From 3069afdfd20339a9ce68920974d45ce89675d436 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Crowdin Bot Date: Sat, 24 May 2025 07:32:14 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] New Crowdin translations by GitHub Action --- i18n/ar/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- i18n/bn-IN/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- i18n/bn/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- i18n/cs/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- i18n/de/real-time-communication.md | 62 +++++++++++------------- i18n/el/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- i18n/eo/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- i18n/es/real-time-communication.md | 64 +++++++++++-------------- i18n/fa/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- i18n/fr/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- i18n/he/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- i18n/hi/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- i18n/hu/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- i18n/id/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- i18n/it/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- i18n/ja/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- i18n/ko/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- i18n/ku-IQ/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- i18n/nl/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- i18n/pl/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- i18n/pt-BR/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- i18n/pt/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- i18n/ru/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- i18n/sv/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- i18n/tr/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- i18n/uk/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- i18n/vi/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- i18n/zh-Hant/real-time-communication.md | 64 +++++++++++-------------- i18n/zh/real-time-communication.md | 44 +++++++---------- 29 files changed, 551 insertions(+), 783 deletions(-) diff --git a/i18n/ar/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/ar/real-time-communication.md index 4ff21b8c..ac747919 100644 --- a/i18n/ar/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/ar/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top. 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen. -3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**. -5. Select **Phone Number** -6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## Criteria **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### Minimum Requirements - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect pro - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/bn-IN/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/bn-IN/real-time-communication.md index 4ff21b8c..ac747919 100644 --- a/i18n/bn-IN/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/bn-IN/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top. 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen. -3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**. -5. Select **Phone Number** -6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## Criteria **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### Minimum Requirements - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect pro - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/bn/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/bn/real-time-communication.md index 4ff21b8c..ac747919 100644 --- a/i18n/bn/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/bn/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top. 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen. -3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**. -5. Select **Phone Number** -6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## Criteria **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### Minimum Requirements - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect pro - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/cs/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/cs/real-time-communication.md index 4ff21b8c..ac747919 100644 --- a/i18n/cs/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/cs/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top. 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen. -3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**. -5. Select **Phone Number** -6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## Criteria **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### Minimum Requirements - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect pro - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/de/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/de/real-time-communication.md index dd12815c..98def998 100644 --- a/i18n/de/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/de/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: Massenüberwachung](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: Überwachungskapitalismus](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,13 +23,13 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** ist eine mobile App, die von Signal Messenger LLC entwickelt wurde. Die App bietet Instant Messaging und Anrufe, die mit dem Signal-Protokoll gesichert sind, einem extrem sicheren Verschlüsselungsprotokoll, dass Forward Secrecy[^1] und Post-Compromise Security[^2] unterstützt. +**Signal** ist eine mobile App, die von Signal Messenger LLC entwickelt wurde. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Datenschutzerklärung" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.signal.org){ .card-link title="Dokumentation" } -[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/signalapp){ .card-link title="Quellcode" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://signal.org/donate){ .card-link title="Spenden" } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.signal.org){ .card-link title="Documentation" } +[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/signalapp){ .card-link title="Source Code" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://signal.org/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. Öffne in Signal die Einstellungen der App und tippe oben auf dein Kontoprofil. 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen. -3. Gebe einen Nutzernamen ein. Dein Benutzername wird immer mit einer eindeutigen Ziffernfolge gekoppelt, damit dein Benutzername eindeutig ist und nicht erraten werden kann. Wenn du beispielsweise "John" eingibst, könnte dein Benutzername `@john.35` lauten. Standardmäßig werden deinem Benutzernamen bei der Erstellung nur 2 Ziffern zugeordnet, aber du kannst weitere Ziffern hinzufügen, bis du die maximale Länge des Benutzernamens erreichst (32 Zeichen). +3. Gebe einen Nutzernamen ein. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. Standardmäßig werden deinem Benutzernamen bei der Erstellung nur 2 Ziffern zugeordnet, aber du kannst weitere Ziffern hinzufügen, bis du die maximale Länge des Benutzernamens erreichst (32 Zeichen). 4. Gehe zurück zur Hauptseite der App-Einstellungen und wähle **Datenschutz**. -5. Wähle **Telefonnummer** -6. Ändere die Einstellung **Wer kann meine Telefonnummer sehen** zu: **Niemand** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly-Logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** ist ein alternativer Signal-Client für Android, der es dir ermöglicht, die lokale Datenbank im Ruhezustand mit einer Passphrase zu verschlüsseln, ungenutzte RAM-Daten sicher zu schreddern, deine Verbindung über Tor zu leiten und [mehr](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). Es gibt auch Verbesserungen bei der Benutzerfreundlichkeit, darunter geplante Backups, automatisches Sperren, Unterstützung für [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) und die Möglichkeit, dein Android-Telefon als verknüpftes Gerät anstelle des Hauptgeräts für ein Signal-Konto zu verwenden. +**Molly** ist ein alternativer Signal-Client für Android, der es dir ermöglicht, die lokale Datenbank im Ruhezustand mit einer Passphrase zu verschlüsseln, ungenutzte RAM-Daten sicher zu schreddern, deine Verbindung über Tor zu leiten und [mehr](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Datenschutzerklärung" } @@ -96,19 +91,17 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex-Logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } -**SimpleX Chat** ist ein Instant Messenger, der ohne eindeutigen Identifikatoren wie Telefonnummern oder Benutzernamen auskommt. Sein dezentrales Netzwerk macht SimpleX Chat zu einem effektiven Werkzeug gegen [:material-close-outline: Zensur](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. +**SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Sein dezentrales Netzwerk macht SimpleX Chat zu einem effektiven Werkzeug gegen [:material-close-outline: Zensur](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://simplex.chat){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://simplex.chat/privacy){ .card-link title="Datenschutzerklärung" } @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -141,15 +134,15 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/
-![Briar-Logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } +![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** ist ein verschlüsselter Instant-Messenger, der sich mit anderen Geräten [über das Tor-Netzwerk verbindet](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works). Das macht es zu einem effektiven Werkzeug zur Umgehung von [:material-close-outline: Zensur](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar kann sich auch über Wi-Fi oder Bluetooth verbinden, wenn sich die Geräte in der Nähe befinden. Dieser lokale Mesh-Modus von Briar kann nützlich sein, wenn die Internetverfügbarkeit ein Problem darstellt. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar kann sich auch über Wi-Fi oder Bluetooth verbinden, wenn sich die Geräte in der Nähe befinden. Dieser lokale Mesh-Modus von Briar kann nützlich sein, wenn die Internetverfügbarkeit ein Problem darstellt. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Datenschutzerklärung" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Dokumentation" } -[:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Quellcode" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Spendenoptionen sind unten auf der Homepage aufgeführt" } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } +[:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## Criteria **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### Mindestanforderungen - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Unsere Best-Case-Kriterien stellen dar, was wir uns von einem perfekten Projekt - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/el/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/el/real-time-communication.md index 4ff21b8c..ac747919 100644 --- a/i18n/el/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/el/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top. 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen. -3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**. -5. Select **Phone Number** -6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## Criteria **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### Minimum Requirements - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect pro - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/eo/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/eo/real-time-communication.md index c5fcd0f9..19410e52 100644 --- a/i18n/eo/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/eo/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: Amasgvatado](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top. 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen. -3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**. -5. Select **Phone Number** -6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## Criteria **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### Minimum Requirements - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect pro - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/es/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/es/real-time-communication.md index 9674854f..7d9a6993 100644 --- a/i18n/es/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/es/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: Vigilancia masiva](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: Capitalismo de Vigilancia](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,13 +23,13 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Logotipo de Signal](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** es una aplicación móvil desarrollada por Signal Messenger LLC. La aplicación ofrece mensajería instantánea y llamadas protegidas con el Protocolo Signal, un protocolo de cifrado extremadamente seguro que admite el secreto hacia adelante[^1] y la seguridad posterior al compromiso.[^2] +**Signal** es una aplicación móvil desarrollada por Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] -[:octicons-home-16: Página Principal](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Política de Privacidad" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.signal.org){ .card-link title="Documentación" } -[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/signalapp){ .card-link title="Código Fuente" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://signal.org/donate){ .card-link title="Contribuir" } +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.signal.org){ .card-link title="Documentation" } +[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/signalapp){ .card-link title="Source Code" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://signal.org/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads "Descargas" @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. En Signal, abra los ajustes de la aplicación y pulse en el perfil de su cuenta en la parte superior. 2. Pulse **Alias** y seleccione **Continuar** en la pantalla "Configure su alias de Signal". -3. Introduzca un alias. Su alias siempre irá emparejado con un único conjunto de dígitos para mantener su alias único y evitar que la gente lo adivine, por ejemplo, si introduce "John" su alias podría terminar siendo `@john.35`. Por defecto, solo se emparejan 2 dígitos con su nombre de usuario cuando lo crea, pero puede añadir más dígitos hasta alcanzar el límite de longitud del nombre de usuario (32 caracteres). +3. Introduzca un alias. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. Por defecto, solo se emparejan 2 dígitos con su nombre de usuario cuando lo crea, pero puede añadir más dígitos hasta alcanzar el límite de longitud del nombre de usuario (32 caracteres). 4. Vuelva a la página principal de ajustes de la aplicación y seleccione **Privacidad**. -5. Seleccione **Número de Teléfono** -6. Cambie el ajuste **Quién Puede Ver Mi Número** a: **Nadie** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** es un cliente alternativo de Signal para Android que le permite cifrar la base de datos local con una frase de contraseña en reposo, hacer que los datos de RAM no utilizados se destruyan de forma segura, enrutar su conexión a través de Tor, y [más](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). También cuenta con mejoras de usabilidad, como copias de seguridad programadas, bloqueo automático, compatibilidad con [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) y la posibilidad de utilizar su teléfono Android como dispositivo vinculado en lugar del dispositivo principal para una cuenta Signal. +**Molly** es un cliente alternativo de Signal para Android que le permite cifrar la base de datos local con una frase de contraseña en reposo, hacer que los datos de RAM no utilizados se destruyan de forma segura, enrutar su conexión a través de Tor, y [más](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Página Principal](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Política de Privacidad" } @@ -96,19 +91,17 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } -**SimpleX** Chat es un servicio de mensajería instantánea descentralizado que no depende de ningún identificador único, como números de teléfono o nombres de usuario. Su red descentralizada hace de SimpleX Chat una herramienta eficaz contra la [:material-close-outline: Censura](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. +**SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Su red descentralizada hace de SimpleX Chat una herramienta eficaz contra la [:material-close-outline: Censura](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. [:octicons-home-16: Página Principal](https://simplex.chat){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://simplex.chat/privacy){ .card-link title="Política de Privacidad" } @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** es un servicio de mensajería instantánea cifrado que [se conecta](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) a otros clientes utilizando la Red Tor, lo que lo convierte en una herramienta eficaz para eludir la [:material-close-outline: Censura](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar también puede conectarse a través de Wi-Fi o Bluetooth si está cerca. El modo de malla local de Briar puede ser útil cuando la disponibilidad de Internet es un problema. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar también puede conectarse a través de Wi-Fi o Bluetooth si está cerca. El modo de malla local de Briar puede ser útil cuando la disponibilidad de Internet es un problema. -[:octicons-home-16: Página Principal](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Política de Privacidad" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentación" } -[:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Código Fuente" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Las opciones de donación están listadas en la parte inferior de la página principal" } +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } +[:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads "Descargas" @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## Criterios **Por favor, ten en cuenta que no estamos afiliados con ninguno de los proyectos que recomendamos.** Además de [nuestros criterios estándar](about/criteria.md), hemos desarrollado un conjunto claro de requisitos que nos permiten ofrecer recomendaciones objetivas. Sugerimos que te familiarices con esta lista, antes de decidir utilizar un proyecto y realizar tu propia investigación para asegurarte de que es la elección ideal para ti. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### Requisitos Mínimos - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Nuestro criterio del mejor caso representa lo que nos gustaría ver del proyecto - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/fa/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/fa/real-time-communication.md index 4ff21b8c..ac747919 100644 --- a/i18n/fa/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/fa/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top. 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen. -3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**. -5. Select **Phone Number** -6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## Criteria **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### Minimum Requirements - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect pro - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/fr/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/fr/real-time-communication.md index 9851292e..1fe77763 100644 --- a/i18n/fr/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/fr/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: Surveillance de masse](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: Capitalisme de surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Logo de Signal](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** est une application mobile développée par Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal** est une application mobile développée par Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. Dans Signal, ouvrez les paramètres de l'application et appuyez sur votre profil en haut. 2. Appuyez sur **Nom d'utilisateur** et choisissez **Continuer** sur l'écran "Configurez votre nom d'utilisateur Signal". -3. Entrez un nom d'utilisateur. Votre nom d'utilisateur sera toujours combiné avec un ensemble unique de chiffres afin que votre nom d'utilisateur reste unique et que personne ne puisse le deviner. Par exemple, si vous entrez "John", votre nom d'utilisateur pourrait être `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Entrez un nom d'utilisateur. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Retournez à la page principale des paramètres de l'application et sélectionnez **Confidentialité**. -5. Sélectionnez **Numéro de téléphone** -6. Modifiez le paramètre **Qui peut voir mon numéro** et mettre : **Personne** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar peut également se connecter par Wi-Fi ou Bluetooth lorsqu'il se trouve à proximité. Le mode de maillage local de Briar peut être utile lorsque la disponibilité d’internet pose problème. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar peut également se connecter par Wi-Fi ou Bluetooth lorsqu'il se trouve à proximité. Le mode de maillage local de Briar peut être utile lorsque la disponibilité d’internet pose problème. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## Critères **Veuillez noter que nous ne sommes affiliés à aucun des projets que nous recommandons.** En plus de [nos critères de base](about/criteria.md), nous avons développé un ensemble d'exigences claires pour nous permettre de fournir des recommandations objectives. Nous vous suggérons de vous familiariser avec cette liste avant de choisir d'utiliser un projet, et de mener vos propres recherches pour vous assurer que c'est le bon choix pour vous. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### Exigences minimales - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Nos critères de cas idéal représentent ce que nous aimerions voir d'un projet - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/he/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/he/real-time-communication.md index 719f2faf..87136dcd 100644 --- a/i18n/he/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/he/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: מעקב המוני](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: קפיטליזם מעקב](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Signal לוגו](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** היא אפליקציה לנייד שפותחה על ידי סיגנל מסנג'ר LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal** היא אפליקציה לנייד שפותחה על ידי סיגנל מסנג'ר LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top. 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen. -3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**. -5. Select **Phone Number** -6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar יכול גם להתחבר באמצעות Wi-Fi או Bluetooth כאשר הוא נמצא בקרבה מקומית. מצב הרשת המקומי של Briar יכול להיות שימושי כאשר זמינות האינטרנט היא בעיה. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar יכול גם להתחבר באמצעות Wi-Fi או Bluetooth כאשר הוא נמצא בקרבה מקומית. מצב הרשת המקומי של Briar יכול להיות שימושי כאשר זמינות האינטרנט היא בעיה. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## קריטריונים **שים לב שאיננו קשורים לאף אחד מהפרויקטים שאנו ממליצים עליהם.** בנוסף ל [הקריטריונים הסטנדרטיים שלנו](about/criteria.md), פיתחנו סט ברור של דרישות כדי לאפשר לנו לספק המלצות אובייקטיביות. אנו מציעים לך להכיר את הרשימה הזו לפני שתבחר להשתמש בפרויקט, ולערוך מחקר משלך כדי להבטיח שזו הבחירה הנכונה עבורך. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### דרישות מינימליות - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/hi/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/hi/real-time-communication.md index 4ff21b8c..ac747919 100644 --- a/i18n/hi/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/hi/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top. 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen. -3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**. -5. Select **Phone Number** -6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## Criteria **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### Minimum Requirements - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect pro - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/hu/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/hu/real-time-communication.md index 126c2959..a43164fe 100644 --- a/i18n/hu/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/hu/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top. 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen. -3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**. -5. Select **Phone Number** -6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## Követelmények **Tartsd figyelemben, hogy nem állunk kapcsolatban az általunk ajánlott projektek egyikével sem.** Az [alap kritériumaink mellett](about/criteria.md), egyértelmű követelményrendszert dolgoztunk ki, hogy objektív ajánlásokat tudjunk tenni. Javasoljuk, hogy ismerkedj meg ezzel a listával, mielőtt kiválasztanál egy projektet, és végezz saját kutatásokat, hogy megbizonyosodj arról, hogy ez a megfelelő választás számodra. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### Alap elvárások - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ A legjobb esetben alkalmazott követelményeink azt fejezik ki, hogy mit szeretn - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/id/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/id/real-time-communication.md index f54d8973..b42ce043 100644 --- a/i18n/id/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/id/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: Pengawasan Massal](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: Kapitalisme Pengawasan](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top. 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen. -3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**. -5. Select **Phone Number** -6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## Kriteria **Harap diperhatikan bahwa kami tidak berafiliasi dengan proyek-proyek yang kami rekomendasikan.** Selain [kriteria standar kami](about/criteria.md), kami telah mengembangkan serangkaian persyaratan yang jelas untuk memungkinkan kami memberikan rekomendasi yang objektif. Kami sarankan Anda membiasakan diri dengan daftar ini sebelum memilih untuk menggunakan sebuah proyek, dan melakukan penelitian sendiri untuk memastikan bahwa itu adalah pilihan yang tepat untuk Anda. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### Persyaratan Minimum - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/it/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/it/real-time-communication.md index 65acb2e2..10e43356 100644 --- a/i18n/it/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/it/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: Sorveglianza di massa](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: Capitalismo di sorveglianza](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Logo di Signal](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** è un'app per dispositivi mobili sviluppata da Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal** è un'app per dispositivi mobili sviluppata da Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. In Signal, apri le impostazioni dell'app e tocca il profilo del tuo account in alto. 2. Tocca **Username** e scegli **Continua** nella schermata "Imposta il tuo username Signal". -3. Inserisci un username. Il tuo username sarà sempre abbinato a un set di cifre univoche per mantenere il tuo username unico e impedire alle persone di indovinarlo, per esempio se inserisci "John" il tuo nome utente potrebbe finire per essere `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Inserisci un username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Torna alla pagina delle impostazioni principali dell'app e seleziona **Privacy**. -5. Seleziona **Numero Di Telefono** -6. Modifica l'impostazione **Chi può vedere il mio numero** in: **Nessuno** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar può anche connettersi via Wi-Fi o Bluetooth quando si trova nelle vicinanze. La modalità mesh locale di Briar può essere utile quando la connessione a Internet è problematica. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar può anche connettersi via Wi-Fi o Bluetooth quando si trova nelle vicinanze. La modalità mesh locale di Briar può essere utile quando la connessione a Internet è problematica. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## Criteri **Ti preghiamo di notare che non siamo affiliati con alcun progetto consigliato.** Oltre ai [nostri criteri standard](about/criteria.md), abbiamo sviluppato una serie chiara di requisiti per consentirci di fornire consigli oggettivi. Ti suggeriamo di familiarizzare con questo elenco prima di scegliere di utilizzare un progetto e di condurre le tue ricerche per assicurarti che si tratti della scelta adatta a te. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### Requisiti minimi - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ I nostri criteri ottimali rappresentano ciò che vorremmo vedere dal progetto pe - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/ja/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/ja/real-time-communication.md index f2a9b97a..74b9a15a 100644 --- a/i18n/ja/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/ja/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: 監視社会](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: 監視資本主義](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top. 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen. -3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**. -5. Select **Phone Number** -6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## 規準 **私たちは、推薦するどのプロジェクトとも提携していません。**客観的に推薦できるよう、[標準となる規準](about/criteria.md)に加えて、一連の明確な要件を定めています。 プロジェクトを利用する前に、このリストをよく理解し、ご自身で調査を行って、そのプロジェクトがあなたにとって適切な選択かどうかをご確認ください。 @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### 最低要件 - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/ko/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/ko/real-time-communication.md index b8b854e4..65de2e0b 100644 --- a/i18n/ko/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/ko/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: 대중 감시(Mass Surveillance)](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: 감시 자본주의(Surveillance Capitalism)](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Signal 로고](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal**은 Signal Messenger LLC에서 개발한 모바일 앱입니다. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal**은 Signal Messenger LLC에서 개발한 모바일 앱입니다. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top. 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen. -3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**. -5. Select **Phone Number** -6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. 근거리에 있는 경우 Wi-Fi 혹은 Bluetooth를 통해 연결하는 것도 가능합니다. Briar 로컬 메시 모드는 인터넷을 제대로 사용할 수 없는 상황에도 유용합니다. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. 근거리에 있는 경우 Wi-Fi 혹은 Bluetooth를 통해 연결하는 것도 가능합니다. Briar 로컬 메시 모드는 인터넷을 제대로 사용할 수 없는 상황에도 유용합니다. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## 평가 기준 **Privacy Guides는 권장 목록의 어떠한 프로젝트와도 제휴를 맺지 않았습니다.** 객관적인 권장 목록을 제공하기 위해, [일반적인 평가 기준](about/criteria.md)에 더해 명확한 요구 사항을 정립하였습니다. 어떠한 프로젝트를 선택해 사용하기 전에, 이러한 요구 사항들을 숙지하고 여러분 스스로 조사하는 과정을 거쳐 적절한 선택을 하시기 바랍니다. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### 최소 요구 사항 - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/ku-IQ/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/ku-IQ/real-time-communication.md index 4ff21b8c..ac747919 100644 --- a/i18n/ku-IQ/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/ku-IQ/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top. 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen. -3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**. -5. Select **Phone Number** -6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## Criteria **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### Minimum Requirements - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect pro - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/nl/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/nl/real-time-communication.md index 6218691d..8b01f6d8 100644 --- a/i18n/nl/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/nl/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: Massabewaking](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: Surveillance kapitalisme](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** is een mobiele app ontwikkeld door Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal** is een mobiele app ontwikkeld door Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top. 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen. -3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**. -5. Select **Phone Number** -6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar kan ook verbinding maken via Wi-Fi of Bluetooth wanneer hij in de buurt is. Briar's lokale mesh-modus kan nuttig zijn wanneer de beschikbaarheid van internet een probleem is. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar kan ook verbinding maken via Wi-Fi of Bluetooth wanneer hij in de buurt is. Briar's lokale mesh-modus kan nuttig zijn wanneer de beschikbaarheid van internet een probleem is. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## Criteria **Wij zijn niet verbonden aan de projecten die wij aanbevelen.** Naast [onze standaardcriteria](about/criteria.md)hebben wij een duidelijke reeks eisen ontwikkeld om objectieve aanbevelingen te kunnen doen. Wij stellen voor dat je jezelf vertrouwd maakt met deze lijst voordat je een project kiest, en jouw eigen onderzoek uitvoert om er zeker van te zijn dat je de juiste keuze maakt. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### Minimale vereisten - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Onze best-case criteria geven aan wat wij zouden willen zien van het perfecte pr - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/pl/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/pl/real-time-communication.md index 4ff21b8c..ac747919 100644 --- a/i18n/pl/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/pl/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top. 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen. -3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**. -5. Select **Phone Number** -6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## Criteria **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### Minimum Requirements - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect pro - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/pt-BR/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/pt-BR/real-time-communication.md index e4cfdb4f..12c929f9 100644 --- a/i18n/pt-BR/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/pt-BR/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top. 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen. -3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**. -5. Select **Phone Number** -6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## Criteria **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### Minimum Requirements - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Nosso critério de melhor caso representa o que gostaríamos de ver em um projet - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/pt/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/pt/real-time-communication.md index 0c9d6b65..73a013ab 100644 --- a/i18n/pt/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/pt/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: Vigilância em massa](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: Capitalismo de vigilância](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Logótipo Signal](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** é uma aplicação para dispositivos móveis desenvolvida pela Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal** é uma aplicação para dispositivos móveis desenvolvida pela Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top. 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen. -3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**. -5. Select **Phone Number** -6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. O Briar pode ligar-se através de Wi-Fi ou Bluetooth. O modo de rede local do Briar pode ser útil, quando não estiver garantida a disponibilidade da Internet. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. O Briar pode ligar-se através de Wi-Fi ou Bluetooth. O modo de rede local do Briar pode ser útil, quando não estiver garantida a disponibilidade da Internet. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## Framadate **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### Requisitos mínimos - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Os nossos melhores critérios representam o que gostaríamos de ver num projeto - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/ru/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/ru/real-time-communication.md index 368f5f30..872478de 100644 --- a/i18n/ru/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/ru/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: Массовое наблюдение](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: Капитализм слежки](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** - мобильное приложение, разработанное Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal** - мобильное приложение, разработанное Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top. 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen. -3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**. -5. Select **Phone Number** -6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar также может передавать сообщения через Wi-Fi или Bluetooth, если получатель находится в непосредственной близости. Режим локальной сети Briar может быть полезен, когда Вы не имеете доступа к Интернету. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar также может передавать сообщения через Wi-Fi или Bluetooth, если получатель находится в непосредственной близости. Режим локальной сети Briar может быть полезен, когда Вы не имеете доступа к Интернету. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## Критерии **Обрати внимание, что у нас нет связей ни с одним проектом, который мы рекомендуем.** В дополнение к [нашим стандартным критериям](about/criteria.md) мы разработали четкий набор требований, позволяющий давать объективные рекомендации. Перед тем, как вы решите выбрать какой-либо проект, мы рекомендуем вам ознакомиться со списком критериев и провести собственное исследование, чтобы убедиться в правильности своего выбора. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### Минимальные требования к сервисам - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/sv/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/sv/real-time-communication.md index 5c41d5c7..d0828010 100644 --- a/i18n/sv/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/sv/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: Massövervakning](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: Övervakningskapitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top. 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen. -3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**. -5. Select **Phone Number** -6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Hemsida](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Integritetspolicy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## Kriterier **Observera att vi inte är knutna till något av de projekt som vi rekommenderar.** Förutom [våra standardkriterier](about/criteria.md)har vi utvecklat en tydlig uppsättning krav som gör det möjligt för oss att ge objektiva rekommendationer. Vi föreslår att du bekantar dig med den här listan innan du väljer att använda ett projekt, och att du gör din egen forskning för att se till att det är rätt val för dig. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### Minimikrav - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Våra kriterier för bästa fall representerar vad vi skulle vilja se av det per - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/tr/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/tr/real-time-communication.md index e6b6661f..006e5022 100644 --- a/i18n/tr/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/tr/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Signal logosu](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal**, Signal Messenger LLC tarafından geliştirilen bir mobil uygulamadır. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal**, Signal Messenger LLC tarafından geliştirilen bir mobil uygulamadır. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top. 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen. -3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**. -5. Select **Phone Number** -6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## Kriter **Lütfen önerdiğimiz projelerin hiçbirine bağlı olmadığımızı unutmayın.** [standart kriterlerimize](about/criteria.md) ek olarak, objektif tavsiyelerde bulunabilmemiz için bir takım gereklilikler geliştirdik. Bir projeyi kullanmayı seçmeden önce bu listeye aşina olmanızı ve sizin için doğru seçim olduğundan emin olmak için kendi araştırmanızı yapmanızı öneririz. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### Minimum Gereksinimler - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ En iyi durum kriterlerimiz, bu kategorideki mükemmel bir projede görmek istedi - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/uk/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/uk/real-time-communication.md index 8df4b697..fef985ef 100644 --- a/i18n/uk/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/uk/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: Масове спостереження](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: Капіталізм нагляду](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top. 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen. -3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**. -5. Select **Phone Number** -6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## Criteria **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### Minimum Requirements - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect pro - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/vi/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/vi/real-time-communication.md index ea0c58fe..4b0e7465 100644 --- a/i18n/vi/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/vi/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top. 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen. -3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**. -5. Select **Phone Number** -6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## Framadate **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### Minimum Requirements - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect pro - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/zh-Hant/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/zh-Hant/real-time-communication.md index d5703af8..5f1987b3 100644 --- a/i18n/zh-Hant/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/zh-Hant/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: 大規模監控](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: 監控資本主義](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,13 +23,13 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** 是由Signal Messenger LLC開發的行動應用程式。 該應用程式使用 Signal 通訊協定 提供即時通訊的安全保障，Signal 通訊協定是一種極為安全的加密協定，支援 前向保密[^1] 和 洩漏後安全[^2] 。 +**Signal** 是由Signal Messenger LLC開發的行動應用程式。 The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] -[:octicons-home-16: 首頁](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="隱私權政策" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.signal.org){ .card-link title="說明文件" } -[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/signalapp){ .card-link title="原始碼" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://signal.org/donate){ .card-link title="捐款" } +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.signal.org){ .card-link title="Documentation" } +[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/signalapp){ .card-link title="Source Code" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://signal.org/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
下載 @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. 在 Signal 中，打開應用程式的設定並點擊上方的帳戶個人資料。 2. 點選**使用者名稱**，然後在「設定您的 Signal 使用者名稱」畫面上選擇**繼續**。 -3. 輸入一個使用者名稱 此用戶名將一直與一組獨特數字配對，以保持用戶名的唯一性防止人們猜測它，例如，如果輸入“John”，您的用戶名最終可能會是`@john.35`。 根據預設設定，當您建立使用者名稱時，只有 2 位數字會與使用者名稱配對，但您可以增加更多位數，直到達到使用者名稱的長度限制 (32 個字元)。 +3. 輸入一個使用者名稱 Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. 根據預設設定，當您建立使用者名稱時，只有 2 位數字會與使用者名稱配對，但您可以增加更多位數，直到達到使用者名稱的長度限制 (32 個字元)。 4. 返回系統應用程式設定頁面並選擇**隱私權**。 -5. 選擇**手機號碼** -6. 將 **誰可以看到我的號碼** 設定為：**沒有人** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** 是 Android 的替代 Signal 用戶端，可讓您使用密碼加密本機資料庫、安全地刪除未使用的 RAM 資料、透過 Tor 路由連線；除此之外，還有 [許多](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features)。 它還改善了可用性，包括備份排程、自動鎖定、 [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) 支援，及提供可將 Android 手機作為連結裝置，而非 Signal 帳戶主要裝置的功能。 +**Molly** 是 Android 的替代 Signal 用戶端，可讓您使用密碼加密本機資料庫、安全地刪除未使用的 RAM 資料、透過 Tor 路由連線；除此之外，還有 [許多](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features)。 It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: 首頁](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="隱私權政策" } @@ -96,19 +91,17 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } -**SimpleX Chat** 是一款不依賴任何獨特識別碼（例如：電話號碼、使用者名稱）的即時通訊工具。 其分佈式網路使 SimpleX Chat 成為對抗 [:material-close-outline: 審查](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray } 的有效工具。 +**SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. 其分佈式網路使 SimpleX Chat 成為對抗 [:material-close-outline: 審查](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray } 的有效工具。 [:octicons-home-16: 首頁](https://simplex.chat){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://simplex.chat/privacy){ .card-link title="隱私權政策" } @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** 是一個加密的即時通訊軟體，可以使用 Tor 網路 [連線](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) 到其他用戶端，使其成為規避 [:material-close-outline: 審查](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray } 的有效工具。 Briar 還可以使用鄰近 Wi-Fi 或藍牙連接。 當無法使用網際網路時， Briar 的本地網格（mesh）模式可能很有用。 +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar 還可以使用鄰近 Wi-Fi 或藍牙連接。 當無法使用網際網路時， Briar 的本地網格（mesh）模式可能很有用。 -[:octicons-home-16: 首頁](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } -[:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="隱私權政策" } -[:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="說明文件" } -[:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="原始碼" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="捐款方式列在其首頁底部" } +[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } +[:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } +[:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } +[:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
下載 @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## 標準 **請注意，我們與推薦的任何項目均無關。**除了[我們的通用標準](about/criteria.md)外，我們還制定了一套明確的要求，以便我們能夠提供客觀的建議。 我們建議您在選擇使用項目之前先熟悉此列表，並進行自己的研究，以確保它是您的正確選擇。 @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### 最低合格要求 - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted. diff --git a/i18n/zh/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/zh/real-time-communication.md index 0746511e..1b66b5b9 100644 --- a/i18n/zh/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/zh/real-time-communication.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp - [:material-eye-outline: 大规模监控](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue} - [:material-account-cash: 监视资本主义](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown} -These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md). +These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md). [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button} @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for se ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right } -**Signal** 是Signal Messenger LLC所研发的一款手机应用。 The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] +**Signal** 是Signal Messenger LLC所研发的一款手机应用。 The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2] [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a 1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top. 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen. -3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). +3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters). 4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**. -5. Select **Phone Number** -6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody** - -You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username. - -Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. - -The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs). +5. Select **Phone Number**. +6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**. +7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation: @@ -73,7 +68,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material- ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right } -**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. +**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } @@ -96,17 +91,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates. -There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)). +**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3] -All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements. - -Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. +Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code. ## SimpleX Chat
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } +![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right } **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. @@ -129,11 +122,11 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. +SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages. To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up. -You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository. +You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository. SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website). @@ -143,13 +136,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right } -**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. +**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" } [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" } -[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" } +[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
Downloads @@ -165,12 +158,10 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/ To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. +Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. + The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited. -Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). - -Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol. - ## Criteria **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. @@ -178,7 +169,7 @@ Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code ### Minimum Requirements - Must have open-source clients. -- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. +- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts. - Must use E2EE for private messages by default. - Must support E2EE for all messages. - Must support forward secrecy[^1] @@ -193,6 +184,7 @@ Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect pro - Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md). - Should use E2EE for all messages by default. - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS. +[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy). [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well. [^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.