60bf037ef9b63ac80d4b9081211d6a2dd32f7d38
3
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 lockbitchat
|
6152a77b51 |
security: fix SAS verification bypass and unauthenticated frame injection; release v5.5.2
A security review of the transport and verification layers. Every item is a fix
to how untrusted peer input is handled; no features changed.
- SAS verification could be bypassed. `verification_both_confirmed` is an
unauthenticated frame on a channel that is not yet trusted, but it was taken as
proof that both sides had compared their codes — so a peer who completed the
signalling exchange could send it right after the data channel opened and drive
the other side to a "verified" session while the user never looked at the code.
It is now only an acknowledgement: refused unless this side already confirmed
locally, and _setVerifiedStatus() independently rejects any SAS-based
transition without a local confirmation. Holding ECDH-derived keys was never
proof of identity — a MITM has those too.
- Unauthenticated frames could be injected into the chat. A bare
{type:"message"} frame, a raw non-JSON frame and a binary frame were each
decoded and rendered, bypassing decryption, the HMAC check and the verification
gate; the injected text was indistinguishable from a genuine message. Chat
content now reaches the UI only through the authenticated enhanced_message
path.
- A peer could supply the verification code. `sas_code` announcements were
adopted verbatim when no local SAS had been derived yet. They may now only
corroborate the locally derived code.
- Anti-replay never ran. The sequence-number and AAD validators were defined on
SecureKeyStorage instead of the connection manager, so every call site failed
with a TypeError and the sliding replay window was dead code. Moved onto the
manager, wired into the live chat path, and a missing or non-numeric sequence
number now fails closed instead of sailing through the range checks.
- File transfers are gated on verification in both directions. Control frames are
written straight to the data channel by the transfer system; sending was
already gated, receiving now is too.
- Tighter CSP: connect-src and img-src no longer allow arbitrary https: hosts
(nothing in the app talks to a third party), plus base-uri 'none'.
- The SAS is no longer written to logs, and is compared in constant time on every
path. Fixed SecureMasterKeyManager.isUnlocked() testing a field renamed long
ago, so it never actually gated anything.
- Fixed the header showing "Secure undefined%": getRealSecurityLevel() became
reachable for the first time by the move above and returned only per-feature
booleans, while the header renders `level` and `score` directly. It now runs
the same verified scoring as every other consumer.
Adds regression tests for the verification gate, inbound frame authentication and
the security-level shape.
|
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|
lockbitchat
|
b39f9ecd2c |
release: v4.8.20 secure chat tools — completed, fixed and polished
Completes the messaging controls from v4.8.14 and fixes the bug that made them appear broken for recipients. Fixed: - Per-message metadata was silently dropped for recipients. NotificationIntegration wrapped onMessage and deliverMessageToUI with 2-arg shims that called the originals without the 3rd argument (meta); with notifications enabled, view-once, disappearing timers and unsend all failed on the receiving side. Both wrappers now forward all arguments. Added tests/notification-meta-forwarding.test.mjs. - Chat would not open after SAS: composer props were threaded into the wrong component (EnhancedConnectionSetup vs EnhancedChatInterface) -> ReferenceError nowTick on the verified re-render. Props moved to the chat component. Changed: - Code blocks: lightweight dependency-free syntax highlighting via React nodes (no innerHTML/remote scripts); code mode expands the input; copy auto-clears the clipboard after ~30s. - View-once: configurable visible-after-open time (5s/15s/30s/1m) via meta.onceTtl. - Disappearing timer: duration picker (Off/30s/5m/1h) instead of click-cycling. - Composer toolbar moved next to "Send files"; borderless buttons, brand-orange active state; pickers open upward and are mobile-friendly. - Sender bubble background lightened to rgba(249,115,22,0.05). Removed: - Panic wipe button (disconnect already wipes keys and clears session state). Transport unchanged: per-message metadata travels inside the encrypted envelope, whitelisted/bounded by _sanitizeMessageMeta. Full suite: 19 files, all passing. Docs (README, CHANGELOG) updated; version bumped to 4.8.20. |
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|
lockbitchat
|
15173a9278 |
release: v4.8.14 secure chat tools (code blocks, view-once, disappearing, unsend, panic)
New privacy-focused messaging controls in the composer: - Code blocks: button wraps the message in a fenced block; both peers render a monospace code window with a copy button (clipboard auto-clears after ~30s). Window is built from sanitized text via React nodes — no new XSS surface. - View-once: recipient sees a blurred bubble, reveals on tap, then it is wiped. Honestly cooperative (not screenshot-proof). - Disappearing messages: optional 30s/5m/1h timer auto-deletes on both sides with a live countdown; incoming TTL clamped to [5s, 24h]. - Unsend (delete for everyone) via new MESSAGE_TYPES.message_delete control. - Panic wipe: clears chat, wipes keys and disconnects (behind a confirm). Transport: - Per-message metadata (id / view-once / timer) travels inside the encrypted envelope, not in the sanitized text, so content cannot spoof these controls. - _sanitizeMessageMeta whitelists + bounds metadata on send and receive. - AAD/replay protection, SAS gate and receive-side DOMPurify are unchanged. Adds tests/secure-chat-features.test.mjs (full suite: 17 files, all passing). Bumps version to 4.8.14 across package.json, package-lock.json, manifest.json, index.html, meta.json, README, SECURITY_DISCLAIMER, header and init banner. |