/tools.md
+++ b/i18n/hu/tools.md
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ Ha további információt szeretnél megtudni az egyes projektekről, hogy miér
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Smartphone Tor Proxy)](tor.md#orbot)
- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Onion Browser (Tor for iOS)](tor.md#onion-browser-ios)
@@ -714,9 +713,10 @@ These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functional
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Mobile Tor Proxy)](alternative-networks.md#orbot)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
diff --git a/i18n/hu/tor.md b/i18n/hu/tor.md
index 19f1aeb8..90735780 100644
--- a/i18n/hu/tor.md
+++ b/i18n/hu/tor.md
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Mielőtt csatlakoznál a Torhoz, kérjük, olvasd el az [áttekintést](advanced
There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for [:material-incognito: anonymous](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy ""){.pg-purple} browsing for desktop computers and Android.
-Néhány ilyen alkalmazás jobb, mint mások, a választás a fenyegetettségi szintedtől függ. Ha alkalmi Tor-felhasználó vagy, és nem aggódsz amiatt, hogy az internetszolgáltatód bizonyítékokat gyűjt rólad, akkor az olyan alkalmazások, mint az [Orbot](#orbot) vagy a mobil böngésző alkalmazások használata a Tor-hálózat eléréséhez valószínűleg rendben van. Az emberek számának növelése, akik mindennaposan használják a Tor-t, segít csökkenteni a Tor rossz hírnevét, és csökkenti az ISP-k (internetszolgáltatók) és kormányok által összeállított "Tor felhasználók listáinak" minőségét.
+Néhány ilyen alkalmazás jobb, mint mások, a választás a fenyegetettségi szintedtől függ. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using mobile browser apps like [Onion Browser](#onion-browser-ios) to access the Tor network is probably fine. Az emberek számának növelése, akik mindennaposan használják a Tor-t, segít csökkenteni a Tor rossz hírnevét, és csökkenti az ISP-k (internetszolgáltatók) és kormányok által összeállított "Tor felhasználók listáinak" minőségét.
Ha a teljes anonimitás a legfontosabb számodra, akkor **csak** az asztali Tor Browser klienst használd, ideális esetben egy [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) konfigurációban. Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against deanonymization.
@@ -84,46 +84,6 @@ A Tor böngészőt úgy tervezték, hogy megakadályozza az ujjlenyomatolást, v
A Tor Böngésző közvetlen számítógépre telepítése mellett vannak olyan operációs rendszerek is, amelyeket kifejezetten a Tor-hálózathoz való csatlakozásra terveztek, mint például a [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) a [Qubes OS-en](desktop.md#qubes-os), amelyek még nagyobb biztonságot és védelmet nyújtanak, mint a hagyományos Tor Browser önmagában.
-## Orbot
-
-
-
-{ align=right }
-
-Az **Orbot** egy ingyenes Tor VPN okostelefonokhoz, amely a Tor hálózaton keresztül irányítja az eszközödön lévő bármely alkalmazás forgalmát.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Honlap](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Adatvédelmi tájékoztató" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=Dokumentáció}
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Forráskód" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=Támogatás}
-
-
-Letöltés
-
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
-
-
-
-
-
-Korábban ajánlottuk az *Célcím elszigetelése* beállítás engedélyezését az Orbot beállításaiban. Bár ez a beállítás elméletileg javíthatja az adatvédelmet azáltal, hogy minden egyes IP-címhez más-más áramkör használatát kényszeríti, a legtöbb alkalmazásnál (különösen webböngészésnél) nem nyújt gyakorlati előnyt, jelentős teljesítménycsökkenéssel járhat, és növeli a Tor hálózat terhelését. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
-
-
-
Tippek Androidhoz
-
-Az Orbot képes egyes alkalmazások forgalmát átküldeni egy proxyn, ha azok támogatják a SOCKS vagy a HTTP proxyt. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
-
-Az Orbot gyakran elavult szokott lenni a Guardian Project [F-Droid adattárjában](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) és a [Google Playen](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android), ezért érdemes inkább közvetlenül a [GitHub adattárból](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases) letölteni.
-
-All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
-
-
-
-On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
-
## Onion Browser (iOS)
@@ -149,6 +109,4 @@ Az **Onion Browser** egy nyílt forráskódú böngésző, amely lehetővé tesz
Onion Browser does not provide the same levels of privacy protections as Tor Browser does on desktop platforms. For casual use it is a perfectly fine way to access hidden services, but if you're concerned about being traced or monitored by advanced adversaries you should not rely on this as an anonymity tool.
-[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside Orbot, but this still comes with some limitations on iOS (noted in the Orbot section above).
-
-[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot), but this still comes with some limitations on iOS.
diff --git a/i18n/id/alternative-networks.md b/i18n/id/alternative-networks.md
index fb05b7b2..27700bef 100644
--- a/i18n/id/alternative-networks.md
+++ b/i18n/id/alternative-networks.md
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ The recommended way to access the Tor network is via the official Tor Browser, w
[Tor Browser Info :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
+You can access the Tor network using other tools; making this determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
+
Try it out!
@@ -42,12 +44,54 @@ You can try connecting to _Privacy Guides_ via Tor at [xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh
+#### Orbot
+
+
+
+{ align=right }
+
+**Orbot** is a mobile application which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
+
+
+Downloads
+
+- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
+- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+- [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid)
+
+
+
+
+
+We previously recommended enabling the _Isolate Destination Address_ preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
+
+\=== "Android"
+
+```
+Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+Orbot is often outdated on Google Play and the Guardian Project's F-Droid repository, so consider downloading directly from the GitHub repository instead. All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
+```
+
+\=== "iOS"
+
+```
+On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
+```
+
#### Snowflake
-{ align=right }
-{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
**Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.
@@ -110,4 +154,5 @@ Also, unlike Tor, every I2P node will relay traffic for other users by default,
There are downsides to I2P's approach, however. Tor relying on dedicated exit nodes means more people in less safe environments can use it, and the relays that do exist on Tor are likely to be more performant and stable, as they generally aren't run on residential connections. Tor is also far more focused on **browser privacy** (i.e. anti-fingerprinting), with a dedicated [Tor Browser](tor.md) to make browsing activity as anonymous as possible. I2P is used via your [regular web browser](desktop-browsers.md), and while you can configure your browser to be more privacy-protecting, you probably still won't have the same browser fingerprint as other I2P users (there's no "crowd" to blend in with in that regard).
-Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
+[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+ Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
diff --git a/i18n/id/android/index.md b/i18n/id/android/index.md
index 44698eae..3811c8a3 100644
--- a/i18n/id/android/index.md
+++ b/i18n/id/android/index.md
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ There are also many private alternatives to the apps that come pre-installed on
When you buy an Android phone, the default operating system comes bundled with apps and functionality that are not part of the Android Open Source Project. Many of these apps—even apps like the dialer which provide basic system functionality—require invasive integrations with Google Play Services, which in turn asks for privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, and numerous other things on your device in order for those basic system apps and many other apps to function in the first place. Frameworks like Google Play Services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android.
-This problem could be solved by using an alternative Android distribution, commonly known as a _custom ROM_, that does not come with such invasive integration. Unfortunately, many custom Android distributions often violate the Android security model by not supporting critical security features such as AVB, rollback protection, firmware updates, and so on. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require [more permissive](https://github.com/LineageOS/android_system_sepolicy/search?q=userdebug\&type=code) SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
+This problem could be solved by using an alternative Android distribution, commonly known as a _custom ROM_, that does not come with such invasive integration. Unfortunately, many custom Android distributions often violate the Android security model by not supporting critical security features such as AVB, rollback protection, firmware updates, and so on. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require more permissive SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
Idealnya, ketika memilih distribusi Android kustom, Anda harus memastikan bahwa distribusi tersebut menjunjung tinggi model keamanan Android. At the very least, the distribution should have production builds, support for AVB, rollback protection, timely firmware and operating system updates, and SELinux in [enforcing mode](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts#enforcement_levels). All of our recommended Android distributions satisfy these criteria:
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Idealnya, ketika memilih distribusi Android kustom, Anda harus memastikan bahwa
[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_\(Android\)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_\(operating_system\)#Security_and_privacy). Hal ini dapat mengurangi privasi jika ada eksploitasi yang dibantu oleh penurunan keamanan. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition, meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the attack surface of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
-Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. Mereka juga bukan cara yang tepat untuk menyelesaikan tujuan yang dimaksudkan. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as [Orbot](../tor.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
+Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (like AdAway) and firewalls which require root access persistently (like AFWall+) are dangerous and should not be used. Mereka juga bukan cara yang tepat untuk menyelesaikan tujuan yang dimaksudkan. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy-enhancing services such as [Orbot](../alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_\(computing\)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
diff --git a/i18n/id/device-integrity.md b/i18n/id/device-integrity.md
index f3548963..99cb3aa2 100644
--- a/i18n/id/device-integrity.md
+++ b/i18n/id/device-integrity.md
@@ -188,4 +188,4 @@ It is important to note that Auditor can only effectively detect changes **after
No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
-If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service.
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address from the attestation service, you could consider using [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [VPN](vpn.md).
diff --git a/i18n/id/tools.md b/i18n/id/tools.md
index e7232a0b..ead1e74f 100644
--- a/i18n/id/tools.md
+++ b/i18n/id/tools.md
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ Untuk detail lebih lanjut tentang setiap proyek, mengapa proyek tersebut dipilih
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Smartphone Tor Proxy)](tor.md#orbot)
- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Onion Browser (Tor for iOS)](tor.md#onion-browser-ios)
@@ -714,9 +713,10 @@ These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functional
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Mobile Tor Proxy)](alternative-networks.md#orbot)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
diff --git a/i18n/id/tor.md b/i18n/id/tor.md
index 5fc00308..59aafe96 100644
--- a/i18n/id/tor.md
+++ b/i18n/id/tor.md
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Before connecting to Tor, please ensure you've read our [overview](advanced/tor-
There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for [:material-incognito: anonymous](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy ""){.pg-purple} browsing for desktop computers and Android.
-Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
+Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using mobile browser apps like [Onion Browser](#onion-browser-ios) to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** be using the desktop Tor Browser client, ideally in a [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) configuration. Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against deanonymization.
@@ -84,46 +84,6 @@ Tor Browser dirancang untuk mencegah sidik jari, atau mengidentifikasi Anda berd
In addition to installing Tor Browser on your computer directly, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser alone.
-## Orbot
-
-
-
-{ align=right }
-
-**Orbot** adalah VPN Tor gratis untuk ponsel pintar yang merutekan lalu lintas dari aplikasi apa pun pada perangkat Anda melalui jaringan Tor.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
-
-
-Downloads
-
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
-
-
-
-
-
-Kami sebelumnya merekomendasikan untuk mengaktifkan preferensi *Isolasi Alamat Tujuan* di pengaturan Orbot. Walaupun pengaturan ini secara teoritis dapat meningkatkan privasi dengan memaksakan penggunaan sirkuit yang berbeda untuk setiap alamat IP yang Anda sambungkan, pengaturan ini tidak memberikan keuntungan praktis untuk sebagian besar aplikasi (terutama penelusuran web), dapat menimbulkan dampak buruk signifikan terhadap kinerja, dan meningkatkan beban pada jaringan Tor. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
-
-
-
Tips for Android
-
-Orbot dapat memproksi aplikasi individual jika aplikasi tersebut mendukung proksi SOCKS atau HTTP. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
-
-Orbot sering kali ketinggalan versi di [repositori F-Droid] (https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) dan [Google Play] (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android) milik Guardian Project, jadi pertimbangkan untuk mengunduh langsung dari [repositori GitHub] (https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases).
-
-All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
-
-
-
-On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
-
## Onion Browser (iOS)
@@ -149,6 +109,4 @@ On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks
Onion Browser does not provide the same levels of privacy protections as Tor Browser does on desktop platforms. For casual use it is a perfectly fine way to access hidden services, but if you're concerned about being traced or monitored by advanced adversaries you should not rely on this as an anonymity tool.
-[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside Orbot, but this still comes with some limitations on iOS (noted in the Orbot section above).
-
-[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot), but this still comes with some limitations on iOS.
diff --git a/i18n/it/alternative-networks.md b/i18n/it/alternative-networks.md
index 5805b9eb..3171a81a 100644
--- a/i18n/it/alternative-networks.md
+++ b/i18n/it/alternative-networks.md
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ The recommended way to access the Tor network is via the official Tor Browser, w
[Tor Browser Info :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
+You can access the Tor network using other tools; making this determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Incrementare il numero di persone che utilizzano Tor su una base giornaliera, aiuta a ridurre il cattivo stigma nei confronti di Tor, e riduce la qualità degli "elenchi di utenti di Tor", che gli ISP e i governi potrebbero compilare.
+
Try it out!
@@ -42,12 +44,54 @@ You can try connecting to _Privacy Guides_ via Tor at [xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh
+#### Orbot
+
+
+
+{ align=right }
+
+**Orbot** is a mobile application which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
+
+
+Scarica
+
+- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
+- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+- [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid)
+
+
+
+
+
+We previously recommended enabling the _Isolate Destination Address_ preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
+
+\=== "Android"
+
+```
+Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+Orbot is often outdated on Google Play and the Guardian Project's F-Droid repository, so consider downloading directly from the GitHub repository instead. All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
+```
+
+\=== "iOS"
+
+```
+On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
+```
+
#### Snowflake
-{ align=right }
-{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
**Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.
@@ -110,4 +154,5 @@ Also, unlike Tor, every I2P node will relay traffic for other users by default,
There are downsides to I2P's approach, however. Tor relying on dedicated exit nodes means more people in less safe environments can use it, and the relays that do exist on Tor are likely to be more performant and stable, as they generally aren't run on residential connections. Tor is also far more focused on **browser privacy** (i.e. anti-fingerprinting), with a dedicated [Tor Browser](tor.md) to make browsing activity as anonymous as possible. I2P is used via your [regular web browser](desktop-browsers.md), and while you can configure your browser to be more privacy-protecting, you probably still won't have the same browser fingerprint as other I2P users (there's no "crowd" to blend in with in that regard).
-Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
+[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+ Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
diff --git a/i18n/it/android/index.md b/i18n/it/android/index.md
index 9e60f0f4..8d2f4573 100644
--- a/i18n/it/android/index.md
+++ b/i18n/it/android/index.md
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Idealmente, quando si sceglie una distribuzione modificata di Android, bisogna a
[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_\(Android\)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_\(operating_system\)#Security_and_privacy). Ciò può ridurre la privacy in caso di exploit assistito dalla sicurezza ridotta. I metodi di rooting comuni richiedono la manomissione diretta della partizione d'avvio, rendendo impossibile l'esecuzione corretta dell'Avvio Verificato. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition, meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the attack surface of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
-Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. Inoltre, sono il modo errato per risolvere i loro scopi. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as [Orbot](../tor.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
+Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (like AdAway) and firewalls which require root access persistently (like AFWall+) are dangerous and should not be used. Inoltre, sono il modo errato per risolvere i loro scopi. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy-enhancing services such as [Orbot](../alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_\(computing\)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
diff --git a/i18n/it/device-integrity.md b/i18n/it/device-integrity.md
index 75e2d9be..cc4762db 100644
--- a/i18n/it/device-integrity.md
+++ b/i18n/it/device-integrity.md
@@ -188,4 +188,4 @@ Auditor esegue l'attestazione e il rilevamento delle intrusioni con **due** disp
Nessuna informazione personalmente identificabile è inviata al servizio di attestazione. Ti consigliamo di iscriverti con un profilo anonimo e di abilitare l'attestazione da remoto per il monitoraggio costante.
-Se il tuo [modello di minaccia](basics/threat-modeling.md) richiede la privacy, potresti considerare l'utilizzo di [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) o di una VPN, per nascondere il tuo indirizzo IP dal servizio di attestazione.
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address from the attestation service, you could consider using [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [VPN](vpn.md).
diff --git a/i18n/it/tools.md b/i18n/it/tools.md
index bbfdabab..f1f2adb6 100644
--- a/i18n/it/tools.md
+++ b/i18n/it/tools.md
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ Per ulteriori dettagli su ogni progetto, perché è stato scelto e ulteriori con
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Smartphone Tor Proxy)](tor.md#orbot)
- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Onion Browser (Tor for iOS)](tor.md#onion-browser-ios)
@@ -714,9 +713,10 @@ Questi strumenti possono essere utili per alcuni individui. Forniscono funzional
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Mobile Tor Proxy)](alternative-networks.md#orbot)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
diff --git a/i18n/it/tor.md b/i18n/it/tor.md
index 4a3931da..b99a0214 100644
--- a/i18n/it/tor.md
+++ b/i18n/it/tor.md
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Prima di connetterti a Tor, ti preghiamo di assicurarti di aver letto la nostra
There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for [:material-incognito: anonymous](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy ""){.pg-purple} browsing for desktop computers and Android.
-Alcune di queste app sono migliori di altre e, anche in questo caso, la scelta dipende dal proprio modello di minaccia. Se sei un utente casuale di Tor e non sei preoccupato dal fatto che il tuo ISP raccolga prove contro di te, utilizzare app come [Orbot](#orbot) o le app browser per mobile per accedere alla rete di Tor va probabilmente bene. Incrementare il numero di persone che utilizzano Tor su una base giornaliera, aiuta a ridurre il cattivo stigma nei confronti di Tor, e riduce la qualità degli "elenchi di utenti di Tor", che gli ISP e i governi potrebbero compilare.
+Alcune di queste app sono migliori di altre e, anche in questo caso, la scelta dipende dal proprio modello di minaccia. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using mobile browser apps like [Onion Browser](#onion-browser-ios) to access the Tor network is probably fine. Incrementare il numero di persone che utilizzano Tor su una base giornaliera, aiuta a ridurre il cattivo stigma nei confronti di Tor, e riduce la qualità degli "elenchi di utenti di Tor", che gli ISP e i governi potrebbero compilare.
Se l'anonimato più completo è fondamentale per la tua situazione, dovresti utilizzare **soltanto** il client del Browser Tor per desktop, idealmente in una configurazione [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os). Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against deanonymization.
@@ -84,46 +84,6 @@ Tor Browser è progettato per impedire il fingerprinting, o la tua identificazio
Oltre a installare Tor Browser direttamente sul tuo computer, esistono inoltre dei sistemi operativi specificamente progettati per connettersi alla rete di Tor, come [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) su [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), che forniscono sicurezza e protezioni persino maggiori, rispetto al solo Tor Browser standard.
-## Orbot
-
-
-
-{ align=right }
-
-**Orbot** è una VPN di Tor gratuita per smartphone, che instrada il traffico da qualsiasi app sul tuo dispositivo, tramite la rete di Tor.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Informativa sulla privacy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentazione}
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Codice sorgente" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribuisci }
-
-
-Scarica
-
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
-
-
-
-
-
-Abbiamo precedentemente consiglito di abilitare la preferenza *Isola Indirizzo di Destinazione* nelle impostazioni di Orbot. Sebbene quest'impostazione possa teoricamente migliorare la privacy, imponendo l'utilizzo di un circuito differente per ogni indirizzo IP cui ti connetti, non fornisce un vantaggio pratico per gran parte delle applicazioni (specialmente per la navigazione web), può comportare una significativa riduzione delle prestazioni e incrementa il carico sulla rete di Tor. Non consigliamo più la regolazione di quest'impostazione dal suo valore predefinito, a meno che tu sappia che è necessario.[^1]
-
-
-
Suggerimenti per Android
-
-Orbot può delegare le singole app, se supportano il proxy SOCKS o HTTP. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
-
-Orbot è spesso obsoleto sul [repository di F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) di Guardian Project e su [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android), quindi, piuttosto, cerca di scaricarlo direttamente dal [repository di GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases).
-
-All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
-
-
-
-On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
-
## Onion Browser (iOS)
@@ -149,6 +109,4 @@ On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks
Onion Browser does not provide the same levels of privacy protections as Tor Browser does on desktop platforms. For casual use it is a perfectly fine way to access hidden services, but if you're concerned about being traced or monitored by advanced adversaries you should not rely on this as an anonymity tool.
-[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside Orbot, but this still comes with some limitations on iOS (noted in the Orbot section above).
-
-[^1]: L'impostazione `IsolateDestAddr` è discussa nella [mailing list Tor](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html) e nella [documentazione Stream Isolation di Whonix](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), dove entrambi i progetti suggeriscono che di solito non è un buon approccio per la maggior parte delle persone.
+[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot), but this still comes with some limitations on iOS.
diff --git a/i18n/ja/alternative-networks.md b/i18n/ja/alternative-networks.md
index 5c039cc0..8adab9aa 100644
--- a/i18n/ja/alternative-networks.md
+++ b/i18n/ja/alternative-networks.md
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ The recommended way to access the Tor network is via the official Tor Browser, w
[Tor Browser Info :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
+You can access the Tor network using other tools; making this determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. 日常的にTorを使う人が増えることはTorのマイナスイメージをやわらげ、ISPや政府が作成しているかもしれない「Torユーザーリスト」の質を下げることになります。
+
Try it out!
@@ -42,12 +44,54 @@ You can try connecting to _Privacy Guides_ via Tor at [xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh
+#### Orbot
+
+
+
+{ align=right }
+
+**Orbot** is a mobile application which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
+
+
+Downloads
+
+- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
+- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+- [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid)
+
+
+
+
+
+We previously recommended enabling the _Isolate Destination Address_ preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
+
+\=== "Android"
+
+```
+Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+Orbot is often outdated on Google Play and the Guardian Project's F-Droid repository, so consider downloading directly from the GitHub repository instead. All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
+```
+
+\=== "iOS"
+
+```
+On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
+```
+
#### Snowflake
-{ align=right }
-{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
**Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.
@@ -110,4 +154,5 @@ Also, unlike Tor, every I2P node will relay traffic for other users by default,
There are downsides to I2P's approach, however. Tor relying on dedicated exit nodes means more people in less safe environments can use it, and the relays that do exist on Tor are likely to be more performant and stable, as they generally aren't run on residential connections. Tor is also far more focused on **browser privacy** (i.e. anti-fingerprinting), with a dedicated [Tor Browser](tor.md) to make browsing activity as anonymous as possible. I2P is used via your [regular web browser](desktop-browsers.md), and while you can configure your browser to be more privacy-protecting, you probably still won't have the same browser fingerprint as other I2P users (there's no "crowd" to blend in with in that regard).
-Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
+[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+ Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
diff --git a/i18n/ja/android/index.md b/i18n/ja/android/index.md
index 62f95b3f..97cf0f6c 100644
--- a/i18n/ja/android/index.md
+++ b/i18n/ja/android/index.md
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Androidのカスタムディストリビューションを選択する場合に
[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_\(Android\)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_\(operating_system\)#Security_and_privacy). root化によって低下したセキュリティーの脆弱性が悪用されると、プライバシーが損なわれてしまう可能性があります。 一般的な方法でroot化を行うと、ブートパーティションが直接変更されてしまうため、確認付きブートを行うことはできなくなります。 Apps that require root will also modify the system partition, meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the attack surface of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
-Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as [Orbot](../tor.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
+Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (like AdAway) and firewalls which require root access persistently (like AFWall+) are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy-enhancing services such as [Orbot](../alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_\(computing\)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
diff --git a/i18n/ja/device-integrity.md b/i18n/ja/device-integrity.md
index 0cf35a86..11510e08 100644
--- a/i18n/ja/device-integrity.md
+++ b/i18n/ja/device-integrity.md
@@ -188,4 +188,4 @@ It is important to note that Auditor can only effectively detect changes **after
No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
-If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service.
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address from the attestation service, you could consider using [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [VPN](vpn.md).
diff --git a/i18n/ja/tools.md b/i18n/ja/tools.md
index 46acac27..2576c20b 100644
--- a/i18n/ja/tools.md
+++ b/i18n/ja/tools.md
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ For more details about each project, why they were chosen, and additional tips o
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Smartphone Tor Proxy)](tor.md#orbot)
- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Onion Browser (Tor for iOS)](tor.md#onion-browser-ios)
@@ -714,9 +713,10 @@ These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functional
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Mobile Tor Proxy)](alternative-networks.md#orbot)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
diff --git a/i18n/ja/tor.md b/i18n/ja/tor.md
index a0164b26..a131312a 100644
--- a/i18n/ja/tor.md
+++ b/i18n/ja/tor.md
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Torに接続する前に、Torと安全に接続する方法についての[概
Torネットワークへの接続は様々な方法がありますが、Firefoxをフォークし、デスクトップやAndroid用で[:material-incognito: 匿名](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy ""){.pg-purple}ブラウジングを重視した**Tor Browser**が最も利用されています。
-Torネットワークに接続するアプリには長短があり、どれを使うかは脅威モデルによります。 ISPが不利な証拠を集めることについて心配しないTorのカジュアルなユーザーであれば、[Orbit](#orbot)などのモバイルブラウザからTorネットワークに接続することは良い方法です。 日常的にTorを使う人が増えることはTorのマイナスイメージをやわらげ、ISPや政府が作成しているかもしれない「Torユーザーリスト」の質を下げることになります。
+Torネットワークに接続するアプリには長短があり、どれを使うかは脅威モデルによります。 If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using mobile browser apps like [Onion Browser](#onion-browser-ios) to access the Tor network is probably fine. 日常的にTorを使う人が増えることはTorのマイナスイメージをやわらげ、ISPや政府が作成しているかもしれない「Torユーザーリスト」の質を下げることになります。
完全な匿名性が最優先であるなら、デスクトップのTor Browser**のみ**を使うべきであり、[Whonix](desktop.md#whonix)と[Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os)の構成が理想的です。 モバイルブラウザではTorはあまり使われておらず（そのためフィンガープリンティングされやすい）、匿名化解除に対して厳密にテストはされていません。
@@ -84,46 +84,6 @@ Tor Browserはフィンガープリントを防止するよう設計されてお
Tor Browserを直接コンピューターにインストールするだけではなく、[Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os)上の[Whonix](desktop.md#whonix)のようにTorネットワークに接続するためのOSもあり、Tor Browser単体で使うよりもよりセキュリティを強化することができます。
-## Orbot
-
-
-
-{ align=right }
-
-**Orbot**はスマートフォン用の無償のTor VPNで、アプリの通信をTorネットワーク経由にすることができます。
-
-[:octicons-home-16: ウェブページ](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="プライバシーポリシー" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=ドキュメント}
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="ソースコード" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=貢献 }
-
-
-ダウンロード
-
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
-
-
-
-
-
-以前はOrbotの*宛先アドレスの分離*の設定を有効にすることを推奨していました。 この設定で接続ごとに異なるIPアドレスを使用することになり、論理的にはプライバシーを改善することができます。ただし、多くのアプリケーションでは（特にウェブブラウジング）実用上の利点はなく、パフォーマンスが著しく低下し、Torネットワークに負荷をかけるだけです。 必要がある場合を除き、この設定をデフォルトから変更することは推奨しません。[^1]
-
-
-
Android向けのヒント
-
-OrbotはSOCKSもしくはHTTPのプロキシに対応している個別のアプリケーションのプロキシの役割を果たします。 [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService)を使うことで、すべてのネットワーク接続をプロキシ経由にすることができ、VPNキルスイッチにすることができます :gear: **設定** → **ネットワークとインターネット** → **VPN** → :gear: → **VPN以外の接続のブロック**。
-
-Guardian Projectの[F-Droidリポジトリ](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) や [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)のOrbotは古いことが多いため、[GitHubリポジトリ](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)から直接ダウンロードすることを検討してください。
-
-どのリポジトリでも同じ署名を使っているため、互換性があります。
-
-
-
-iOS版のOrbotは潜在的にアプリがクラッシュするか情報がリークしてしまう可能性があります。iOSではAndroidのようにOSレベルでVPN以外の接続をブロックするような機能はなく、ネットワーク拡張機能にメモリ制限があるためTorをアプリクラッシュなしに実行することは難しいためです。 現状、デスクトップコンピューターでTorを使う方がモバイルでTorを使うよりも常に安全です。
-
## Onion Browser (iOS)
@@ -149,6 +109,4 @@ iOS版のOrbotは潜在的にアプリがクラッシュするか情報がリー
Onion Browserはデスクトップ版のTor Browserと同じレベルでプライバシーを保護することはできません。 Onion Serviceへアクセスするカジュアルな利用には適していますが、高度な追跡や監視を警戒する場合、匿名化ツールとして利用するべきではありません。
-[特に](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929)、Onion Browserはすべての接続がTorを経由することを*保証*していません。 ビルトインのTorを使う場合、Webkitの制約のために[実際のIPアドレスがWebRTCやオーディオ・ビデオストリーム経由でリークする**可能性があります**](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs)。 Onion BrowserとOrbotを併用することでより*安全*になりますが、iOS上での制約は残ります（上記Orbotのセクションを参照）。
-
-[^1]: `IsolateDestAddr`は[Torのメーリングリスト](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html)や[WhonixのStream Isolationドキュメント](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation)で議論されており、どちらにおいても、よいアプローチではないとされています。
+[特に](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929)、Onion Browserはすべての接続がTorを経由することを*保証*していません。 ビルトインのTorを使う場合、Webkitの制約のために[実際のIPアドレスがWebRTCやオーディオ・ビデオストリーム経由でリークする**可能性があります**](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs)。 It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot), but this still comes with some limitations on iOS.
diff --git a/i18n/ko/alternative-networks.md b/i18n/ko/alternative-networks.md
index e1b3f4d3..90b5c372 100644
--- a/i18n/ko/alternative-networks.md
+++ b/i18n/ko/alternative-networks.md
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ The recommended way to access the Tor network is via the official Tor Browser, w
[Tor Browser Info :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
+You can access the Tor network using other tools; making this determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Tor를 일상에서 사용하는 사용자가 증가한다면 Tor에 대한 부정적인 이미지를 해소할 수 있고, 정부 또는 ISP가 Tor 사용자 명단을 수집하는 행위의 가치를 줄일 수 있습니다.
+
Try it out!
@@ -42,12 +44,54 @@ You can try connecting to _Privacy Guides_ via Tor at [xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh
+#### Orbot
+
+
+
+{ align=right }
+
+**Orbot** is a mobile application which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
+
+
+Downloads
+
+- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
+- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+- [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid)
+
+
+
+
+
+We previously recommended enabling the _Isolate Destination Address_ preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
+
+\=== "Android"
+
+```
+Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+Orbot is often outdated on Google Play and the Guardian Project's F-Droid repository, so consider downloading directly from the GitHub repository instead. All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
+```
+
+\=== "iOS"
+
+```
+On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
+```
+
#### Snowflake
-{ align=right }
-{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
**Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.
@@ -110,4 +154,5 @@ Also, unlike Tor, every I2P node will relay traffic for other users by default,
There are downsides to I2P's approach, however. Tor relying on dedicated exit nodes means more people in less safe environments can use it, and the relays that do exist on Tor are likely to be more performant and stable, as they generally aren't run on residential connections. Tor is also far more focused on **browser privacy** (i.e. anti-fingerprinting), with a dedicated [Tor Browser](tor.md) to make browsing activity as anonymous as possible. I2P is used via your [regular web browser](desktop-browsers.md), and while you can configure your browser to be more privacy-protecting, you probably still won't have the same browser fingerprint as other I2P users (there's no "crowd" to blend in with in that regard).
-Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
+[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+ Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
diff --git a/i18n/ko/android/index.md b/i18n/ko/android/index.md
index b1353bb0..7e5f88be 100644
--- a/i18n/ko/android/index.md
+++ b/i18n/ko/android/index.md
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ There are also many private alternatives to the apps that come pre-installed on
When you buy an Android phone, the default operating system comes bundled with apps and functionality that are not part of the Android Open Source Project. Many of these apps—even apps like the dialer which provide basic system functionality—require invasive integrations with Google Play Services, which in turn asks for privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, and numerous other things on your device in order for those basic system apps and many other apps to function in the first place. Frameworks like Google Play Services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android.
-This problem could be solved by using an alternative Android distribution, commonly known as a _custom ROM_, that does not come with such invasive integration. 다만 안타깝게도, 대부분의 커스텀 Android 배포판은 AVB, 롤백 보호, 펌웨어 업데이트 등의 중요한 보안 기능을 지원하지 않음으로써 Android 보안 모델을 위반하는 경우가 많습니다. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require [more permissive](https://github.com/LineageOS/android_system_sepolicy/search?q=userdebug\&type=code) SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
+This problem could be solved by using an alternative Android distribution, commonly known as a _custom ROM_, that does not come with such invasive integration. 다만 안타깝게도, 대부분의 커스텀 Android 배포판은 AVB, 롤백 보호, 펌웨어 업데이트 등의 중요한 보안 기능을 지원하지 않음으로써 Android 보안 모델을 위반하는 경우가 많습니다. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require more permissive SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
커스텀 Android 배포판을 선택할 때는 해당 배포판이 Android 보안 모델을 준수하는지 확인하는 것이 이상적입니다. At the very least, the distribution should have production builds, support for AVB, rollback protection, timely firmware and operating system updates, and SELinux in [enforcing mode](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts#enforcement_levels). All of our recommended Android distributions satisfy these criteria:
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ This problem could be solved by using an alternative Android distribution, commo
[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_\(Android\)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_\(operating_system\)#Security_and_privacy). 보안 수준이 낮아져 취약점의 발생으로 이어질 경우 프라이버시 또한 저해됩니다. 루팅은 일반적으로 부팅 파티션을 직접 조작하는 방식으로 이루어지므로, 자체 검사 부팅을 제대로 수행할 수 없습니다. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition, meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the attack surface of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
-Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. 이러한 방식은 광고 차단기의 본래 목적 면에서도 적절한 방식이 아닙니다. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as [Orbot](../tor.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
+Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (like AdAway) and firewalls which require root access persistently (like AFWall+) are dangerous and should not be used. 이러한 방식은 광고 차단기의 본래 목적 면에서도 적절한 방식이 아닙니다. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy-enhancing services such as [Orbot](../alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_\(computing\)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
diff --git a/i18n/ko/device-integrity.md b/i18n/ko/device-integrity.md
index f3548963..99cb3aa2 100644
--- a/i18n/ko/device-integrity.md
+++ b/i18n/ko/device-integrity.md
@@ -188,4 +188,4 @@ It is important to note that Auditor can only effectively detect changes **after
No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
-If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service.
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address from the attestation service, you could consider using [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [VPN](vpn.md).
diff --git a/i18n/ko/tools.md b/i18n/ko/tools.md
index 1b0a7376..fb7452ba 100644
--- a/i18n/ko/tools.md
+++ b/i18n/ko/tools.md
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ For more details about each project, why they were chosen, and additional tips o
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Smartphone Tor Proxy)](tor.md#orbot)
- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Onion Browser (Tor for iOS)](tor.md#onion-browser-ios)
@@ -714,9 +713,10 @@ These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functional
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Mobile Tor Proxy)](alternative-networks.md#orbot)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
diff --git a/i18n/ko/tor.md b/i18n/ko/tor.md
index 82c00e46..585bf693 100644
--- a/i18n/ko/tor.md
+++ b/i18n/ko/tor.md
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Tor에 연결하기 전에 [개요](advanced/tor-overview.md)에서 Tor가 무
There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for [:material-incognito: anonymous](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy ""){.pg-purple} browsing for desktop computers and Android.
-Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Tor를 일상에서 사용하는 사용자가 증가한다면 Tor에 대한 부정적인 이미지를 해소할 수 있고, 정부 또는 ISP가 Tor 사용자 명단을 수집하는 행위의 가치를 줄일 수 있습니다.
+Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using mobile browser apps like [Onion Browser](#onion-browser-ios) to access the Tor network is probably fine. Tor를 일상에서 사용하는 사용자가 증가한다면 Tor에 대한 부정적인 이미지를 해소할 수 있고, 정부 또는 ISP가 Tor 사용자 명단을 수집하는 행위의 가치를 줄일 수 있습니다.
If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** be using the desktop Tor Browser client, ideally in a [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) configuration. Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against deanonymization.
@@ -84,46 +84,6 @@ Tor 브라우저는 핑거프린팅 및 브라우저 설정 기반 사용자 식
Tor Browser를 컴퓨터에 설치해서 연결하는 방법도 있지만, [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os)의 [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix)처럼 Tor 네트워크에 연결하기 위한 용도로 만들어진 운영 체제도 있습니다. 이러한 연결 방식은 Tor Browser를 사용하는 것보다 더 강력한 보안을 제공합니다.
-## Orbot
-
-
-
-{ align=right }
-
-**Orbot**는 기기의 어떤 앱이든 해당 앱의 트래픽을 Tor 네트워크를 통해 라우팅하는 스마트폰용 무료 Tor VPN입니다.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
-
-
-Downloads
-
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
-
-
-
-
-
-이전에는 Orbot 설정에서 *Isolate Destination Address* 옵션을 활성화하도록 권장했었습니다. 이론적으로, 이 옵션은 연결이 발생하는 모든 IP 주소마다 다른 경로를 사용하도록 하여 프라이버시를 향상시킬 수 있습니다. 하지만 대부분의 애플리케이션(특히 웹 브라우저)에 실질적인 이점을 제공하지 않으며, 상당한 성능 저하를 초래하고 Tor 네트워크의 부하를 증가시킵니다. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
-
-
-
Tips for Android
-
-Orbot은 앱이 SOCKS/HTTP 프록시를 지원하는 경우 개별적으로 프록시를 적용하는 것도 가능합니다. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
-
-Guardian Project [F-Droid 저장소](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid), [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)에서의 Orbot은 구버전인 경우가 많으므로, [GitHub 저장소](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)에서 직접 다운로드하는 것을 추천드립니다.
-
-All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
-
-
-
-On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
-
## Onion Browser (iOS)
@@ -149,6 +109,4 @@ On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks
Onion Browser does not provide the same levels of privacy protections as Tor Browser does on desktop platforms. For casual use it is a perfectly fine way to access hidden services, but if you're concerned about being traced or monitored by advanced adversaries you should not rely on this as an anonymity tool.
-[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside Orbot, but this still comes with some limitations on iOS (noted in the Orbot section above).
-
-[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot), but this still comes with some limitations on iOS.
diff --git a/i18n/ku-IQ/alternative-networks.md b/i18n/ku-IQ/alternative-networks.md
index bc959181..484e582e 100644
--- a/i18n/ku-IQ/alternative-networks.md
+++ b/i18n/ku-IQ/alternative-networks.md
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ The recommended way to access the Tor network is via the official Tor Browser, w
[Tor Browser Info :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
+You can access the Tor network using other tools; making this determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
+
Try it out!
@@ -42,12 +44,54 @@ You can try connecting to _Privacy Guides_ via Tor at [xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh
+#### Orbot
+
+
+
+{ align=right }
+
+**Orbot** is a mobile application which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
+
+
+Downloads
+
+- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
+- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+- [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid)
+
+
+
+
+
+We previously recommended enabling the _Isolate Destination Address_ preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
+
+\=== "Android"
+
+```
+Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+Orbot is often outdated on Google Play and the Guardian Project's F-Droid repository, so consider downloading directly from the GitHub repository instead. All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
+```
+
+\=== "iOS"
+
+```
+On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
+```
+
#### Snowflake
-{ align=right }
-{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
**Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.
@@ -110,4 +154,5 @@ Also, unlike Tor, every I2P node will relay traffic for other users by default,
There are downsides to I2P's approach, however. Tor relying on dedicated exit nodes means more people in less safe environments can use it, and the relays that do exist on Tor are likely to be more performant and stable, as they generally aren't run on residential connections. Tor is also far more focused on **browser privacy** (i.e. anti-fingerprinting), with a dedicated [Tor Browser](tor.md) to make browsing activity as anonymous as possible. I2P is used via your [regular web browser](desktop-browsers.md), and while you can configure your browser to be more privacy-protecting, you probably still won't have the same browser fingerprint as other I2P users (there's no "crowd" to blend in with in that regard).
-Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
+[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+ Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
diff --git a/i18n/ku-IQ/android/index.md b/i18n/ku-IQ/android/index.md
index b9651fb9..75323d86 100644
--- a/i18n/ku-IQ/android/index.md
+++ b/i18n/ku-IQ/android/index.md
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ There are also many private alternatives to the apps that come pre-installed on
When you buy an Android phone, the default operating system comes bundled with apps and functionality that are not part of the Android Open Source Project. Many of these apps—even apps like the dialer which provide basic system functionality—require invasive integrations with Google Play Services, which in turn asks for privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, and numerous other things on your device in order for those basic system apps and many other apps to function in the first place. Frameworks like Google Play Services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android.
-This problem could be solved by using an alternative Android distribution, commonly known as a _custom ROM_, that does not come with such invasive integration. Unfortunately, many custom Android distributions often violate the Android security model by not supporting critical security features such as AVB, rollback protection, firmware updates, and so on. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require [more permissive](https://github.com/LineageOS/android_system_sepolicy/search?q=userdebug\&type=code) SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
+This problem could be solved by using an alternative Android distribution, commonly known as a _custom ROM_, that does not come with such invasive integration. Unfortunately, many custom Android distributions often violate the Android security model by not supporting critical security features such as AVB, rollback protection, firmware updates, and so on. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require more permissive SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that it upholds the Android security model. At the very least, the distribution should have production builds, support for AVB, rollback protection, timely firmware and operating system updates, and SELinux in [enforcing mode](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts#enforcement_levels). All of our recommended Android distributions satisfy these criteria:
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that
[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_\(Android\)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_\(operating_system\)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition, meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the attack surface of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
-Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as [Orbot](../tor.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
+Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (like AdAway) and firewalls which require root access persistently (like AFWall+) are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy-enhancing services such as [Orbot](../alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_\(computing\)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
diff --git a/i18n/ku-IQ/device-integrity.md b/i18n/ku-IQ/device-integrity.md
index f3548963..99cb3aa2 100644
--- a/i18n/ku-IQ/device-integrity.md
+++ b/i18n/ku-IQ/device-integrity.md
@@ -188,4 +188,4 @@ It is important to note that Auditor can only effectively detect changes **after
No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
-If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service.
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address from the attestation service, you could consider using [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [VPN](vpn.md).
diff --git a/i18n/ku-IQ/tools.md b/i18n/ku-IQ/tools.md
index 2136229a..2f4b7ad4 100644
--- a/i18n/ku-IQ/tools.md
+++ b/i18n/ku-IQ/tools.md
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ For more details about each project, why they were chosen, and additional tips o
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Smartphone Tor Proxy)](tor.md#orbot)
- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Onion Browser (Tor for iOS)](tor.md#onion-browser-ios)
@@ -714,9 +713,10 @@ These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functional
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Mobile Tor Proxy)](alternative-networks.md#orbot)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
diff --git a/i18n/ku-IQ/tor.md b/i18n/ku-IQ/tor.md
index c20d62ba..c3014f96 100644
--- a/i18n/ku-IQ/tor.md
+++ b/i18n/ku-IQ/tor.md
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Before connecting to Tor, please ensure you've read our [overview](advanced/tor-
There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for [:material-incognito: anonymous](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy ""){.pg-purple} browsing for desktop computers and Android.
-Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
+Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using mobile browser apps like [Onion Browser](#onion-browser-ios) to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** be using the desktop Tor Browser client, ideally in a [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) configuration. Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against deanonymization.
@@ -84,46 +84,6 @@ The Tor Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting, or identifying you based
In addition to installing Tor Browser on your computer directly, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser alone.
-## Orbot
-
-
-
-{ align=right }
-
-**Orbot** is a free Tor VPN for smartphones which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
-
-
-Downloads
-
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
-
-
-
-
-
-We previously recommended enabling the *Isolate Destination Address* preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
-
-
-
Tips for Android
-
-Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
-
-Orbot is often outdated on the Guardian Project's [F-Droid repository](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android), so consider downloading directly from the [GitHub repository](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases) instead.
-
-All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
-
-
-
-On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
-
## Onion Browser (iOS)
@@ -149,6 +109,4 @@ On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks
Onion Browser does not provide the same levels of privacy protections as Tor Browser does on desktop platforms. For casual use it is a perfectly fine way to access hidden services, but if you're concerned about being traced or monitored by advanced adversaries you should not rely on this as an anonymity tool.
-[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside Orbot, but this still comes with some limitations on iOS (noted in the Orbot section above).
-
-[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot), but this still comes with some limitations on iOS.
diff --git a/i18n/nl/alternative-networks.md b/i18n/nl/alternative-networks.md
index fbfeb54b..5db23c84 100644
--- a/i18n/nl/alternative-networks.md
+++ b/i18n/nl/alternative-networks.md
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ The recommended way to access the Tor network is via the official Tor Browser, w
[Tor Browser Info :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
+You can access the Tor network using other tools; making this determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
+
Try it out!
@@ -42,12 +44,54 @@ You can try connecting to _Privacy Guides_ via Tor at [xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh
+#### Orbot
+
+
+
+{ align=right }
+
+**Orbot** is a mobile application which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
+
+
+Downloads
+
+- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
+- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+- [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid)
+
+
+
+
+
+We previously recommended enabling the _Isolate Destination Address_ preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
+
+\=== "Android"
+
+```
+Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+Orbot is often outdated on Google Play and the Guardian Project's F-Droid repository, so consider downloading directly from the GitHub repository instead. All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
+```
+
+\=== "iOS"
+
+```
+On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
+```
+
#### Snowflake
-{ align=right }
-{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
**Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.
@@ -110,4 +154,5 @@ Also, unlike Tor, every I2P node will relay traffic for other users by default,
There are downsides to I2P's approach, however. Tor relying on dedicated exit nodes means more people in less safe environments can use it, and the relays that do exist on Tor are likely to be more performant and stable, as they generally aren't run on residential connections. Tor is also far more focused on **browser privacy** (i.e. anti-fingerprinting), with a dedicated [Tor Browser](tor.md) to make browsing activity as anonymous as possible. I2P is used via your [regular web browser](desktop-browsers.md), and while you can configure your browser to be more privacy-protecting, you probably still won't have the same browser fingerprint as other I2P users (there's no "crowd" to blend in with in that regard).
-Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
+[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+ Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
diff --git a/i18n/nl/android/index.md b/i18n/nl/android/index.md
index 11195d6c..53488d96 100644
--- a/i18n/nl/android/index.md
+++ b/i18n/nl/android/index.md
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ There are also many private alternatives to the apps that come pre-installed on
When you buy an Android phone, the default operating system comes bundled with apps and functionality that are not part of the Android Open Source Project. Many of these apps—even apps like the dialer which provide basic system functionality—require invasive integrations with Google Play Services, which in turn asks for privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, and numerous other things on your device in order for those basic system apps and many other apps to function in the first place. Frameworks like Google Play Services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android.
-This problem could be solved by using an alternative Android distribution, commonly known as a _custom ROM_, that does not come with such invasive integration. Helaas schenden veel aangepaste Android-distributies vaak het Android-beveiligingsmodel door cruciale beveiligingsfuncties zoals AVB, terugdraaibeveiliging, firmware-updates, enzovoort, niet te ondersteunen. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require [more permissive](https://github.com/LineageOS/android_system_sepolicy/search?q=userdebug\&type=code) SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
+This problem could be solved by using an alternative Android distribution, commonly known as a _custom ROM_, that does not come with such invasive integration. Helaas schenden veel aangepaste Android-distributies vaak het Android-beveiligingsmodel door cruciale beveiligingsfuncties zoals AVB, terugdraaibeveiliging, firmware-updates, enzovoort, niet te ondersteunen. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require more permissive SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
Idealiter, wanneer je een aangepaste Android distributie kiest, moet je ervoor zorgen dat het het Android beveiligingsmodel handhaaft. At the very least, the distribution should have production builds, support for AVB, rollback protection, timely firmware and operating system updates, and SELinux in [enforcing mode](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts#enforcement_levels). All of our recommended Android distributions satisfy these criteria:
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Idealiter, wanneer je een aangepaste Android distributie kiest, moet je ervoor z
[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_\(Android\)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_\(operating_system\)#Security_and_privacy). Dit kan de privacy verminderen mocht er een exploit zijn die door de verminderde beveiliging wordt geholpen. Bij veelgebruikte rootingmethoden wordt rechtstreeks met de opstartpartitie geknoeid, waardoor het onmogelijk is om een succesvolle Verified Boot uit te voeren. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition, meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the attack surface of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
-Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. Zij zijn ook niet de juiste manier om het beoogde doel te bereiken. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as [Orbot](../tor.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
+Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (like AdAway) and firewalls which require root access persistently (like AFWall+) are dangerous and should not be used. Zij zijn ook niet de juiste manier om het beoogde doel te bereiken. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy-enhancing services such as [Orbot](../alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_\(computing\)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
diff --git a/i18n/nl/device-integrity.md b/i18n/nl/device-integrity.md
index f3548963..99cb3aa2 100644
--- a/i18n/nl/device-integrity.md
+++ b/i18n/nl/device-integrity.md
@@ -188,4 +188,4 @@ It is important to note that Auditor can only effectively detect changes **after
No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
-If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service.
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address from the attestation service, you could consider using [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [VPN](vpn.md).
diff --git a/i18n/nl/tools.md b/i18n/nl/tools.md
index 90bf1821..a92697ee 100644
--- a/i18n/nl/tools.md
+++ b/i18n/nl/tools.md
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ Voor meer details over elk project, waarom ze werden gekozen, en extra tips of t
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Smartphone Tor Proxy)](tor.md#orbot)
- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Onion Browser (Tor for iOS)](tor.md#onion-browser-ios)
@@ -714,9 +713,10 @@ These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functional
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Mobile Tor Proxy)](alternative-networks.md#orbot)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
diff --git a/i18n/nl/tor.md b/i18n/nl/tor.md
index e974cf30..05e10a71 100644
--- a/i18n/nl/tor.md
+++ b/i18n/nl/tor.md
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Before connecting to Tor, please ensure you've read our [overview](advanced/tor-
There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for [:material-incognito: anonymous](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy ""){.pg-purple} browsing for desktop computers and Android.
-Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
+Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using mobile browser apps like [Onion Browser](#onion-browser-ios) to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** be using the desktop Tor Browser client, ideally in a [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) configuration. Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against deanonymization.
@@ -84,46 +84,6 @@ De Tor Browser is ontworpen om fingerprinting, of het identificeren van jou op b
In addition to installing Tor Browser on your computer directly, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser alone.
-## Orbot
-
-
-
-{ align=right }
-
-**Orbot** is een gratis Tor VPN voor smartphones die het verkeer van elke app op je toestel door het Tor-netwerk leidt.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
-
-
-Downloads
-
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
-
-
-
-
-
-Wij hebben eerder aanbevolen *Isolate Destination Address* in de Orbot instellingen in te schakelen. Hoewel deze instelling theoretisch de privacy kan verbeteren door het gebruik van een ander circuit af te dwingen voor elk IP adres waarmee je verbinding maakt, biedt het geen praktisch voordeel voor de meeste toepassingen (vooral web browsen), kan het gepaard gaan met een aanzienlijke prestatievermindering en verhoogt het de belasting van het Tor netwerk. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
-
-
-
Tips for Android
-
-Orbot kan individuele apps proxyen als ze SOCKS of HTTP proxying ondersteunen. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
-
-Orbot is vaak verouderd op de [F-Droid repository](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) en [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android) van het Guardian Project, dus overweeg in plaats daarvan direct te downloaden van de [GitHub repository](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases).
-
-All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
-
-
-
-On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
-
## Onion Browser (iOS)
@@ -149,6 +109,4 @@ On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks
Onion Browser does not provide the same levels of privacy protections as Tor Browser does on desktop platforms. For casual use it is a perfectly fine way to access hidden services, but if you're concerned about being traced or monitored by advanced adversaries you should not rely on this as an anonymity tool.
-[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside Orbot, but this still comes with some limitations on iOS (noted in the Orbot section above).
-
-[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot), but this still comes with some limitations on iOS.
diff --git a/i18n/pl/alternative-networks.md b/i18n/pl/alternative-networks.md
index bc959181..484e582e 100644
--- a/i18n/pl/alternative-networks.md
+++ b/i18n/pl/alternative-networks.md
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ The recommended way to access the Tor network is via the official Tor Browser, w
[Tor Browser Info :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
+You can access the Tor network using other tools; making this determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
+
Try it out!
@@ -42,12 +44,54 @@ You can try connecting to _Privacy Guides_ via Tor at [xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh
+#### Orbot
+
+
+
+{ align=right }
+
+**Orbot** is a mobile application which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
+
+
+Downloads
+
+- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
+- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+- [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid)
+
+
+
+
+
+We previously recommended enabling the _Isolate Destination Address_ preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
+
+\=== "Android"
+
+```
+Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+Orbot is often outdated on Google Play and the Guardian Project's F-Droid repository, so consider downloading directly from the GitHub repository instead. All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
+```
+
+\=== "iOS"
+
+```
+On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
+```
+
#### Snowflake
-{ align=right }
-{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
**Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.
@@ -110,4 +154,5 @@ Also, unlike Tor, every I2P node will relay traffic for other users by default,
There are downsides to I2P's approach, however. Tor relying on dedicated exit nodes means more people in less safe environments can use it, and the relays that do exist on Tor are likely to be more performant and stable, as they generally aren't run on residential connections. Tor is also far more focused on **browser privacy** (i.e. anti-fingerprinting), with a dedicated [Tor Browser](tor.md) to make browsing activity as anonymous as possible. I2P is used via your [regular web browser](desktop-browsers.md), and while you can configure your browser to be more privacy-protecting, you probably still won't have the same browser fingerprint as other I2P users (there's no "crowd" to blend in with in that regard).
-Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
+[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+ Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
diff --git a/i18n/pl/android/index.md b/i18n/pl/android/index.md
index 6d90fc87..bd9a614a 100644
--- a/i18n/pl/android/index.md
+++ b/i18n/pl/android/index.md
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Wybierając niestandardową dystrybucję Androida, należy upewnić się, że je
[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_\(Android\)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_\(operating_system\)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition, meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the attack surface of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
-Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. Nie są one również właściwym sposobem na rozwiązanie ich zamierzonych celów. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as [Orbot](../tor.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
+Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (like AdAway) and firewalls which require root access persistently (like AFWall+) are dangerous and should not be used. Nie są one również właściwym sposobem na rozwiązanie ich zamierzonych celów. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy-enhancing services such as [Orbot](../alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_\(computing\)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
diff --git a/i18n/pl/device-integrity.md b/i18n/pl/device-integrity.md
index f3548963..99cb3aa2 100644
--- a/i18n/pl/device-integrity.md
+++ b/i18n/pl/device-integrity.md
@@ -188,4 +188,4 @@ It is important to note that Auditor can only effectively detect changes **after
No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
-If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service.
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address from the attestation service, you could consider using [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [VPN](vpn.md).
diff --git a/i18n/pl/tools.md b/i18n/pl/tools.md
index 03470a82..ec789281 100644
--- a/i18n/pl/tools.md
+++ b/i18n/pl/tools.md
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ For more details about each project, why they were chosen, and additional tips o
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Smartphone Tor Proxy)](tor.md#orbot)
- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Onion Browser (Tor for iOS)](tor.md#onion-browser-ios)
@@ -714,9 +713,10 @@ These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functional
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Mobile Tor Proxy)](alternative-networks.md#orbot)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
diff --git a/i18n/pl/tor.md b/i18n/pl/tor.md
index c20d62ba..c3014f96 100644
--- a/i18n/pl/tor.md
+++ b/i18n/pl/tor.md
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Before connecting to Tor, please ensure you've read our [overview](advanced/tor-
There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for [:material-incognito: anonymous](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy ""){.pg-purple} browsing for desktop computers and Android.
-Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
+Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using mobile browser apps like [Onion Browser](#onion-browser-ios) to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** be using the desktop Tor Browser client, ideally in a [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) configuration. Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against deanonymization.
@@ -84,46 +84,6 @@ The Tor Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting, or identifying you based
In addition to installing Tor Browser on your computer directly, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser alone.
-## Orbot
-
-
-
-{ align=right }
-
-**Orbot** is a free Tor VPN for smartphones which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
-
-
-Downloads
-
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
-
-
-
-
-
-We previously recommended enabling the *Isolate Destination Address* preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
-
-
-
Tips for Android
-
-Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
-
-Orbot is often outdated on the Guardian Project's [F-Droid repository](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android), so consider downloading directly from the [GitHub repository](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases) instead.
-
-All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
-
-
-
-On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
-
## Onion Browser (iOS)
@@ -149,6 +109,4 @@ On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks
Onion Browser does not provide the same levels of privacy protections as Tor Browser does on desktop platforms. For casual use it is a perfectly fine way to access hidden services, but if you're concerned about being traced or monitored by advanced adversaries you should not rely on this as an anonymity tool.
-[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside Orbot, but this still comes with some limitations on iOS (noted in the Orbot section above).
-
-[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot), but this still comes with some limitations on iOS.
diff --git a/i18n/pt-BR/alternative-networks.md b/i18n/pt-BR/alternative-networks.md
index 6f47fee7..5579a00d 100644
--- a/i18n/pt-BR/alternative-networks.md
+++ b/i18n/pt-BR/alternative-networks.md
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ The recommended way to access the Tor network is via the official Tor Browser, w
[Tor Browser Info :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
+You can access the Tor network using other tools; making this determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Aumentar o número de pessoas que usam Tor todos os dias ajuda a reduzir o mau estigma do Tor, e diminui a qualidade das "listas de usuários de Tor" que os ISPs e os governos podem compilar.
+
Try it out!
@@ -42,12 +44,54 @@ You can try connecting to _Privacy Guides_ via Tor at [xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh
+#### Orbot
+
+
+
+{ align=right }
+
+**Orbot** is a mobile application which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
+
+
+Downloads
+
+- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
+- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+- [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid)
+
+
+
+
+
+We previously recommended enabling the _Isolate Destination Address_ preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
+
+\=== "Android"
+
+```
+Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+Orbot is often outdated on Google Play and the Guardian Project's F-Droid repository, so consider downloading directly from the GitHub repository instead. All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
+```
+
+\=== "iOS"
+
+```
+On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
+```
+
#### Snowflake
-{ align=right }
-{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
**Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.
@@ -110,4 +154,5 @@ Also, unlike Tor, every I2P node will relay traffic for other users by default,
There are downsides to I2P's approach, however. Tor relying on dedicated exit nodes means more people in less safe environments can use it, and the relays that do exist on Tor are likely to be more performant and stable, as they generally aren't run on residential connections. Tor is also far more focused on **browser privacy** (i.e. anti-fingerprinting), with a dedicated [Tor Browser](tor.md) to make browsing activity as anonymous as possible. I2P is used via your [regular web browser](desktop-browsers.md), and while you can configure your browser to be more privacy-protecting, you probably still won't have the same browser fingerprint as other I2P users (there's no "crowd" to blend in with in that regard).
-Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
+[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+ Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
diff --git a/i18n/pt-BR/android/index.md b/i18n/pt-BR/android/index.md
index 76c1d3b0..2c4aa4a8 100644
--- a/i18n/pt-BR/android/index.md
+++ b/i18n/pt-BR/android/index.md
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ O ideal é que, ao escolher uma distribuição personalizada do Android, você s
[Rooting](https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_no_Android#:~:text=O%20root%20ou%20rooting%20%C3%A9,indispon%C3%ADveis%20em%20sua%20configura%C3%A7%C3%A3o%20padr%C3%A3o.)) telefones Android pode diminuir significativamente a segurança pois enfraquece o [modelo de segurança do Android](https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android#:~:text=Android%20%C3%A9%20um%20sistema%20operacional,desenvolvedores%20conhecido%20como%20Open%20Handset)#Security_and_privacy). Isto pode diminuir a privacidade se houver um exploit que seja assistenciado pela diminuição da segurança. Métodos comuns de root envolvem diretamente adulteração com a partição de boot, tornando impossível executar uma boot verificada com sucesso. Apps que requerem root também modificarão a partição do sistema, o que significa que o Boot Verificado terá de permanecer desativado. Ter o root exposto diretamente na interface do usuário também aumenta a superfície de ataque do seu dispositivo e pode ajudar na [escalada de privilégios](https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Escalonamento_de_privil%C3%A9gios#:~:text=A%20escala%C3%A7%C3%A3o%20de%20privil%C3%A9gios%20%C3%A9,de%20um%20aplicativo%20ou%20usu%C3%A1rio.) vulnerabilidades e desvios da política do SELinux.
-Bloqueadores de conteúdo que modificam os [arquivos hosts](https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(arquivo\)#:~:text=O%20arquivo%20hosts%2C%20%C3%A9%20um,plano%2C%20tradicionalmente%20nomeado%20como%20hosts.)) (AdAway) e firewalls (AFWall+) que exigem acesso à raiz de forma persistente são perigosos e não devem ser usados. Eles também não são a maneira correta de resolver seus objetivos pretendidos. Para bloqueio de conteúdo, sugerimos criptografia [DNS](../dns.md) ou funcionalidade de bloqueio de conteúdo fornecida por uma VPN. TrackerControl e AdAway em modo sem root ocuparão o slot de VPN (usando uma VPN com loopback local), impedindo que você utilize serviços de aprimoramento de privacidade como [Orbot](../tor.md#orbot) ou um [verdadeiro provedor VPN](../vpn.md).
+Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (like AdAway) and firewalls which require root access persistently (like AFWall+) are dangerous and should not be used. Eles também não são a maneira correta de resolver seus objetivos pretendidos. Para bloqueio de conteúdo, sugerimos criptografia [DNS](../dns.md) ou funcionalidade de bloqueio de conteúdo fornecida por uma VPN. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy-enhancing services such as [Orbot](../alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
O AFWall+ funciona com base na abordagem filtro de pacotes:~:text=de%20uma%20rede-,Filtro%20de%20pacotes,-O%20primeiro%20tipo) e pode ser contornável em algumas situações.
diff --git a/i18n/pt-BR/device-integrity.md b/i18n/pt-BR/device-integrity.md
index 1a9c7cb6..1b809762 100644
--- a/i18n/pt-BR/device-integrity.md
+++ b/i18n/pt-BR/device-integrity.md
@@ -188,4 +188,4 @@ It is important to note that Auditor can only effectively detect changes **after
No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
-If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service.
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address from the attestation service, you could consider using [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [VPN](vpn.md).
diff --git a/i18n/pt-BR/tools.md b/i18n/pt-BR/tools.md
index e03fbc13..18aad76e 100644
--- a/i18n/pt-BR/tools.md
+++ b/i18n/pt-BR/tools.md
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ Para mais detalhes sobre cada projeto, porque foram escolhidos, e dicas ou truqu
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Smartphone Tor Proxy)](tor.md#orbot)
- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Onion Browser (Tor for iOS)](tor.md#onion-browser-ios)
@@ -714,9 +713,10 @@ These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functional
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Mobile Tor Proxy)](alternative-networks.md#orbot)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
diff --git a/i18n/pt-BR/tor.md b/i18n/pt-BR/tor.md
index ba03074f..3a0c90f6 100644
--- a/i18n/pt-BR/tor.md
+++ b/i18n/pt-BR/tor.md
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Antes de se conectar ao Tor, certifique-se de ler nosso [overview](advanced/tor-
Há uma variedade de maneiras de se conectar à rede Tor a partir do seu dispositivo, o mais utilizado é o **Navegador Tor**, um fork do Firefox projetado para [:material-incognito: anônimo](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy ""){.pg-purple} navegação para computadores de computador e Android.
-Alguns desses aplicativos são melhores do que outros, e novamente fazer uma determinação equivale ao seu modelo de ameaça. Se você é um usuário casual do Tor que não está preocupado com o ISP que coleta provas contra você, usar aplicativos como o [Orbot](#orbot) ou aplicativos do navegador móvel para acessar a rede Tor provavelmente não é problema. Aumentar o número de pessoas que usam Tor todos os dias ajuda a reduzir o mau estigma do Tor, e diminui a qualidade das "listas de usuários de Tor" que os ISPs e os governos podem compilar.
+Alguns desses aplicativos são melhores do que outros, e novamente fazer uma determinação equivale ao seu modelo de ameaça. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using mobile browser apps like [Onion Browser](#onion-browser-ios) to access the Tor network is probably fine. Aumentar o número de pessoas que usam Tor todos os dias ajuda a reduzir o mau estigma do Tor, e diminui a qualidade das "listas de usuários de Tor" que os ISPs e os governos podem compilar.
Se o anonimato mais completo for fundamental para a sua situação, você deve somente **** utilizar o cliente do navegador Tor para área de trabalho, idealmente em uma configuração de [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os). Navegadores móveis com acesso à rede Tor são escolhas menos comuns (e mais rastreáveis) para o usuário final, algumas de suas configurações não passaram por testes de segurança e desanimalização.
@@ -84,46 +84,6 @@ O Navegador Tor foi projetado para evitar a coleta de suas "impressões digitais
Além de instalar o Navegador Tor diretamente no seu computador, existem também sistemas operacionais projetados especificamente para se conectar à rede Tor, como [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) na [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), que oferecem segurança e proteção ainda maiores do que o Navegador Tor padrão sozinho.
-## Orbot
-
-
-
-{ align=right }
-
-**Orbot** é uma VPN Tor gratuita para celulares que encaminha o tráfego de qualquer aplicativo no seu dispositivo através da Rede Tor.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Página inicial](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Política de Privacidade" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentação}
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Código Fonte" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribuir }
-
-
-Downloads
-
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
-
-
-
-
-
-Antes, recomendávamos habilitar a opção *"Isolar os endereços de destino"* (Isolate Destination Address) nas configurações do Orbot. Embora essa configuração possa, teoricamente, melhorar a privacidade, impondo o uso de um circuito diferente para cada endereço IP ao qual você se conecta, ela não fornece uma vantagem prática para a maioria dos aplicativos (especialmente a navegação na Internet), podendo vir com uma significativa perda de desempenho, e aumento da sobrecarga na rede Tor. Não recomendamos mais ajustar esta definição a partir do seu valor padrão, a menos que você saiba o que precisa.[^1]
-
-
-
Dicas para o Android
-
-Orbot pode fazer proxy em aplicativos individuais se eles suportarem proxy SOCKS ou HTTP. Esses navegadores podem criar um proxy em todas as suas conexões de rede usando [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) e pode ser usado com a desabilitação de conexões fora do VPN em :gear: **Configurações** → **Rede e Internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Bloquear conexões sem VPN**.
-
-Orbot costuma estar desatualizado no [repositório F-Droid, do Projeto Guardian](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) e na [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android), então, considere baixar diretamente do [repositório GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases) em vez disso.
-
-Todas as versões são assinadas usando a mesma assinatura, por isso devem ser compatíveis entre si.
-
-
-
-No iOS, o Orbot tem algumas limitações que podem causar falhas ou vazamentos: o iOS não tem um recurso eficaz no nível do sistema operacional para bloquear conexões que não estão utilizando uma VPN, como no Android por exempo.O iOS tem um limite de memória artificial para extensões de rede que torna difícil executar o Tor no Orbot sem falhas. Atualmente, é sempre mais seguro usar o Tor em um computador ‘desktop’ do que em um dispositivo móvel.
-
## Onion Browser (iOS)
@@ -149,6 +109,4 @@ No iOS, o Orbot tem algumas limitações que podem causar falhas ou vazamentos:
O Onion Browser não oferece os mesmos níveis de proteções de privacidade que o Navegador Tor disponibiliza em plataformas ‘desktop’. Para uso casual é uma maneira perfeitamente excelente de acessar serviços ocultos, mas se você está preocupado em ser rastreado ou monitorado por adversários avançados você não deve confiar nisso como uma ferramenta de anonimato.
-[É importante observar que](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929) O Onion Browser não *garante que* todas as solicitações passem pelo Tor. Ao usar a versão integrada do Tor, [seu IP real **será** vazado via WebRTC e fluxos de áudio/vídeo](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) devido às limitações do WebKit. É *mais seguro* usar o Onion Browser junto com o Orbot, mas ele ainda possui algumas limitações no iOS (mencionadas na seção sobre o Orbot acima).
-
-[^1]: A configuração `IsolateDestAddr` é discutida na [lista de envio Tor](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html) e [Documentação de isolamento de transmissão da Whonix's](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), onde ambos os projetos sugerem que normalmente não é uma boa abordagem para a maioria das pessoas.
+[É importante observar que](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929) O Onion Browser não *garante que* todas as solicitações passem pelo Tor. Ao usar a versão integrada do Tor, [seu IP real **será** vazado via WebRTC e fluxos de áudio/vídeo](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) devido às limitações do WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot), but this still comes with some limitations on iOS.
diff --git a/i18n/pt/alternative-networks.md b/i18n/pt/alternative-networks.md
index 919958f4..de11c721 100644
--- a/i18n/pt/alternative-networks.md
+++ b/i18n/pt/alternative-networks.md
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ The recommended way to access the Tor network is via the official Tor Browser, w
[Tor Browser Info :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
+You can access the Tor network using other tools; making this determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
+
Try it out!
@@ -42,12 +44,54 @@ You can try connecting to _Privacy Guides_ via Tor at [xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh
+#### Orbot
+
+
+
+{ align=right }
+
+**Orbot** is a mobile application which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
+
+
+Downloads
+
+- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
+- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+- [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid)
+
+
+
+
+
+We previously recommended enabling the _Isolate Destination Address_ preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
+
+\=== "Android"
+
+```
+Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+Orbot is often outdated on Google Play and the Guardian Project's F-Droid repository, so consider downloading directly from the GitHub repository instead. All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
+```
+
+\=== "iOS"
+
+```
+On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
+```
+
#### Snowflake
-{ align=right }
-{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
**Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.
@@ -110,4 +154,5 @@ Also, unlike Tor, every I2P node will relay traffic for other users by default,
There are downsides to I2P's approach, however. Tor relying on dedicated exit nodes means more people in less safe environments can use it, and the relays that do exist on Tor are likely to be more performant and stable, as they generally aren't run on residential connections. Tor is also far more focused on **browser privacy** (i.e. anti-fingerprinting), with a dedicated [Tor Browser](tor.md) to make browsing activity as anonymous as possible. I2P is used via your [regular web browser](desktop-browsers.md), and while you can configure your browser to be more privacy-protecting, you probably still won't have the same browser fingerprint as other I2P users (there's no "crowd" to blend in with in that regard).
-Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
+[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+ Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
diff --git a/i18n/pt/android/index.md b/i18n/pt/android/index.md
index b9651fb9..75323d86 100644
--- a/i18n/pt/android/index.md
+++ b/i18n/pt/android/index.md
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ There are also many private alternatives to the apps that come pre-installed on
When you buy an Android phone, the default operating system comes bundled with apps and functionality that are not part of the Android Open Source Project. Many of these apps—even apps like the dialer which provide basic system functionality—require invasive integrations with Google Play Services, which in turn asks for privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, and numerous other things on your device in order for those basic system apps and many other apps to function in the first place. Frameworks like Google Play Services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android.
-This problem could be solved by using an alternative Android distribution, commonly known as a _custom ROM_, that does not come with such invasive integration. Unfortunately, many custom Android distributions often violate the Android security model by not supporting critical security features such as AVB, rollback protection, firmware updates, and so on. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require [more permissive](https://github.com/LineageOS/android_system_sepolicy/search?q=userdebug\&type=code) SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
+This problem could be solved by using an alternative Android distribution, commonly known as a _custom ROM_, that does not come with such invasive integration. Unfortunately, many custom Android distributions often violate the Android security model by not supporting critical security features such as AVB, rollback protection, firmware updates, and so on. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require more permissive SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that it upholds the Android security model. At the very least, the distribution should have production builds, support for AVB, rollback protection, timely firmware and operating system updates, and SELinux in [enforcing mode](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts#enforcement_levels). All of our recommended Android distributions satisfy these criteria:
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that
[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_\(Android\)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_\(operating_system\)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition, meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the attack surface of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
-Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as [Orbot](../tor.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
+Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (like AdAway) and firewalls which require root access persistently (like AFWall+) are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy-enhancing services such as [Orbot](../alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_\(computing\)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
diff --git a/i18n/pt/device-integrity.md b/i18n/pt/device-integrity.md
index f3548963..99cb3aa2 100644
--- a/i18n/pt/device-integrity.md
+++ b/i18n/pt/device-integrity.md
@@ -188,4 +188,4 @@ It is important to note that Auditor can only effectively detect changes **after
No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
-If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service.
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address from the attestation service, you could consider using [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [VPN](vpn.md).
diff --git a/i18n/pt/tools.md b/i18n/pt/tools.md
index 06f4b055..b60a29bb 100644
--- a/i18n/pt/tools.md
+++ b/i18n/pt/tools.md
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ Para obter mais detalhes sobre cada projeto, o motivo pelo qual foi escolhido e
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Smartphone Tor Proxy)](tor.md#orbot)
- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Onion Browser (Tor for iOS)](tor.md#onion-browser-ios)
@@ -714,9 +713,10 @@ These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functional
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Mobile Tor Proxy)](alternative-networks.md#orbot)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
diff --git a/i18n/pt/tor.md b/i18n/pt/tor.md
index 442ca228..af054cb0 100644
--- a/i18n/pt/tor.md
+++ b/i18n/pt/tor.md
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Before connecting to Tor, please ensure you've read our [overview](advanced/tor-
There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for [:material-incognito: anonymous](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy ""){.pg-purple} browsing for desktop computers and Android.
-Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
+Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using mobile browser apps like [Onion Browser](#onion-browser-ios) to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** be using the desktop Tor Browser client, ideally in a [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) configuration. Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against deanonymization.
@@ -84,46 +84,6 @@ O Tor foi concebido para evitar a recolha de impressões digitais, ou a sua iden
In addition to installing Tor Browser on your computer directly, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser alone.
-## Orbot
-
-
-
-{ align=right }
-
-**Orbot** é uma VPN Tor gratuita para dispositivos móveis que encaminha o tráfego de qualquer aplicação no seu dispositivo através da rede Tor.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
-
-
-Downloads
-
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
-
-
-
-
-
-Anteriormente, recomendamos ativar a preferência *Isolar endereço de destino* nas configurações do Orbot. Enquanto esta configuração pode teoricamente melhorar a privacidade ao forçar o uso de um circuito diferente para cada endereço IP ao qual você se conecta, ela não fornece uma vantagem prática para a maioria das aplicações (especialmente navegação na web), pode vir com uma penalidade significativa de desempenho, e aumenta a carga na rede Tor. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
-
-
-
Tips for Android
-
-Os dados de cada usuário são criptografados usando sua própria chave de criptografia exclusiva, e os arquivos do sistema operacional são deixados não criptografados. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
-
-O Orbot está frequentemente desatualizado no [repositório F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) e no [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android) do Projeto Guardian, então considere fazer o download diretamente do [repositório GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases).
-
-All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
-
-
-
-On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
-
## Onion Browser (iOS)
@@ -149,6 +109,4 @@ On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks
Onion Browser does not provide the same levels of privacy protections as Tor Browser does on desktop platforms. For casual use it is a perfectly fine way to access hidden services, but if you're concerned about being traced or monitored by advanced adversaries you should not rely on this as an anonymity tool.
-[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside Orbot, but this still comes with some limitations on iOS (noted in the Orbot section above).
-
-[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot), but this still comes with some limitations on iOS.
diff --git a/i18n/ru/alternative-networks.md b/i18n/ru/alternative-networks.md
index 0fc07010..c59700a8 100644
--- a/i18n/ru/alternative-networks.md
+++ b/i18n/ru/alternative-networks.md
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ The recommended way to access the Tor network is via the official Tor Browser, w
[Tor Browser Info :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
+You can access the Tor network using other tools; making this determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
+
Try it out!
@@ -42,12 +44,54 @@ You can try connecting to _Privacy Guides_ via Tor at [xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh
+#### Orbot
+
+
+
+{ align=right }
+
+**Orbot** is a mobile application which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
+
+
+Downloads
+
+- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
+- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+- [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid)
+
+
+
+
+
+We previously recommended enabling the _Isolate Destination Address_ preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
+
+\=== "Android"
+
+```
+Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+Orbot is often outdated on Google Play and the Guardian Project's F-Droid repository, so consider downloading directly from the GitHub repository instead. All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
+```
+
+\=== "iOS"
+
+```
+On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
+```
+
#### Snowflake
-{ align=right }
-{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
**Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.
@@ -110,4 +154,5 @@ Also, unlike Tor, every I2P node will relay traffic for other users by default,
There are downsides to I2P's approach, however. Tor relying on dedicated exit nodes means more people in less safe environments can use it, and the relays that do exist on Tor are likely to be more performant and stable, as they generally aren't run on residential connections. Tor is also far more focused on **browser privacy** (i.e. anti-fingerprinting), with a dedicated [Tor Browser](tor.md) to make browsing activity as anonymous as possible. I2P is used via your [regular web browser](desktop-browsers.md), and while you can configure your browser to be more privacy-protecting, you probably still won't have the same browser fingerprint as other I2P users (there's no "crowd" to blend in with in that regard).
-Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
+[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+ Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
diff --git a/i18n/ru/android/index.md b/i18n/ru/android/index.md
index 7e2b0893..9188ccf5 100644
--- a/i18n/ru/android/index.md
+++ b/i18n/ru/android/index.md
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ This problem could be solved by using an alternative Android distribution, commo
[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_\(Android\)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_\(operating_system\)#Security_and_privacy). Это может снизить конфиденциальность, если произойдет эксплойт, вызванный снижением безопасности. Обычные методы рутинга предполагают прямое вмешательство в загрузочный раздел, что делает невозможным успешное выполнение проверенной загрузки. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition, meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the attack surface of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
-Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. Они также не являются корректным способом решения поставленных перед ними задач. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as [Orbot](../tor.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
+Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (like AdAway) and firewalls which require root access persistently (like AFWall+) are dangerous and should not be used. Они также не являются корректным способом решения поставленных перед ними задач. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy-enhancing services such as [Orbot](../alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_\(computing\)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
diff --git a/i18n/ru/device-integrity.md b/i18n/ru/device-integrity.md
index 8f1fc7d7..a92fc373 100644
--- a/i18n/ru/device-integrity.md
+++ b/i18n/ru/device-integrity.md
@@ -188,4 +188,4 @@ It is important to note that Auditor can only effectively detect changes **after
No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
-If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service.
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address from the attestation service, you could consider using [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [VPN](vpn.md).
diff --git a/i18n/ru/tools.md b/i18n/ru/tools.md
index 7f7c4c04..5f776d04 100644
--- a/i18n/ru/tools.md
+++ b/i18n/ru/tools.md
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ If you want assistance figuring out the best privacy tools and alternative progr
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Smartphone Tor Proxy)](tor.md#orbot)
- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Onion Browser (Tor for iOS)](tor.md#onion-browser-ios)
@@ -714,9 +713,10 @@ These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functional
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Mobile Tor Proxy)](alternative-networks.md#orbot)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
diff --git a/i18n/ru/tor.md b/i18n/ru/tor.md
index 9551fc43..aa3b07d7 100644
--- a/i18n/ru/tor.md
+++ b/i18n/ru/tor.md
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Before connecting to Tor, please ensure you've read our [overview](advanced/tor-
There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for [:material-incognito: anonymous](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy ""){.pg-purple} browsing for desktop computers and Android.
-Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
+Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using mobile browser apps like [Onion Browser](#onion-browser-ios) to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** be using the desktop Tor Browser client, ideally in a [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) configuration. Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against deanonymization.
@@ -84,46 +84,6 @@ If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** b
In addition to installing Tor Browser on your computer directly, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser alone.
-## Orbot
-
-
-
-{ align=right }
-
-**Orbot** - это бесплатный Tor VPN для смартфонов, который направляет трафик от любого приложения на твоём устройстве через сеть Tor.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
-
-
-Downloads
-
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
-
-
-
-
-
-Ранее мы рекомендовали включать *Изолировать адреса назначения* в настройках Orbot. Хотя эта настройка теоретически может улучшить конфиденциальность за счет принудительного использования отдельной схемы для каждого IP-адреса, к которому ты подключаешься, она не дает практического преимущества для большинства приложений (особенно для просмотра веб-страниц), может сопровождаться значительным снижением производительности и увеличивает нагрузку на сеть Tor. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
-
-
-
Tips for Android
-
-Orbot может проксировать отдельные приложения, если они поддерживают SOCKS или HTTP проксирование. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
-
-В [репозитории F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) проекта Guardian и [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android) часто загружена устаревшая версия Orbot, поэтому его лучше загружать непосредственно с [оепозитория GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases).
-
-All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
-
-
-
-On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
-
## Onion Browser (iOS)
@@ -149,6 +109,4 @@ On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks
Onion Browser does not provide the same levels of privacy protections as Tor Browser does on desktop platforms. For casual use it is a perfectly fine way to access hidden services, but if you're concerned about being traced or monitored by advanced adversaries you should not rely on this as an anonymity tool.
-[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside Orbot, but this still comes with some limitations on iOS (noted in the Orbot section above).
-
-[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot), but this still comes with some limitations on iOS.
diff --git a/i18n/sv/alternative-networks.md b/i18n/sv/alternative-networks.md
index bc959181..484e582e 100644
--- a/i18n/sv/alternative-networks.md
+++ b/i18n/sv/alternative-networks.md
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ The recommended way to access the Tor network is via the official Tor Browser, w
[Tor Browser Info :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
+You can access the Tor network using other tools; making this determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
+
Try it out!
@@ -42,12 +44,54 @@ You can try connecting to _Privacy Guides_ via Tor at [xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh
+#### Orbot
+
+
+
+{ align=right }
+
+**Orbot** is a mobile application which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
+
+
+Downloads
+
+- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
+- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+- [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid)
+
+
+
+
+
+We previously recommended enabling the _Isolate Destination Address_ preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
+
+\=== "Android"
+
+```
+Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+Orbot is often outdated on Google Play and the Guardian Project's F-Droid repository, so consider downloading directly from the GitHub repository instead. All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
+```
+
+\=== "iOS"
+
+```
+On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
+```
+
#### Snowflake
-{ align=right }
-{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
**Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.
@@ -110,4 +154,5 @@ Also, unlike Tor, every I2P node will relay traffic for other users by default,
There are downsides to I2P's approach, however. Tor relying on dedicated exit nodes means more people in less safe environments can use it, and the relays that do exist on Tor are likely to be more performant and stable, as they generally aren't run on residential connections. Tor is also far more focused on **browser privacy** (i.e. anti-fingerprinting), with a dedicated [Tor Browser](tor.md) to make browsing activity as anonymous as possible. I2P is used via your [regular web browser](desktop-browsers.md), and while you can configure your browser to be more privacy-protecting, you probably still won't have the same browser fingerprint as other I2P users (there's no "crowd" to blend in with in that regard).
-Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
+[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+ Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
diff --git a/i18n/sv/android/index.md b/i18n/sv/android/index.md
index ef921f9f..75323d86 100644
--- a/i18n/sv/android/index.md
+++ b/i18n/sv/android/index.md
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that
[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_\(Android\)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_\(operating_system\)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition, meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the attack surface of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
-Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as [Orbot](../tor.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
+Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (like AdAway) and firewalls which require root access persistently (like AFWall+) are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy-enhancing services such as [Orbot](../alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_\(computing\)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
diff --git a/i18n/sv/device-integrity.md b/i18n/sv/device-integrity.md
index 8803735b..1d6c301b 100644
--- a/i18n/sv/device-integrity.md
+++ b/i18n/sv/device-integrity.md
@@ -188,4 +188,4 @@ It is important to note that Auditor can only effectively detect changes **after
No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
-If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service.
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address from the attestation service, you could consider using [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [VPN](vpn.md).
diff --git a/i18n/sv/tools.md b/i18n/sv/tools.md
index aeb339e9..e3706104 100644
--- a/i18n/sv/tools.md
+++ b/i18n/sv/tools.md
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ Om du vill ha mer information om varje projekt, varför de valdes ut och ytterli
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Smartphone Tor Proxy)](tor.md#orbot)
- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Onion Browser (Tor for iOS)](tor.md#onion-browser-ios)
@@ -714,9 +713,10 @@ These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functional
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Mobile Tor Proxy)](alternative-networks.md#orbot)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
diff --git a/i18n/sv/tor.md b/i18n/sv/tor.md
index 528a8bb6..fc96f5f7 100644
--- a/i18n/sv/tor.md
+++ b/i18n/sv/tor.md
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Before connecting to Tor, please ensure you've read our [overview](advanced/tor-
There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for [:material-incognito: anonymous](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy ""){.pg-purple} browsing for desktop computers and Android.
-Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
+Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using mobile browser apps like [Onion Browser](#onion-browser-ios) to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** be using the desktop Tor Browser client, ideally in a [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) configuration. Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against deanonymization.
@@ -84,46 +84,6 @@ The Tor Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting, or identifying you based
In addition to installing Tor Browser on your computer directly, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser alone.
-## Orbot
-
-
-
-{ align=right }
-
-**Orbot** is a free Tor VPN for smartphones which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
-
-
-Downloads
-
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
-
-
-
-
-
-We previously recommended enabling the *Isolate Destination Address* preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
-
-
-
Tips for Android
-
-Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
-
-Orbot is often outdated on the Guardian Project's [F-Droid repository](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android), so consider downloading directly from the [GitHub repository](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases) instead.
-
-All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
-
-
-
-On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
-
## Onion Browser (iOS)
@@ -149,6 +109,4 @@ On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks
Onion Browser does not provide the same levels of privacy protections as Tor Browser does on desktop platforms. For casual use it is a perfectly fine way to access hidden services, but if you're concerned about being traced or monitored by advanced adversaries you should not rely on this as an anonymity tool.
-[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside Orbot, but this still comes with some limitations on iOS (noted in the Orbot section above).
-
-[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot), but this still comes with some limitations on iOS.
diff --git a/i18n/tr/alternative-networks.md b/i18n/tr/alternative-networks.md
index 151d687e..dba47492 100644
--- a/i18n/tr/alternative-networks.md
+++ b/i18n/tr/alternative-networks.md
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ The recommended way to access the Tor network is via the official Tor Browser, w
[Tor Browser Info :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
+You can access the Tor network using other tools; making this determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
+
Try it out!
@@ -42,12 +44,54 @@ You can try connecting to _Privacy Guides_ via Tor at [xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh
+#### Orbot
+
+
+
+{ align=right }
+
+**Orbot** is a mobile application which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
+
+
+Downloads
+
+- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
+- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+- [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid)
+
+
+
+
+
+We previously recommended enabling the _Isolate Destination Address_ preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
+
+\=== "Android"
+
+```
+Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+Orbot is often outdated on Google Play and the Guardian Project's F-Droid repository, so consider downloading directly from the GitHub repository instead. All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
+```
+
+\=== "iOS"
+
+```
+On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
+```
+
#### Snowflake
-{ align=right }
-{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
**Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.
@@ -110,4 +154,5 @@ Also, unlike Tor, every I2P node will relay traffic for other users by default,
There are downsides to I2P's approach, however. Tor relying on dedicated exit nodes means more people in less safe environments can use it, and the relays that do exist on Tor are likely to be more performant and stable, as they generally aren't run on residential connections. Tor is also far more focused on **browser privacy** (i.e. anti-fingerprinting), with a dedicated [Tor Browser](tor.md) to make browsing activity as anonymous as possible. I2P is used via your [regular web browser](desktop-browsers.md), and while you can configure your browser to be more privacy-protecting, you probably still won't have the same browser fingerprint as other I2P users (there's no "crowd" to blend in with in that regard).
-Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
+[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+ Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
diff --git a/i18n/tr/android/index.md b/i18n/tr/android/index.md
index 029cc5a4..c8525a5e 100644
--- a/i18n/tr/android/index.md
+++ b/i18n/tr/android/index.md
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that
[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_\(Android\)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_\(operating_system\)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition, meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the attack surface of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
-Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as [Orbot](../tor.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
+Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (like AdAway) and firewalls which require root access persistently (like AFWall+) are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy-enhancing services such as [Orbot](../alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_\(computing\)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
diff --git a/i18n/tr/device-integrity.md b/i18n/tr/device-integrity.md
index 3d7884ae..f73676c5 100644
--- a/i18n/tr/device-integrity.md
+++ b/i18n/tr/device-integrity.md
@@ -188,4 +188,4 @@ It is important to note that Auditor can only effectively detect changes **after
No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
-If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service.
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address from the attestation service, you could consider using [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [VPN](vpn.md).
diff --git a/i18n/tr/tools.md b/i18n/tr/tools.md
index aa4fb48b..77e9f415 100644
--- a/i18n/tr/tools.md
+++ b/i18n/tr/tools.md
@@ -106,8 +106,7 @@ Anonimliğe ihtiyacınız varsa **Tor Browser** (Masaüstü ve Android) en iyi s
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Akıllı Telefon Tor Proxy)](tor.md#orbot)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Onion Browser (iOS için Tor)](tor.md#onion-browser-ios)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Onion Browser (Tor for iOS)](tor.md#onion-browser-ios)
@@ -710,9 +709,10 @@ Bu araçlar belirli bireyler için fayda sağlayabilir. Çoğu insanın endişel
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Kar Tanesi](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Mobile Tor Proxy)](alternative-networks.md#orbot)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
diff --git a/i18n/tr/tor.md b/i18n/tr/tor.md
index f30d07e5..5524e050 100644
--- a/i18n/tr/tor.md
+++ b/i18n/tr/tor.md
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Before connecting to Tor, please ensure you've read our [overview](advanced/tor-
There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for [:material-incognito: anonymous](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy ""){.pg-purple} browsing for desktop computers and Android.
-Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
+Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using mobile browser apps like [Onion Browser](#onion-browser-ios) to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** be using the desktop Tor Browser client, ideally in a [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) configuration. Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against deanonymization.
@@ -84,46 +84,6 @@ The Tor Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting, or identifying you based
In addition to installing Tor Browser on your computer directly, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser alone.
-## Orbot
-
-
-
-{ align=right }
-
-**Orbot**, cihazınızdaki herhangi bir uygulamadan gelen trafiği Tor ağı üzerinden yönlendiren akıllı telefonlar için ücretsiz bir Tor VPN'dir.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Ana Sayfa](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
-
-
-İndirmeler
-
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
-- [:simple-appstore: Accrescent](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
-
-
-
-
-
-Daha önce Orbot ayarlarında *Hedef Adresi İzole Et tercihinin* etkinleştirilmesini önermiştik. Bu ayar, bağlandığınız her IP adresi için farklı bir devre kullanılmasını zorunlu kılarak teorik olarak gizliliği artırabilir, ancak çoğu uygulama (özellikle web taraması) için pratik bir avantaj sağlamaz, önemli bir performans düşüşüne neden olabilir ve Tor ağı üzerindeki yükü artırır. İhtiyacınız olduğunu bilmediğiniz sürece bu ayarın varsayılan değerinden ayarlanmasını artık önermiyoruz.[^1]
-
-
-
Android için İpuçları
-
-Orbot, SOCKS veya HTTP proxy'yi destekliyorsa tek tek uygulamaları proxy'leyebilir. Ayrıca [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) kullanarak tüm ağ bağlantılarınızı proxy yapabilir ve :gear: **Ayarlar** → **Ağ ve internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **VPN olmadan bağlantıları engelle** içindeki VPN kill switch ile kullanılabilir.
-
-Orbot, Guardian Project'in [F-Droid repository](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) ve [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android) sitelerinde genellikle güncel değildir, bu nedenle bunun yerine doğrudan [GitHub repository](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases) adresinden indirmeyi düşünün.
-
-Tüm sürümler aynı imza kullanılarak imzalanmıştır, bu nedenle birbirleriyle uyumlu olmalıdırlar.
-
-
-
-IOS'ta Orbot, çökmelere veya sızıntılara neden olabilecek bazı sınırlamalara sahiptir: iOS, Android'in yaptığı gibi VPN olmadan bağlantıları engellemek için etkili bir işletim sistemi düzeyinde özelliğe sahip değildir ve iOS'un ağ uzantıları için yapay bir bellek sınırı vardır, bu da Orbot'ta Tor'u çökmeden çalıştırmayı zorlaştırır. Şu anda Tor'u masaüstü bilgisayarda kullanmak mobil cihazda kullanmaya kıyasla her zaman daha güvenlidir.
-
## Onion Browser (iOS)
@@ -147,6 +107,4 @@ IOS'ta Orbot, çökmelere veya sızıntılara neden olabilecek bazı sınırlama
Onion Browser, masaüstü platformlarda Tor Browser ile aynı düzeyde gizlilik koruması sağlamaz. Sıradan kullanım için gizli hizmetlere erişmenin mükemmel bir yoludur, ancak gelişmiş düşmanlar tarafından izlenmekten veya izlenmekten endişe ediyorsanız, buna bir anonimlik aracı olarak güvenmemelisiniz.
-[Özellikle](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser tüm isteklerin Tor üzerinden geçeceğini *garanti* etmez. Tor'un yerleşik sürümünü kullanırken, WebKit'in sınırlamaları nedeniyle [gerçek IP'niz WebRTC ve ses/video akışları aracılığıyla **sızdırılacaktır**](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs). Onion Browser'ı Orbot ile birlikte kullanmak *daha güvenlidir*, ancak bu yine de iOS'ta bazı sınırlamalarla birlikte gelir (yukarıdaki Orbot bölümünde belirtilmiştir).
-
-[^1]: `IsolateDestAddr` ayarı [Tor posta listesinde](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html) ve [Whonix'in Stream Isolation belgelerinde](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) tartışılmaktadır ve her iki proje de bunun çoğu insan için genellikle iyi bir yaklaşım olmadığını önermektedir.
+[Özellikle](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser tüm isteklerin Tor üzerinden geçeceğini *garanti* etmez. Tor'un yerleşik sürümünü kullanırken, WebKit'in sınırlamaları nedeniyle [gerçek IP'niz WebRTC ve ses/video akışları aracılığıyla **sızdırılacaktır**](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs). It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot), but this still comes with some limitations on iOS.
diff --git a/i18n/uk/alternative-networks.md b/i18n/uk/alternative-networks.md
index 77dfd2c0..7753da39 100644
--- a/i18n/uk/alternative-networks.md
+++ b/i18n/uk/alternative-networks.md
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ The recommended way to access the Tor network is via the official Tor Browser, w
[Tor Browser Info :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
+You can access the Tor network using other tools; making this determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
+
Try it out!
@@ -42,12 +44,54 @@ You can try connecting to _Privacy Guides_ via Tor at [xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh
+#### Orbot
+
+
+
+{ align=right }
+
+**Orbot** is a mobile application which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
+
+
+Downloads
+
+- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
+- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+- [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid)
+
+
+
+
+
+We previously recommended enabling the _Isolate Destination Address_ preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
+
+\=== "Android"
+
+```
+Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+Orbot is often outdated on Google Play and the Guardian Project's F-Droid repository, so consider downloading directly from the GitHub repository instead. All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
+```
+
+\=== "iOS"
+
+```
+On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
+```
+
#### Snowflake
-{ align=right }
-{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
**Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.
@@ -110,4 +154,5 @@ Also, unlike Tor, every I2P node will relay traffic for other users by default,
There are downsides to I2P's approach, however. Tor relying on dedicated exit nodes means more people in less safe environments can use it, and the relays that do exist on Tor are likely to be more performant and stable, as they generally aren't run on residential connections. Tor is also far more focused on **browser privacy** (i.e. anti-fingerprinting), with a dedicated [Tor Browser](tor.md) to make browsing activity as anonymous as possible. I2P is used via your [regular web browser](desktop-browsers.md), and while you can configure your browser to be more privacy-protecting, you probably still won't have the same browser fingerprint as other I2P users (there's no "crowd" to blend in with in that regard).
-Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
+[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+ Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
diff --git a/i18n/uk/android/index.md b/i18n/uk/android/index.md
index ac083d97..c62eef7d 100644
--- a/i18n/uk/android/index.md
+++ b/i18n/uk/android/index.md
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ There are also many private alternatives to the apps that come pre-installed on
When you buy an Android phone, the default operating system comes bundled with apps and functionality that are not part of the Android Open Source Project. Many of these apps—even apps like the dialer which provide basic system functionality—require invasive integrations with Google Play Services, which in turn asks for privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, and numerous other things on your device in order for those basic system apps and many other apps to function in the first place. Frameworks like Google Play Services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android.
-This problem could be solved by using an alternative Android distribution, commonly known as a _custom ROM_, that does not come with such invasive integration. На жаль, багато користувацьких прошивок Android часто порушують модель безпеки Android, не підтримуючи критичні функції безпеки, такі як AVB, захист від відкату, оновлення мікропрограми тощо. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require [more permissive](https://github.com/LineageOS/android_system_sepolicy/search?q=userdebug\&type=code) SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
+This problem could be solved by using an alternative Android distribution, commonly known as a _custom ROM_, that does not come with such invasive integration. На жаль, багато користувацьких прошивок Android часто порушують модель безпеки Android, не підтримуючи критичні функції безпеки, такі як AVB, захист від відкату, оновлення мікропрограми тощо. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require more permissive SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
В ідеалі, вибираючи користувальницький дистрибутив Android, ви повинні переконатися, що він підтримує модель безпеки Android. At the very least, the distribution should have production builds, support for AVB, rollback protection, timely firmware and operating system updates, and SELinux in [enforcing mode](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts#enforcement_levels). All of our recommended Android distributions satisfy these criteria:
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ This problem could be solved by using an alternative Android distribution, commo
[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_\(Android\)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_\(operating_system\)#Security_and_privacy). Це може знизити конфіденційність у разі використання експлойта, якому сприяє зниження безпеки. Поширені методи отримання root-прав передбачають втручання в розділ boot, що унеможливлює успішне виконання Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition, meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the attack surface of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
-Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. Вони також не є правильним способом вирішення своїх цілей. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as [Orbot](../tor.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
+Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (like AdAway) and firewalls which require root access persistently (like AFWall+) are dangerous and should not be used. Вони також не є правильним способом вирішення своїх цілей. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy-enhancing services such as [Orbot](../alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_\(computing\)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
diff --git a/i18n/uk/device-integrity.md b/i18n/uk/device-integrity.md
index f3548963..99cb3aa2 100644
--- a/i18n/uk/device-integrity.md
+++ b/i18n/uk/device-integrity.md
@@ -188,4 +188,4 @@ It is important to note that Auditor can only effectively detect changes **after
No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
-If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service.
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address from the attestation service, you could consider using [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [VPN](vpn.md).
diff --git a/i18n/uk/tools.md b/i18n/uk/tools.md
index 588e99dc..a48ac218 100644
--- a/i18n/uk/tools.md
+++ b/i18n/uk/tools.md
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ For more details about each project, why they were chosen, and additional tips o
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Smartphone Tor Proxy)](tor.md#orbot)
- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Onion Browser (Tor for iOS)](tor.md#onion-browser-ios)
@@ -714,9 +713,10 @@ These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functional
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Mobile Tor Proxy)](alternative-networks.md#orbot)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
diff --git a/i18n/uk/tor.md b/i18n/uk/tor.md
index 5d450a19..e2838752 100644
--- a/i18n/uk/tor.md
+++ b/i18n/uk/tor.md
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Before connecting to Tor, please ensure you've read our [overview](advanced/tor-
There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for [:material-incognito: anonymous](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy ""){.pg-purple} browsing for desktop computers and Android.
-Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
+Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using mobile browser apps like [Onion Browser](#onion-browser-ios) to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** be using the desktop Tor Browser client, ideally in a [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) configuration. Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against deanonymization.
@@ -84,46 +84,6 @@ If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** b
In addition to installing Tor Browser on your computer directly, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser alone.
-## Orbot
-
-
-
-{ align=right }
-
-**Orbot** — це безкоштовна Tor VPN для смартфонів, яка спрямовує трафік від будь-якої програми на вашому пристрої через мережу Tor.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
-
-
-Downloads
-
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
-
-
-
-
-
-We previously recommended enabling the *Isolate Destination Address* preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
-
-
-
Tips for Android
-
-Orbot може спрямовувати через проксі окремі програми, якщо вони підтримують SOCKS або HTTP-проксі. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
-
-Orbot часто застаріває в [F-Droid репозиторії](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) Guardian Project та [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android) Guardian Project, тому краще завантажуйте безпосередньо з [GitHub репозиторію](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases).
-
-All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
-
-
-
-On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
-
## Onion Browser (iOS)
@@ -149,6 +109,4 @@ On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks
Onion Browser does not provide the same levels of privacy protections as Tor Browser does on desktop platforms. For casual use it is a perfectly fine way to access hidden services, but if you're concerned about being traced or monitored by advanced adversaries you should not rely on this as an anonymity tool.
-[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside Orbot, but this still comes with some limitations on iOS (noted in the Orbot section above).
-
-[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot), but this still comes with some limitations on iOS.
diff --git a/i18n/vi/alternative-networks.md b/i18n/vi/alternative-networks.md
index bc959181..484e582e 100644
--- a/i18n/vi/alternative-networks.md
+++ b/i18n/vi/alternative-networks.md
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ The recommended way to access the Tor network is via the official Tor Browser, w
[Tor Browser Info :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
+You can access the Tor network using other tools; making this determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
+
Try it out!
@@ -42,12 +44,54 @@ You can try connecting to _Privacy Guides_ via Tor at [xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh
+#### Orbot
+
+
+
+{ align=right }
+
+**Orbot** is a mobile application which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
+
+
+Downloads
+
+- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
+- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+- [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid)
+
+
+
+
+
+We previously recommended enabling the _Isolate Destination Address_ preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
+
+\=== "Android"
+
+```
+Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+Orbot is often outdated on Google Play and the Guardian Project's F-Droid repository, so consider downloading directly from the GitHub repository instead. All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
+```
+
+\=== "iOS"
+
+```
+On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
+```
+
#### Snowflake
-{ align=right }
-{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
**Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.
@@ -110,4 +154,5 @@ Also, unlike Tor, every I2P node will relay traffic for other users by default,
There are downsides to I2P's approach, however. Tor relying on dedicated exit nodes means more people in less safe environments can use it, and the relays that do exist on Tor are likely to be more performant and stable, as they generally aren't run on residential connections. Tor is also far more focused on **browser privacy** (i.e. anti-fingerprinting), with a dedicated [Tor Browser](tor.md) to make browsing activity as anonymous as possible. I2P is used via your [regular web browser](desktop-browsers.md), and while you can configure your browser to be more privacy-protecting, you probably still won't have the same browser fingerprint as other I2P users (there's no "crowd" to blend in with in that regard).
-Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
+[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+ Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
diff --git a/i18n/vi/android/index.md b/i18n/vi/android/index.md
index b9651fb9..75323d86 100644
--- a/i18n/vi/android/index.md
+++ b/i18n/vi/android/index.md
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ There are also many private alternatives to the apps that come pre-installed on
When you buy an Android phone, the default operating system comes bundled with apps and functionality that are not part of the Android Open Source Project. Many of these apps—even apps like the dialer which provide basic system functionality—require invasive integrations with Google Play Services, which in turn asks for privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, and numerous other things on your device in order for those basic system apps and many other apps to function in the first place. Frameworks like Google Play Services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android.
-This problem could be solved by using an alternative Android distribution, commonly known as a _custom ROM_, that does not come with such invasive integration. Unfortunately, many custom Android distributions often violate the Android security model by not supporting critical security features such as AVB, rollback protection, firmware updates, and so on. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require [more permissive](https://github.com/LineageOS/android_system_sepolicy/search?q=userdebug\&type=code) SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
+This problem could be solved by using an alternative Android distribution, commonly known as a _custom ROM_, that does not come with such invasive integration. Unfortunately, many custom Android distributions often violate the Android security model by not supporting critical security features such as AVB, rollback protection, firmware updates, and so on. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require more permissive SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that it upholds the Android security model. At the very least, the distribution should have production builds, support for AVB, rollback protection, timely firmware and operating system updates, and SELinux in [enforcing mode](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts#enforcement_levels). All of our recommended Android distributions satisfy these criteria:
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that
[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_\(Android\)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_\(operating_system\)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition, meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the attack surface of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
-Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as [Orbot](../tor.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
+Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (like AdAway) and firewalls which require root access persistently (like AFWall+) are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy-enhancing services such as [Orbot](../alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_\(computing\)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
diff --git a/i18n/vi/device-integrity.md b/i18n/vi/device-integrity.md
index f3548963..99cb3aa2 100644
--- a/i18n/vi/device-integrity.md
+++ b/i18n/vi/device-integrity.md
@@ -188,4 +188,4 @@ It is important to note that Auditor can only effectively detect changes **after
No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
-If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service.
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address from the attestation service, you could consider using [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [VPN](vpn.md).
diff --git a/i18n/vi/tools.md b/i18n/vi/tools.md
index 4e421aaf..19a5600b 100644
--- a/i18n/vi/tools.md
+++ b/i18n/vi/tools.md
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ For more details about each project, why they were chosen, and additional tips o
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Smartphone Tor Proxy)](tor.md#orbot)
- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Onion Browser (Tor for iOS)](tor.md#onion-browser-ios)
@@ -714,9 +713,10 @@ These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functional
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Mobile Tor Proxy)](alternative-networks.md#orbot)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
diff --git a/i18n/vi/tor.md b/i18n/vi/tor.md
index c782e7b7..ee9f50e4 100644
--- a/i18n/vi/tor.md
+++ b/i18n/vi/tor.md
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Before connecting to Tor, please ensure you've read our [overview](advanced/tor-
There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for [:material-incognito: anonymous](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy ""){.pg-purple} browsing for desktop computers and Android.
-Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
+Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using mobile browser apps like [Onion Browser](#onion-browser-ios) to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** be using the desktop Tor Browser client, ideally in a [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) configuration. Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against deanonymization.
@@ -90,46 +90,6 @@ The Tor Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting, or identifying you based
In addition to installing Tor Browser on your computer directly, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser alone.
-## Google Pixel
-
-
-
-{ align=right }
-
-**Orbot** is a free Tor VPN for smartphones which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
-
-
-Downloads
-
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
-
-
-
-
-
-We previously recommended enabling the *Isolate Destination Address* preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
-
-
-
Tips for Android
-
-Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
-
-Orbot is often outdated on the Guardian Project's [F-Droid repository](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android), so consider downloading directly from the [GitHub repository](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases) instead.
-
-All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
-
-
-
-On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
-
## Onion Browser (iOS)
@@ -155,6 +115,4 @@ On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks
Onion Browser does not provide the same levels of privacy protections as Tor Browser does on desktop platforms. For casual use it is a perfectly fine way to access hidden services, but if you're concerned about being traced or monitored by advanced adversaries you should not rely on this as an anonymity tool.
-[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside Orbot, but this still comes with some limitations on iOS (noted in the Orbot section above).
-
-[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot), but this still comes with some limitations on iOS.
diff --git a/i18n/zh-Hant/alternative-networks.md b/i18n/zh-Hant/alternative-networks.md
index 508cc2bb..79fd652b 100644
--- a/i18n/zh-Hant/alternative-networks.md
+++ b/i18n/zh-Hant/alternative-networks.md
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ cover: alternative-networks.webp
[Tor 瀏覽器資訊 :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Tor 詳細介紹 :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
+You can access the Tor network using other tools; making this determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. 越多人使用 Tor 有助於減少 Tor 的不良印記，降低 ISP 和政府可能編制的「Tor 用戶清單」內容。
+
試用一下！
@@ -42,12 +44,54 @@ cover: alternative-networks.webp
+#### Orbot
+
+
+
+{ align=right }
+
+**Orbot** is a mobile application which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
+
+
+下載
+
+- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
+- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+- [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid)
+
+
+
+
+
+We previously recommended enabling the _Isolate Destination Address_ preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
+
+\=== "Android"
+
+```
+Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+Orbot is often outdated on Google Play and the Guardian Project's F-Droid repository, so consider downloading directly from the GitHub repository instead. All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
+```
+
+\=== "iOS"
+
+```
+On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
+```
+
#### Snowflake
-{ align=right }
-{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
**Snowflake** 可透過瀏覽器中執行「Snowflake 代理」來向 Tor 專案捐贈頻寬。
@@ -110,4 +154,5 @@ Running a Snowflake proxy is low-risk, even more so than running a Tor relay or
然而，I2P 的方法也有缺點。 Tor 依賴專用的出口節點，這意味著更多的人可以在不太安全的環境中使用它，而且Tor 上確實存在的中繼可能性能更高、更穩定，因為它們通常不在長駐連接上運行。 Tor 也更關注**瀏覽器隱私**（即防指紋），並配有專用的 [Tor 瀏覽器](tor.md) 來盡可能使瀏覽活動匿名。 I2P 透過[常用網頁瀏覽器](desktop-browsers.md) 使用，雖然可以將瀏覽器設定為更保護隱私，但可能不會與其他 I2P 使用者有相同的瀏覽器指紋（沒有在這方面混在「人群」）。
-由於其強大的橋接網路和不同的[可插拔傳輸](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention)，Tor 更能抵抗審查。 另一方面，I2P 使用目錄伺服器進行初始連接，這些目錄伺服器是變化的/不受信任的，由志願者運行，而 Tor 使用的硬編碼/受信任的伺服器可能更容易被阻止。
+[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+ 由於其強大的橋接網路和不同的[可插拔傳輸](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention)，Tor 更能抵抗審查。 另一方面，I2P 使用目錄伺服器進行初始連接，這些目錄伺服器是變化的/不受信任的，由志願者運行，而 Tor 使用的硬編碼/受信任的伺服器可能更容易被阻止。
diff --git a/i18n/zh-Hant/android/index.md b/i18n/zh-Hant/android/index.md
index 575c8f77..fed51023 100644
--- a/i18n/zh-Hant/android/index.md
+++ b/i18n/zh-Hant/android/index.md
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ schema:
[Rooting](https://zh.wikipedia.org/zh-tw/Root_%28Android%29) Android 手機會大幅降低安全性，因為它會削弱完整的 [Android 安全模型](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_\(operating_system\)#Security_and_privacy) 。 如果有人利用降低的安全性來進行攻擊，這可能會威脅到您的隱私。 常見的 root 方法涉及直接篡改開機分割區，以至於造成無法成功執行驗證啟動。 需要 root 的應用程式也會修改系統磁碟分割，這意味著 Verified Boot 必須維持停用。 在使用者介面中直接暴露 root 也會增加裝置的攻擊面，並可能有助於 [特權提升](https://zh.wikipedia.org/zh-tw/%E7%89%B9%E6%9D%83%E6%8F%90%E5%8D%87) 漏洞和繞過 SELinux 政策。
-修改 [hosts 檔案](https://zh.wikipedia.org/zh-tw/Hosts%E6%96%87%E4%BB%B6) （AdAway） 的內容封鎖程式，以及需要 root 存取權限的防火牆 (AFWall+) 都很危險，不應該使用。 它們也不是解決預期目的的正確方法。 對於內容阻擋，我們建議使用加密 [DNS](../dns.md) ，或改用 VPN 提供的內容封鎖功能。 TrackerControl 和 AdAway 在非 root 模式下會佔用 VPN 插槽（透過使用本機環回 VPN），使您無法使用 [Orbot](../tor.md#orbot) 或 [VPN](../vpn.md) 等增強隱私的服務。
+Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (like AdAway) and firewalls which require root access persistently (like AFWall+) are dangerous and should not be used. 它們也不是解決預期目的的正確方法。 對於內容阻擋，我們建議使用加密 [DNS](../dns.md) ，或改用 VPN 提供的內容封鎖功能。 TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy-enhancing services such as [Orbot](../alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
AFWall+ 以 [封包過濾](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_\(computing\)#Packet_filter) 方式運作，在某些情況下可能會被繞過。
diff --git a/i18n/zh-Hant/device-integrity.md b/i18n/zh-Hant/device-integrity.md
index d0fd2f5d..d81a0232 100644
--- a/i18n/zh-Hant/device-integrity.md
+++ b/i18n/zh-Hant/device-integrity.md
@@ -189,4 +189,4 @@ Auditor 使用 **兩個** 設備執行證明和入侵檢測，即一個 _被驗
沒有個人識別資料被提交給證明服務。 建議使用匿名帳戶註冊，並啟用遠程認證，以進行持續監控。
-如果您的 [威脅模型](basics/threat-modeling.md) 需要隱私性，可以考慮使用[Orbot](tor.md#orbot) 或VPN，從證明服務中隱藏 IP地址。
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address from the attestation service, you could consider using [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [VPN](vpn.md).
diff --git a/i18n/zh-Hant/tools.md b/i18n/zh-Hant/tools.md
index f02d1aa1..d10370bc 100644
--- a/i18n/zh-Hant/tools.md
+++ b/i18n/zh-Hant/tools.md
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ description: Privacy Guides 社群所推薦的隱私工具、服務、軟體及
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Smartphone Tor Proxy)](tor.md#orbot)
- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Onion Browser (Tor for iOS)](tor.md#onion-browser-ios)
@@ -714,9 +713,10 @@ For encrypting your OS drive, we typically recommend using the encryption tool y
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Mobile Tor Proxy)](alternative-networks.md#orbot)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
diff --git a/i18n/zh-Hant/tor.md b/i18n/zh-Hant/tor.md
index 6e50cec3..d6329dc4 100644
--- a/i18n/zh-Hant/tor.md
+++ b/i18n/zh-Hant/tor.md
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ schema:
從裝置連線到 Tor 網路的方式有多種，最常用的是 **Tor 瀏覽器** ，它是 Firefox 的分叉，專為在電腦和Android上 [:material-incognito: 匿名](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy ""){.pg-purple} 瀏覽而設計
-其些應用程式比其他應用程式更好，但再次提醒其選用決定取決於您的威脅模型。 如果是Tor 的一般使用者，不擔心 ISP 收集針對您的證據，那麼使用[Orbot](#orbot) 等應用程式或行動瀏覽器應用程式訪用 Tor 網路可能沒問題。 越多人使用 Tor 有助於減少 Tor 的不良印記，降低 ISP 和政府可能編制的「Tor 用戶清單」內容。
+其些應用程式比其他應用程式更好，但再次提醒其選用決定取決於您的威脅模型。 If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using mobile browser apps like [Onion Browser](#onion-browser-ios) to access the Tor network is probably fine. 越多人使用 Tor 有助於減少 Tor 的不良印記，降低 ISP 和政府可能編制的「Tor 用戶清單」內容。
如果更完全的匿名至關重要，則應 **僅使用** 桌面版的 Tor 客戶端應用，最好再加上[Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) 一起搭配使用。 Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against deanonymization.
@@ -84,46 +84,6 @@ Tor 瀏覽器旨在防止指紋識別----根據您的瀏覽器配置識別您。
除了直接在電腦安裝 Tor 瀏覽器外，還有專門設計用於連接到 Tor 網路的操作系統，例如 [Qubes OS 作業系統](desktop.md#qubes-os) ＋ [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) ，它們提供比標準 Tor 瀏覽器更高的安全性和保護。
-## Orbot
-
-
-
-{ align=right }
-
-**Orbot** 是一款免費的Tor VPN ，適用於智慧型手機，可讓裝置上的任何應用程式流量通過 Tor 網路。
-
-[:octicons-home-16: 首頁](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="隱私權政策" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=文檔}
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="原始碼" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=捐款 }
-
-
-下載
-
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
-
-
-
-
-
-我們之前建議在 Orbot 設定中啟用 *隔離目標位址* 偏好設定。 雖然從理論上講，此設定可以強制您連接不同 IP 位址使用不同的迴路來改善隱私，但它並未為大多數應用程式（特別是 Web瀏覽）提供實際優勢，可能會帶來顯著的效能拖累，增加 Tor 網路的負載。 我們不再建議您從預設值調整此設定，除非您知道需要調整。[^1]
-
-
-
Android 提示
-
-Orbot 可以代理個別應用程式，如果它們有支援 SOCKS 或 HTTP 代理。 It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
-
-Guardian Project 的[F-Droid repository](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid)和 [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android) 上Orbot 往往不是最新版，因此請考慮直接從 [GitHub repository](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases) 下載。
-
-All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
-
-
-
-On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
-
## Onion Browser (iOS)
@@ -149,6 +109,4 @@ On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks
Onion Browser 不提供與 Tor Browser 在電腦平台上相同等級的隱私保護。 對於日常使用而言，這是存取隱藏服務的絕佳方式，但如果您擔心被先進的對手追蹤或監視，則不應將其視為匿名工具。
-[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside Orbot, but this still comes with some limitations on iOS (noted in the Orbot section above).
-
-[^1]: `IsolateDestAddr` 設定問題已在 [Tor 郵件群組](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html) 和 [Whonix's 串流隔離文檔](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) 中討論過，兩項專案都認為對大多數人而言它並不是好方法。
+[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot), but this still comes with some limitations on iOS.
diff --git a/i18n/zh/alternative-networks.md b/i18n/zh/alternative-networks.md
index 466f8861..7215eea0 100644
--- a/i18n/zh/alternative-networks.md
+++ b/i18n/zh/alternative-networks.md
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ The recommended way to access the Tor network is via the official Tor Browser, w
[Tor Browser Info :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
+You can access the Tor network using other tools; making this determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
+
Try it out!
@@ -42,12 +44,54 @@ You can try connecting to _Privacy Guides_ via Tor at [xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh
+#### Orbot
+
+
+
+{ align=right }
+
+**Orbot** is a mobile application which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
+
+
+Downloads
+
+- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
+- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+- [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid)
+
+
+
+
+
+We previously recommended enabling the _Isolate Destination Address_ preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
+
+\=== "Android"
+
+```
+Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+Orbot is often outdated on Google Play and the Guardian Project's F-Droid repository, so consider downloading directly from the GitHub repository instead. All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
+```
+
+\=== "iOS"
+
+```
+On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
+```
+
#### Snowflake
-{ align=right }
-{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
+{ align=right }
**Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.
@@ -110,4 +154,5 @@ Also, unlike Tor, every I2P node will relay traffic for other users by default,
There are downsides to I2P's approach, however. Tor relying on dedicated exit nodes means more people in less safe environments can use it, and the relays that do exist on Tor are likely to be more performant and stable, as they generally aren't run on residential connections. Tor is also far more focused on **browser privacy** (i.e. anti-fingerprinting), with a dedicated [Tor Browser](tor.md) to make browsing activity as anonymous as possible. I2P is used via your [regular web browser](desktop-browsers.md), and while you can configure your browser to be more privacy-protecting, you probably still won't have the same browser fingerprint as other I2P users (there's no "crowd" to blend in with in that regard).
-Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
+[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+ Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
diff --git a/i18n/zh/android/index.md b/i18n/zh/android/index.md
index 29852c47..271cc17d 100644
--- a/i18n/zh/android/index.md
+++ b/i18n/zh/android/index.md
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ There are also many private alternatives to the apps that come pre-installed on
When you buy an Android phone, the default operating system comes bundled with apps and functionality that are not part of the Android Open Source Project. Many of these apps—even apps like the dialer which provide basic system functionality—require invasive integrations with Google Play Services, which in turn asks for privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, and numerous other things on your device in order for those basic system apps and many other apps to function in the first place. Frameworks like Google Play Services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android.
-This problem could be solved by using an alternative Android distribution, commonly known as a _custom ROM_, that does not come with such invasive integration. 不巧，很多安卓 ROM 不支持 AVB、回滚保护、系统更新、等这些关键的安全功能，破坏了安卓的安全模型。 Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require [more permissive](https://github.com/LineageOS/android_system_sepolicy/search?q=userdebug\&type=code) SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
+This problem could be solved by using an alternative Android distribution, commonly known as a _custom ROM_, that does not come with such invasive integration. 不巧，很多安卓 ROM 不支持 AVB、回滚保护、系统更新、等这些关键的安全功能，破坏了安卓的安全模型。 Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require more permissive SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
在挑选安卓 ROM 时，理想的情况，是能找到坚持安卓安全模型的 ROM。 At the very least, the distribution should have production builds, support for AVB, rollback protection, timely firmware and operating system updates, and SELinux in [enforcing mode](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts#enforcement_levels). All of our recommended Android distributions satisfy these criteria:
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ This problem could be solved by using an alternative Android distribution, commo
[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_\(Android\)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_\(operating_system\)#Security_and_privacy). 如果有一个被降低的安全性所帮助的漏洞，这可能会减少隐私。 常见的root方法涉及直接篡改启动分区，使得它不可能成功地进行验证性启动。 Apps that require root will also modify the system partition, meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the attack surface of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
-Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. 它们也不是解决其预期目的的正确方法。 For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as [Orbot](../tor.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
+Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_\(file\)) (like AdAway) and firewalls which require root access persistently (like AFWall+) are dangerous and should not be used. 它们也不是解决其预期目的的正确方法。 For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy-enhancing services such as [Orbot](../alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_\(computing\)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
diff --git a/i18n/zh/device-integrity.md b/i18n/zh/device-integrity.md
index f7670f4f..5a983c76 100644
--- a/i18n/zh/device-integrity.md
+++ b/i18n/zh/device-integrity.md
@@ -188,4 +188,4 @@ It is important to note that Auditor can only effectively detect changes **after
No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
-If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service.
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address from the attestation service, you could consider using [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [VPN](vpn.md).
diff --git a/i18n/zh/tools.md b/i18n/zh/tools.md
index afaa4e68..7f03a94b 100644
--- a/i18n/zh/tools.md
+++ b/i18n/zh/tools.md
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ If you want assistance figuring out the best privacy tools and alternative progr
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Smartphone Tor Proxy)](tor.md#orbot)
- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Onion Browser (Tor for iOS)](tor.md#onion-browser-ios)
@@ -714,9 +713,10 @@ These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functional
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
-- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } { .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Mobile Tor Proxy)](alternative-networks.md#orbot)
+- { .twemoji loading=lazy }{ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
diff --git a/i18n/zh/tor.md b/i18n/zh/tor.md
index 4c08eafe..9e8c5be0 100644
--- a/i18n/zh/tor.md
+++ b/i18n/zh/tor.md
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Before connecting to Tor, please ensure you've read our [overview](advanced/tor-
There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for [:material-incognito: anonymous](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy ""){.pg-purple} browsing for desktop computers and Android.
-Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
+Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using mobile browser apps like [Onion Browser](#onion-browser-ios) to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** be using the desktop Tor Browser client, ideally in a [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) configuration. Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against deanonymization.
@@ -84,46 +84,6 @@ Tor浏览器旨在防止指纹识别，或根据您的浏览器配置识别您
In addition to installing Tor Browser on your computer directly, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser alone.
-## Orbot
-
-
-
-{ align=right }
-
-**Orbot** is a free Tor VPN for smartphones which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
-
-
-Downloads
-
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
-
-
-
-
-
-We previously recommended enabling the *Isolate Destination Address* preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
-
-
-
Tips for Android
-
-Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
-
-Orbot is often outdated on the Guardian Project's [F-Droid repository](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android), so consider downloading directly from the [GitHub repository](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases) instead.
-
-All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
-
-
-
-On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
-
## Onion Browser (iOS)
@@ -149,6 +109,4 @@ On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks
Onion Browser does not provide the same levels of privacy protections as Tor Browser does on desktop platforms. For casual use it is a perfectly fine way to access hidden services, but if you're concerned about being traced or monitored by advanced adversaries you should not rely on this as an anonymity tool.
-[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside Orbot, but this still comes with some limitations on iOS (noted in the Orbot section above).
-
-[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
+[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot), but this still comes with some limitations on iOS.