Commit Graph
2 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
lockbitchat 113bb107d3 feat(groups): audio and video calls in group chats; release v6.6.6
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A group call is N-1 ordinary 1:1 calls, one to each other member, each riding
the pairwise session that member already has — a transport a human already
authenticated by comparing the safety code. No mixer, no SFU, no point at which
two people's media meets anywhere but on a device.

Call control is separate from call media, because the two reach different sets
of people. Who opened a call, who joined and who left travels as group frames
signed with the sender's group identity key, so it reaches members currently
reachable only through a relay — and a relaying member can drop one but cannot
write one. Media flows only where a direct link exists, so a member without one
shows as connecting rather than being omitted. Frames carry a per-sender
sequence checked before the action, so a captured leave cannot end a later call,
and simultaneous calls converge on the lower random call id.

One capture is shared across every leg rather than one getUserMedia per member,
and legs answer without prompting: the flag permitting that is set only locally,
only while this user is in the call, and cleared when they leave.

UI: a gallery that sizes itself from the space it has, a spotlight view, an
active-speaker indicator read from the waveform, and the call surface in the
same visual language as the 1:1 one.

Also in this commit, the v6.5.0 language-suggestion work that had not been
pushed yet; its notes are in the changelog. And two fixes: the safety-code input
asks for digits rather than text, and starting a new chat from inside a group no
longer creates it behind the group where it cannot be seen — which had made it
impossible to connect to anyone new, or to add anyone to a group, while a group
was open.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XSxAkET3hQTkYDQfbjCQwZ
2026-09-01 01:04:11 -04:00
lockbitchat e00c3bd413 feat(groups): group chats, and a mesh rather than a star; release v6.1.1
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A group is an orchestration layer over the pairwise sessions the app already
holds. It owns no transport and no shared key: every frame leaves over a chat
that is already SAS-verified and already ratcheted, so a removed member simply
stops being sent anything. Membership is a roster the admin signs, ordered by
epoch, and the safety code is a commit-then-reveal round over every member's
fingerprint and nonce.

Delivery was the part that did not match its own description. The admin held a
link to everyone and nobody else held a link to anybody, so the relay path — the
documented fallback — was in fact the entire topology, and the admin going away
partitioned the group. Now, once the code is confirmed, each pair without a link
dials one over that relay path. The descriptors are compact enough to ride a
group frame and are signed with the sender's group identity key, so the relaying
member can drop a dial but cannot substitute one. The member with the smaller
fingerprint dials, which is the whole glare protocol.

Mesh links are released without a human comparing digits. Twenty-eight codes for
a group of eight is not a check anyone performs; the guarantee moves rather than
disappears, since the descriptor was signed by a key the signed roster names and
the group code covers. markGroupLinkVerified refuses any session whose in-band
exchange has not completed and whose peer has not proved possession of that key.

An existing 1:1 chat between two members is adopted instead of re-dialled, via a
probe bound to that session's own key fingerprint so it cannot be replayed onto
another chat to impersonate its author.

Security fix: g_hello was accepted on any session from anyone who knew the group
id, so any member could publish an identity the admin never invited and have the
admin sign and broadcast a roster containing it. It is now accepted only on a
session an invitation went out on, which also confines it to a direct link.

Mesh connections are kept out of the chat registry and muted from the document
events the header listens to, so a routing detail cannot tear down the display of
a conversation the user actually opened.
2026-08-25 16:27:08 -04:00