7b703e4e652372706647ace436811d3f93f92c1f
4
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 lockbitchat
|
27279ae7c6 |
feat(crypto): Double Ratchet forward secrecy; hardening pass; release v5.7.1
Adds the Double Ratchet (Signal's design) on top of the existing ECDH session keys, so message protection no longer rests on one set of keys lasting the whole conversation. Every message gets its own key, derived through a one-way function and discarded after use, and each change of direction introduces a fresh ECDH key pair that re-keys the session root. The ratchet needed no handshake change: both peers already hold each other's authenticated ECDH public key, and the safety code compared during verification covers exactly those keys. Its root is derived from the existing shared secret through its own branch of the key schedule. Support is negotiated in the invitation and response and used only when both sides have it; a peer on an earlier release falls back to per-session keys. The security panel reports which of the two is actually in force. Out-of-order delivery is supported within fixed bounds (512 skipped keys per chain, 1024 retained, five-minute expiry), and inbound frames are authenticated before any ratchet state is committed, so a malformed frame cannot desynchronise a live session. Also in this release: - Verification is enforced as a gate, not a label: control frames (reconnection signalling, call setup, message deletion, delivery receipts) are acted on only after both peers have compared the safety code, and verified state is set in a single guarded place. - Chat content reaches the interface through one authenticated path; an older, weaker inbound path was retired. - The security panel measures what it displays — several checks previously returned a fixed result and now exercise the subsystem they describe. - Invitation data is no longer kept in local storage, and entries left by earlier versions are cleared on first launch. - View-once and disappearing messages no longer place their text in system notifications. - Shared-secret buffers are overwritten once derivation completes; scanned QR codes are decompressed with a size limit; voice notes are validated against audio type and size budgets before skipping the consent prompt; the master password is collected by the app rather than a browser dialog. - Connection setup no longer fails on networks where STUN/TURN are unreachable: it proceeds as soon as usable candidates exist and only waits while there are none. Test suite grows from 27 to 41 files, covering forward secrecy, post-compromise re-keying, out-of-order delivery across ratchet steps, the skipped-key bounds, tamper resistance, negotiation fallback, and byte-level key-derivation compatibility with 5.6.0. |
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|
lockbitchat
|
6152a77b51 |
security: fix SAS verification bypass and unauthenticated frame injection; release v5.5.2
A security review of the transport and verification layers. Every item is a fix
to how untrusted peer input is handled; no features changed.
- SAS verification could be bypassed. `verification_both_confirmed` is an
unauthenticated frame on a channel that is not yet trusted, but it was taken as
proof that both sides had compared their codes — so a peer who completed the
signalling exchange could send it right after the data channel opened and drive
the other side to a "verified" session while the user never looked at the code.
It is now only an acknowledgement: refused unless this side already confirmed
locally, and _setVerifiedStatus() independently rejects any SAS-based
transition without a local confirmation. Holding ECDH-derived keys was never
proof of identity — a MITM has those too.
- Unauthenticated frames could be injected into the chat. A bare
{type:"message"} frame, a raw non-JSON frame and a binary frame were each
decoded and rendered, bypassing decryption, the HMAC check and the verification
gate; the injected text was indistinguishable from a genuine message. Chat
content now reaches the UI only through the authenticated enhanced_message
path.
- A peer could supply the verification code. `sas_code` announcements were
adopted verbatim when no local SAS had been derived yet. They may now only
corroborate the locally derived code.
- Anti-replay never ran. The sequence-number and AAD validators were defined on
SecureKeyStorage instead of the connection manager, so every call site failed
with a TypeError and the sliding replay window was dead code. Moved onto the
manager, wired into the live chat path, and a missing or non-numeric sequence
number now fails closed instead of sailing through the range checks.
- File transfers are gated on verification in both directions. Control frames are
written straight to the data channel by the transfer system; sending was
already gated, receiving now is too.
- Tighter CSP: connect-src and img-src no longer allow arbitrary https: hosts
(nothing in the app talks to a third party), plus base-uri 'none'.
- The SAS is no longer written to logs, and is compared in constant time on every
path. Fixed SecureMasterKeyManager.isUnlocked() testing a field renamed long
ago, so it never actually gated anything.
- Fixed the header showing "Secure undefined%": getRealSecurityLevel() became
reachable for the first time by the move above and returned only per-feature
booleans, while the header renders `level` and `score` directly. It now runs
the same verified scoring as every other consumer.
Adds regression tests for the verification gate, inbound frame authentication and
the security-level shape.
|
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|
lockbitchat
|
b39f9ecd2c |
release: v4.8.20 secure chat tools — completed, fixed and polished
Completes the messaging controls from v4.8.14 and fixes the bug that made them appear broken for recipients. Fixed: - Per-message metadata was silently dropped for recipients. NotificationIntegration wrapped onMessage and deliverMessageToUI with 2-arg shims that called the originals without the 3rd argument (meta); with notifications enabled, view-once, disappearing timers and unsend all failed on the receiving side. Both wrappers now forward all arguments. Added tests/notification-meta-forwarding.test.mjs. - Chat would not open after SAS: composer props were threaded into the wrong component (EnhancedConnectionSetup vs EnhancedChatInterface) -> ReferenceError nowTick on the verified re-render. Props moved to the chat component. Changed: - Code blocks: lightweight dependency-free syntax highlighting via React nodes (no innerHTML/remote scripts); code mode expands the input; copy auto-clears the clipboard after ~30s. - View-once: configurable visible-after-open time (5s/15s/30s/1m) via meta.onceTtl. - Disappearing timer: duration picker (Off/30s/5m/1h) instead of click-cycling. - Composer toolbar moved next to "Send files"; borderless buttons, brand-orange active state; pickers open upward and are mobile-friendly. - Sender bubble background lightened to rgba(249,115,22,0.05). Removed: - Panic wipe button (disconnect already wipes keys and clears session state). Transport unchanged: per-message metadata travels inside the encrypted envelope, whitelisted/bounded by _sanitizeMessageMeta. Full suite: 19 files, all passing. Docs (README, CHANGELOG) updated; version bumped to 4.8.20. |
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|
lockbitchat
|
15173a9278 |
release: v4.8.14 secure chat tools (code blocks, view-once, disappearing, unsend, panic)
New privacy-focused messaging controls in the composer: - Code blocks: button wraps the message in a fenced block; both peers render a monospace code window with a copy button (clipboard auto-clears after ~30s). Window is built from sanitized text via React nodes — no new XSS surface. - View-once: recipient sees a blurred bubble, reveals on tap, then it is wiped. Honestly cooperative (not screenshot-proof). - Disappearing messages: optional 30s/5m/1h timer auto-deletes on both sides with a live countdown; incoming TTL clamped to [5s, 24h]. - Unsend (delete for everyone) via new MESSAGE_TYPES.message_delete control. - Panic wipe: clears chat, wipes keys and disconnects (behind a confirm). Transport: - Per-message metadata (id / view-once / timer) travels inside the encrypted envelope, not in the sanitized text, so content cannot spoof these controls. - _sanitizeMessageMeta whitelists + bounds metadata on send and receive. - AAD/replay protection, SAS gate and receive-side DOMPurify are unchanged. Adds tests/secure-chat-features.test.mjs (full suite: 17 files, all passing). Bumps version to 4.8.14 across package.json, package-lock.json, manifest.json, index.html, meta.json, README, SECURITY_DISCLAIMER, header and init banner. |