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i18n/eo/basics/common-threats.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: 'material/eye-outline'
 description: Via modelo de minaco estas propra, sed ĉi tiuj estas iuj el la aferoj pri kiuj la vizitantoj al ĉi tiu retejo zorgas.
 ---
 
-Ĝenerale, ni kategoriigas niajn rekomendojn en [minacoj](threat-modeling.md) aŭ celoj pri kiuj la plej multaj homoj zorgas. ==Eble vi zorgus pri neniu, unu, kelkaj, aŭ ĉiuj el tiuj ebloj==, kaj la ilojn kaj servojn vi uzus, dependas de kiaj viaj celoj estas. Eble vi ankaŭ havas specifajn minacojn ekster ĉi tiuj kategorioj, kiu tute bonas! La plej grava parto estas evoluigi komprenon de la avantaĝoj kaj mankoj de la iloj kiujn vi elektas uzi, ĉar preskaŭ neniuj el ili protektos vin kontraŭ ĉiuj minacoj.
+Ĝenerale, ni kategoriigas niajn rekomendojn en [minacoj](threat-modeling.md) aŭ celoj pri kiuj la plej multaj homoj zorgas. ==Eble vi zorgus pri neniu, unu, kelkaj, aŭ ĉiuj el tiuj ebloj==, kaj la ilojn kaj servojn vi uzus, dependas de kiaj viaj celoj estas. You may have specific threats outside these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! La plej grava parto estas evoluigi komprenon de la avantaĝoj kaj mankoj de la iloj kiujn vi elektas uzi, ĉar preskaŭ neniuj el ili protektos vin kontraŭ ĉiuj minacoj.
 
 <span class="pg-purple">:material-incognito: **Anonymity**</span>
 :
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain ac
 <span class="pg-viridian">:material-package-variant-closed-remove: **Supply Chain Attacks**</span>
 :
 
-Typically a form of <span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: Targeted Attack</span> that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party.
+Typically, a form of <span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: Targeted Attack</span> that centers around a vulnerability or exploit introduced into otherwise good software either directly or through a dependency from a third party.
 
 <span class="pg-orange">:material-bug-outline: **Passive Attacks**</span>
 :
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as
 <span class="pg-green">:material-account-search: **Public Exposure**</span>
 :
 
-Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public.
+Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the public.
 
 <span class="pg-blue-gray">:material-close-outline: **Censorship**</span>
 :
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ To minimize the damage that a malicious piece of software *could* do, you should
 
 Mobile operating systems generally have better application sandboxing than desktop operating systems: Apps can't obtain root access, and require permission for access to system resources.
 
-Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS has similar sandboxing capabilities to Android, and macOS has full system permission control (and developers can opt-in to sandboxing for applications). However, these operating systems do transmit identifying information to their respective OEMs. Linux tends to not submit information to system vendors, but it has poor protection against exploits and malicious apps. This can be mitigated somewhat with specialized distributions which make significant use of virtual machines or containers, such as [Qubes OS](../desktop.md#qubes-os).
+Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS has similar sandboxing capabilities to Android, and macOS has full system permission control (and developers can opt in to sandboxing for applications). However, these operating systems do transmit identifying information to their respective OEMs. Linux tends to not submit information to system vendors, but it has poor protection against exploits and malicious apps. This can be mitigated somewhat with specialized distributions which make significant use of virtual machines or containers, such as [Qubes OS](../desktop.md#qubes-os).
 
 </div>
 
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible
 
 </div>
 
-Even with E2EE, service providers can still profile you based on **metadata**, which typically isn't protected. While the service provider can't read your messages, they can still observe important things, such as who you're talking to, how often you message them, and when you're typically active. Protection of metadata is fairly uncommon, and—if it's within your [threat model](threat-modeling.md)—you should pay close attention to the technical documentation of the software you're using to see if there's any metadata minimization or protection at all.
+Even with E2EE, service providers can still profile you based on **metadata**, which typically isn't protected. While the service provider can't read your messages, they can still observe important things, such as whom you're talking to, how often you message them, and when you're typically active. Protection of metadata is fairly uncommon, and—if it's within your [threat model](threat-modeling.md)—you should pay close attention to the technical documentation of the software you're using to see if there's any metadata minimization or protection at all.
 
 ## Amasgvatado
 
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ Mass surveillance is the intricate effort to monitor the "behavior, many activit
 
 If you want to learn more about surveillance methods and how they're implemented in your city you can also take a look at the [Atlas of Surveillance](https://atlasofsurveillance.org) by the [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://eff.org).
 
-In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice.fr/villes) maintained by the non-profit association La Quadrature du Net.
+In France, you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice.fr/villes) maintained by the non-profit association La Quadrature du Net.
 
 </div>
 
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategies lik
 
 For many people, tracking and surveillance by private corporations is a growing concern. Pervasive ad networks, such as those operated by Google and Facebook, span the internet far beyond just the sites they control, tracking your actions along the way. Using tools like content blockers to limit network requests to their servers, and reading the privacy policies of the services you use can help you avoid many basic adversaries (although it can't completely prevent tracking).[^4]
 
-Additionally, even companies outside of the *AdTech* or tracking industry can share your information with [data brokers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_broker) (such as Cambridge Analytica, Experian, or Datalogix) or other parties. You can't automatically assume your data is safe just because the service you're using doesn't fall within the typical AdTech or tracking business model. The strongest protection against corporate data collection is to encrypt or obfuscate your data whenever possible, making it difficult for different providers to correlate data with each other and build a profile on you.
+Additionally, even companies outside the *AdTech* or tracking industry can share your information with [data brokers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_broker) (such as Cambridge Analytica, Experian, or Datalogix) or other parties. You can't automatically assume your data is safe just because the service you're using doesn't fall within the typical AdTech or tracking business model. The strongest protection against corporate data collection is to encrypt or obfuscate your data whenever possible, making it difficult for different providers to correlate data with each other and build a profile on you.
 
 ## Limigado de Publika Informo