The bundles carried all thirteen translations at once and a page fetched them a
third time as raw source; each page now loads only its own language. Alongside
that: JavaScript is minified, the eight stylesheets are served as one file, the
QR scanner is fetched after the app is up instead of on every visit, Inter ships
once rather than five copies of the same file, and Font Awesome is subset to the
82 icons this app draws instead of all 2468.
1.85 MB across 43 requests becomes under 700 KB across 33. On mobile the page
starts drawing in 1.6 s instead of 6.3 s and is usable in 4.5 s instead of 11 s.
Pages also carry their text in the HTML now. Everything was drawn by JavaScript
into an empty div, so crawlers saw correct metadata around nothing, and twelve of
the thirteen language pages had never been shown to anyone. The documentation is
published under /docs/ with a new FAQ, and unknown addresses return a real 404.
Separately: the localized shells were served with the year-long immutable cache
header meant for static assets, which pinned anyone who opened /de/ or /ru/ to
that build. The header is fixed and the service worker refreshes what it cached.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014KjzTXxrhzYoDDWChYQ4u2
The invitation carried the whole session: both public keys, their signatures, a
salt, a challenge and the full SDP. It now carries only what brings up DTLS —
ICE credentials, the certificate fingerprint, candidates, an expiry — plus a
16-byte commitment to the key material. The key material itself moves to the
DataChannel and is checked against that commitment before it is parsed.
Measured on the live site: 2274 characters across 4 animated QR frames became
151 characters in a single frame.
The safety code is now computed over a transcript of both descriptors and both
key blobs, and the HKDF salt is derived from that same transcript instead of
being transmitted. authProof is replaced by one signature over it.
SBQ2_SEND_ENABLED is the single value that reverts new invitations to SB1.
Adds the Double Ratchet (Signal's design) on top of the existing ECDH session
keys, so message protection no longer rests on one set of keys lasting the whole
conversation. Every message gets its own key, derived through a one-way function
and discarded after use, and each change of direction introduces a fresh ECDH
key pair that re-keys the session root.
The ratchet needed no handshake change: both peers already hold each other's
authenticated ECDH public key, and the safety code compared during verification
covers exactly those keys. Its root is derived from the existing shared secret
through its own branch of the key schedule.
Support is negotiated in the invitation and response and used only when both
sides have it; a peer on an earlier release falls back to per-session keys. The
security panel reports which of the two is actually in force.
Out-of-order delivery is supported within fixed bounds (512 skipped keys per
chain, 1024 retained, five-minute expiry), and inbound frames are authenticated
before any ratchet state is committed, so a malformed frame cannot desynchronise
a live session.
Also in this release:
- Verification is enforced as a gate, not a label: control frames (reconnection
signalling, call setup, message deletion, delivery receipts) are acted on only
after both peers have compared the safety code, and verified state is set in a
single guarded place.
- Chat content reaches the interface through one authenticated path; an older,
weaker inbound path was retired.
- The security panel measures what it displays — several checks previously
returned a fixed result and now exercise the subsystem they describe.
- Invitation data is no longer kept in local storage, and entries left by earlier
versions are cleared on first launch.
- View-once and disappearing messages no longer place their text in system
notifications.
- Shared-secret buffers are overwritten once derivation completes; scanned QR
codes are decompressed with a size limit; voice notes are validated against
audio type and size budgets before skipping the consent prompt; the master
password is collected by the app rather than a browser dialog.
- Connection setup no longer fails on networks where STUN/TURN are unreachable:
it proceeds as soon as usable candidates exist and only waits while there are
none.
Test suite grows from 27 to 41 files, covering forward secrecy, post-compromise
re-keying, out-of-order delivery across ratchet steps, the skipped-key bounds,
tamper resistance, negotiation fallback, and byte-level key-derivation
compatibility with 5.6.0.
- Replaced original JSON with minimized binary format (gzip + base64).
- Adjusted rendering and QR code generation for compatibility.
- Reduced payload size for improved efficiency.
- Updated connection flow between users via QR codes
- Added manual switching option in QR code generator
- Increased number of QR codes for better readability
- Removed session creation and Lightning payment logic
- Refactored security system:
* no more restrictions
* all systems enabled on session creation
- Improved QR code exchange for mobile devices
Replace CDN React/ReactDOM/Babel with local libs; remove Babel and inline scripts
Build Tailwind locally, add safelist; switch to assets/tailwind.css
Self-host Font Awesome and Inter (CSS + woff2); remove external font CDNs
Implement strict CSP (no unsafe-inline/eval; scripts/styles/fonts from self)
Extract inline handlers; move PWA scripts to external files
Add local QR code generation (qrcode lib) and remove api.qrserver.com
Improve SessionTypeSelector visual selection (highlighted background and ring)
Keep PWA working with service worker and offline assets
Refs: CSP hardening, offline-first, no external dependencies
lockbitchat