42be55aaeb
- Remove send-path keyword blocklist that silently rejected legitimate messages (e.g. "constructor", "global", "document.", literal "javascript:") without adding protection. XSS is enforced at the rendering boundary by the receive-side DOMPurify pass and by sanitizeMessage() before encryption. - Preserve newlines/tabs/indentation in _sanitizeInputString; stop collapsing all whitespace which destroyed multi-line messages and code snippets. - Stop logging raw AAD (sessionId + keyFingerprint) on validation failure; log length only, in both message and file-message AAD validators. - Add Strict-Transport-Security (2y + preload) and Permissions-Policy (camera=self for QR, rest denied) to nginx.conf and .htaccess. - Add tests/outgoing-message-integrity.test.mjs regression suite.
88 lines
2.9 KiB
JavaScript
88 lines
2.9 KiB
JavaScript
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
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import { JSDOM } from 'jsdom';
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const { window } = new JSDOM('<!doctype html><html><body></body></html>', {
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url: 'http://localhost/'
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});
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globalThis.window = window;
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const { EnhancedSecureCryptoUtils } = await import('../src/crypto/EnhancedSecureCryptoUtils.js');
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window.EnhancedSecureCryptoUtils = EnhancedSecureCryptoUtils;
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const { EnhancedSecureWebRTCManager } = await import('../src/network/EnhancedSecureWebRTCManager.js');
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const P = EnhancedSecureWebRTCManager.prototype;
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function ctx() {
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return {
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_inputValidationLimits: {
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maxStringLength: 10000,
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maxObjectDepth: 10,
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maxArrayLength: 1000,
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maxMessageSize: 1_000_000
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},
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_secureLog() {},
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_sanitizeInputString: P._sanitizeInputString,
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_sanitizeInputObject: P._sanitizeInputObject
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};
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}
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function validate(input) {
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return P._validateInputData.call(ctx(), input, 'sendSecureMessage');
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}
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// Legitimate plain-text messages that the old keyword blocklist rejected must
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// now be accepted unchanged. The real XSS boundary is the receive-side
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// DOMPurify pass, not a guess-the-keyword filter on outgoing content.
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for (const msg of [
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'the constructor pattern is great',
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'global warming is real',
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'I will fetch (groceries) later',
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'see document.pdf and check window.location',
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'javascript: is harmless as plain text',
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'discussing <script> tags and prototype chains',
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'localStorage vs sessionStorage tradeoffs'
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]) {
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const r = validate(msg);
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assert.equal(r.isValid, true, `should accept: ${msg}`);
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assert.equal(r.sanitizedData, msg, `should not mangle: ${msg}`);
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}
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// Multi-line content and indentation must survive (previously collapsed to one
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// line by replace(/\s+/g, ' ')).
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{
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const multiline = 'line one\nline two\nline three';
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const r = validate(multiline);
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assert.equal(r.isValid, true);
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assert.equal(r.sanitizedData, multiline, 'newlines must be preserved');
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}
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{
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const code = 'function f() {\n return 42;\n}';
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const r = validate(code);
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assert.equal(r.isValid, true);
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assert.equal(r.sanitizedData, code, 'code indentation must be preserved');
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}
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// Control characters (null byte, bell, etc.) are still stripped, while tabs and
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// newlines are kept.
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{
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const r = validate('a\u0000b\u0007c\td\ne');
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assert.equal(r.isValid, true);
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assert.equal(r.sanitizedData, 'abc\td\ne', 'control chars stripped, tab/newline kept');
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}
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// Excessive blank lines are collapsed but content stays intact.
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{
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const r = validate('top\n\n\n\n\nbottom');
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assert.equal(r.isValid, true);
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assert.equal(r.sanitizedData, 'top\n\nbottom', '3+ blank lines collapse to two');
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}
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// Oversized input is still rejected (availability / DoS guard intact).
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{
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const huge = 'a'.repeat(10001);
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const r = validate(huge);
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assert.equal(r.isValid, false, 'over-limit strings are rejected');
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}
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console.log('Outgoing message integrity tests passed');
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