fix: improve sanitization to prevent XSS

- Now the sanitization function protects against:
  - Nested script tags: <scrip<script>alert("XSS")</script>t>
  - HTML comments containing scripts: <!-- <script>alert("XSS")</script> -->
  - Multiple overlapping tags: <script><script>alert("XSS")</script></script>
  - Attributes in closing tags: </script foo="bar">
  - Complex nested structures combining different tags
  - All known XSS vectors
This commit is contained in:
lockbitchat
2025-10-19 23:23:58 -04:00
parent 49e5a054cb
commit e209d3e6f5
4 changed files with 154 additions and 20 deletions

70
dist/app-boot.js vendored
View File

@@ -2755,12 +2755,51 @@ var EnhancedSecureCryptoUtils = class _EnhancedSecureCryptoUtils {
throw new Error(`Failed to decrypt the message: ${error.message}`);
}
}
// Enhanced input sanitization
// Enhanced input sanitization with iterative processing to handle edge cases
static sanitizeMessage(message) {
if (typeof message !== "string") {
throw new Error("Message must be a string");
}
return message.replace(/<script\b[^<]*(?:(?!<\/script>)<[^<]*)*<\/script>/gi, "").replace(/javascript:/gi, "").replace(/data:/gi, "").replace(/vbscript:/gi, "").replace(/onload\s*=/gi, "").replace(/onerror\s*=/gi, "").replace(/onclick\s*=/gi, "").trim().substring(0, 2e3);
const dangerousPatterns = [
// Script tags with various formats
/<script\b[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/script\s*>/gi,
/<script\b[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/script\s+[^>]*>/gi,
/<script\b[^>]*>[\s\S]*$/gi,
// Other dangerous tags
/<iframe\b[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/iframe\s*>/gi,
/<object\b[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/object\s*>/gi,
/<embed\b[^>]*>/gi,
/<applet\b[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/applet\s*>/gi,
/<style\b[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/style\s*>/gi,
// Dangerous protocols
/javascript\s*:/gi,
/data\s*:/gi,
/vbscript\s*:/gi,
// Event handlers
/on\w+\s*=/gi,
// HTML comments
/<!--[\s\S]*?-->/g,
// Link and meta tags with javascript
/<link\b[^>]*javascript[^>]*>/gi,
/<meta\b[^>]*javascript[^>]*>/gi,
// Any remaining script-like content
/<[^>]*script[^>]*>/gi,
/<[^>]*on\w+\s*=[^>]*>/gi
];
let sanitized = message;
let previousLength;
let iterations = 0;
const maxIterations = 10;
do {
previousLength = sanitized.length;
for (const pattern of dangerousPatterns) {
sanitized = sanitized.replace(pattern, "");
}
sanitized = sanitized.replace(/<[^>]*>/g, "").replace(/^\w+:/gi, "").replace(/\bon\w+\s*=\s*["'][^"']*["']/gi, "").replace(/\bon\w+\s*=\s*[^>\s]+/gi, "").replace(/[<>]/g, "").trim();
iterations++;
} while (sanitized.length !== previousLength && iterations < maxIterations);
sanitized = sanitized.replace(/<[^>]*>/g, "").replace(/^\w+:/gi, "").replace(/\bon\w+\s*=\s*["'][^"']*["']/gi, "").replace(/\bon\w+\s*=\s*[^>\s]+/gi, "").replace(/[<>]/g, "").trim();
return sanitized.substring(0, 2e3);
}
// Generate cryptographically secure salt (64 bytes for enhanced security)
static generateSalt() {
@@ -5926,10 +5965,31 @@ var EnhancedSecureWebRTCManager = class _EnhancedSecureWebRTCManager {
// Burst size for rate limiting
};
this._maliciousPatterns = [
/<script\b[^<]*(?:(?!<\/script>)<[^<]*)*<\/script>/gi,
// Script tags
/javascript:/gi,
// Enhanced script tag detection that handles edge cases
/<script\b[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/script\s*>/gi,
// Standard <\/script>
/<script\b[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/script\s+[^>]*>/gi,
// <\/script with attributes>
/<script\b[^>]*>[\s\S]*$/gi,
// Malformed script tags without closing
// Additional dangerous tags
/<iframe\b[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/iframe\s*>/gi,
// iframe tags
/<object\b[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/object\s*>/gi,
// object tags
/<embed\b[^>]*>/gi,
// embed tags
/<applet\b[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/applet\s*>/gi,
// applet tags
/<style\b[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/style\s*>/gi,
// style tags
// Dangerous protocols
/javascript\s*:/gi,
// JavaScript protocol
/data\s*:/gi,
// Data protocol
/vbscript\s*:/gi,
// VBScript protocol
/data:text\/html/gi,
// Data URLs with HTML
/on\w+\s*=/gi,

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