New Crowdin translations by GitHub Action

i18n/de/android/distributions.md

@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
 ---
 meta_title: The Best Custom Android OSes (aka Custom ROMs) - Privacy Guides
-title: Alternative Distributions
+title: Alternative Distributionen
-description: You can replace the operating system on your Android phone with these secure and privacy-respecting alternatives.
+description: Du kannst das Betriebssystem deines Android-Handys mit diesen sicheren und Privatsphäre-freundlichen Alternativen ersetzen.
 schema:
   - "@context": http://schema.org
     "@type": WebPage
-    name: Private Android Operating Systems
+    name: Private Android-Betriebssysteme
     url: ./
   - "@context": http://schema.org
     "@type": CreativeWork
     name: GrapheneOS
     image: /assets/img/android/grapheneos.svg
     url: https://grapheneos.org/
-    sameAs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GrapheneOS
+    sameAs: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/GrapheneOS
     subjectOf:
       "@context": http://schema.org
       "@type": WebPage
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ schema:
     name: Divest
     image: /assets/img/android/divestos.svg
     url: https://divestos.org/
-    sameAs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DivestOS
+    sameAs: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/DivestOS
     subjectOf:
       "@context": http://schema.org
       "@type": WebPage
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ schema:
 robots: nofollow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large
 ---
 
-<small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>
+<small>Schützt vor der/den folgenden Bedrohung(en):</small>
 
 - [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
 - [:material-bug-outline: Passive Angriffe](../basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
@@ -39,24 +39,24 @@ A **custom Android-based operating system** (often known as a **custom ROM**) is
 
 We recommend installing one of these custom Android operating systems on your device, listed in order of preference, depending on your device's compatibility with these operating systems.
 
-## AOSP Derivatives
+## AOSP-Derivate
 
 ### GrapheneOS
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
-![GrapheneOS logo](../assets/img/android/grapheneos.svg#only-light){ align=right }
+![GrapheneOS-Logo](../assets/img/android/grapheneos.svg#only-light){ align=right }
-![GrapheneOS logo](../assets/img/android/grapheneos-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
+![GrapheneOS-Logo](../assets/img/android/grapheneos-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
 
-**GrapheneOS** is the best choice when it comes to privacy and security.
+**GrapheneOS** ist die beste Wahl, wenn es um Datenschutz und Sicherheit geht.
 
 GrapheneOS provides additional [security hardening](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardening_\(computing\)) and privacy improvements. It has a [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), network and sensor permissions, and various other [security features](https://grapheneos.org/features). GrapheneOS also comes with full firmware updates and signed builds, so verified boot is fully supported.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://grapheneos.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+[:octicons-eye-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Datenschutzrichtlinie" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq){ .card-link title=Dokumentation}
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://grapheneos.org/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://grapheneos.org/source){ .card-link title="Quellcode" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Spenden }
 
 </div>
 
@@ -70,21 +70,21 @@ GrapheneOS provides the option to switch back to connecting to Google's servers
 
 ### DivestOS
 
-If GrapheneOS isn't compatible with your phone, DivestOS is a good alternative. It supports a wide variety of phones with _varying_ levels of security protections and quality control.
+Wenn GrapheneOS nicht mit deinem Handy kompatibel ist, ist DivestOS eine gute Alternative. Es unterstützt eine Vielzahl von Telefonen mit _unterschiedlichen_ Sicherheitsstufen und Qualitätskontrollen.
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
-![DivestOS logo](../assets/img/android/divestos.svg){ align=right }
+![DivestOS-Logo](../assets/img/android/divestos.svg){ align=right }
 
-**DivestOS** is a soft-fork of [LineageOS](https://lineageos.org).
+**DivestOS** ist ein Soft-Fork von [LineageOS](https://lineageos.org).
-DivestOS inherits many [supported devices](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=devices\&base=LineageOS) from LineageOS. It has signed builds, making it possible to have [verified boot](../os/android-overview.md#verified-boot) on some non-Pixel devices. Not all supported devices support verified boot or other security features.
+DivestOS erbt viele [unterstützte Geräte](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=devices\&base=LineageOS) von LineageOS. It has signed builds, making it possible to have [verified boot](../os/android-overview.md#verified-boot) on some non-Pixel devices. Not all supported devices support verified boot or other security features.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://divestos.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:simple-torbrowser:](http://divestoseb5nncsydt7zzf5hrfg44md4bxqjs5ifcv4t7gt7u6ohjyyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=privacy_policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+[:octicons-eye-16:](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=privacy_policy){ .card-link title="Datenschutzrichtlinie" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=faq){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=faq){ .card-link title="Dokumentation" }
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/divested-mobile){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/divested-mobile){ .card-link title="Quellcode" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://divested.dev/pages/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://divested.dev/pages/donate){ .card-link title="Spenden" }
 
 </div>
 
@@ -100,11 +100,11 @@ DivestOS uses F-Droid as its default app store. We normally [recommend avoiding
 
 DivestOS replaces many of Android's background network connections to Google services with alternative services, such as using OpenEUICC for eSIM activation, NTP.org for network time, and Quad9 for DNS. These connections can be modified, but their deviation from a standard Android phone's network connections could mean it is easier for an adversary on your network to deduce what operating system you have installed on your phone. If this is a concern to you, consider using a [trusted VPN](../vpn.md) and enabling the native VPN [kill switch](../os/android-overview.md#vpn-killswitch) to hide this network traffic from your local network and ISP.
 
-## Criteria
+## Kriterien
 
-**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](../about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+**Bitte beachte, dass wir mit keinem der Projekte, die wir empfehlen, in Verbindung stehen.** Zusätzlich zu [unseren Standardkriterien](../about/criteria.md) haben wir eine Reihe klarer Anforderungen entwickelt, die es uns ermöglichen, objektive Empfehlungen zu geben. Wir empfehlen dir, dich mit der Liste vertraut zu machen, bevor du dich für ein Projekt entscheidest, und deine eigenen Recherchen anzustellen, um sicherzustellen, dass es die richtige Wahl für dich ist.
 
-- Must be open-source software.
+- Es muss sich um Open-Source Software handeln.
 - Must support bootloader locking with custom AVB key support.
 - Must receive major Android updates within 0-1 months of release.
 - Must receive Android feature updates (minor version) within 0-14 days of release.

i18n/de/basics/common-misconceptions.md

@@ -16,21 +16,21 @@ schema:
             Ob der Quellcode verfügbar ist und wie die Software lizenziert wird, hat erstmal keinen Einfluss auf ihre Sicherheit. Open-Source-Software hat das Potenzial, sicherer zu sein als proprietäre Software, aber es gibt absolut keine Garantie dafür, dass dies der Fall ist. Bei der Bewertung von Software sollten Sie den Ruf und die Sicherheit jedes einzelnen Tools berücksichtigen.
       - 
         "@type": Question
-        name: Can shifting trust to another provider increase privacy?
+        name: Kann die Verlagerung von Vertrauen auf einen anderen Anbieter die Privatsphäre erhöhen?
         acceptedAnswer:
           "@type": Answer
           text: |
-            We talk about "shifting trust" a lot when discussing solutions like VPNs (which shift the trust you place in your ISP to the VPN provider). While this protects your browsing data from your ISP specifically, the VPN provider you choose still has access to your browsing data: Your data isn't completely secured from all parties.
+            Bei Lösungen wie VPNs (bei denen das Vertrauen in den Internetanbieter auf den VPN-Anbieter übertragen wird) sprechen wir häufig von „Vertrauensverlagerung“. Dies schützt deine Surfverhalten zwar vor deinem Internetanbieter, aber der von dir gewählte VPN-Anbieter hat immer noch Zugriff auf deine Surfdaten: Deine Daten sind nicht vollständig vor allen Parteien geschützt.
       - 
         "@type": Question
-        name: Are privacy-focused solutions inherently trustworthy?
+        name: Sind auf Datenschutz ausgerichtete Lösungen von Natur aus vertrauenswürdig?
         acceptedAnswer:
           "@type": Answer
           text: |
             Focusing solely on the privacy policies and marketing of a tool or provider can blind you to its weaknesses. When you're looking for a more private solution, you should determine what the underlying problem is and find technical solutions to that problem. For example, you may want to avoid Google Drive, which gives Google access to all of your data. The underlying problem in this case is lack of E2EE, so you should make sure that the provider you switch to actually implements E2EE, or use a tool (like Cryptomator) which provides E2EE on any cloud provider. Switching to a "privacy-focused" provider (that doesn't implement E2EE) doesn't solve your problem: it just shifts trust from Google to that provider.
       - 
         "@type": Question
-        name: How complicated should my threat model be?
+        name: Wie kompliziert sollte mein Bedrohungsmodell sein?
         acceptedAnswer:
           "@type": Answer
           text: |
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ schema:
             Finding the "best" solution for yourself doesn't necessarily mean you are after an infallible solution with dozens of conditions—these solutions are often difficult to work with realistically. As we discussed previously, security often comes at the cost of convenience.
 ---
 
-## "Open-source software is always secure" or "Proprietary software is more secure"
+## „Open-Source-Software ist immer sicher“oder „Proprietäre Software ist sicherer“
 
 These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis.
 
@@ -48,30 +48,30 @@ On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imp
 
 To avoid biased decisions, it's *vital* that you evaluate the privacy and security standards of the software you use.
 
-## "Shifting trust can increase privacy"
+## „Die Verlagerung von Vertrauen kann die Privatsphäre stärken“
 
-We talk about "shifting trust" a lot when discussing solutions like VPNs (which shift the trust you place in your ISP to the VPN provider). While this protects your browsing data from your ISP *specifically*, the VPN provider you choose still has access to your browsing data: Your data isn't completely secured from all parties. This means that:
+Bei Lösungen wie VPNs (bei denen das Vertrauen in den Internetanbieter auf den VPN-Anbieter übertragen wird) sprechen wir häufig von „Vertrauensverlagerung“. Dies schützt deine Surfverhalten zwar *speziell* vor deinem Internetanbieter, aber der von dir gewählte VPN-Anbieter hat immer noch Zugriff auf deine Surfdaten: Deine Daten sind nicht vollständig vor allen Parteien geschützt. Das bedeutet:
 
-1. You must exercise caution when choosing a provider to shift trust to.
+1. Bei der Auswahl eines Anbieters, dem du dein Vertrauen schenkst, musst du Vorsicht walten lassen.
-2. You should still use other techniques, like E2EE, to protect your data completely. Merely distrusting one provider to trust another is not securing your data.
+2. Du solltest trotzdem andere Techniken wie E2EE verwenden, um deine Daten vollständig zu schützen. Einem Anbieter zu misstrauen, um einem anderen zu vertrauen, bedeutet nicht, deine Daten zu sichern.
 
-## "Privacy-focused solutions are inherently trustworthy"
+## „Auf den Datenschutz ausgerichtete Lösungen sind von Natur aus vertrauenswürdig“
 
 Focusing solely on the privacy policies and marketing of a tool or provider can blind you to its weaknesses. When you're looking for a more private solution, you should determine what the underlying problem is and find technical solutions to that problem. For example, you may want to avoid Google Drive, which gives Google access to all of your data. The underlying problem in this case is lack of E2EE, so you should make sure that the provider you switch to actually implements E2EE, or use a tool (like [Cryptomator](../encryption.md#cryptomator-cloud)) which provides E2EE on any cloud provider. Switching to a "privacy-focused" provider (that doesn't implement E2EE) doesn't solve your problem: it just shifts trust from Google to that provider.
 
 The privacy policies and business practices of providers you choose are very important, but should be considered secondary to technical guarantees of your privacy: You shouldn't shift trust to another provider when trusting a provider isn't a requirement at all.
 
-## "Complicated is better"
+## „Kompliziert ist besser“
 
-We often see people describing privacy threat models that are overly complex. Often, these solutions include problems like many different email accounts or complicated setups with lots of moving parts and conditions. The replies are usually answers to "What is the best way to do *X*?"
+Oft sehen wir Menschen, die Bedrohungsmodelle für Privatsphäre beschreiben, die übermäßig komplex sind. Often, these solutions include problems like many different email accounts or complicated setups with lots of moving parts and conditions. The replies are usually answers to "What is the best way to do *X*?"
 
 Finding the "best" solution for yourself doesn't necessarily mean you are after an infallible solution with dozens of conditions—these solutions are often difficult to work with realistically. As we discussed previously, security often comes at the cost of convenience. Below, we provide some tips:
 
-1. ==Actions need to serve a particular purpose:== think about how to do what you want with the fewest actions.
+1. ==Aktionen müssen einem bestimmten Zweck dienen:== Überlege dir, wie du dein Ziel mit möglichst wenigen Aktionen erreichen kannst.
-2. ==Remove human failure points:== We fail, get tired, and forget things. To maintain security, avoid relying on manual conditions and processes that you have to remember.
+2. ==Beseitige menschliche Schwachstellen:== Wir versagen, werden müde und vergessen Dinge. Um Sicherheit zu gewährleisten, solltest du dich nicht auf manuelle Bedingungen und Prozesse verlassen, die du dir merken musst.
-3. ==Use the right level of protection for what you intend.== We often see recommendations of so-called law-enforcement or subpoena-proof solutions. These often require specialist knowledge and generally aren't what people want. There's no point in building an intricate threat model for anonymity if you can be easily de-anonymized by a simple oversight.
+3. ==Wähle das richtige Maß an Schutz für das, was du beabsichtigst.== Wir sehen oft Empfehlungen für sogenannte gesetzeskonforme oder vorladungssichere Lösungen. Diese erfordern oft Fachwissen und sind im Allgemeinen nicht das, was die Meisten wollen. Es macht keinen Sinn, ein kompliziertes Bedrohungsmodell für Anonymität zu entwickeln, wenn man durch ein einfaches Versehen de-anonymisiert werden kann.
 
-So, how might this look?
+Wie könnte das also aussehen?
 
 One of the clearest threat models is one where people *know who you are* and one where they do not. There will always be situations where you must declare your legal name and there are others where you don't need to.
 

i18n/de/mobile-phones.md

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 ---
 title: Mobiltelefone
 icon: material/cellphone-check
-description: These mobile devices have proper Android Verified Boot support for custom operating systems.
+description: Diese Handys verfügen über eine geeignete Android Verified Boot-Unterstützung für benutzerdefinierte Betriebssysteme.
 cover: android.webp
 schema:
   - "@context": http://schema.org
     "@type": WebPage
-    name: Mobile Phone Recommendations
+    name: Empfehlungen für Mobiltelefone
     url: ./
   - "@context": http://schema.org
     "@type": Product
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ schema:
       "@type": Brand
       name: Google
     image: /assets/img/android/google-pixel.png
-    sameAs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Pixel
+    sameAs: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Pixel
     review:
       "@type": Review
       author:
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ schema:
 robots: nofollow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large
 ---
 
-<small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>
+<small>Schützt vor der/den folgenden Bedrohung(en):</small>
 
 - [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
 - [:material-bug-outline: Passive Angriffe](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Most **mobile phones** receive short or limited windows of security updates from
 
 The mobile devices listed here provide a long lifespan of guaranteed security updates and allow you to install a custom operating system without violating the Android security model.
 
-[Recommended Custom OSes :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](android/distributions.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Details about Android Security :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/android-overview.md#security-protections){ .md-button }
+[Empfohlene Custom ROMs :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](android/distributions.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Details zur Android-Sicherheit :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/android-overview.md#security-protections){ .md-button }
 
 <div class="admonition warning" markdown>
 <p class="admonition-title">Warnung</p>
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ End-of-life devices (such as GrapheneOS's "extended support" devices) do not hav
 
 </div>
 
-## Purchasing Advice
+## Kauf-Hinweis
 
 When purchasing a device, we recommend getting one as new as possible. The software and firmware of mobile devices are only supported for a limited time, so buying new extends that lifespan as much as possible.
 
@@ -58,15 +58,15 @@ A few more tips regarding Android devices and operating system compatibility:
 
 ## Google Pixel
 
-Google Pixel phones are the **only** devices we recommend for purchase. Pixel phones have stronger hardware security than any other Android devices currently on the market, due to proper AVB support for third-party operating systems and Google's custom [Titan](https://security.googleblog.com/2021/10/pixel-6-setting-new-standard-for-mobile.html) security chips acting as the Secure Element.
+Google Pixel-Handys sind die **einzigen** Geräte, die wir zum Kauf empfehlen. Pixel-Telefone verfügen über eine stärkere Hardwaresicherheit als alle anderen Android-Geräte, die derzeit auf dem Markt sind. Dies ist auf die ordnungsgemäße AVB-Unterstützung für Betriebssysteme von Drittanbietern und die eigenen [Titan](https://security.googleblog.com/2021/10/pixel-6-setting-new-standard-for-mobile.html) Sicherheitschips von Google zurückzuführen, die als Secure Element fungieren.
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
 ![Google Pixel 6](assets/img/android/google-pixel.png){ align=right }
 
-**Google Pixel** devices are known to have good security and properly support [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), even when installing custom operating systems.
+**Google Pixel**-Geräte sind dafür bekannt, dass sie über eine gute Sicherheit verfügen und [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) ordnungsgemäß unterstützen, selbst wenn sie benutzerdefinierte Betriebssysteme installiert haben.
 
-Beginning with the **Pixel 8** and **8 Pro**, Pixel devices receive a minimum of 7 years of guaranteed security updates, ensuring a much longer lifespan compared to the 2-5 years competing OEMs typically offer.
+Ab dem **Pixel 8** und **8 Pro** erhalten Pixel-Geräte mindestens 7 Jahre lang garantierte Sicherheitsupdates, was im Vergleich zu den 2-5 Jahren, die konkurrierende OEMs üblicherweise anbieten, eine viel längere Lebensdauer gewährleistet.
 
 [:material-shopping: Store](https://store.google.com/category/phones){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 
@@ -78,20 +78,20 @@ Google Pixel phones use a TEE OS called Trusty which is [open source](https://so
 
 The installation of GrapheneOS on a Pixel phone is easy with their [web installer](https://grapheneos.org/install/web). If you don't feel comfortable doing it yourself and are willing to spend a bit of extra money, check out the [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) as they come preloaded with GrapheneOS from the reputable [Nitrokey](https://nitrokey.com/about) company.
 
-A few more tips for purchasing a Google Pixel:
+Ein paar weitere Tipps für den Kauf eines Google Pixel:
 
-- If you're after a bargain on a Pixel device, we suggest buying an "**a**" model, just after the next flagship is released. Discounts are usually available because Google will be trying to clear their stock.
+- Wenn du ein Schnäppchen bei einem Pixel-Gerät machen möchtest, empfehlen wir dir, ein „**a**“-Modell zu kaufen, kurz nachdem das nächste Flaggschiff veröffentlicht wurde. Meist gibt es dann Rabatte, weil Google versucht, seine Bestände zu räumen.
 - Consider price beating options and specials offered at physical stores.
 - Look at online community bargain sites in your country. These can alert you to good sales.
 - Google provides a list showing the [support cycle](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) for each one of their devices. The price per day for a device can be calculated as: <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline" class="tml-display" style="display:inline math;"> <mfrac> <mtext>Cost</mtext> <mrow> <mtext>End of Life Date</mtext> <mo>−</mo> <mtext>Current Date</mtext> </mrow> </mfrac> </math>
   , meaning that the longer use of the device the lower cost per day.
-- If the Pixel is unavailable in your region, the [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) can be shipped globally.
+- Auch wenn das Pixel in deiner Region nicht verfügbar ist, kann das [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) weltweit versendet werden.
 
-## Criteria
+## Kriterien
 
-**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+**Bitte beachte, dass wir mit keinem der Projekte, die wir empfehlen, in Verbindung stehen.** Zusätzlich zu [unseren Standardkriterien](about/criteria.md) haben wir eine Reihe klarer Anforderungen entwickelt, die es uns ermöglichen, objektive Empfehlungen zu geben. Wir empfehlen dir, dich mit der Liste vertraut zu machen, bevor du dich für ein Projekt entscheidest, und deine eigenen Recherchen anzustellen, um sicherzustellen, dass es die richtige Wahl für dich ist.
 
-- Must support at least one of our recommended custom operating systems.
+- Muss mindestens eines der von uns empfohlenen benutzerdefinierten Betriebssysteme unterstützen.
-- Must be currently sold new in stores.
+- Muss derzeit neu im Handel erhältlich sein.
-- Must receive a minimum of 5 years of security updates.
+- Muss mindestens 5 Jahre lang Sicherheitsupdates erhalten.
 - Must have dedicated secure element hardware.