---
title: "Przegląd Qubes"
icon: simple/qubesos
description: Qubes to system operacyjny oparty na izolowaniu aplikacji w *qubes* (dawniej "maszynach wirtualnych") w celu zwiększenia bezpieczeństwa.
---

[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated *qubes*, (which are Virtual Machines). You can assign each *qube* a level of trust based on its purpose. Qubes OS provides security by using isolation. It only permits actions on a per-case basis and therefore is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb).

## How does Qubes OS work?

Qubes uses [compartmentalization](https://qubes-os.org/intro) to keep the system secure. Qubes are created from templates, the defaults being for Fedora, Debian and [Whonix](../desktop.md#whonix). Qubes OS also allows you to create once-use [disposable](https://qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-use-disposables) *qubes*.

<details class="note" markdown>
<summary>The term <em>qubes</em> is gradually being updated to avoid referring to them as "virtual machines".</summary>

Some of the information here and on the Qubes OS documentation may contain conflicting language as the "appVM" term is gradually being changed to "qube". Qubes are not entire virtual machines, but maintain similar functionalities to VMs.

</details>

![Qubes architecture](../assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png)
<figcaption>Qubes Architecture, Credit: What is Qubes OS Intro</figcaption>

Each qube has a [colored border](https://qubes-os.org/screenshots) that can help you keep track of the domain in which it runs. You could, for example, use a specific color for your banking browser, while using a different color for a general untrusted browser.

![Colored border](../assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png)
<figcaption>Qubes window borders, Credit: Qubes Screenshots</figcaption>

## Why Should I use Qubes?

Qubes OS is useful if your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md) requires strong security and isolation, such as if you think you'll be opening untrusted files from untrusted sources. A typical reason for using Qubes OS is to open documents from unknown sources, but the idea is that if a single qube is compromised it won't affect the rest of the system.

Qubes OS utilizes [dom0](https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Dom0) Xen VM for controlling other *qubes* on the host OS, all of which display individual application windows within dom0's desktop environment. There are many uses for this type of architecture. Here are some tasks you can perform. You can see just how much more secure these processes are made by incorporating multiple steps.

### Copying and Pasting Text

You can [copy and paste text](https://qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-and-paste-text) using `qvm-copy-to-vm` or the below instructions:

1. Press **Ctrl+C** to tell the *qube* you're in that you want to copy something.
2. Press **Ctrl+Shift+C** to tell the *qube* to make this buffer available to the global clipboard.
3. Press **Ctrl+Shift+V** in the destination *qube* to make the global clipboard available.
4. Press **Ctrl+V** in the destination *qube* to paste the contents in the buffer.

### File Exchange

To copy and paste files and directories (folders) from one *qube* to another, you can use the option **Copy to Other AppVM...** or **Move to Other AppVM...**. The difference is that the **Move** option will delete the original file. Either option will protect your clipboard from being leaked to any other *qubes*. This is more secure than air-gapped file transfer. An air-gapped computer will still be forced to parse partitions or file systems. That is not required with the inter-qube copy system.

<details class="note" markdown>
<summary>Qubes do not have their own filesystems.</summary>

You can [copy and move files](https://qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-and-move-files) between *qubes*. When doing so the changes aren't immediately made and can be easily undone in case of an accident. When you run a *qube*, it does not have a persistent filesystem. You can create and delete files, but these changes are ephemeral.

</details>

### Inter-VM Interactions

The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes which allows communication between domains. It is built on top of the Xen library *vchan*, which facilitates [isolation through policies](https://qubes-os.org/news/2020/06/22/new-qrexec-policy-system).

## Connecting to Tor via a VPN

We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.

After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.

Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:

| Qube name       | Opis Qube                                                                                                        | NetVM           |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net         | *Twój domyślny qube sieciowy (preinstalowany)*                                                                   | *n/a*           |
| sys-firewall    | *Domyślna zapora sieciowa qube (preinstalowana)*                                                                 | sys-net         |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | VPN ProxyVM, stworzona przez [użytkownika](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall    |
| sys-whonix      | Maszyna wirtualna Whonix Gateway                                                                                 | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix     | Maszyna wirtualna Whonix Workstation                                                                             | sys-whonix      |

## Android

Aby uzyskać dodatkowe informacje, zachęcamy Cię do zapoznania się z obszerną dokumentacją Qubes OS znajdującą się na stronie [Qubes OS](https://qubes-os.org/doc). Kopie offline można pobrać z Qubes OS [repozytorium](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-doc).

- [Prawdopodobnie najbezpieczniejszy system operacyjny na świecie](https://opentech.fund/news/qubes-os-arguably-the-worlds-most-secure-operating-system-motherboard) (Open Technology Fund)
- [Kompartmentalizacja oprogramowania vs. separacja fizyczna](https://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/2014/Software_compartmentalization_vs_physical_separation.pdf) (J. Rutkowska)
- [Podział mojego cyfrowego życia na domeny bezpieczeństwa](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/03/13/partitioning-my-digital-life-into.html) (J. Rutkowska)
- [Powiązane artykuły](https://qubes-os.org/news/categories/#articles) (Qubes OS)
