feat: user-configurable STUN/TURN servers (advanced network settings)

- add iceServers.js: allowlist-based validation/normalization of user-supplied
  STUN/TURN URLs (rejects javascript:/data:/http/ws, control chars, enforces limits)
- add iceSettingsStore.js: opt-in persistence encrypted at rest with a
  non-extractable AES-GCM device key in IndexedDB; load/save/clear
- add IceServerSettings.jsx modal: public vs custom servers, JSON/line input,
  live validation, relay-only toggle, 'Test servers' connectivity check,
  save-on-device prompt, forget-saved action
- wire chosen servers/privacy mode into EnhancedSecureWebRTCManager construction
  (priority: custom > operator override > built-in defaults)
- entry point on the connection-creation screen next to the relay-only toggle
- add ice-servers-validation.test.mjs to the suite
This commit is contained in:
lockbitchat
2026-06-15 15:39:13 -04:00
parent 366f080128
commit 7f2ecce57f
15 changed files with 1307 additions and 23 deletions
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// Pure, dependency-free validation and normalization of user-supplied ICE
// (STUN/TURN) servers. No DOM, no browser APIs — safe to unit-test in Node.
//
// Security intent: a user can paste arbitrary text here. We must never hand an
// un-vetted value to RTCPeerConnection, and we must reject anything that is not
// a real STUN/TURN URL (e.g. javascript:, data:, http(s):, ws(s):) so the field
// cannot be abused as an injection surface or silently break the connection.
// Validation is allowlist-based: only known-good schemes, host shapes, and the
// standard transport query are accepted; everything else is rejected.
export const ICE_LIMITS = Object.freeze({
MAX_SERVERS: 10,
MAX_URLS_PER_SERVER: 8,
MAX_STRING_LENGTH: 512
});
// RTCIceServer only accepts these schemes. Everything else is rejected.
export const ALLOWED_ICE_SCHEMES = Object.freeze(['stun', 'stuns', 'turn', 'turns']);
const SCHEME_RE = /^(stuns?|turns?):/i;
// Positive allowlist for the host portion: hostname/IPv4, or bracketed IPv6,
// with an optional numeric port. Anything outside this shape is rejected.
const HOST_RE = /^(\[[0-9a-f:]+\]|[a-z0-9.-]+)(:\d{1,5})?$/i;
const TRANSPORT_RE = /^transport=(udp|tcp)$/i;
// True if the string contains any ASCII control character (0x000x1F or 0x7F).
// Implemented via char codes to keep the source free of literal control bytes.
function hasControlChars(value) {
for (let i = 0; i < value.length; i++) {
const code = value.charCodeAt(i);
if (code < 0x20 || code === 0x7f) return true;
}
return false;
}
/**
* Validate a single ICE URL string.
* @returns {string|null} error message, or null if valid.
*/
export function validateIceUrl(url) {
if (typeof url !== 'string') return 'URL must be a string';
const trimmed = url.trim();
if (!trimmed) return 'URL is empty';
if (trimmed.length > ICE_LIMITS.MAX_STRING_LENGTH) return 'URL is too long';
if (hasControlChars(trimmed)) return 'URL contains invalid characters';
const scheme = trimmed.match(SCHEME_RE);
if (!scheme) {
return 'URL must start with stun:, stuns:, turn: or turns:';
}
// Validate the part after "<scheme>:" — host[:port][?transport=udp|tcp].
const rest = trimmed.slice(scheme[0].length);
const [hostPort, query, ...extra] = rest.split('?');
if (extra.length > 0) return 'URL has an invalid query';
if (!hostPort) return 'URL is missing a host';
if (!HOST_RE.test(hostPort)) return 'URL has an invalid host or port';
if (query !== undefined && !TRANSPORT_RE.test(query)) {
return 'URL query must be transport=udp or transport=tcp';
}
return null;
}
export function isTurnUrl(url) {
return typeof url === 'string' && /^turns?:/i.test(url.trim());
}
function validateSecret(value, label) {
if (value === undefined || value === null || value === '') return null;
if (typeof value !== 'string') return `${label} must be a string`;
if (value.length > ICE_LIMITS.MAX_STRING_LENGTH) return `${label} is too long`;
if (hasControlChars(value)) return `${label} contains invalid characters`;
return null;
}
/**
* Validate and normalize a list of ICE server entries.
* Each entry: { urls: string | string[], username?: string, credential?: string }
* @returns {{ servers: Array, errors: string[], warnings: string[] }}
*/
export function normalizeIceServers(entries) {
const errors = [];
const warnings = [];
const servers = [];
if (!Array.isArray(entries)) {
return { servers: [], errors: ['Server list must be an array'], warnings: [] };
}
if (entries.length === 0) {
return { servers: [], errors: [], warnings: [] };
}
if (entries.length > ICE_LIMITS.MAX_SERVERS) {
errors.push(`Too many servers (max ${ICE_LIMITS.MAX_SERVERS})`);
return { servers: [], errors, warnings };
}
entries.forEach((entry, index) => {
const label = `Server #${index + 1}`;
if (!entry || typeof entry !== 'object') {
errors.push(`${label}: invalid entry`);
return;
}
const rawUrls = Array.isArray(entry.urls) ? entry.urls : [entry.urls];
if (rawUrls.length === 0 || rawUrls.length > ICE_LIMITS.MAX_URLS_PER_SERVER) {
errors.push(`${label}: between 1 and ${ICE_LIMITS.MAX_URLS_PER_SERVER} URLs required`);
return;
}
const cleanUrls = [];
let entryHasTurn = false;
for (const rawUrl of rawUrls) {
const err = validateIceUrl(rawUrl);
if (err) {
errors.push(`${label}: ${err}`);
continue;
}
const trimmed = rawUrl.trim();
cleanUrls.push(trimmed);
if (isTurnUrl(trimmed)) entryHasTurn = true;
}
if (cleanUrls.length === 0) return;
const userErr = validateSecret(entry.username, `${label} username`);
if (userErr) errors.push(userErr);
const credErr = validateSecret(entry.credential, `${label} credential`);
if (credErr) errors.push(credErr);
const server = { urls: cleanUrls.length === 1 ? cleanUrls[0] : cleanUrls };
if (entry.username) server.username = String(entry.username);
if (entry.credential) server.credential = String(entry.credential);
if (entryHasTurn && (!server.username || !server.credential)) {
warnings.push(`${label}: TURN servers usually require a username and credential`);
}
servers.push(server);
});
return { servers, errors, warnings };
}
/**
* Parse free-form user input into ICE server entries.
* Accepts either a JSON array of RTCIceServer-like objects, or one URL per line
* (URL-only servers, e.g. public STUN). Returns normalized + validated output.
*/
export function parseIceServersInput(text) {
if (typeof text !== 'string' || !text.trim()) {
return { servers: [], errors: [], warnings: [] };
}
const trimmed = text.trim();
if (trimmed.startsWith('[') || trimmed.startsWith('{')) {
let parsed;
try {
parsed = JSON.parse(trimmed);
} catch {
return { servers: [], errors: ['Invalid JSON'], warnings: [] };
}
const arr = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : [parsed];
return normalizeIceServers(arr);
}
// Line-based: each non-empty line is a single URL-only server.
const entries = trimmed
.split('\n')
.map(line => line.trim())
.filter(Boolean)
.map(url => ({ urls: url }));
return normalizeIceServers(entries);
}
/** Does a normalized server list contain at least one TURN/TURNS server? */
export function listHasTurn(servers) {
if (!Array.isArray(servers)) return false;
return servers.some(server => {
const urls = Array.isArray(server?.urls) ? server.urls : [server?.urls];
return urls.some(isTurnUrl);
});
}
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// Persistent, at-rest-encrypted storage for the user's custom ICE (STUN/TURN)
// configuration. Persistence is OPTIONAL: the UI only calls saveIceSettings when
// the user explicitly opts in ("Save on this device"). Session-only use never
// touches this store — the settings live in React state and vanish on reload.
//
// At-rest protection model:
// - A non-extractable AES-GCM device key is generated once and kept in
// IndexedDB. It can never be exported back into JS, so a copy of the
// on-disk database is useless without executing code in this exact origin.
// - The settings blob (which may contain TURN credentials) is encrypted with
// that key before being written.
// This protects against disk/profile inspection. It does NOT protect against a
// live code-execution compromise of the page (consistent with the project's
// stated threat model — see SECURITY.md). Credentials are never persisted in
// plaintext, and the user can delete them at any time via clearIceSettings().
const DB_NAME = 'securebit-net';
const DB_VERSION = 1;
const STORE = 'kv';
const KEY_RECORD = 'ice-device-key';
const SETTINGS_RECORD = 'ice-settings';
const SETTINGS_VERSION = 1;
function isSupported() {
return typeof indexedDB !== 'undefined' &&
typeof crypto !== 'undefined' &&
!!crypto.subtle;
}
function openDb() {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
let request;
try {
request = indexedDB.open(DB_NAME, DB_VERSION);
} catch (error) {
reject(error);
return;
}
request.onupgradeneeded = () => {
const db = request.result;
if (!db.objectStoreNames.contains(STORE)) {
db.createObjectStore(STORE);
}
};
request.onsuccess = () => resolve(request.result);
request.onerror = () => reject(request.error);
});
}
function idbGet(db, key) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const tx = db.transaction(STORE, 'readonly');
const req = tx.objectStore(STORE).get(key);
req.onsuccess = () => resolve(req.result);
req.onerror = () => reject(req.error);
});
}
function idbPut(db, key, value) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const tx = db.transaction(STORE, 'readwrite');
tx.objectStore(STORE).put(value, key);
tx.oncomplete = () => resolve();
tx.onerror = () => reject(tx.error);
});
}
function idbDelete(db, key) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const tx = db.transaction(STORE, 'readwrite');
tx.objectStore(STORE).delete(key);
tx.oncomplete = () => resolve();
tx.onerror = () => reject(tx.error);
});
}
async function getOrCreateDeviceKey(db) {
const existing = await idbGet(db, KEY_RECORD);
if (existing instanceof CryptoKey) {
return existing;
}
const key = await crypto.subtle.generateKey(
{ name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 },
false, // non-extractable
['encrypt', 'decrypt']
);
await idbPut(db, KEY_RECORD, key);
return key;
}
/**
* Persist custom ICE settings, encrypted at rest.
* @param {{ servers: Array, privacyMode: string }} settings
*/
export async function saveIceSettings(settings) {
if (!isSupported()) throw new Error('Persistent storage is not available in this browser');
const db = await openDb();
const key = await getOrCreateDeviceKey(db);
const payload = JSON.stringify({
version: SETTINGS_VERSION,
servers: Array.isArray(settings?.servers) ? settings.servers : [],
privacyMode: settings?.privacyMode === 'relay-only' ? 'relay-only' : 'standard'
});
const iv = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));
const ciphertext = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(
{ name: 'AES-GCM', iv },
key,
new TextEncoder().encode(payload)
);
await idbPut(db, SETTINGS_RECORD, {
iv: Array.from(iv),
data: Array.from(new Uint8Array(ciphertext))
});
}
/**
* Load and decrypt previously saved ICE settings.
* Fails closed: returns null if absent, unsupported, or undecryptable.
* @returns {Promise<{ servers: Array, privacyMode: string }|null>}
*/
export async function loadIceSettings() {
if (!isSupported()) return null;
try {
const db = await openDb();
const record = await idbGet(db, SETTINGS_RECORD);
if (!record || !Array.isArray(record.iv) || !Array.isArray(record.data)) {
return null;
}
const key = await idbGet(db, KEY_RECORD);
if (!(key instanceof CryptoKey)) return null;
const plaintext = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(
{ name: 'AES-GCM', iv: new Uint8Array(record.iv) },
key,
new Uint8Array(record.data)
);
const parsed = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext));
return {
servers: Array.isArray(parsed.servers) ? parsed.servers : [],
privacyMode: parsed.privacyMode === 'relay-only' ? 'relay-only' : 'standard'
};
} catch {
// Corrupted or tampered record: fail closed.
return null;
}
}
/** Delete any persisted ICE settings (the device key is left in place). */
export async function clearIceSettings() {
if (!isSupported()) return;
try {
const db = await openDb();
await idbDelete(db, SETTINGS_RECORD);
} catch {
// Best-effort deletion; nothing to surface to the user.
}
}
export async function hasSavedIceSettings() {
if (!isSupported()) return false;
try {
const db = await openDb();
const record = await idbGet(db, SETTINGS_RECORD);
return !!record;
} catch {
return false;
}
}