1.5 KiB
1.5 KiB
Security Architecture
Current baseline
| Area | Current behavior |
|---|---|
| Protocol | 4.1 with mismatch rejection |
| Peer verification | mandatory manual SAS entry |
| Transport | WebRTC over DTLS |
| Privacy mode | optional TURN relay-only mode |
| Message UI safety | incoming decrypted text sanitized before display |
| File transfer | validated metadata, explicit consent, allowlist policy |
| Local metadata | encrypted IndexedDB envelopes with migration |
| Lifecycle | unified disconnect cleanup and bounded resource retention |
Verification state machine
connection established
↓
shared keys derived
↓
deterministic SAS displayed
↓
manual out-of-band comparison
↓
local input validated
↓
peer confirmation received
↓
verified session
The verified state is reached only when both local and remote confirmation flags are true.
File-transfer architecture
- sender emits metadata
- receiver validates name, size, type, and abuse limits
- receiver sees Accept / Reject prompt
- no receive buffers are allocated before acceptance
- sender transmits chunks only after acceptance
- completed received buffers are retained within a bounded window
Disconnect cleanup
The canonical disconnect path clears:
- WebRTC channels and peer connection handles
- timers, deferred retries, fake traffic, and decoy traffic
- pending transfer state and consent waits
- verification state and crypto/PFS state
- React file-transfer callbacks and stale UI transfer state