Commit Graph

17 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
lockbitchat b39f9ecd2c release: v4.8.20 secure chat tools — completed, fixed and polished
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Completes the messaging controls from v4.8.14 and fixes the bug that made them
appear broken for recipients.

Fixed:
- Per-message metadata was silently dropped for recipients. NotificationIntegration
  wrapped onMessage and deliverMessageToUI with 2-arg shims that called the
  originals without the 3rd argument (meta); with notifications enabled, view-once,
  disappearing timers and unsend all failed on the receiving side. Both wrappers
  now forward all arguments. Added tests/notification-meta-forwarding.test.mjs.
- Chat would not open after SAS: composer props were threaded into the wrong
  component (EnhancedConnectionSetup vs EnhancedChatInterface) -> ReferenceError
  nowTick on the verified re-render. Props moved to the chat component.

Changed:
- Code blocks: lightweight dependency-free syntax highlighting via React nodes
  (no innerHTML/remote scripts); code mode expands the input; copy auto-clears
  the clipboard after ~30s.
- View-once: configurable visible-after-open time (5s/15s/30s/1m) via meta.onceTtl.
- Disappearing timer: duration picker (Off/30s/5m/1h) instead of click-cycling.
- Composer toolbar moved next to "Send files"; borderless buttons, brand-orange
  active state; pickers open upward and are mobile-friendly.
- Sender bubble background lightened to rgba(249,115,22,0.05).

Removed:
- Panic wipe button (disconnect already wipes keys and clears session state).

Transport unchanged: per-message metadata travels inside the encrypted envelope,
whitelisted/bounded by _sanitizeMessageMeta. Full suite: 19 files, all passing.
Docs (README, CHANGELOG) updated; version bumped to 4.8.20.
2026-06-19 02:58:03 -04:00
lockbitchat 15173a9278 release: v4.8.14 secure chat tools (code blocks, view-once, disappearing, unsend, panic)
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New privacy-focused messaging controls in the composer:
- Code blocks: button wraps the message in a fenced block; both peers render a
  monospace code window with a copy button (clipboard auto-clears after ~30s).
  Window is built from sanitized text via React nodes — no new XSS surface.
- View-once: recipient sees a blurred bubble, reveals on tap, then it is wiped.
  Honestly cooperative (not screenshot-proof).
- Disappearing messages: optional 30s/5m/1h timer auto-deletes on both sides
  with a live countdown; incoming TTL clamped to [5s, 24h].
- Unsend (delete for everyone) via new MESSAGE_TYPES.message_delete control.
- Panic wipe: clears chat, wipes keys and disconnects (behind a confirm).

Transport:
- Per-message metadata (id / view-once / timer) travels inside the encrypted
  envelope, not in the sanitized text, so content cannot spoof these controls.
- _sanitizeMessageMeta whitelists + bounds metadata on send and receive.
- AAD/replay protection, SAS gate and receive-side DOMPurify are unchanged.

Adds tests/secure-chat-features.test.mjs (full suite: 17 files, all passing).
Bumps version to 4.8.14 across package.json, package-lock.json, manifest.json,
index.html, meta.json, README, SECURITY_DISCLAIMER, header and init banner.
2026-06-18 20:37:50 -04:00
lockbitchat 42be55aaeb fix(security): restore outgoing message integrity, add HSTS/Permissions-Policy
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- Remove send-path keyword blocklist that silently rejected legitimate
  messages (e.g. "constructor", "global", "document.", literal "javascript:")
  without adding protection. XSS is enforced at the rendering boundary by the
  receive-side DOMPurify pass and by sanitizeMessage() before encryption.
- Preserve newlines/tabs/indentation in _sanitizeInputString; stop collapsing
  all whitespace which destroyed multi-line messages and code snippets.
- Stop logging raw AAD (sessionId + keyFingerprint) on validation failure;
  log length only, in both message and file-message AAD validators.
- Add Strict-Transport-Security (2y + preload) and Permissions-Policy
  (camera=self for QR, rest denied) to nginx.conf and .htaccess.
- Add tests/outgoing-message-integrity.test.mjs regression suite.
2026-06-18 16:48:29 -04:00
lockbitchat be1d02f1f7 release: v4.8.11 file transfer reliability fix
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fix(file-transfer): size chunks under the 64KB SCTP message limit

Each 64KB chunk became a ~87KB AES-GCM+Base64 file_chunk message,
exceeding WebRTC's 64KB SCTP message-size floor. The consent handshake
(small messages) succeeded, but no chunk was ever delivered on Safari
and cross-browser connections whose SDP omits a=max-message-size, so
files never transferred. Send chunk size is now 16KB (~22KB on the
wire); inbound chunks up to 64KB stay accepted for backward compat.

fix(file-transfer): make MIME advisory, drive validation by extension

The client-supplied MIME type is easily spoofed and varies across
browsers/OSes, yet was a hard gate: files with an empty MIME or a
cross-OS variant (application/x-zip-compressed, image/jpg) were wrongly
rejected. Extension allow-list plus BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS is now the
boundary; a blatantly foreign MIME on a safe extension is still rejected
and per-type size limits still apply.
2026-06-16 18:24:29 -04:00
lockbitchat 7f2ecce57f feat: user-configurable STUN/TURN servers (advanced network settings)
- add iceServers.js: allowlist-based validation/normalization of user-supplied
  STUN/TURN URLs (rejects javascript:/data:/http/ws, control chars, enforces limits)
- add iceSettingsStore.js: opt-in persistence encrypted at rest with a
  non-extractable AES-GCM device key in IndexedDB; load/save/clear
- add IceServerSettings.jsx modal: public vs custom servers, JSON/line input,
  live validation, relay-only toggle, 'Test servers' connectivity check,
  save-on-device prompt, forget-saved action
- wire chosen servers/privacy mode into EnhancedSecureWebRTCManager construction
  (priority: custom > operator override > built-in defaults)
- entry point on the connection-creation screen next to the relay-only toggle
- add ice-servers-validation.test.mjs to the suite
2026-06-15 15:39:13 -04:00
lockbitchat d11f250257 release: v4.8.8 file transfer consent fix
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Complete the mandatory receiver-consent gate that was wired in the
backend but never connected to the UI callback chain:

- Add the missing onIncomingFileRequest (4th) callback to
  setFileTransferCallbacks in app.jsx — its absence caused
  handleFileTransferStart to auto-reject every incoming file.
- Remove independent callback registration from FileTransferComponent;
  the component was overwriting app-level callbacks on mount and
  nulling all four on unmount, silently breaking progress/received/
  error handlers whenever the panel was hidden.
- Lift pendingIncomingFiles state to the root component so consent
  prompts are shown regardless of panel visibility; auto-open the
  panel on incoming request.
- Add getReceivedFileObjectURL / revokeReceivedFileObjectURL on
  EnhancedSecureWebRTCManager for download buttons in the panel.
- Update file-transfer-ui-cleanup regression test to match the new
  single-owner callback architecture.
- All 14 tests pass; clean production build.
2026-05-26 22:55:52 -04:00
lockbitchat 2468cb495e release: v4.8.7 WebRTC join reliability patch
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2026-05-19 09:49:22 -04:00
lockbitchat 1cc873223a fix: stabilize manual WebRTC join flow
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2026-05-18 19:49:57 -04:00
lockbitchat f2a4276b31 fix: remove untracked disconnect timer
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2026-05-17 23:16:14 -04:00
lockbitchat 33f3764ec5 fix: synchronize WebRTC privacy mode state 2026-05-17 23:09:45 -04:00
lockbitchat a04a70eb97 fix: throttle inbound file chunks 2026-05-17 23:05:43 -04:00
lockbitchat 0fbcc240be fix: add inbound message rate limiting 2026-05-17 23:01:58 -04:00
lockbitchat 18022c6b68 fix: gate debug window hooks behind explicit flag 2026-05-17 22:58:21 -04:00
lockbitchat f71ff62417 fix: make WebRTC privacy mode explicit 2026-05-17 17:57:11 -04:00
lockbitchat ce48e8a851 fix: harden chat sanitization with DOMPurify 2026-05-17 17:52:36 -04:00
lockbitchat cc7f850e7d fix: bind SAS verification to DTLS fingerprint strings 2026-05-17 17:46:15 -04:00
lockbitchat 0a42aa13c3 release: prepare v4.8.5 security hardening release
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2026-05-17 14:48:52 -04:00