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@@ -13,15 +13,11 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp
- [:material-eye-outline: 대중 감시(Mass Surveillance)](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs ""){.pg-blue}
- [:material-account-cash: 감시 자본주의(Surveillance Capitalism)](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model ""){.pg-brown}
These are our recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication**. These come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md).
These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md).
[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why ""){.md-button}
## 암호화 메신저
암호화 메신저는 민감한 대화를 보호하는 용도로 유용합니다.
### Signal
## Signal
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
@@ -61,15 +57,15 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. 개인 프로필 또한 암호화되어 여러분이 대화하는 상대에게만 공유됩니다. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. 해당 기능을 사용할 경우, 발신자 주소는 메시지 본문과 함께 암호화되어 서버에서는 수신자 주소만 볼 수 있습니다. Sealed Sender는 연락처 목록에 있는 사람들에게만 활성화되지만, 스팸 수신 위험성이 높아짐에 따라 모든 수신자에게 활성화하는 것도 가능합니다.
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam.
Signal 프로토콜은 2016년에 독립적으로 [감사를 받았습니다](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf). The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs).
The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs).
Signal 설치 구성 및 보안 강화 관련 도움말이 필요하신 분은 다음 내용을 참고하세요.
We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation:
[Signal 설정 및 보안 강화 :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening)
[Signal Configuration and Hardening :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening)
#### Molly (Android)
### Molly (Android)
If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals ""){.pg-red} you may consider using this alternative app, which features a number of security and usability improvements, to access the Signal network.
@@ -106,7 +102,7 @@ All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements.
Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code.
### SimpleX Chat
## SimpleX Chat
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
@@ -141,7 +137,7 @@ You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.c
SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website).
### Briar
## Briar
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
@@ -175,76 +171,28 @@ Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
## 추가 선택지
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. 대화 참여자 중 한 명만 키가 유출되더라도 이전에 주고받은 **모든** 메시지의 기밀성이 손상됩니다.
</div>
### Session
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
![Session 로고](assets/img/messengers/session.svg){ align=right }
**Session**는 비공개, 보안, 익명 대화에 중점을 둔 탈중앙화 메신저입니다. Session은 개인 메시지, 그룹 채팅, 음성 통화를 지원합니다.
Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io) to store and route messages. 모든 암호화 메시지는 Oxen 서비스 노드 네트워크의 노드 3개를 이용해 라우팅되므로, 특정 노드가 사용자에 대한 의미 있는 정보를 수집하는 것은 불가능에 가깝습니다.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getsession.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://getsession.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://getsession.org/faq){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/oxen-io){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
<details class="downloads" markdown>
<summary>Downloads</summary>
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=network.loki.messenger)
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1470168868)
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/oxen-io/session-android/releases)
- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://getsession.org/download)
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://getsession.org/download)
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://getsession.org/download)
</details>
</div>
Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants.
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021:
> The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.
Session has a [white paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
## 평가 기준
**Privacy Guides는 권장 목록의 어떠한 프로젝트와도 제휴를 맺지 않았습니다.** 객관적인 권장 목록을 제공하기 위해, [일반적인 평가 기준](about/criteria.md)에 더해 명확한 요구 사항을 정립하였습니다. 어떠한 프로젝트를 선택해 사용하기 전에, 이러한 요구 사항들을 숙지하고 여러분 스스로 조사하는 과정을 거쳐 적절한 선택을 하시기 바랍니다.
### 최소 요구 사항
- Has open-source clients.
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
- Has been independently audited.
- Must have open-source clients.
- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particuarly phone numbers or emails) with contacts.
- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
- Must support E2EE for all messages.
- Must support forward secrecy[^1]
- Must have a published audit from a reputable, independent third party.
### 우대 사항
평가 기준에서 '우대 사항'은 해당 부문에서 완벽한 프로젝트에 기대하는 바를 나타냅니다. 다음의 우대 사항에 해당하지 않더라도 권장 목록에 포함될 수 있습니다. 단, 우대 사항에 해당할수록 이 페이지의 다른 항목보다 높은 순위를 갖습니다.
- Supports forward secrecy[^1]
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
- Has open-source servers.
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
- Should support future secrecy (post-compromise security)[^2]
- Should have open-source servers.
- Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
[^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
[^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.