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i18n/pt/real-time-communication.md

@@ -13,15 +13,11 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp
 - [:material-eye-outline: Vigilância em massa](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue}
 - [:material-account-cash: Capitalismo de vigilância](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown}
 
-These are our recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication**. These come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md).
+These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md).
 
 [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button}
 
-## Aplicações de mensagens encriptadas
-
-Estas aplicações de mensagens são ótimas para proteger as suas comunicações sensíveis.
-
-### Signal
+## Signal
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
@@ -61,15 +57,15 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a
 
 You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
 
-Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Os perfis pessoais também são encriptados e apenas são partilhados com os contactos com quem conversa. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. O endereço do remetente é encriptado juntamente com o corpo da mensagem e apenas o endereço do destinatário é visível para o servidor. O Sealed Sender só está ativado para as pessoas da sua lista de contactos, mas pode ser ativado para todos os destinatários, com o risco acrescido de poder receber spam.
+Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam.
 
-O protocolo foi objeto de uma [auditoria](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) independente em 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs).
+The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs).
 
-Temos algumas dicas adicionais sobre como configurar e fortalecer a sua instalação do Signal:
+We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation:
 
-[Configuração e robustecimento do Signal :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening)
+[Signal Configuration and Hardening :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening)
 
-#### Molly (Android)
+### Molly (Android)
 
 If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals ""){.pg-red} you may consider using this alternative app, which features a number of security and usability improvements, to access the Signal network.
 
@@ -106,7 +102,7 @@ All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements.
 
 Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code.
 
-### SimpleX Chat
+## SimpleX Chat
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
@@ -141,7 +137,7 @@ You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.c
 
 SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website).
 
-### Briar
+## Briar
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
@@ -175,76 +171,28 @@ Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/
 
 Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
 
-## Opções adicionais
-
-<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
-
-These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Qualquer comprometimento da chave entre os destinatários da mensagem afetará a confidencialidade de **todas** as comunicações anteriores.
-
-</div>
-
-### Session
-
-<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
-
-![Logótipo Session](assets/img/messengers/session.svg){ align=right }
-
-**Session** é uma aplicação descentralizada de mensagens instantâneas com foco em comunicações privadas, seguras e anónimas. A sessão oferece suporte para mensagens diretas, conversas de grupo e chamadas de voz.
-
-Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io) to store and route messages. Cada mensagem encriptada é encaminhada através de três nós na Oxen Service Node Network, tornando virtualmente impossível que os nós compilem informação significativa sobre aqueles que utilizam a rede.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getsession.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://getsession.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://getsession.org/faq){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/oxen-io){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-
-<details class="downloads" markdown>
-<summary>Downloads</summary>
-
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=network.loki.messenger)
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1470168868)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/oxen-io/session-android/releases)
-- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://getsession.org/download)
-- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://getsession.org/download)
-- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://getsession.org/download)
-
-</details>
-
-</div>
-
-Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants.
-
-Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
-
-Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021:
-
-> The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.
-
-Session has a [white paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
-
-## Critérios
+## Framadate
 
 **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
 
 ### Requisitos mínimos
 
-- Has open-source clients.
-- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
-- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
-- Supports E2EE for all messages.
-- Has been independently audited.
+- Must have open-source clients.
+- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts.
+- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
+- Must support E2EE for all messages.
+- Must support forward secrecy[^1]
+- Must have a published audit from a reputable, independent third party.
 
 ### Melhor caso
 
 Os nossos melhores critérios representam o que gostaríamos de ver num projeto perfeito desta categoria. As nossas recomendações podem não incluir todas as funcionalidades, mas incluem as que, na nossa opinião, têm um impacto mais elevado.
 
-- Supports forward secrecy[^1]
-- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
-- Has open-source servers.
-- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
-- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
-- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
+- Should support future secrecy (post-compromise security)[^2]
+- Should have open-source servers.
+- Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
+- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
+- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
 
 [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
-[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
+[^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.