Adds the Double Ratchet (Signal's design) on top of the existing ECDH session
keys, so message protection no longer rests on one set of keys lasting the whole
conversation. Every message gets its own key, derived through a one-way function
and discarded after use, and each change of direction introduces a fresh ECDH
key pair that re-keys the session root.
The ratchet needed no handshake change: both peers already hold each other's
authenticated ECDH public key, and the safety code compared during verification
covers exactly those keys. Its root is derived from the existing shared secret
through its own branch of the key schedule.
Support is negotiated in the invitation and response and used only when both
sides have it; a peer on an earlier release falls back to per-session keys. The
security panel reports which of the two is actually in force.
Out-of-order delivery is supported within fixed bounds (512 skipped keys per
chain, 1024 retained, five-minute expiry), and inbound frames are authenticated
before any ratchet state is committed, so a malformed frame cannot desynchronise
a live session.
Also in this release:
- Verification is enforced as a gate, not a label: control frames (reconnection
signalling, call setup, message deletion, delivery receipts) are acted on only
after both peers have compared the safety code, and verified state is set in a
single guarded place.
- Chat content reaches the interface through one authenticated path; an older,
weaker inbound path was retired.
- The security panel measures what it displays — several checks previously
returned a fixed result and now exercise the subsystem they describe.
- Invitation data is no longer kept in local storage, and entries left by earlier
versions are cleared on first launch.
- View-once and disappearing messages no longer place their text in system
notifications.
- Shared-secret buffers are overwritten once derivation completes; scanned QR
codes are decompressed with a size limit; voice notes are validated against
audio type and size budgets before skipping the consent prompt; the master
password is collected by the app rather than a browser dialog.
- Connection setup no longer fails on networks where STUN/TURN are unreachable:
it proceeds as soon as usable candidates exist and only waits while there are
none.
Test suite grows from 27 to 41 files, covering forward secrecy, post-compromise
re-keying, out-of-order delivery across ratchet steps, the skipped-key bounds,
tamper resistance, negotiation fallback, and byte-level key-derivation
compatibility with 5.6.0.
A security review of the transport and verification layers. Every item is a fix
to how untrusted peer input is handled; no features changed.
- SAS verification could be bypassed. `verification_both_confirmed` is an
unauthenticated frame on a channel that is not yet trusted, but it was taken as
proof that both sides had compared their codes — so a peer who completed the
signalling exchange could send it right after the data channel opened and drive
the other side to a "verified" session while the user never looked at the code.
It is now only an acknowledgement: refused unless this side already confirmed
locally, and _setVerifiedStatus() independently rejects any SAS-based
transition without a local confirmation. Holding ECDH-derived keys was never
proof of identity — a MITM has those too.
- Unauthenticated frames could be injected into the chat. A bare
{type:"message"} frame, a raw non-JSON frame and a binary frame were each
decoded and rendered, bypassing decryption, the HMAC check and the verification
gate; the injected text was indistinguishable from a genuine message. Chat
content now reaches the UI only through the authenticated enhanced_message
path.
- A peer could supply the verification code. `sas_code` announcements were
adopted verbatim when no local SAS had been derived yet. They may now only
corroborate the locally derived code.
- Anti-replay never ran. The sequence-number and AAD validators were defined on
SecureKeyStorage instead of the connection manager, so every call site failed
with a TypeError and the sliding replay window was dead code. Moved onto the
manager, wired into the live chat path, and a missing or non-numeric sequence
number now fails closed instead of sailing through the range checks.
- File transfers are gated on verification in both directions. Control frames are
written straight to the data channel by the transfer system; sending was
already gated, receiving now is too.
- Tighter CSP: connect-src and img-src no longer allow arbitrary https: hosts
(nothing in the app talks to a third party), plus base-uri 'none'.
- The SAS is no longer written to logs, and is compared in constant time on every
path. Fixed SecureMasterKeyManager.isUnlocked() testing a field renamed long
ago, so it never actually gated anything.
- Fixed the header showing "Secure undefined%": getRealSecurityLevel() became
reachable for the first time by the move above and returned only per-feature
booleans, while the header renders `level` and `score` directly. It now runs
the same verified scoring as every other consumer.
Adds regression tests for the verification gate, inbound frame authentication and
the security-level shape.
Updated PBKDF2 key derivation parameters to align with OWASP 2025 recommendations.
PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 now uses 310,000 iterations instead of 100,000 to improve resistance
against modern GPU and ASIC brute-force attacks.
- Updated both encryptData() and decryptData() derivation routines.
- Ensures ~100ms derivation time on modern CPUs (meets OWASP 2025 standard).
- No changes required for backward compatibility of existing ciphertexts.
- Implemented proper RFC 5869 compliant HKDF key derivation process
- Added Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) key for enhanced session security
- Improved key separation using unique info parameters for each derived key
- Enhanced salt size from 32 to 64 bytes for increased entropy
- Added comprehensive key validation and error handling
- Implemented proper ECDH + HKDF integration following Web Crypto API best practices
- Added metadata encryption key for enhanced data protection
- Improved compatibility with modern cryptographic standards (RFC 7748, NIST SP 800-56A)
-Enhanced logging and debugging capabilities for cryptographic operations
- Maintained backward compatibility while upgrading security infrastructure
Security improvements:
- Cryptographic isolation between different key purposes
- Enhanced protection against cross-key attacks
- Improved resistance to future key compromise scenarios
- Better compliance with OWASP cryptographic storage guidelines
Technical details:
- Refactored deriveSharedKeys() method for proper HKDF implementation
- Updated WebRTC manager to use new messageKey API
- Added comprehensive error handling and validation
- Improved browser compatibility with standardized cryptographic operations
- This update strengthens the existing security foundation with modern cryptographic practices while maintaining full system compatibility.
- Fixed biased cryptographic random with modulo operations
- Corrected biased cryptographic random with addition operations
- Resolved infinite page loading issue
- Rebuilt all distribution files
- Guarded all Notification API usage to avoid ReferenceError on iOS Safari.
- Set default permission to 'denied' when Notification is undefined.
- Added early return in notification flow when Notifications API is unavailable.
- Wrapped Notification.permission, requestPermission(), and new Notification(...) with typeof checks.
- Updated SecureNotificationManager and app.jsx to degrade gracefully.
- Verified build passes and chat loads correctly on iOS without notifications.
- Removed temporary console logs used for debugging
- Disabled DEBUG_MODE flag
- Updated configuration to run in production mode
- Cleaned up leftover debug utilities to reduce noise in console
- Updated connection flow between users via QR codes
- Added manual switching option in QR code generator
- Increased number of QR codes for better readability
- Removed session creation and Lightning payment logic
- Refactored security system:
* no more restrictions
* all systems enabled on session creation
- Improved QR code exchange for mobile devices
- Replace unsafe console.error/warn calls with secure logging system
- Implement production-safe logging that masks sensitive data
- Add automatic sanitization for cryptographic keys and sensitive information
- Create secure logging infrastructure for EnhancedSecureWebRTCManager and EnhancedSecureCryptoUtils
- Prevent data leakage of internal logic and error details in production
- Add production/development mode detection for appropriate logging levels
- Implement server-side error logging for production environments
- Replace unsafe console.error/warn calls with secure logging system
- Implement production-safe logging that masks sensitive data
- Add automatic sanitization for cryptographic keys and sensitive information
- Create secure logging infrastructure for EnhancedSecureWebRTCManager and EnhancedSecureCryptoUtils
- Prevent data leakage of internal logic and error details in production
- Add production/development mode detection for appropriate logging levels
- Implement server-side error logging for production environments
BREAKING CHANGE: Enhanced key validation now performs complete ASN.1 parsing
Security improvements:
- Added complete ASN.1 DER parser for full structure validation
- Implemented OID validation for algorithms and curves (P-256/P-384 only)
- Added EC point format verification (uncompressed format 0x04)
- Validate SPKI structure elements count and types
- Check key size limits to prevent DoS attacks (50-2000 bytes)
- Verify unused bits in BIT STRING (must be 0)
- Added fallback support from P-384 to P-256
This fixes high-risk vulnerability where keys with valid headers but
modified data could be accepted. Now all structural elements are validated
according to PKCS standards.
Affected methods:
- validateKeyStructure() - complete rewrite with ASN.1 parsing
- All key import/export methods now use enhanced validation
Security Enhancements:
- Add salt entropy validation (minimum 16 unique bytes for 64-byte salts)
- Expand secure logging patterns to catch more sensitive data types
(fingerprint, mac, hash patterns)
- Implement random timing delays in verifyAuthProof() to mask execution timing
- Revert sanitizeMessage() to working regex-based approach
Validation Improvements:
- validateSalt() now checks both size and entropy quality
- secureLog.sanitizeContext() enhanced with additional sensitive patterns
- Added timing attack protection with 5-25ms random delays
- Added a real verification system for active encryption modules, giving users full control over enabled modules.
- During session purchase or activation, the actual enabled modules are now displayed for both free and paid sessions.
- Refactored session timer initialization for proper functionality and accurate countdown.
- Optimized code structure related to session management and module verification.
BREAKING CHANGE: Project renamed from LockBit.chat to SecureBit.chat
- Changed project name to avoid confusion with LockBit ransomware group
- Updated all documentation, branding, and references
- Maintained all existing functionality and security features
- Domain migration planned to securebit.chat
Reason: The LockBit name became associated with a notorious ransomware
group, causing conflicts on platforms and potential confusion for users.
SecureBit better reflects our mission of providing secure P2P messaging
while avoiding negative associations.
This change affects:
- README.md and all documentation
- Package.json name field
- Brand assets and logos
- Website references
- Social media handles
Core functionality remains unchanged:
✅ 12-layer military-grade security
✅ Lightning Network integration
✅ P2P WebRTC architecture
✅ Open source MIT license
lockbitchat