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@@ -6,6 +6,86 @@ description: Tor est un réseau décentralisé, gratuit, conçu pour utiliser In
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Tor est un réseau décentralisé, gratuit, conçu pour utiliser Internet avec le plus de confidentialité possible. S'il est utilisé correctement, le réseau permet une navigation et des communications privées et anonymes.
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## Safely Connecting to Tor
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Before connecting to [Tor](../tor.md), you should carefully consider what you're looking to accomplish by using Tor in the first place, and who you're trying to hide your network activity from.
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If you live in a free country, are accessing mundane content via Tor, aren't worried about your ISP or local network administrators having the knowledge that you're using Tor, and want to help [de-stigmatize](https://2019.www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en) Tor usage, you can likely connect to Tor directly via standard means like [Tor Browser](../tor.md) without worry.
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If you have the ability to access a trusted VPN provider and **any** of the following are true, you almost certainly should connect to Tor through a VPN:
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- You already use a [trusted VPN provider](../vpn.md)
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- Your threat model includes an adversary which is capable of extracting information from your ISP
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- Your threat model includes your ISP itself as an adversary
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- Your threat model includes local network administrators before your ISP as an adversary
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Because we already [generally recommend](../basics/vpn-overview.md) that the vast majority of people use a trusted VPN provider for a variety of reasons, the following recommendation about connecting to Tor via a VPN likely applies to you. <mark>There is no need to disable your VPN before connecting to Tor</mark>, as some online resources would lead you to believe.
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Connecting directly to Tor will make your connection stand out to any local network administrators or your ISP. Detecting and correlating this traffic [has been done](https://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/17/justice/massachusetts-harvard-hoax/) in the past by network administrators to identify and deanonymize specific Tor users on their network. On the other hand, connecting to a VPN is almost always less suspicious, because commercial VPN providers are used by everyday consumers for a variety of mundane tasks like bypassing geo-restrictions, even in countries with heavy internet restrictions.
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Therefore, you should make an effort to hide your IP address **before** connecting to the Tor network. You can do this by simply connecting to a VPN (through a client installed on your computer) and then accessing [Tor](../tor.md) as normal, through Tor Browser for example. This creates a connection chain like:
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- [x] You → VPN → Tor → Internet
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From your ISP's perspective, it looks like you're accessing a VPN normally (with the associated cover that provides you). From your VPN's perspective, they can see that you are connecting to the Tor network, but nothing about what websites you're accessing. From Tor's perspective, you're connecting normally, but in the unlikely event of some sort of Tor network compromise, only your VPN's IP would be exposed, and your VPN would *additionally* have to be compromised to deanonymize you.
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This is **not** censorship circumvention advice, because if Tor is blocked entirely by your ISP, your VPN likely is as well. Rather, this recommendation aims to make your traffic blend in better with commonplace VPN user traffic, and provide you with some level of plausible deniability by obscuring the fact that you're connecting to Tor from your ISP.
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---
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We **very strongly discourage** combining Tor with a VPN in any other manner. Do not configure your connection in a way which resembles any of the following:
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- You → Tor → VPN → Internet
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- You → VPN → Tor → VPN → Internet
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- Any other configuration
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Some VPN providers and other publications will occasionally recommend these **bad** configurations to evade Tor bans (exit nodes being blocked by websites) in some places. [Normally](https://support.torproject.org/#about_change-paths), Tor frequently changes your circuit path through the network. When you choose a permanent *destination* VPN (connecting to a VPN server *after* Tor), you're eliminating this advantage and drastically harming your anonymity.
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Setting up bad configurations like these is difficult to do accidentally, because it usually involves either setting up custom proxy settings inside Tor Browser, or setting up custom proxy settings inside your VPN client which routes your VPN traffic through the Tor Browser. As long as you avoid these non-default configurations, you're probably fine.
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---
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!!! info "VPN/SSH Fingerprinting"
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The Tor Project [notes](https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/wikis/doc/TorPlusVPN#vpnssh-fingerprinting) that *theoretically* using a VPN to hide Tor activities from your ISP may not be foolproof. VPNs have been found to be vulnerable to website traffic fingerprinting, where an adversary can still guess what website is being visited, because all websites have specific traffic patterns.
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Therefore, it's not unreasonable to believe that encrypted Tor traffic hidden by a VPN could also be detected via similar methods. There are no research papers on this subject, and we still consider the benefits of using a VPN to far outweigh these risks, but it is something to keep in mind.
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If you still believe that pluggable transports (bridges) provide additional protection against website traffic fingerprinting that a VPN does not, you always have the option to use a bridge **and** a VPN in conjunction.
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Determining whether you should first use a VPN to connect to the Tor network will require some common sense and knowledge of your own government's and ISP's policies relating to what you're connecting to. However, again in most cases you will be better off being seen as connecting to a commercial VPN network than directly to the Tor network. If VPN providers are censored in your area, then you can also consider using Tor pluggable transports (e.g. Snowflake or meek bridges) as an alternative, but using these bridges may arouse more suspicion than standard WireGuard/OpenVPN tunnels.
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## What Tor is Not
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The Tor network is not the perfect privacy protection tool in all cases, and has a number of drawbacks which should be carefully considered. These things should not discourage you from using Tor if it is appropriate for your needs, but they are still things to think about when deciding which solution is most appropriate for you.
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### Tor is not a free VPN
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The release of the *Orbot* mobile app has lead many people to describe Tor as a "free VPN" for all of your device traffic. However, treating Tor like this poses some dangers compared to a typical VPN.
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Unlike Tor exit nodes, VPN providers are usually not *actively* [malicious](#caveats). Because Tor exit nodes can be created by anybody, they are hotspots for network logging and modification. In 2020, many Tor exit nodes were documented to be downgrading HTTPS traffic to HTTP in order to [hijack cryptocurrency transactions](https://therecord.media/thousands-of-tor-exit-nodes-attacked-cryptocurrency-users-over-the-past-year). Other exit node attacks such as replacing downloads via unencrypted channels with malware have also been observed. HTTPS does mitigate these threats to an extent.
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As we've alluded to already, Tor is also easily identifiable on the network. Unlike an actual VPN provider, using Tor will make you stick out as a person likely attempting to evade authorities. In a perfect world, Tor would be seen by network administrators and authorities as a tool with many uses (like how VPNs are viewed), but in reality the perception of Tor is still far less legitimate than the perception of commercial VPNs, so using a real VPN provides you with plausible deniability, e.g. "I was just using it to watch Netflix," etc.
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### Tor usage is not undetectable
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**Even if you use bridges and pluggable transports,** the Tor Project provides no tools to hide the fact that you are using Tor from your ISP. Even using obfuscated "pluggable transports" or non-public bridges do not hide the fact that you are using a private communications channel. The most popular pluggable transports like obfs4 (which obfuscates your traffic to "look like nothing") and meek (which uses domain fronting to camouflage your traffic) can be [detected](https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/889-Tor-0day-Burning-Bridges.html) with fairly standard traffic analysis techniques. Snowflake has similar issues, and can be [easily detected](https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/944-Tor-0day-Snowflake.html) *before* a Tor connection is even established.
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Pluggable transports other than these three do exist, but typically rely on security through obscurity to evade detection. They aren't impossible to detect, they are just used by so few people that it's not worth the effort building detectors for them. They shouldn't be relied upon if you specifically are being monitored.
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It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and evading detection. It is easier to accomplish the former because of the many real-world limitations on what network censors can realistically do en masse, but these techniques do not hide the fact that you—*specifically* you—are using Tor from an interested party monitoring your network.
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### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser
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Anonymity can often be at odds with security: Tor's anonymity requires every user to be identical, which creates a monoculture (the same bugs are present across all Tor Browser users). As a cybersecurity rule of thumb, monocultures are generally regarded as bad: Security through diversity (which Tor lacks) provides natural segmentation by limiting vulnerabilities to smaller groups, and is therefore usually desirable, but this diversity is also less good for anonymity.
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Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):
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1. Look for new Critical/High vulnerabilities in Firefox nightly or beta builds, then check if they are exploitable in Tor Browser (this vulnerability period can last weeks).
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2. Chain *multiple* Medium/Low vulnerabilities together until they get the level of access they're looking for (this vulnerability period can last months or longer).
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Those at risk of browser vulnerabilities should consider additional protections to defend against Tor Browser exploits, such as using Whonix in [Qubes](../os/qubes-overview.md) to contain your Tor browsing in a secure VM and protect against leaks.
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## Création de chemins vers les services de surface
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Les "services de surface" sont des sites web auxquels vous pouvez accéder avec n'importe quel navigateur, comme [privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org). Tor vous permet de vous connecter à ces sites web de manière anonyme en acheminant votre trafic via un réseau composé de milliers de serveurs gérés par des bénévoles et appelés nœuds (ou relais).
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@@ -76,13 +156,34 @@ Tor nous permet de nous connecter à un serveur sans que personne ne connaisse l
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Bien que Tor offre de solides garanties de confidentialité, il faut être conscient que Tor n'est pas parfait:
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- Des adversaires bien financés ayant la capacité d'observer passivement la plupart du trafic réseau mondial ont une chance de désanonymiser les utilisateurs de Tor au moyen d'une analyse avancée du trafic. Tor ne vous protège pas non plus contre le risque de vous exposer par erreur, par exemple si vous partagez trop d'informations sur votre véritable identité.
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- Les nœuds de sortie de Tor peuvent également surveiller le trafic qui passe par eux. Cela signifie que le trafic qui n'est pas chiffré, comme le trafic HTTP ordinaire, peut être enregistré et surveillé. Si ce trafic contient des informations permettant de vous identifier, il peut vous désanonymiser aux yeux de ce nœud de sortie. Par conséquent, nous recommandons d'utiliser HTTPS via Tor dans la mesure du possible.
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- Tor never protects you from exposing yourself by mistake, such as if you share too much information about your real identity.
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- Tor exit nodes can **modify** unencrypted traffic which passes through them. This means traffic which is not encrypted, such as plain HTTP traffic, can be changed by a malicious exit node. **Never** download files from an unencrypted `http://` website over Tor, and ensure your browser is set to always upgrade HTTP traffic to HTTPS.
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- Les nœuds de sortie de Tor peuvent également surveiller le trafic qui passe par eux. Unencrypted traffic which contains personally identifiable information can deanonymize you to that exit node. Again, we recommend only using HTTPS over Tor.
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- Powerful adversaries with the capability to passively watch *all* network traffic around the globe ("Global Passive Adversaries") are **not** something that Tor protects you against (and using Tor [with a VPN](#safely-connecting-to-tor) doesn't change this fact).
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- Well-funded adversaries with the capability to passively watch *most* network traffic around the globe still have a *chance* of deanonymizing Tor users by means of advanced traffic analysis.
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Si vous souhaitez utiliser Tor pour naviguer sur le web, nous ne recommandons que le navigateur Tor **officiel** - il est conçu pour empêcher la prise d'empreintes numériques.
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- [Navigateur Tor :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../tor.md#tor-browser)
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### Protections provided by bridges
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Tor bridges are commonly touted as an alternative method to hiding Tor usage from an ISP, instead of a VPN (as we suggest using if possible). Something to consider is that while bridges may provide adequate censorship circumvention, this is only a *transient* benefit. They do not adequately protect you from your ISP discovering you connected to Tor in the *past* with historical traffic log analysis.
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To illustrate this point, consider the following scenario: You connect to Tor via a bridge, and your ISP doesn’t detect it because they are not doing sophisticated analysis of your traffic, so things are working as intended. Now, 4 months go by, and the IP of your bridge has been made public. This is a very common occurrence with bridges, they are discovered and blocked relatively frequently, just not immediately.
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Your ISP wants to identify Tor users 4 months ago, and with their limited metadata logging they can see that you connected to an IP address which was later revealed to be a Tor bridge. You have virtually no other excuse to be making such a connection, so the ISP can say with very high confidence that you were a Tor user at that time.
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Contrast this with our recommended scenario, where you connect to Tor via a VPN. Say that 4 months later your ISP again wants to identify anybody who used Tor 4 months ago. Their logs almost certainly can identify your traffic 4 months ago, but all they would likely be able to see is that you connected to a VPN’s IP address. This is because most ISPs only retain metadata over long periods of time, not the full contents of the traffic you request. Storing the entirety of your traffic data would require a massive quantity of storage which nearly all threat actors wouldn't possess.
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Because your ISP almost certainly is not capturing all packet-level data and storing it forever, they have no way of determining what you connected to with that VPN *after* the fact with an advanced technique like deep packet inspection, and therefore you have plausible deniability.
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Therefore, bridges provide the most benefit when circumventing internet censorship *in the moment*, but they are not an adequate substitute for **all** the benefits that using a VPN alongside Tor can provide. Again, this is not advice *against* using Tor bridges, you should just be aware of these limitations while making your decision. In some cases bridges may be the *only* option (if all VPN providers are blocked, for instance), so you can still use them in those circumstances with this limitation in mind.
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If you think that a bridge can aid in defending against fingerprinting or other advanced network analysis more than a VPN's encrypted tunnel already can, you always have the option to use a bridge in conjunction with a VPN as well. That way you are still protected by the pluggable transport's obfuscation techniques even if an adversary gains some level of visibility into your VPN tunnel. If you decide to go this route, we recommend connecting to an obfs4 bridge behind your VPN for optimal fingerprinting protection, rather than meek or Snowflake.
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It is [possible](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/clarify-tors-weaknesses-with-respect-to-observability/3676/16) that the [WebTunnel](https://forum.torproject.org/t/tor-relays-announcement-webtunnel-a-new-pluggable-transport-for-bridges-now-available-for-deployment/8180) pluggable transport currently being trialed may mitigate some of these concerns. We will continue to keep an eye on that technology as it develops.
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## Ressources supplémentaires
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- [Manuel d'utilisation du navigateur Tor](https://tb-manual.torproject.org)
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@@ -215,39 +215,6 @@ Nous recommandons une grande variété d'applications Android sur ce site. Les a
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En utilisant Shelter, vous accordez une confiance totale à son développeur, car Shelter agit en tant qu'[administrateur de l'appareil](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/admin/device-admin) pour créer le Profil professionnel, et il a un accès étendu aux données stockées dans ce dernier.
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### Auditor
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!!! recommendation
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{ align=right }
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{ align=right }
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**Auditor** est une application qui exploite les fonctions de sécurité matérielle pour assurer le contrôle de l'intégrité d'un appareil en validant activement son identité et l'intégrité de son système d'exploitation. Actuellement, elle ne fonctionne qu'avec GrapheneOS ou le système d'exploitation de base pour les [appareils pris en charge](https://attestation.app/about#device-support).
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[:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://attestation.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
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[:octicons-eye-16:](https://attestation.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
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[:octicons-info-16:](https://attestation.app/about){ .card-link title=Documentation}
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[:octicons-code-16:](https://attestation.app/source){ .card-link title="Code source" }
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[:octicons-heart-16:](https://attestation.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
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??? downloads "Téléchargements"
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- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.attestation.auditor.play)
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- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases)
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- [:material-cube-outline: Magasin d'application de GrapheneOS](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
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Auditor effectue l'attestation et la détection d'intrusion :
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- A l'aide d'un modèle de [Confiance lors de la première utilisation (TOFU - Trust On First Use)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_on_first_use) entre un *auditeur* et un *audité*, la paire établit une clé privée dans le trousseau [matériel](https://source.android.com/security/keystore/) d'*Auditor*.
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- L'*auditeur* peut être une autre instance de l'application Auditor ou le [Service d'Attestation à Distance](https://attestation.app).
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- L'*auditeur* enregistre l'état et la configuration actuels de l'*audité*.
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- En cas d'altération du système d'exploitation de l'*audité* après l'appairage, l'auditeur sera informé de la modification de l'état et des configurations de l'appareil.
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- Vous serez alerté de ce changement.
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Aucune donnée à charactère personnel n'est soumise au service d'attestation. Nous vous recommandons de vous inscrire avec un compte anonyme et d'activer l'attestation à distance pour un contrôle continu.
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Si votre [modèle de menace](basics/threat-modeling.md) nécessite une certaine confidentialité, vous pouvez envisager d'utiliser [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) ou un VPN pour cacher votre adresse IP au service d'attestation. Pour s'assurer de l'authenticité de votre matériel et de votre système d'exploitation, [effectuez une attestation locale](https://grapheneos.org/install/web#verifying-installation) immédiatement après l'installation de l'appareil et avant toute connexion à internet.
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### Secure Camera
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!!! recommendation
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@@ -347,7 +314,7 @@ Aurora Store ne vous permet pas de télécharger des applications payantes grâc
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### Manuellement avec les notifications RSS
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Pour les applications publiées sur des plateformes telles que GitHub et GitLab, vous pouvez ajouter un flux RSS à votre [agrégateur d'actualités](/news-aggregators) qui vous aidera à suivre les nouvelles versions.
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For apps that are released on platforms like GitHub and GitLab, you may be able to add an RSS feed to your [news aggregator](news-aggregators.md) that will help you keep track of new releases.
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@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Pour minimiser les dommages potentiels qu'un logiciel malveillant peut causer, v
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Les systèmes d'exploitation mobiles sont généralement plus sûrs que les systèmes d'exploitation de bureau en ce qui concerne le sandboxing des applications.
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Les systèmes d'exploitation de bureau sont généralement à la traîne en ce qui concerne le sandboxing. ChromeOS possède des capacités de sandboxing similaires à celles d'Android, et macOS dispose d'un contrôle complet des autorisations système (et les développeurs peuvent opter pour le sandboxing pour les applications). Cependant, ces systèmes d'exploitation transmettent des informations d'identification à leurs constructeurs respectifs. Linux a tendance à ne pas soumettre d'informations aux fournisseurs de systèmes, mais il a une mauvaise protection contre les exploits et les applications malveillantes. Ce problème peut être quelque peu atténué avec des distributions spécialisées qui font un usage intensif des machines virtuelles ou des conteneurs, comme Qubes OS.
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Les systèmes d'exploitation de bureau sont généralement à la traîne en ce qui concerne le sandboxing. ChromeOS possède des capacités de sandboxing similaires à celles d'Android, et macOS dispose d'un contrôle complet des autorisations système (et les développeurs peuvent opter pour le sandboxing pour les applications). Cependant, ces systèmes d'exploitation transmettent des informations d'identification à leurs constructeurs respectifs. Linux a tendance à ne pas soumettre d'informations aux fournisseurs de systèmes, mais il a une mauvaise protection contre les exploits et les applications malveillantes. This can be mitigated somewhat with specialized distributions which make significant use of virtual machines or containers, such as [Qubes OS](../desktop.md#qubes-os).
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<span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: Attaques ciblées</span>
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@@ -5,70 +5,106 @@ icon: material/vpn
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description: Les réseaux privés virtuels déplacent le risque de votre FAI à un tiers en qui vous avez confiance. Vous devriez garder ces éléments à l'esprit.
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---
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Les Réseaux Privés Virtuels sont un moyen d'étendre l'extrémité de votre réseau à une sortie située ailleurs dans le monde. Un Fournisseur d'Accès Internet (FAI) peut voir le flux du trafic internet qui entre et sort de votre dispositif de terminaison de réseau (c'est-à-dire la box/modem).
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Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit somewhere else in the world.
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Les protocoles de chiffrement tels que HTTPS sont couramment utilisés sur internet, ils peuvent donc ne pas être en mesure de voir exactement ce que vous publiez ou lisez, mais ils peuvent avoir une idée [des domaines que vous visitez](../advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).
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Normally, an ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (i.e. modem). Encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, so they may not be able to see exactly what you're posting or reading, but they can get an idea of the [domains you request](../advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).
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Un VPN peut vous aider car il peut déplacer la confiance offerte à votre FAI vers un serveur situé ailleurs dans le monde. Par conséquent, le FAI ne voit que le fait que vous êtes connecté à un VPN et rien sur l'activité que vous lui transmettez.
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Using a VPN hides even this information from your ISP, by shifting the trust you place in your network to a server somewhere else in the world. As a result, the ISP then only sees that you are connected to a VPN and nothing about the activity that you're passing through it.
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!!! note "À noter"
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When we refer to "Virtual Private Networks" on this website, we are usually referring to **commercial** [VPN providers](../vpn.md), who you pay a monthly fee to in exchange for routing your internet traffic securely through their public servers. There are many other forms of VPN, such as ones you host yourself or ones operated by workplaces which allow you to securely connect to internal/employee network resources, however, these VPNs are usually designed for accessing remote networks securely, rather than protecting the privacy of your internet connection.
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## How does a VPN work?
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VPNs encrypt your traffic between your device and a server owned by your VPN provider. From the perspective of anyone between you and the VPN server, it looks like you're connecting to the VPN server. From the perspective of anyone between the VPN server and your destination site, all they can see is the VPN server connecting to the website.
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``` mermaid
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flowchart LR
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763931["Your Device<div>(with VPN Client)</div>"] ===|"VPN Encryption"| 404512{"VPN Server"}
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404512 -.-|"No VPN Encryption"| 593753((("The Internet\n(Your Destination)")))
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subgraph 763931["Your Device<div>(with VPN Client)</div>"]
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end
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```
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Note that a VPN does not add any security or encryption to your traffic between the VPN server and your destination on the internet. To access a website securely you **must** still ensure HTTPS is in use regardless of whether you use a VPN.
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## Devrais-je utiliser un VPN ?
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|
||||
**Oui**, sauf si vous utilisez déjà Tor. Un VPN fait deux choses: déplacer les risques de votre Fournisseur d'Accès à Internet vers lui-même et cacher votre adresse IP d'un service tiers.
|
||||
|
||||
Les VPN ne peuvent pas chiffrer les données en dehors de la connexion entre votre appareil et le serveur VPN. Les fournisseurs de VPN peuvent voir et modifier votre trafic de la même manière que votre FAI pourrait le faire. Et il n'existe aucun moyen de vérifier de quelque manière que ce soit la politique de "non journalisation" d'un fournisseur de VPN.
|
||||
|
||||
Cependant, ils cachent votre IP réelle d'un service tiers, à condition qu'il n'y ait pas de fuites d'IP. Ils vous aident à vous fondre dans la masse et à atténuer le suivi par IP.
|
||||
|
||||
## Quand ne devrais-je pas utiliser un VPN ?
|
||||
|
||||
L'utilisation d'un VPN dans les cas où vous utilisez votre [identité connue](common-misconceptions.md#complicated-is-better) ne sera probablement pas utile.
|
||||
|
||||
Cela peut déclencher des systèmes de détection de spam et de fraude, par exemple si vous vous connectez au site web de votre banque.
|
||||
|
||||
## Qu'en est-il du chiffrement ?
|
||||
|
||||
Le chiffrement offert par les fournisseurs VPN se situe entre vos appareils et leurs serveurs. Il garantit que ce lien spécifique est sécurisé. Il s'agit d'une avancée par rapport à l'utilisation de proxys non chiffrés où un adversaire sur le réseau peut intercepter les communications entre vos appareils et lesdits proxys et les modifier. Cependant, le chiffrement entre vos applications ou navigateurs et les fournisseurs de services n'est pas géré par ce chiffrement.
|
||||
|
||||
Pour que ce que vous faites sur les sites web que vous visitez reste privé et sécurisé, vous devez utiliser le protocole HTTPS. Cela protégera vos mots de passe, jetons de session et requêtes du fournisseur VPN. Envisagez d'activer "HTTPS partout" dans votre navigateur pour atténuer les attaques de rétrogradation comme [SSL Strip](https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Marlinspike/BlackHat-DC-09-Marlinspike-Defeating-SSL.pdf).
|
||||
|
||||
## Devrais-je utiliser un DNS chiffré avec un VPN ?
|
||||
|
||||
À moins que votre fournisseur VPN n'héberge les serveurs DNS chiffrés, **non**. L'utilisation de DOH/DOT (ou de toute autre forme de DNS chiffré) avec des serveurs tiers ne fera qu'ajouter des entités supplémentaires auxquelles il faudra faire confiance, et ne fait **absolument rien** pour améliorer votre confidentialité/sécurité. Votre fournisseur de VPN peut toujours voir quels sites web vous visitez en se basant sur les adresses IP et d'autres méthodes. Au lieu de faire uniquement confiance à votre fournisseur de VPN, vous faites maintenant confiance à la fois au fournisseur de VPN et au fournisseur de DNS.
|
||||
|
||||
Une raison courante de recommander le DNS chiffré est qu'il permet de lutter contre l'usurpation DNS. Cependant, votre navigateur devrait déjà vérifier la présence de [certificats TLS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Digital_certificates) avec **HTTPS** et vous en avertir. Si vous n'utilisez pas **HTTPS**, alors un adversaire peut toujours modifier n'importe quoi d'autre que vos requêtes DNS et le résultat final sera peu différent.
|
||||
|
||||
Inutile de dire que **vous ne devriez pas utiliser de DNS chiffré avec Tor**. Toutes vos requêtes DNS seraient ainsi dirigées vers un seul circuit, ce qui permettrait au fournisseur de DNS chiffré de vous désanonymiser.
|
||||
|
||||
## Devrais-je utiliser Tor *et* un VPN?
|
||||
|
||||
En utilisant un VPN avec Tor, vous créez essentiellement un nœud d'entrée permanent, souvent avec une trace financière attachée. Cela ne vous apporte aucun avantages supplémentaires, tout en augmentant considérablement la surface d'attaque de votre connexion. Si vous souhaitez cacher votre utilisation de Tor à votre FAI ou à votre gouvernement, Tor a une solution intégrée pour cela : les passerelles Tor. [En savoir plus sur les passerelles Tor et pourquoi l'utilisation d'un VPN n'est pas nécessaire](../advanced/tor-overview.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## Et si j'ai besoin d'anonymat ?
|
||||
|
||||
Les VPNs ne peuvent pas fournir d'anonymat. Votre fournisseur de VPN verra toujours votre adresse IP réelle, et dispose souvent d'une trace financière qui peut être liée directement à vous. Vous ne pouvez pas compter sur des politiques de "non journalisation" pour protéger vos données. Utilisez plutôt [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/fr/).
|
||||
|
||||
## Qu'en est-il des fournisseurs de VPN qui proposent des nœuds Tor ?
|
||||
|
||||
N'utilisez pas cette fonctionnalité. L'intérêt d'utiliser Tor est que vous ne faites pas confiance à votre fournisseur de VPN. Actuellement Tor ne supporte que le protocole [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol). [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol) (utilisé dans [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC) pour le partage de la voix et de la vidéo, le nouveau protocole [HTTP3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3), etc.), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol) et les autres paquets seront abandonnés. Pour compenser cela, les fournisseurs de VPN acheminent généralement tous les paquets non TCP par leur serveur VPN (votre premier saut). C'est le cas de [Proton VPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn/). De plus, lorsque vous utilisez cette configuration Tor par VPN, vous n'avez pas le contrôle sur d'autres fonctionnalités importantes de Tor telles que [Adresse de Destination Isolée](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (utilisation d'un circuit Tor différent pour chaque domaine que vous visitez).
|
||||
|
||||
Cette fonctionnalité doit être considérée comme un moyen pratique d'accéder au réseau Tor, et non comme un moyen de rester anonyme. Pour un véritable anonymat, utilisez le navigateur Tor, TorSocks, ou une passerelle Tor.
|
||||
|
||||
## Quand les VPNs sont-ils utiles ?
|
||||
|
||||
Un VPN peut toujours vous être utile dans divers scénarios, tels que :
|
||||
**Yes**, almost certainly. A VPN has many advantages, including:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Cacher votre trafic de **seulement** votre Fournisseur d'Accès Internet.
|
||||
1. Cacher vos téléchargements (tels que les torrents) à votre FAI et aux organisations anti-piratage.
|
||||
1. Cacher votre adresse IP des sites web et services tiers, empêchant le suivi basé sur l'adresse IP.
|
||||
1. Hiding your IP from third-party websites and services, helping you blend in and preventing IP based tracking.
|
||||
1. Allowing you to bypass geo-restrictions on certain content.
|
||||
|
||||
Pour des situations comme celles-ci, ou si vous avez une autre raison impérieuse, les fournisseurs de VPN que nous avons listés ci-dessus sont ceux que nous pensons être les plus dignes de confiance. Cependant, l'utilisation d'un fournisseur de VPN signifie toujours que vous *faites confiance* à ce fournisseur. Dans presque tous les autres cas, vous devriez utiliser un outil sécurisé **par conception** tel que Tor.
|
||||
VPNs can provide *some* of the same benefits Tor provides, such as hiding your IP from the websites you visit and geographically shifting your network traffic, and good VPN providers will not cooperate with e.g. legal authorities from oppressive regimes, especially if you choose a VPN provider outside your own jurisdiction.
|
||||
|
||||
## Sources et Lectures Complémentaires
|
||||
VPNs cannot encrypt data outside the connection between your device and the VPN server. VPN providers can also see and modify your traffic the same way your ISP could, so there is still a level of trust you are placing in them. Et il n'existe aucun moyen de vérifier de quelque manière que ce soit la politique de "non journalisation" d'un fournisseur de VPN.
|
||||
|
||||
1. [VPN - un Récit Très Précaire](https://schub.io/blog/2019/04/08/very-precarious-narrative.html) par Dennis Schubert
|
||||
1. [Présentation du Réseau Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md)
|
||||
1. [IVPN Privacy Guides](https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides)
|
||||
1. ["Ai-je besoin d'un VPN ?"](https://www.doineedavpn.com), un outil développé par IVPN pour défier le marketing agressif des autres VPNs en aidant les individus à décider si un VPN leur convient.
|
||||
## When isn't a VPN suitable?
|
||||
|
||||
Using a VPN in cases where you're using your [real-life or well-known identity](common-misconceptions.md#complicated-is-better) online is unlikely be useful. Cela peut déclencher des systèmes de détection de spam et de fraude, par exemple si vous vous connectez au site web de votre banque.
|
||||
|
||||
It's important to remember that a VPN will not provide you with absolute anonymity, because the VPN provider itself will still see your real IP address, destination website information, and often has a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. You can't rely on "no logging" policies to protect your data from anyone who is able to protect. If you need complete safety from the network itself, consider using [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) in addition to or instead of a VPN.
|
||||
|
||||
You also should not trust a VPN to secure your connection to an unencrypted, HTTP destination. Pour que ce que vous faites sur les sites web que vous visitez reste privé et sécurisé, vous devez utiliser le protocole HTTPS. This will keep your passwords, session tokens, and queries safe from the VPN provider and other potential adversaries in between the VPN server and your destination. You should enable HTTPS-only mode in your browser (if it's supported) to mitigate attacks which try to downgrade your connection from HTTPS to HTTP.
|
||||
|
||||
## Devrais-je utiliser un DNS chiffré avec un VPN ?
|
||||
|
||||
Unless your VPN provider hosts the encrypted DNS servers themselves, **probably not**. Using DOH/DOT (or any other form of encrypted DNS) with third-party servers will simply add more entities to trust. Votre fournisseur de VPN peut toujours voir quels sites web vous visitez en se basant sur les adresses IP et d'autres méthodes. All this being said, there may be some advantages to enabling encrypted DNS in order to enable other security features in your browser, such as ECH. Browser technologies which are reliant on in-browser encrypted DNS are relatively new and not yet widespread, so whether they are relevant to you in particular is an exercise we will leave to you to research independently.
|
||||
|
||||
Another common reason encrypted DNS is recommended is that it prevents DNS spoofing. Cependant, votre navigateur devrait déjà vérifier la présence de [certificats TLS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Digital_certificates) avec **HTTPS** et vous en avertir. Si vous n'utilisez pas **HTTPS**, alors un adversaire peut toujours modifier n'importe quoi d'autre que vos requêtes DNS et le résultat final sera peu différent.
|
||||
|
||||
## Devrais-je utiliser Tor *et* un VPN?
|
||||
|
||||
Maybe, Tor is not necessarily suitable for everybody in the first place. Consider your [threat model](threat-modeling.md), because if your adversary is not capable of extracting information from your VPN provider, using a VPN alone may provide enough protection.
|
||||
|
||||
If you do use Tor then you are *probably* best off connecting to the Tor network via a commercial VPN provider. However, this is a complex subject which we've written more about on our [Tor overview](../advanced/tor-overview.md) page.
|
||||
|
||||
## Should I access Tor through VPN providers that provide "Tor nodes"?
|
||||
|
||||
You should not use that feature: The primary advantage of using Tor is that you do not trust your VPN provider, which is negated when you use Tor nodes hosted by your VPN instead of connecting directly to Tor from your computer.
|
||||
|
||||
Currently, Tor only supports the TCP protocol. UDP (used by [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC), [HTTP3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3), and other protocols), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol), and other packets will be dropped. Pour compenser cela, les fournisseurs de VPN acheminent généralement tous les paquets non TCP par leur serveur VPN (votre premier saut). C'est le cas de [Proton VPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn/). De plus, lorsque vous utilisez cette configuration Tor par VPN, vous n'avez pas le contrôle sur d'autres fonctionnalités importantes de Tor telles que [Adresse de Destination Isolée](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (utilisation d'un circuit Tor différent pour chaque domaine que vous visitez).
|
||||
|
||||
The feature should be viewed as a *convenient* way to access hidden services on Tor, not to stay anonymous. For proper anonymity, use the actual [Tor Browser](../tor.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## Commercial VPN Ownership
|
||||
|
||||
Most VPN services are owned by the same [few companies](https://vpnpro.com/blog/hidden-vpn-owners-unveiled-97-vpns-23-companies/). These shady companies run lots of smaller VPN services to create the illusion that you have more choice than you actually do and to maximize profit. Typically, these providers that feed into their shell company have terrible privacy policies and shouldn't be trusted with your internet traffic. You should be very strict about which provider you decide to use.
|
||||
|
||||
You should also be wary that many VPN review sites are merely advertising vehicles open to the highest bidder. ==Privacy Guides does not make money from recommending external products, and never uses affiliate programs.==
|
||||
|
||||
[Our VPN Recommendations](../vpn.md ""){.md-button}
|
||||
|
||||
## Modern VPN Alternatives
|
||||
|
||||
Recently, some attempts have been made by various organizations to address some issues which centralized VPNs have. These technologies are relatively new, but worth keeping an eye on as the field develops.
|
||||
|
||||
### Multi-Party Relays
|
||||
|
||||
Multi-Party Relays (MPRs) use multiple nodes owned by different parties, such that no individual party knows both who you are and what you're connecting to. This is the basic idea behind Tor, but now there are some paid services that try to emulate this model.
|
||||
|
||||
MPRs seek to solve a problem inherent to VPNs: the fact that you must trust them completely. They accomplish this goal by segmenting the responsibilities between two or more different companies. For example, Apple's iCloud+ Private Relay routes your traffic through two servers:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Firstly, a server operated by Apple.
|
||||
|
||||
This server is able to see your device's IP when you connect to it, and has knowledge of your payment information and Apple ID tied to your iCloud subscription. However, it is unable to see what website you are connecting to.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Secondly, a server operated by a partner CDN, such as Cloudflare or Fastly.
|
||||
|
||||
This server actually makes the connection to your destination website, but has no knowledge of your device. The only IP address it knows about is Apple's server's.
|
||||
|
||||
Other MPRs run by different companies like Google or INVISV operate in a very similar manner. This protection by segmentation only exists if you trust the two companies to not collude with each other to deanonymize you.
|
||||
|
||||
### Decentralized VPNs
|
||||
|
||||
Another attempt at solving the issues with centralized VPN services are dVPNs. These are based on blockchain technology and claim to eliminate trust in a single party by distributing the nodes across lots of different people. However, many times a dVPN will default to a single node, meaning you need to trust that node completely, just like a traditional VPN. Unlike a traditional VPN, this one node that can see all your traffic is a random person instead of your VPN provider that can be audited and has legal responsibilities to uphold their privacy policy. Multi-hop is needed to solve this, but that comes with a stability and performance cost.
|
||||
|
||||
Another consideration is legal liability. The exit node will need to deal with legal problems from misuse of the network, an issue that the Tor network has contended with for its entire existence. This discourages regular people from running nodes and makes it more attractive for a malicious actor with lots of resources to host one. This is a big problem if the service is single-node, as the potentially malicious exit node can see who you are and what you're connecting to.
|
||||
|
||||
Many dVPNs are used to push a cryptocurrency rather than to make the best service. They also tend to be smaller networks with fewer nodes, making them more vulnerable to [Sybil attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sybil_attack).
|
||||
|
||||
## Informations VPN Liées
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -76,3 +112,4 @@ Pour des situations comme celles-ci, ou si vous avez une autre raison impérieus
|
||||
- [Enquête sur les Applications VPN Gratuites](https://www.top10vpn.com/free-vpn-app-investigation/)
|
||||
- [Les propriétaires inconnus des VPNs dévoilés : 101 produits VPN gérés par seulement 23 sociétés](https://vpnpro.com/blog/hidden-vpn-owners-unveiled-97-vpns-23-companies/)
|
||||
- [Cette société chinoise est secrètement à l'origine de 24 applications populaires qui cherchent à obtenir des autorisations dangereuses](https://vpnpro.com/blog/chinese-company-secretly-behind-popular-apps-seeking-dangerous-permissions/)
|
||||
- [VPN - un Récit Très Précaire](https://schub.io/blog/2019/04/08/very-precarious-narrative.html) par Dennis Schubert
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -119,11 +119,9 @@ Nix est un gestionnaire de paquets basé sur les sources ; s'il n'y a pas de paq
|
||||
|
||||
Whonix est conçu pour fonctionner sous la forme de deux machines virtuelles : une "Station de Travail" et une "Passerelle" Tor. Toutes les communications de la station de travail doivent passer par la passerelle Tor, et seront acheminées par le réseau Tor. Cela signifie que même si la "Station de Travail" est compromise par un logiciel malveillant quelconque, la véritable adresse IP reste cachée.
|
||||
|
||||
Parmi ses fonctionnalités, citons l'isolation des Flux Tor, [l'anonymisation des frappes de clavier](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Keystroke_Deanonymization#Kloak), [un swap chiffré](https://github.com/Whonix/swap-file-creator), et un allocateur de mémoire renforcé.
|
||||
Some of its features include Tor Stream Isolation, [keystroke anonymization](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Keystroke_Deanonymization#Kloak), [encrypted swap](https://github.com/Whonix/swap-file-creator), and a hardened memory allocator. Future versions of Whonix will likely include [full system AppArmor policies](https://github.com/Whonix/apparmor-profile-everything) and a [sandbox app launcher](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Sandbox-app-launcher) to fully confine all processes on the system.
|
||||
|
||||
Les futures versions de Whonix incluront probablement [des politiques AppArmor système complètes](https://github.com/Whonix/apparmor-profile-everything) et [un lanceur d'apps bac à sable](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Sandbox-app-launcher) pour confiner complètement tous les processus sur le système.
|
||||
|
||||
Il est préférable d'utiliser Whonix [en conjonction avec Qubes](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Why_use_Qubes_over_other_Virtualizers).
|
||||
Whonix is best used [in conjunction with Qubes](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Why_use_Qubes_over_other_Virtualizers). We have a [recommended guide](os/qubes-overview.md#connecting-to-tor-via-a-vpn) on configuring Whonix in conjunction with a VPN ProxyVM in Qubes to hide your Tor activities from your ISP.
|
||||
|
||||
### Tails
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
223
i18n/fr/device-integrity.md
Normal file
223
i18n/fr/device-integrity.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: Device Integrity
|
||||
icon: material/security
|
||||
description: These tools can be used to check your devices for compromise.
|
||||
cover: device-integrity.webp
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
These tools can be used to validate the integrity of your mobile devices and check them for indicators of compromise by spyware and malware such as Pegasus, Predator, or KingsPawn. This page focuses on **mobile security**, because mobile devices typically have read-only systems with well-known configurations, so detecting malicious modifications is easier than on traditional desktop systems. We may expand the focus of this page in the future.
|
||||
|
||||
!!! note "This is an advanced topic"
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functionality which most people do not need to worry about, and often require more in-depth technical knowledge to use effectively.
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
It is **critical** to understand that scanning your device for public indicators of compromise is **not sufficient** to determine that a device is "clean", and not targeted with a particular spyware tool. Reliance on these publicly-available scanning tools can miss recent security developments and give you a false sense of security.
|
||||
|
||||
## General Advice
|
||||
|
||||
The majority of system-level exploits on modern mobile devices—especially zero-click compromises—are non-persistent, meaning they will not remain or run automatically after a reboot. For this reason, we highly recommend rebooting your device regularly. We recommend everybody reboot their devices once a week at minimum, but if non-persistent malware is of particular concern for you, we and many security experts recommend a daily reboot schedule.
|
||||
|
||||
This means an attacker would have to regularly re-infect your device to retain access, although we'll note this is not impossible. Rebooting your device also will not protect you against _persistent_ malware, but this is less common on mobile devices due to modern security features like secure/verified boot.
|
||||
|
||||
## Post-Compromise Information & Disclaimer
|
||||
|
||||
If any of the following tools indicate a potential compromise by spyware such as Pegasus, Predator, or KingsPawn, we advise that you contact:
|
||||
|
||||
- If you are a human rights defender, journalist, or from a civil society organization: [Amnesty International's Security Lab](https://securitylab.amnesty.org/contact-us/)
|
||||
- If a business or government device is compromised: Contact the appropriate security liason at your enterprise, department, or agency
|
||||
- Local law enforcement
|
||||
|
||||
**We are unable to help you directly beyond this.** We are happy to discuss your specific situation or circumstances and review your results in our [community](https://discuss.privacyguides.net) spaces, but it is unlikely we can assist you beyond what is written on this page.
|
||||
|
||||
The tools on this page are only capable of detecting indicators of compromise, not removing them. If you are concerned about having been compromised, we advise that you:
|
||||
|
||||
- Consider replacing the device completely
|
||||
- Consider changing your SIM/eSIM number
|
||||
- Not restore from a backup, because that backup may be compromised
|
||||
|
||||
These tools provide analysis based on the information they have the ability to access from your device, and publicly-accessible indicators of compromise. It is important to keep in mind two things:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Indicators of compromise are just that: _indicators_. They are not a definitive finding, and may occasionally be **false positives**. If an indicator of compromise is detected, it means you should do additional research into the _potential_ threat.
|
||||
2. The indicators of compromise these tools look for are published by threat research organizations, but not all indicators are made available to the public! This means that these tools can present a **false negative**, if your device is infected with spyware which is not detected by any of the public indicators. Reliable and comprehensive digital forensic support and triage requires access to non-public indicators, research and threat intelligence.
|
||||
|
||||
## External Verification Tools
|
||||
|
||||
External verification tools run on your computer and scan your mobile device for forensic traces which are helpful to identify potential compromise.
|
||||
|
||||
!!! danger "Danger"
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Public indicators of compromise are insufficient to determine that a device is "clean", and not targeted with a particular spyware tool. Reliance on public indicators alone can miss recent forensic traces and give a false sense of security.
|
||||
|
||||
Reliable and comprehensive digital forensic support and triage requires access to non-public indicators, research and threat intelligence.
|
||||
|
||||
Such support is available to civil society through [Amnesty International's Security Lab](https://www.amnesty.org/en/tech/) or [Access Now’s Digital Security Helpline](https://www.accessnow.org/help/).
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
These tools can trigger false-positives. If any of these tools finds indicators of compromise, you need to dig deeper to determine your actual risk. Some reports may be false positives based on websites you've visited in the past, and findings which are many years old are likely either false-positives or indicate previous (and no longer active) compromise.
|
||||
|
||||
### Mobile Verification Toolkit
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Mobile Verification Toolkit** (**MVT**) is a collection of utilities which simplifies and automates the process of scanning mobile devices for potential traces of targeting or infection by known spyware campaigns. MVT was developed by Amnesty International and released in 2021 in the context of the [Pegasus Project](https://forbiddenstories.org/about-the-pegasus-project/).
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mvt.re/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mvt-project/mvt){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://docs.mvt.re/en/latest/install/)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://docs.mvt.re/en/latest/install/)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
!!! warning "Avertissement"
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Using MVT is insufficient to determine that a device is "clean", and not targeted with a particular spyware tool.
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
MVT is _most_ useful for scanning iOS devices. Android stores very little diagnostic information useful to triage potential compromises, and because of this `mvt-android` capabilities are limited as well. On the other hand, encrypted iOS iTunes backups provide a large enough subset of files stored on the device to detect suspicious artifacts in many cases. This being said, MVT does still provide fairly useful tools for both iOS and Android analysis.
|
||||
|
||||
If you use iOS and are at high-risk, we have three additional suggestions for you:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Create and keep regular (monthly) iTunes backups. This allows you to find and diagnose past infections later with MVT, if new threats are discovered in the future.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Trigger _sysdiagnose_ logs often and back them up externally. These logs can provide invaluable data to future forensic investigators if need be.
|
||||
|
||||
The process to do so varies by model, but you can trigger it on newer phones by holding down _Power_ + _Volume Up_ + _Volume Down_ until you feel a brief vibration. After a few minutes, the timestamped _sysdiagnose_ log will appear in **Settings** > **Privacy & Security** > **Analytics & Improvements** > **Analytics Data**.
|
||||
|
||||
3. Enable [Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode).
|
||||
|
||||
MVT allows you to perform deeper scans/analysis if your device is jailbroken. Unless you know what you are doing, **do not jailbreak or root your device.** Jailbreaking your device exposes it to considerable security risks.
|
||||
|
||||
### iMazing (iOS)
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**iMazing** provides a free spyware analyzer tool for iOS devices which acts as a GUI-wrapper for [MVT](#mobile-verification-toolkit). This can be much easier to run compared to MVT itself, which is a command-line tool designed for technologists and forensic investigators.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://imazing.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://imazing.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://imazing.com/spyware-analyzer){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://imazing.com/download)
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://imazing.com/download)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
iMazing automates and interactively guides you through the process of using [MVT](#mobile-verification-toolkit) to scan your device for publicly-accessible indicators of compromise published by various threat researchers. All of the information and warnings which apply to MVT apply to this tool as well, so we suggest you also familiarize yourself with the notes on MVT in the sections above.
|
||||
|
||||
## On-Device Verification
|
||||
|
||||
These are apps you can install which check your device and operating system for signs of tampering, and validate the identity of your device.
|
||||
|
||||
!!! warning "Avertissement"
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Using these apps is insufficient to determine that a device is "clean", and not targeted with a particular spyware tool.
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Auditor (Android)
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Auditor** is an app which leverages hardware security features to provide device integrity monitoring by actively validating the identity of a device and the integrity of its operating system. Currently, it only works with GrapheneOS or the stock operating system for [supported devices](https://attestation.app/about#device-support).
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://attestation.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://attestation.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://attestation.app/about){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://attestation.app/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://attestation.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.attestation.auditor.play)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases)
|
||||
- [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Auditor is not a scanning/analysis tool like some other tools on this page, rather it uses your device's hardware-backed keystore to allow you to verify the identity of your device and gain assurance that the operating system itself hasn't been tampered with or downgraded via verified boot. This provides a very robust integrity check of your device itself, but doesn't necessarily check whether the user-level apps running on your device are malicious.
|
||||
|
||||
Auditor performs attestation and intrusion detection with **two** devices, an _auditee_ (the device being verified) and an _auditor_ (the device performing the verification). The auditor can be any Android 10+ device (or a remote web service operated by [GrapheneOS](android.md#grapheneos)), while the auditee must be a specifically [supported device](https://attestation.app/about#device-support). Auditor works by:
|
||||
|
||||
- Using a [Trust On First Use (TOFU)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_on_first_use) model between an _auditor_ and _auditee_, the pair establish a private key in the [hardware-backed keystore](https://source.android.com/security/keystore/) of the _Auditor_.
|
||||
- The _auditor_ can either be another instance of the Auditor app or the [Remote Attestation Service](https://attestation.app).
|
||||
- The _auditor_ records the current state and configuration of the _auditee_.
|
||||
- Should tampering with the operating system of the _auditee_ happen after the pairing is complete, the auditor will be aware of the change in the device state and configurations.
|
||||
- You will be alerted to the change.
|
||||
|
||||
It is important to note that Auditor can only effectively detect changes **after** the initial pairing, not necessarily during or before due to its TOFU model. To make sure that your hardware and operating system is genuine, [perform local attestation](https://grapheneos.org/install/web#verifying-installation) immediately after the device has been installed and prior to any internet connection.
|
||||
|
||||
No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
|
||||
|
||||
If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service.
|
||||
|
||||
## On-Device Scanners
|
||||
|
||||
These are apps you can install on your device which scan your device for signs of compromise.
|
||||
|
||||
!!! warning "Avertissement"
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Using these apps is insufficient to determine that a device is "clean", and not targeted with a particular spyware tool.
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Hypatia (Android)
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Hypatia** is an open source real-time malware scanner for Android, from the developer of [DivestOS](android.md#divestos). It accesses the internet to download signature database updates, but does not upload your files or any metadata to the cloud (scans are performed entirely locally).
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://divestos.org/pages/our_apps#hypatia){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://divestos.org/pages/privacy_policy#hypatia){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/divested-mobile/hypatia){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://divested.dev/pages/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-android: F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/packages/us.spotco.malwarescanner/)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Hypatia is particularly good at detecting common stalkerware: If you suspect you are a victim of stalkerware, you should [visit this page](https://stopstalkerware.org/information-for-survivors/) for advice.
|
||||
|
||||
### iVerify (iOS)
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**iVerify** is an iOS app which automatically scans your device to check configuration settings, patch level, and other areas of security. It also checks your device for indicators of compromise by jailbreak tools or spyware such as Pegasus.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.iverify.io/consumer){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.iverify.io/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://www.iverify.io/frequently-asked-questions#iVerify-General){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/iverify/id1466120520)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Like all iOS apps, iVerify is restricted to what it can observe about your device from within the iOS App Sandbox. It will not provide nearly as robust analysis as a full-system analysis tool like [MVT](#mobile-verification-toolkit). Its primary function is to detect whether your device is jailbroken, which it is effective at, however a hypothetical threat which is _specifically_ designed to bypass iVerify's checks would likely succeed at doing so.
|
||||
|
||||
iVerify is **not** an "antivirus" tool, and will not detect non-system-level malware such as malicious custom keyboards or malicious Wi-Fi Sync configurations, for example.
|
||||
|
||||
In addition to device scanning, iVerify also includes a number of additional security utilities which you may find useful, including device reboot reminders, iOS update notifications (which are often faster than Apple's staggered update notification rollout), some basic privacy and security guides, and a DNS over HTTPS tool which can connect your device's [DNS](dns.md) queries securely to Quad9, Cloudflare, or Google.
|
||||
@@ -49,6 +49,22 @@ Pour copier et coller des fichiers et des répertoires (dossiers) d'un *qube* à
|
||||
|
||||
L'[environnement qrexec](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec/) est une partie essentielle de Qubes qui permet la communication entre les domaines. Il est construit sur la bibliothèque Xen *vchan*, qui facilite [l'isolation de par le biais de politiques](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2020/06/22/new-qrexec-policy-system/).
|
||||
|
||||
## Connecting to Tor via a VPN
|
||||
|
||||
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
|
||||
|
||||
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
|
||||
|
||||
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
|
||||
|
||||
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
|
||||
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
|
||||
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
|
||||
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
|
||||
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
|
||||
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
|
||||
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
|
||||
|
||||
## Ressources supplémentaires
|
||||
|
||||
Pour de plus amples informations, nous vous encourageons à consulter les pages de documentation complètes de Qubes OS, situées sur le [site web de Qubes OS](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/). Des copies hors ligne peuvent être téléchargées à partir du [dépôt de documentationde](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-doc) Qubes OS.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ Nous [recommandons](dns.md#recommended-providers) un certain nombre de serveurs
|
||||
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Privacy.com](financial-services.md#privacycom-us)
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [MySudo](financial-services.md#mysudo-us-paid)
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
[En savoir plus :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](financial-services.md#payment-masking-services)
|
||||
@@ -429,12 +430,11 @@ Nous [recommandons](dns.md#recommended-providers) un certain nombre de serveurs
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Obtainium (gestionnaire d'applications)](android.md#obtainium)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Aurora Store (client Google Play)](android.md#aurora-store)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Shelter (profils professionnels)](android.md#shelter)
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Auditor (appareils pris en charge)](android.md#auditor)
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Secure Camera](android.md#secure-camera)
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Secure PDF Viewer](android.md#secure-pdf-viewer)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Obtainium (App Manager)](android.md#obtainium)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Aurora Store (Google Play Client)](android.md#aurora-store)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Shelter (Work Profiles)](android.md#shelter)
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Secure Camera](android.md#secure-camera)
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Secure PDF Viewer](android.md#secure-pdf-viewer)
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -468,3 +468,21 @@ Nous [recommandons](dns.md#recommended-providers) un certain nombre de serveurs
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
[En savoir plus :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](router.md)
|
||||
|
||||
## Advanced Tools
|
||||
|
||||
These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functionality which most people do not need to worry about, and often require more in-depth technical knowledge to utilize effectively.
|
||||
|
||||
### Device Integrity Verification
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Mobile Verification Toolkit](device-integrity.md#mobile-verification-toolkit)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [iMazing (iOS)](device-integrity.md#imazing-ios)
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Auditor (Android)](device-integrity.md#auditor-android)
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Hypatia (Android)](device-integrity.md#hypatia-android)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [iVerify (iOS)](device-integrity.md#iverify-ios)
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
[En savoir plus :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](device-integrity.md)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -39,7 +39,15 @@ Tor fonctionne en acheminant votre trafic Internet via ces serveurs gérés par
|
||||
|
||||
## Se connecter à Tor
|
||||
|
||||
Il existe plusieurs façons de se connecter au réseau Tor à partir de votre appareil, la plus utilisée étant le **Navigateur Tor**, un fork de Firefox conçu pour la navigation anonyme sur les ordinateurs de bureau et Android. En plus des applications listées ci-dessous, il existe également des systèmes d'exploitation conçus spécifiquement pour se connecter au réseau Tor tels que [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) sur [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), qui offrent une sécurité et des protections encore plus importantes que le navigateur Tor standard.
|
||||
!!! tip "Conseil"
|
||||
|
||||
Before connecting to Tor, please ensure you've read our [overview](advanced/tor-overview.md) on what Tor is and how to connect to it safely. We often recommend connecting to Tor through a trusted [VPN provider](vpn.md), but you have to do so **properly** to avoid decreasing your anonymity.
|
||||
|
||||
Il existe plusieurs façons de se connecter au réseau Tor à partir de votre appareil, la plus utilisée étant le **Navigateur Tor**, un fork de Firefox conçu pour la navigation anonyme sur les ordinateurs de bureau et Android.
|
||||
|
||||
Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
|
||||
|
||||
If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** be using the desktop Tor Browser client, ideally in a [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) configuration. Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against deanonymization.
|
||||
|
||||
### Navigateur Tor
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -69,6 +77,8 @@ Il existe plusieurs façons de se connecter au réseau Tor à partir de votre ap
|
||||
|
||||
Le Navigateur Tor est conçu pour empêcher la prise d'empreintes numérique, ou l'identification en fonction de la configuration de votre navigateur. Par conséquent, il est impératif de ne **pas** modifier le navigateur au-delà des [niveaux de sécurité](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/fr/security-settings/) par défaut.
|
||||
|
||||
In addition to installing Tor Browser on your computer directly, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser alone.
|
||||
|
||||
### Orbot
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user