feat(handshake): in-band key exchange; SBQ2 live in the connection path; release v5.9.0

The descriptor no longer carries key material. It carries what brings up DTLS
plus a 16-byte commitment; the ECDH and ECDSA public keys travel as the first
frame on the DataChannel and are checked against that commitment BEFORE they are
parsed or imported. Measured on the live site, the invitation went from 2274
characters across 4 animated QR frames to 151 characters in one frame.

What the split buys is that nothing is trusted on the strength of having
completed a handshake. The fingerprint arrives over the channel the user
authenticated by looking at it, so DTLS completes only with whoever showed the
code; the commitment makes substituted key material fail closed automatically
instead of relying on the human comparison; and the SAS is computed over a
transcript covering both descriptors verbatim and both key blobs, so anything an
attacker can change anywhere in the handshake changes the digits.

Consequences for the rest of the crypto:

- the HKDF salt is derived from the transcript rather than transmitted, binding
  every session key to both DTLS fingerprints and every candidate;
- authProof is replaced by one ECDSA signature over the transcript, proving the
  same possession without echoing a nonce back across seven fields;
- Double Ratchet support is implied by the format rather than advertised in it.
  SBQ2 postdates the ratchet, so the "peer is old, fall back to static keys"
  branch is unreachable here -- it used to fire silently, since SBQ2 has no `dr`
  field for _initializeRatchet to find.

Fail closed throughout. _handshakeMode is latched per connection, so a session
cannot be pushed back onto SB1 halfway through; commitment mismatch, wrong role,
duplicate blob, bad proof and timeout all tear the connection down with a
specific message rather than degrade. SBQ2 handshake frames are refused outright
on a non-SBQ2 session, where there would be no commitment to check them against.

Reception of both formats is unconditional and split by first byte (0x02 vs
ASCII 'S') and text prefix. SBQ2_SEND_ENABLED is the single value that governs
what we emit; flipping it to false and redeploying reverts new invitations to
SB1, and the animated multi-frame QR path stays for them.

Verified end to end in real browsers -- 12/12 across {Chrome, Firefox} squared
and three network profiles -- through to a confirmed SAS, an active ratchet, a
64-byte transcript-derived salt and a decrypted message on the far side.

sw.js

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ let DYNAMIC_CACHE = 'securebit-pwa-dynamic-v4.7.56';
 // Build stamp — rewritten by scripts/post-build.js on every release so this file's
 // bytes change each deploy. That is what makes the browser detect a new Service Worker,
 // reinstall it, drop stale caches and (via controllerchange) prompt the page to update.
-const SW_BUILD_VERSION = '1786051485967';
+const SW_BUILD_VERSION = '1786054741114';
 
 // Load version from meta.json on install
 async function getAppVersion() {